RECONSTRUCTING CONFLICT
Critical Geopolitics

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Acknowledgements

Since October 7, 2001, when US and British forces invaded Afghanistan, and significantly after March 19, 2003, when they invaded Iraq, geographers and other social scientists and historians have been compelled to rethink the pervasiveness—and apparent permanence—of war. The transition of those conflicts from war to reconstruction, as they are conventionally framed, even as endemic violence has persisted, has renewed and invigorated a wide range of research on the nature and diffusion of warfare and other forms of organized violence across a variety of social and geographical sites. It is a lesson, unfortunately, with which people in many parts of the world have long been familiar. But it was precisely this difficulty in locating ontological differences between periods and spaces of war, on one hand, and those of peace, on the other, that prompted us to produce this volume, reflecting the varied terrain on which processes of war, peace, and reconstruction are mutually constituted.

The book brings together the work of many people, and it depended on many more. We are grateful to the Critical Geopolitics series editors, Klaus Dodds, Alan Ingram, and Merje Kuus, for helping us to bring the project to their list, and later for their comments on a draft of the manuscript. Katy Low and the staff at Ashgate have been exemplars of efficiency. We also thank the authors for their contributions, all of which have been commissioned for this work, and for taking seriously our efforts to bring the chapters into conversation with each other. We have also benefited enormously from supportive departments and research communities. Scott Kirsch thanks his colleagues in the Department of Geography at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, along with special thanks to Peter Redfield and the working group on expertise, science, and democracy, in which the seeds of this project began to germinate. In addition to his colleagues in the Department of Geography, Colin Flint wishes to thank the faculty and staff of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. We are also grateful to elin slavick for permission to use her World Map for the cover.
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PART I
Introduction
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Chapter 1
Introduction:
Reconstruction and the Worlds that War Makes
Scott Kirsch and Colin Flint

*Reconstruction*—the rebuilding of state, economy, culture and society in the wake of war—is a powerful idea, and a profoundly transformative one. From the refashioning of new landscapes in bombed-out cities and towns to the refashioning of national identities to accommodate changed historical narratives, the term has become synonymous with notions of “post-conflict” society. It draws much of its rhetorical power from an apparently neat demarcation, both spatially and temporally, between war and peace. The reality is far more complex. Even as efforts to produce functioning, harmonious, and regionally or globally integrated post-conflict spaces out of war zones continue to be defined through the language and institutions of reconstruction, conditions of peace and security are often difficult to disentangle from ongoing wars and other forms of political violence. War itself has been phrased as a process of reconstruction and renewal; so has genocide. Hence, in this volume we identify reconstruction as a process of conflict and of militarized power, not something that clearly demarcates a post-war period of peace. The book brings together an internationally diverse range of studies that, in different ways, challenge the false dichotomy between war and peace, and explore instead the ways that war and peace are mutually constituted in the creation of historically specific geographies and geographical knowledges. The book’s purpose, in other words, is to better understand the worlds that war makes.

Processes of post-war reconstruction, framed as projects of recovery and renewal, provide an important window onto the conflicts that rage around (and within) “post-conflict” societies. We would of course acknowledge that the activities conventionally associated with *reconstruction*—such as emergency relief, restoration of energy provision, distribution of healthcare and social services, creation or recreation of state institutions and legal systems, training of armed forces—are typically far less destructive than many forms of institutionalized violence, and we would similarly acknowledge the many different scales and kinds of violence endemic in different conflicts. Our point, however, in challenging the ontological distinctions between conflict and post-conflict, and in challenging presumed linear pathways from war to peace and reconstruction, is to better understand how processes of war, and relations of power shaped through war, are
indeed embedded in the peace. Investigating processes of reconstruction, in this sense, allows us to learn precisely about the integration of war and “post-war” geographies, that is, about how processes, events, and relations of war become internal to new state forms and institutions, new landscapes, and new maps and stories: new spaces in which the terrain of conflict is itself being reconstructed.

At a moment when, as we write, the US and UK are each completing their tenth years of active military operations in Afghanistan and their eighth (or rather, their twentieth) in Iraq (see Dahlman, this volume), wherein they must frequently blur the lines between peacekeeping and state supporting activities, on one hand, and military campaigns, on the other, the contemporary relevance of our topic is clear. Its implications, however, are complex. Through close engagement with what might be called the intersecting spaces of war and reconstruction, the works collected in *Reconstructing Conflict* have much to teach us about both the dynamics of conflict and the entrenchment of power. The volume, in this sense, offers a wide-ranging critical geopolitics of reconstruction and “post-conflict,” pulling apart the normalized categories of “war” and “peace” in order to illustrate the pervasiveness of violence and militarized power relations in shaping our worlds.

The critical geopolitics literature has engaged in some bouts of self-reflection lately (Power and Campbell 2010; Jones and Sage 2009). Though it is difficult to establish a consensus of opinion, there is a general sentiment that critical geopolitics has evolved from its initial focus upon text and narrative to become a more eclectic ontological and epistemological exercise. We agree with Ó Tuathail’s (2009) belief that the goal is to get to the somewhat elusive “real” that is masked by the grand narratives of authoritative geopolitical texts. We also believe that such a contribution requires more than the analysis of dominant texts, but also involves an analysis of the multi-scalar practices of state and non-state actors (Mamadouh 2009). Perhaps more than anything, we emphasize that critical geopolitics requires the study of practices in real-world settings in conjunction with the deconstruction of geopolitical narratives. Post-war reconstruction is a fertile arena for pursuing a critical analysis of geopolitics that blends study of discourse and practice. It provides a sharp focus for “various ways of unpacking the tropes and epistemologies of dominant geographs and scripting of political space” (Power and Campbell 2010: 244). It also provides a bundle of topics that minimize the danger that a focus on discourse may be “diverting attention from military matters, grand strategy and the geographies of resistance from peripheral places” (Dalby 2010: 281). Our goal of problematizing neatly packaged geographies of war and peace allows for a critical exploration of organized violence that illustrates precisely the interaction of narrative and practice, powerful and peripheral, state and non-state in making a restive world of ongoing conflict and suffering.

In this introduction, we begin the collective engagement by sketching reconstruction as a *keyword* for studying material and symbolic processes (Williams 1983; Bennett et al. 2005; Harvey 2006). This approach allows us to explore the evolution of contemporary notions of reconstruction as they have articulated with concrete historical processes of conflict and political violence,
Introduction: Reconstruction and the Worlds that War Makes

from the (capital R) Reconstruction of the American South following the US Civil War to the wartime construction of the World Bank in 1944 as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Next we examine some of the ways that scholars are already integrating war and post-war geographies in critical studies of war and occupation; terrorism, state terror, and the “war on terrorism”; and other forms of political and structural violence (cf. Peluso and Watts 2001; Harvey 2003; Gregory 2004; Hardt and Negri 2004; Gregory and Pred 2006; Klein 2007; Cowen and Gilbert 2008; Dahlman, 2009; Elden 2009; Ingram and Dodds 2009; Kobayashi 2009; Graham 2010). Drawing on a range of concepts, we argue for a conceptualization of war as an ongoing, more or less ‘permanent’ process of militarized power and conflict, varying in intensity over space and time from banal occupation and low-level warfare to sudden and terrifying bombardments and displacements, but premised ideologically on a distinct horizon of peace, and the closure of war as a discrete event. However, there has been little explicit analysis of the spaces and geographies of reconstruction as they are approached in the essays collected in this book.\(^1\) The final section of the chapter introduces the fundamental organization of the book and gives a glimpse of the chapters to follow, offering a preview of the specific contexts that the volume will illuminate but also identifying some of the conceptual contributions that we hope to make in using geographical perspectives to challenge contemporary understandings of war and peace.

Reconstruction as a Keyword

Among the first traces of the term *reconstruction* in political discourse, according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, was the reflection of one commentator who gazed from across the English Channel at *Gallicæ*, in the aftermath of revolution, and wondered “whether, from its ruins, fragments were to be collected for reconstruction of the political edifice” (Mackintosh 1791 in *OED* 2010). The sense that the political edifice could be rebuilt in a planned, rational, perhaps even improved manner, was nicely rendered in the grammar of *reconstruction*, and it was one that closely articulated with the currents of Enlightenment political thought. While the literal meaning of reconstruction, that is, the rebuilding of *anything*, whether natural, artificial, or abstract, has persisted, the *OED* also points to the emergence of another, US-based meaning, at the onset of the Civil War, gaining

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1 There are notable exceptions. The research project on civil wars and their aftermath led by John O’Loughlin has produced work on the Caucasus region (O’Loughlin et al. 2007 and 2008; Bakke et al. 2009), while Dahlman’s and Ó Tuathail’s work on Bosnia (2005; Ó Tuathail and Dahlman 2010) has shown how landscapes produced through war and ethnic cleansing, enshrined in the peace process, have continued to shape the conditions of possibility for refugee returns, politicized ethnic divisions, and for a reconstructed state apparatus.
currency—and complexity—as northerners and unionists began to imagine the “reconstruction” of a post-war Union. Reconstruction, the proper noun, would come to embody this complex temporality of simultaneous war and post-war, and an equally complex territoriality, as we will see.

The centrality of Reconstruction after the American Civil War would, in turn, help to harden the semantic relationship, during the mid-twentieth century, between reconstruction as the rebuilding of an area devastated by warfare, and the restoration of political, social, and economic stability to the region or locality. Indeed, the language of reconstruction embedded in post-World War II international institutions—notably the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)—suggests the extent to which reconstruction processes can serve as hegemonic strategies. The language of reconstruction, in this sense, has provided cultural and ideological resources for various historical actors, but in the process that language has itself been remade in the production and integration of war and post-war geographies.

Already in 1861, shortly after the onset of the US Civil War, references to a reconstruction of the Union were in circulation in Washington. By 1863, when President Lincoln reported to Congress on the problem of the “political framework of the states on what is called the reconstruction,” the reconstruction was evidently an acceptable phraseology for imagining post-war futures, albeit one focused explicitly on the conditions and processes by which the seceding Confederate states were to be restored constitutionally to the federal government. In December of that year, Lincoln’s Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, which was concerned with the restoration of citizenship rights to loyalist southern whites, reflected what had clearly become an official language. The idea that the South itself was to be radically reconstructed, describing a great social transformation centered on the abolition of slavery, appears to emerge only slightly later, and for some, as a terrain of contention in an emerging post-war politics. One abolitionist (Schurz 1865 in OED 2010) would insist, for instance, that “what is commonly termed “reconstruction”’’ meant that it was “the whole organism of southern society that must be reconstructed.”

The 1867–1868 Reconstruction Acts, as they were known, organized much of the South into Union-occupied military districts, and made ultimate restoration of the ex-Confederate states to the Union dependent on their ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which (theoretically) promoted ex-slaves to full citizenship on the basis of due process and equal protection law. The notion of Reconstruction had thus, controversially, gained widespread political and cultural currency, but the more narrow legal focus had coalesced with the broader sense of reconstruction as post-war social, political, and economic transformation. Moreover, as the term was elevated through usage to a proper noun in the American parlance, it also quickly came to signify not only the (diverse) events and processes (laws, institutions, debates, etc.) of reconstruction, but also the historical period during which they took place. This shift in some ways marks generic notions of reconstruction mobilized today to demarcate clearly defined
periods of post-war stabilization and peace. A closer look at the actual historical and geographical transition from wartime to postwar relations of power in the South, however, allows us to better understand how Reconstruction was shaped and realized through interrelations between various social forces, and through new forms of organized political violence and terror.

Eric Foner’s (2005) trenchant and comprehensive history, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877*, offers two useful starting points for this mapping, one historical, the other conceptual. First, it is not incidental that Foner dates Reconstruction from 1863, not 1865, positioning it as a process at least partly co-existing with war, articulated with it, rather than something following war in a linear fashion. For Foner, Reconstruction begins with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which constitutionally freed slaves from the Confederate states, and which also opened opportunities provided for blacks, including those from border states and elsewhere behind Union lines, to enlist in the US Army. The Army, attempting to meet voracious demands for labor, would ultimately enlist some 180,000 ex-slaves during the war, employing them primarily in the construction of fortifications and protection of supply lines. For many, military service presented a clear path to freedom. Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation had also ensured that the enlisted soldiers would be part of an army of liberation; they would also become part of an occupying force.

The war had been re-purposed as one of simultaneous destruction and reconstruction. Foner’s narrative, however, is not one that presumes a top-down sense of agency. Rather, he echoes the words—and historical analysis—of W.E.B. Du Bois, in *Black Reconstruction in America* (1935; in Foner 2005: 4), who argued that “with perplexed and laggard steps, the United States followed in the footsteps of the black slave.” Du Bois’ analysis, marginalized for decades by historians who had systematically “ignored the testimony of the principal actor in the drama of Reconstruction—the emancipated slave,” (Foner 2005: xxi), radically re-interpreted US Southern Reconstruction as both a struggle for genuine democracy in an interracial society and a phase in the struggle between capital and labor. The second—and intersecting—starting point that Foner (with Du Bois) offers for students of the Reconstruction, and of reconstruction processes more generally, is thus a reconfigured sense of human agency. This not only contributes to more adequate historical analysis of Reconstruction; it also portends a richer sense of global reconstruction processes, and the ideological construction of the “post-war”, as geographically differentiated phenomena which are shaped, like other political processes, through contested social relations, and structured by hierarchies of power.

So, while the Emancipation Proclamation plays a critical role, for Foner, signposting the onset of the Reconstruction amidst ongoing war, we also see how this move was, in some ways, thrust upon Lincoln by footsteps on the ground.

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2 This section relies on the 2005 Parkman Prize edition of Foner’s text unless otherwise indicated.
and the collapse of slavery from within well before formal emancipation. Perhaps initially in regions, like the Louisiana sugar plantations, characterized by the most brutal working conditions, widespread “insubordination” and refusal of slaves to work coincided with diminished enforcement capacities among planters as the war began, and expanded, in Du Bois’ (2007: 44–67) terms, into a general strike. More militant sacking of plantation houses when abandoned by planters or encompassed behind Union lines, along with destruction of cotton gins in areas such as the South Carolina Sea Islands, were taken as rites of freedom among emancipated slaves. For Du Bois (2007: 44), this reconfiguration of agency thus made visible how “the black worker won the war by a general strike which transferred his labor from the Confederate planter to the Northern invader, in whose army lines workers began to be organized as a new labor force.” Elsewhere, new geographies of war and liberation took shape as slaves escaped in mass to Union held territory in coastal Virginia and South Carolina, and the plantation belt along the Mississippi River, particularly after a March 1862 decree which forbade the Army from returning the runaway slaves of the “disloyal”. To return them would have amounted to abetting the enemy, since the Confederate armies had impressed tens of thousands into labor, but even these conditions had enabled new opportunities to the slaves for escape behind Union lines. New enclaves of emancipated or runaway slaves were produced both in fixed locations, like New Orleans, and in mobile camps, following behind the Union army camps, reflecting changed social conditions across a devastated landscape, and underscoring the dramatic transformations expected to follow.

Army officers, meanwhile, found themselves in positions of authority under martial law at various settings along the South Atlantic coast and the Mississippi Valley, and in position—and in practical need—to experiment with a range of new models of reconstruction, citizenship, and governance as back-of-the-lines duty. This brought the Army into contact and coalition with a set of classes and interest groups seeking a stake in the project of Reconstruction during the war and its immediate aftermath, from abolitionist, reformist, and missionary groups to spokespeople for the northern black community to the industrial bourgeoisie to the Republican Party which, reflecting a highly sectionalized electorate, was effectively running a one-party state in Washington. Under these conditions, the national state had itself been reinvented during the war, made visible in Reconstruction in terms of:

vastly expanded authority and a new set of purposes, including an unprecedented commitment to the ideal of a national citizenship where equal rights belonged to all Americans regardless of race. Originating in wartime exigencies, the activist state … came to embody the reforming impulse deeply rooted in post-war politics. (Foner 2005: xxvi)

But history shows that the reform impulses that shaped the post-war state could be undermined, or even violently opposed. Some new state institutions, like the
Freedmen’s Bureau, created with local offices throughout the South to facilitate the transition to free labor and provide educational and health programs for millions of ex-slaves, would not survive even the formal Reconstruction period. Others, including formal and informal mechanisms integrating the state with financial and industrial capital, were far more enduring; financing the war had been a key wartime exigency (Bensel 1991; 2000), and as expected, the war of liberation had also generated conditions for what David Harvey (2003) would call, in a more recent context, “accumulation by dispossession.”

For many, however, conditions of security, and of everyday life and labor, had been far better during the war than after. In the Sea Islands, for instance, the arrival of the US Navy as early as 1861 had caused the planters to abandon their cotton fields and slaves, who in turn realized new freedoms by extending their own food crops, hunting, fishing, and leisure under martial law. But even in this early rehearsal for Reconstruction, Foner shows, the arrival of missionaries, teachers, treasury agents, and entrepreneurs, among others, produced troubling results, as the large plantations frequently fell into the hands of army officers, land speculators, and cotton companies. Most disquieting were the campaigns of reactionary violence waged against the agents of Reconstruction, most brutally by the Ku Klux Klan and like-minded groups between 1868 and the end of the formal Reconstruction period in 1877; a settlement achieved, in no small part, through this organized violence and intimidation. Indeed, the scale and geographical extent of political violence carried out by the Klan and related paramilitary groups during this period compels us to rethink the Reconstruction as a moment of transformative warfare, albeit a new kind of war, a war of terror waged, through institutional mechanisms as well as directed violence, to reconfigure power relations around the restoration of relations of white supremacy, “redemption” of the planter class, and control of the black labor force. Just as the Civil War was also a moment of reconstruction, in other words, the Reconstruction was also a period of intensely violent social and political conflict.

Challenging the limited capacities of occupying troops to enforce federal civil and voting rights legislation, along with the political will behind them, the Klan’s war for “home rule” in the Southern states had elements of a “total war” which intentionally blurred the boundaries between combatants, political figures, and civilians. While Klan violence was typically organized and carried out by local groups, its aims intertwined closely with those of the Democratic Party in the South, forming in some ways a military wing of the party which threatened the survival of black and white Republican Party politicians, infrastructure, and even voters, seeking, as one veteran Confederate officer put it, “to defy the reconstructed State Governments, to treat them with contempt, and show that they have no real existence,” (in Foner 2005: 444). Violence, perpetrated by veterans, among others, sometimes employed military tactics and resembled small military strikes. A January 1871 attack on a county jail in South Carolina, for instance, was carried out by some five hundred masked men, who took the jail and lynched eight black prisoners before whipping and terrorizing area blacks.
and white Republicans. The following month, thousands of blacks were still being forced to run to the woods every night to escape continuing attacks. An armed standoff around Colfax, Louisiana, in anticipation of the 1872 election, saw whites armed with guns and a small cannon lay siege against armed freedmen, under the direction of black union veterans, who had entrenched themselves around the county seat. On Easter Sunday, 280 freedmen were killed, including 50 who were massacred after surrendering.

But the violence was also more diffuse, widespread and banal, mobilized as a mode of everyday social regulation. Churches and schools were frequent targets for Klan arson; in the city of Tuskegee, Alabama, for example, nearly every black church and school was burned during the fall of 1870. Storekeepers were publicly whipped for treating blacks too well, as were some landlords for renting rooms to northern teachers. One “carpetbagger” judge recorded 12 murders, nine rapes, 14 arson cases, and an astonishing 700 beatings in his North Carolina judicial district. Blacks who sought redress against employers, or who sought to change employers, were also frequent targets of violence. Reconstruction, for many, was not “post-war,” it was permanent—and asymmetrical—warfare. It was thus a conflict carried out at a wide range of social sites; it was also a war of words, which worked through the construction and maintenance of particular cultural norms and understandings, and the creation of a climate in which violence and terror were accepted as a legitimate weapon and political strategy (Trelease 1995). After bloody electoral campaigns in Mississippi in 1875, when President Grant, the former Civil War General, refused to send in troops to protect black voters or ensure fair elections, and across the South in 1876, the federal state’s failure to protect its citizens was complete. The interlocking systems of hegemony, engendered through violent resistance to the Reconstruction state, would become deeply entrenched in the Southern landscape; it would be nearly a century before they were challenged again.

Reconstruction has also lived on, in other ways, as an ideology of progressive military occupation (see Kirsch, this volume), one which, as with Foner’s army of liberation, identified the state, through acts of emancipation, with the interests of humanity in general. In due course, US expansionists would draw on this rhetoric in support of more cynical liberations—Cuba, Philippines, Panama. The centrality of Reconstruction in America’s principal nineteenth-century historical crisis in this sense played a role in extending the rhetoric and practice of reconstruction across the globe. Soon, World War I presented new contexts for speculating on the problem of the post-war. For example, the political and intellectual climate of Britain in the years between the wars was one of both fear that “civilization” itself was threatened but new projects of eugenics, peace-making, and utopian politics were necessary and possible (Overy 2009). Hence, the principal literal meaning of reconstruction as the rebuilding of an area devastated, in particular, by warfare, and the presumed restoration of political, social, and economic stability

3 For more on the concept of the failed state, see Dowler (this volume).
to the region or locality achieved global imperative. In 1916, Arnold Toynbee, the British historian—and later delegate to the Paris Peace Conference—offered a slim volume on *The New Europe: Some Essays in Reconstruction*, a Great War exercise in imaging European post-war futures along particular national lines. Toynbee, who worked for the British Foreign Office during the war, would later add a study on Austrian reconstruction (Toynbee 1925 in *OED* 2010), thus reflecting with some clarity how *reconstruction* had been generalized, a peculiarly modern name for programs of post-war recovery and renewal which has worked by evoking a horizon of post-war peace that is distinct from periods of war.

A focus on reconstruction as a keyword, and the events of the US Southern Reconstruction in particular, also compels us to recognize the role the US played in establishing post-war reconstruction as a formal geopolitical strategy in the modern world. As we shall see below, and in many of the chapters in this book (see Dahlman; Kirsch; Yamazaki; Barnes and Crampton), reconstruction has remained an essential political tool for the US as it moved beyond consolidating its domestic politics to exerting its power and presence across the globe. From establishing control over the Philippines through the Marshall Plan to contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan, the geopolitics of reconstruction, led by the US, has created new political realities and landscapes that have played a crucial role in shaping new geopolitical worlds. This is not to say that reconstruction is solely a feature of US geopolitics. The ideology of Nazism rested on the idea that a new German nation and Reich was to be constructed in the wake of World War I. The Bolshevik revolution was also sparked by the catastrophes of the Great War, and blended visions of utopia with violent practice, both immediately in the civil war and in the construction of collective farms and successive political purges. The same can be said for Mao’s revolution in China and the millions of lives that were taken in the name of counter-revolution and constructing a socialist society. The wave of decolonization post-World War II was undertaken to construct new independent nation-states and included the horrific violence of the partition of India and historic Palestine, to name just two. As the chapters by Tyner on Cambodia and Dean and Grundy-Warr on the Thai-Burma border in this volume illustrate, reconstruction and violence are national projects that can be interpreted as the ongoing geopolitics of post-colonization. Hence, though the US has played a central role in establishing and maintaining post-war reconstruction as a component of contemporary geopolitics, the idea and practices have become pervasive and also have roots in the political ideologies of nationalism as well as the totalitarianism that emerged with the utopian politics of the twentieth century.

From the impetus provided by the end of World War II, and the immediate political imperatives of political distrust and competition between the Soviet Union and the US (Stafford 2007), the language of reconstruction has emerged as a global phenomenon. As with the case of the US Reconstruction, post-war reconstruction became institutionalized. Most prominently the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the United Nations entrenched the rhetoric and practice of post-war reconstruction. Ironically, two
US politicians especially reviled for their role in the prosecution of war (Robert McNamara and Paul Wolfowitz) went on to serve as Presidents of the World Bank. The UN has fully integrated notions of reconstruction into its institutional vocabulary—and its *raison d’être* is based upon a tacit acknowledgement of the persistence and globality of conflict. The term reconstruction has become increasingly constrained by the demands of “best-practice” faced by NGOs seeking government and IGO funds (Nicely 2009). Increasingly, post-conflict reconstruction is seen as a globalized project serving the neoliberal agenda enacted by a transnational class of elite actors (Robinson 2003). However, the pressures of institutionalized standardization contrast with the contingencies of geographical-historical context. The efforts of Doctors without Borders in post-earthquake Haiti, US-military run reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, or the industrial, NGO, and massive services sectors arising in post-conflict spaces across the world, will mean that the term will continue to evolve in these different contexts.

Given the historic and contemporary resonance of the term reconstruction—over four million Google hits each under “Afghanistan reconstruction” and “Iraq reconstruction” certainly reflect its currency—it is possible that conventional notions of post-conflict reconstruction will be joined by another, emerging meaning: reconstruction as a complex and contested phase within a long-term or permanent war. In this volume the chapters endeavor to inform our understanding of the connectivity of war and post-conflict reconstruction through discussion of both historical and contemporary cases in diverse geographic settings. The spirit, and indeed much of the content, reflects the sense of indignity and warning that Foner so powerfully provided; namely that the term reconstruction can offer a sensory umbrella against the reality of the pervasiveness of militarized power and political violence. In this vein, the different meanings of peace are both compelling drivers in the search for rhetorical comfort. Negative peace, or the absence of war, supports the illusion that the social norm or baseline is free of violence. Sometimes negative peace requires preventive measures, such as peacekeepers or sanctions. On the other hand, positive peace builds upon a sense that moments (perhaps especially “post-conflict”) allow for the steps towards social justice (Hewitt 1983; Lederach 1995; Galtung 1996; Wallensteen 2002). But reconstruction is also a misnomer in the sense that what is being constructed is rarely an idea of how society was but how it should be; we return to this idea in the concluding chapter. Hence both negative and positive peace are intrinsically appealing. However, by exposing the false dichotomy of conflict and reconstruction, greater awareness of the continuity of violent power relations may be achieved; or the existence of power, violence, and marginalization within the politics of peace. We argue that such an understanding is enhanced by a focus on the geographic concepts of place and site, and depends on the relational sense of power that is embodied by critical geographic approaches to the study of war.
Integrating War and “Post-war” Geographies

**Power, Place, and the False Dichotomy of War and Post-war**

To identify and interrogate the false dichotomy between war and peace, or conflict and reconstruction, it is useful to consider places and political spaces, such as nation-states or “war-zones,” as socially constructed. Cities, regions, and countries are constantly being shaped by the decisions of a variety of actors, but this very general sense of the process of social construction is contextualized to take on different forms in different settings. Historical-geographical context is simultaneously framed by and created through social action in a way that leads to an examination of how behavior and outcomes vary across time and space.

In the study of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, it is common to begin by thinking of war and peace as two forms of context that are distinct and are associated with particular forms of politics and other social activities. However, we argue that once it is recognized that politics and the social construction of place are inseparable and mutually constitutive then the geographic approach requires a breakdown of the false dichotomy between the processes and zones of war and peace. The construction of places and spaces is continual and contested. Power relations are constantly being enacted to define access to particular places, rules and norms of behavior, and spheres of jurisdiction. Sometimes these power relations will manifest in violence, and when it becomes organized and sustained it becomes defined as war. However, militarized power relations are very much evident in what is generally categorized as peace. It is the perpetual process of power politics, often manifest violently, and the role it plays in continually reshaping places and spaces, that makes geography a very useful perspective in showing the continuities and legacies across war and post-war periods and hence the false dichotomy of conflict and reconstruction.

To explore the false dichotomy we can conceptualize periods of war as periods of construction. Policymakers and attendant voices in the media have always been keen to portray war as a progressive building exercise that creates new worlds, new states, new empires, new opportunities, etc. Materially war has played a key role in creating new industries and related economic geographies of production and consumption (Soja 1996; Markusen et al. 1991), requiring new “domestic” spaces for training and billeting soldiers (Lutz 2001; Woodward 2004), and new “proving grounds”—sometimes framed as national sacrifice zones (Davis 1991)—for developing the technologies of warfare (Makhijani et al. 2000; Kirsch 2005a: 15–27). Race, gender, and class relations are often radically redefined as part of war-time mobilization, especially in modern periods of “total war” (Chickering et al. 2004) that require all aspects of state and society to be oriented towards the execution of war. Minefields, missile silos, regions of “scorched earth”, vast areas made uninhabitable by nuclear tests and bombing ranges, demarcated areas made inaccessible through secrecy (Paglen 2009) or what is deemed military necessity (such as the Korean peninsula DMZ) are all examples of how war creates distinctive
landscapes at a variety of scales and transforms or reproduces associated social relations. Processes of war, in other words, construct places, spaces, and social relations that extend far beyond the battlefield.

On the other hand, what is termed reconstruction is frequently a conflictual process. The Treaty of Versailles after World War I is infamously known as an act of grand politics that sowed the seeds of Nazism and World War II. The optimistic constructive belief amongst protagonists that World War I would end war between great powers was soon replaced by a process of international relations that was all about competition and excluding some from the decision-making process. Many a “brave new world” has been claimed as the reason why wars are fought, but the racial politics of the US after the Civil War and World War II, or the politics of identity and region that all too often is manifest in bombing and shooting in contemporary Iraq (see Gregory 2004), are just a few cases from a pervasive set of examples that shows conflict, sometimes violent, continues in post-war, ostensibly “peaceful”, settings. Simply, a post-war context is a particular type of setting in which embedded power relations play out.

To fully investigate the processes fusing conflict/post-conflict settings it is necessary to put power front and center in a discussion of post-war reconstruction. Power is understood here in a relational sense (Allen 2003); as a process of interaction between social actors with different resources and structural positions, with outcomes partially determining the nature of new relations. Hence, a transition between a period of formal conflict and post-conflict is likely to redefine some sets of relationships and not others. Overall, the combination of all power relations is transformed by conflict, renegotiating some and cementing others. Thinking of power as relational and as a process thus identifies conflict/post-conflict as a false dichotomy in two ways. First, many, if not most or all, of the social actors involved in conflict are likely to remain post-conflict. Second, conflict is likely to have produced renegotiation but not complete transformation of the power relations between them.

Along with the emphasis on the social construction of places and political spaces, the geographic approach emphasizes the contextual “coming together” of power relations. The actual manifestation and understanding of power relations is a product of place-specific histories and experiences. Sharp et al. (2000) have referred to the process of negotiating power relations as entanglements of power, as it is possible to see resistance to dominance, and, simultaneously, the politics of dominance continuing within the politics of resistance. For example, a social movement resisting imperialism may be imbued with gender and racial political inequities. Sharp et al. (2000: 25) initially define place as the setting of power relations in a way that emphasizes the mutual construction of geography and politics:

Places are thereby constructed and experienced as both material and ecological artefacts and intricate networks of social relations, being the focus of the imaginary, of beliefs, desires and discursive activity, filled with symbolic and
representational meanings. They are also the products of institutionalised social and political-economic power.

However, Sharp et al. (2000) build upon the concept of place to emphasize the geographic term “site” as more useful when examining power relations. The greater explanatory power of site lies in its recognition of the material and rhetorical components of place, and, most efficaciously, the situation—and positionality—of places within broader historical processes and geographic linkages that link particular geographic locations and make them “extra-local.” The negotiation of power relations is not limited within a bounded geographical space (a town, region, or state), but connected to global political, economic, and cultural processes. For example, the “reconstruction” of Afghanistan is a global project that has connected Afghan towns with the homes of South Korean aid workers, the conference rooms in Washington DC and London within which policy is hashed out, and the hometowns of serving soldiers. Thus, a geographical approach utilizes a relational sense of power to see power relations of resistance and domination to be entangled or co-existent, and situated within particular geographic settings that are to be understood within broader historical processes and geographical connections.

Geographic Approaches to the Connections between War and Peace

Reflecting the changes in warfare, and the pervading sense that the War on Terror is an on-going concern, there has been growing interest in rethinking the dynamics of post-conflict. Many of these works, though, are utilitarian, aimed at providing guidelines and feedback for NGO practitioners (Robinson 2003). We are more interested in the way that scholars have increasingly refuted the sense of a dichotomy between war and peace.

Marxism has a long tradition of claiming a connection between capitalism and war, theorizing the relations between periods of peace and conflict as mutually constitutive. Lenin’s (1996) thesis on imperialism, originally published in 1916, politicized the understanding that war was an inevitable feature of monopoly capitalism. The logic of this argument is that capitalism inevitably generates war in a search for markets. World-systems theory, building on Marxist theories of primitive accumulation, offers a different take, that wars created new zones of cheap labor. However, the same theme of a connection between the needs of capital and the construction of war has a long history. The work of David Harvey (1985; 2003) continues this tradition by noting that warfare is a means of “accumulation through dispossession”. War, in this sense, is a component of capitalism’s need to create new regions or landscapes of accumulation to compensate for declining rates of profit. The deconstruction of swathes of physical infrastructure is a form of devaluation of assets that is necessary for a new round of investment and profit (Harvey 1985). In this sense, the destructive process of warfare is a component
of the capitalist cycle of disinvestment (or devaluation) and reinvestment that
destroys and recreates landscapes.

Another angle on the link between capitalism and war is the argument that
capitalism needs war. Emanating from the work of Baran and Sweezy (1966),
the identification of total war has led some to see arms production, and the need
for new wars to stimulate new production, as a driving force behind military
expeditions. World War I has been noted as an important threshold in modern
warfare for the mobilization of the entire society and economy for the prosecution
of war; a conclusion readily accepted by historians of all political hues. Much
contemporary scholarship leans more on the polemical traditions of Baran and
Sweezy, and argues for a linkage between neo-liberal forms of accumulation and
the “contracting out” of warfare. Coined “disaster capitalism” by Naomi Klein,
landscapes of post-war reconstruction are identified as frontiers of capital. Critical
scholarship on post-war reconstruction has engaged this same issue by noting how
post-war reconstruction has become a vehicle or opportunity for the establishment
of neo-liberal forms of governance (Robinson 2003). In other words, post-war
reconstruction is a process of establishing a certain set of social relations.

The themes of capitalism making and needing war are situated within broader
social processes, and need not be looked at from a Marxist perspective. Kearns
(2009) has reminded us of the deep connection between geopolitics, including
the waging of war, and imperialism. The necessity of exploitative relations within
the capitalist world-economy has been identified by a variety of scholars; notably
the early work of Lenin and Hobson, and the subsequent dependency schools and
the derivative world-systems approach. A specific linkage between the structural
inequalities of the world-economy and conflict and violence has been made in a
number of ways. The seminal work of Michael Watts (1983) promoted the term
‘structural violence,’ or the impact of the flow of profits from poor areas of the
world to rich upon life expectancy (van der Wusten 2005). The process of the
expansion of capitalism, and the role of imperial practices, in re-shaping the
pattern of political-economy led to the identification of different types of wars—
including those facilitating colonial expansion (O’Loughlin and van der Wusten
1993; O’Loughlin 2005). The empirical work classifying types of war over the
course of history intersect with the ideas of structural violence to reinforce the
idea, explicit in the Marxist perspective, that the processes of capitalism are seen
to involve, or even require, violence for territorial expansion. Critical to this
scholarship, then, is a sense that the “constructive” aspects of the economy are
inseparable from conquest and war.

The process of the territorial spread of capitalism from its European origins
across the whole of the globe requires the establishment of institutions and social
relations facilitating capital investment, infrastructure to extract resources, and the
flow of profits back to the metropole (Watts 1983; Blaut 1993). In some cases this
required the establishment of formal colonial control, but more recently it tends to
be maintained without actual political annexation or control, or through what is
known as informal imperialism. However, both formal and informal imperialism
are violent. Gregory’s (2004) provocative analysis of the *Colonial Present*, framing the contemporary landscapes of war and security in Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq in terms of long-term, asymmetrical colonial encounters, provides additional concepts for understanding the nature of “post-conflict” geographies. The persistence of extra-territorial control, of powerful countries exerting influence in other sovereign territories through direct and indirect violence, is a persistent aspect of global politics; and one that denies a clear break between periods of war and periods of diplomacy or “normal relations.”

The development of total war, the relationship between geopolitics and empire, and the relative permanence of structural colonial relationships has created another way in which any sense of clear lines between war and peace must be challenged. Following the work of Tilly and Mann on the formation and persistence of the modern state it is wrong to think of any moment when politics was not connected to the violence of territorial control. The formation of the modern territorial state has involved territorial expansion and consolidation of state authority over diverse populations that has involved explicit or latent violence. In other words, politics has always been connected to force, coercion and violence. Hence, the term militarization may be a misnomer, as it implies a time when the politics was separate from the norms and imperatives of the military (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009). Instead, it is often more useful to use the term securitization, to see how all aspects of society can be imbued with the language and practice of violence (prisons, immigration control) in particular contexts. When the specific institutions of the military are involved, it is still appropriate to talk about militarization, but as the further, or innovative, intensification of militarism within a sphere of society rather than something that is completely new. Hence, modern society is largely imbued with the ideology of militarism (Enloe 2004: 219), that is evident in economics, politics, and the construction of landscapes (Woodward 2004).

One manifestation of this prevalent and, often, latent or banal militarism is the construction of everyday behaviors (Bernazzoli and Flint 2010), and the creation of subjects that internalize and practice militarism. Focusing upon the politics of citizenship (Cowen and Gilbert 2008), warfare is exposed as one of the driving forces in defining the institutions and practices of citizenship across historical and geographical contexts. Provisions of state benefits to war veterans (Skocpol 1992; Power 2008) illustrate how the total war phenomenon has manifest itself in the development what is commonly accepted as the domestic politics of peace time. Theoretically, the study of war and citizenship has built upon the Foucoulitian idea of biopolitics (power over life), or the ways in which norms of behaviour are created by a variety of state and non-state institutions (Power 2008; Hannah 2008),

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4 For a more far-reaching analysis of *security* as an emerging biopolitical liberal problematic, undergirding development on a global scale, see Duffield (2007).

5 We define militarism as an ideology privileging military culture, norms, practices, and behavior over those of civil society (Bernazzoli and Flint 2010: 158; Vagts 1959; Enloe 2004).
Reconstructing Conflict

institutions which increasingly draw their legitimacy, in Foucault’s (2003: 241) terms, from “the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die”. In this sense, militarization is a pervasive process because it constantly attempts to create political subjects imbued, to varying degrees, with militaristic beliefs and practices. Building upon the idea of biopolitics there has been a plethora of studies using Agamben’s (1998) contribution to identify the process by which some segments of the population are deemed unworthy of protection from international law, and even basic understandings of morality. Agamben’s theory has been mobilized by scholars investigating the war on terror (Hannah 2006 and 2008) and related conflicts (Gregory 2004). Such approaches also rest on the long-standing practices and rhetoric of Orientalism (Said 1978), and hence have shown that structural imperatives of imperialism produce a connective tissue of othering and violence that cannot easily be separated into distinct zones and periods of peace and war.

Unsurprisingly, recent studies have been provoked and informed by the military responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; what has become known as the “war on terror”.6 The securitization of urban spaces has led to a body of work on cities and war (Graham 2004 and 2010), and there has been an engagement with the military strategy of the United States (Morrissey 2008) and with the changing territorial dimensions of that strategy (Elden 2009). The dominant theme of much of this work is that overt military exercises cannot be separated from economic processes. For Cowen and Smith (2009; see also Smith 2005) the logic of geo-economics is one that is constantly global and exploitive and, often times, demanding military action. Or, as Hardt and Negri (2004) argue, we live in the ‘era of armed globalization,’ a constant state of war that seriously undermines triumphalist claims of the diffusion of democracy. As the war on terror has taken shape across military, legal, financial, diplomatic, and even humanitarian terrain, they theorize war as a permanent—and asymmetrical—social relation which, at a global scale, is increasingly indistinguishable from police activity (see also Alliez and Negri 2003; Kirsch 2005b).7 No longer, they argue, does war comprise an exceptional condition; rather, it describes the normal state of global affairs, serving to stabilize, rather than threaten, the present global order. Whether or not we conceive of this as a fundamentally new global condition, one clear outcome of these processes is reflected in an impoverished sense of peace: even as the horizon of peace is mobilized to justify new conflicts (as well as new landscapes of reconstruction), the meaning of peace is often reduced to conditions of militarized security and a “deceptive illusion fostering the power of disorder and its threat … against the security of the world” (Alliez and Negri 2003: 110).

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6 Among the many problems with the notion of a war on terror, as Elden (2009: xxii) observes, are “that it suggests that war is something that is distinct from terror, and that war is the means of combating it.”  
7 Hardt and Negri’s (2004) argument also depends on an interpretation of war as a regime of biopower, and primary organizing principle of society, which produces death but also controls and regulates life.
In some ways, we have come full circle, and are building upon Lenin’s connections between monopoly capitalism and war to identify the ties between neo-liberalism and war (Ingram and Dodds 2009; Klein 2007). Alternatively, perhaps the reason that Lenin’s claims are being echoed is an indication that there are persistent structural causes of war; notably the continuing processes of exploitation in a capitalist world-economy (Flint and Radil 2009) and the always incomplete, overlapping, and conflicting projects of state-territorial politics (Elden 2009). Of course, this is not to say that nothing has changed in the past one hundred years or so. The disturbing point is precisely that the idea of continual or constant war has become established. Max Boot (2002) and Philip Bobbitt (2003) have, in their different ways, made an argument for the necessity and even benefit of war. These academic offerings support Donald Rumsfeld’s identification of the war on terror as “the long war;” a political situation that President Obama is finding difficult to extricate himself from.

Total war, long war, war on terror, securitization: these terms all suggest that war and its effects are pervasive across time and space, and that the dichotomy of peace and war is, increasingly, a rhetorical device. The historical approach we have taken in this introduction reflects the deep roots of both the material and the rhetorical construction of mutually constituted spaces of war and peace. Hence, the chapters in the volume mix analyses of contemporary events with historical cases, reflecting throughout a critical geopolitical sensibility that is directed at undermining the multiple ways that war and peace have been differentiated both conceptually and in brick and mortar landscapes of reconstruction. Contra what Megoran (2008) has identified in the critical geopolitics discourse as a weak normative engagement with processes, institutions, and tacit justifications of warfare, this volume offers a different kind of engagement with the norms of conflict: a study of the ways that war is distributed across a variety of social sites, and analyses of the consequences of these conditions.

The Worlds that War Makes

We have approached the diverse literatures discussed in the previous section with the goal of highlighting how the social processes of capital accumulation, imperialism, state formation, and militarization are intertwined and pervasive. The continual operation of these processes is the basis for our central claim: war and peace should not be seen as dichotomous periods and spaces. Moreover, places, state, regions, and landscapes are continually being destroyed and re-built by organized violence, or war. The multiple processes that enable the waging of war are constant features of society, and not just moments or historic events that we can compartmentalize in a linear fashion as war, peace and reconstruction. Hence, the continuity of processes across what are commonly termed conflict/post-conflict situations is a matter of the on-going power relations that contest the
way spaces and places are made, maintained, and altered. Simply, the processes of war make the worlds people live in.\footnote{We borrow (and adapt) the phrase from the Illinois jurist and US Senator Sidney Breese, as developed in Foner’s account (2005: 34), who commented, upon observing the far reaching changes brought on by the Civil War and Reconstruction throughout the country, that all Americans must “live in the world the war made.”}

To delve further into these worlds, and to expand our effort to conceptually integrate war and post-war geographies, there is a need to think across diverse contexts. The chapters collected in this volume provide such geographical breadth, including studies encompassing twentieth and early twenty-first century landscapes of war and reconstruction extending from East and Southeast Asia to the Middle East to Europe and North America. The diverse regional expertise of the contributors, and the varied theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches embodied in their work, offer a wide scope onto processes of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. While each chapter in some ways stands alone, each has been commissioned and is intended to contribute to the broader goals sketched here, and to encourage readers, whether researchers, students, practitioners, or general readers, to learn and think critically about the intersections of war, peace, and reconstruction processes. Our aim in putting the book together has thus been, collectively, to develop new geographical approaches for understanding how spaces of war have been reconstructed as ostensible zones of peace, but with their own dynamics of conflict.

The chapters that follow are divided into two parts. The first, beginning with Flint’s typology of representations of war as reconstruction in World War II and early Cold War Europe, focuses explicitly on the interconnected spaces or geographies of war and reconstruction, from the rebuilding of devastated landscapes to the fashioning of new maps and narratives. For Flint, it is precisely these generative aspects of war that are highlighted when we interrogate reconstruction as a process of militarized power, that is, how war requires and facilitates the construction of new geographic settings, which he terms geopolitical landscapes, in the effort to shift or stabilize fluid power relations. The next chapter, by Tyner, turns to a particularly disturbing realization of the dangers of “post-war” worlds, examining genocide as a program of post-conflict reconstruction in Pol Pot’s Cambodia. Tyner’s main focus, however, after untangling the dynamics of mass political violence perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge regime in the creation of Democratic Kampuchea, is to examine the regime’s educational policies, including the publication of a new “second grade” political geography textbook. While education is commonly perceived as a step toward “positive peace,” Tyner shows how “geography, Khmer Rouge style,” featuring redrawn political maps of the country and a radical overhaul of its national identity, helped to authorize the reconstruction of the nation-state through genocide.

Clout’s study of destruction and reconstruction in France’s three northern departments during World War II, by contrast, traces what is in some ways a
more conventional narrative of war, emergency measures, and reconstruction in a region that experienced more than half of France’s property damage during the war. And yet even here, as Clout’s close study of living and working conditions and the reconstruction of landscapes during various phases of the war illustrates, reconstruction is revealed as a contested and changing condition, overlapping complexly with war rather than following it in a linear, sequential fashion. But if this case serves to complicate notions of war and reconstruction as discrete temporal events, then Grundy-Warr’s and Dean’s mapping of “not peace not war” in contemporary Myanmar/Burma explicitly disrupts the notions of war and peace as distinct spatial spheres. Instead, the authors provide a picture of a militarized political landscape in flux, in a state that has never functioned as an integrated political unit, under an array of temporary, overlapping, and contingent forms of sovereignty.

The next chapter, by Woodward and Jenkings, explores the recent wave of published memoirs of British military personnel from the Afghanistan conflict. The authors show how the genre, while reflecting many of the cultural and narrative expectations of the biographical war story, calls attention to everyday practices in a state reconstruction project which, from the perspective of individual soldiers, cannot be differentiated from war. These views of the “colonial present,” Woodward and Jenkings suggest, not only disrupt the perceived linear progression from conflict to reconstruction; they also serve to raise critical questions from within about the viability of wars of reconstruction. Of course, an alternative to the study of self-styled protagonists reflected in military memoirs is to examine the impacts of military presence upon local people and landscapes; this is the approach taken in the chapter by Higate and Henry in the ostensibly post-conflict/non-conflict setting of Cyprus. Through an ethnographic mapping of the Cypriot landscape of sovereign base areas, buffer zones, out of bounds areas, and tourist complexes, the authors seek to understand how such constructed spaces remain bound up in ideologies of militarism. Even what are deemed spaces of peace, in other words, reflect in different ways the pervasiveness of violence behind categories of “post-conflict.” The next chapter in this section, set in Aceh, Indonesia, expands on questions raised about the mutual constitution of war and peace in spaces of reconstruction by turning explicitly to the dynamics of humanitarian disasters. In the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the humanitarian crisis in Aceh helped to generate conditions enabling what seems a lasting peace settlement between the Free Aceh movement and the Government of Indonesia. And yet, as authors Waizenegger and Hyndman show, victims of the long standing and destructive civil war have found it difficult to access humanitarian relief that is widely available to victims of the natural disaster, even as hundreds of millions in tsunami aid dollars have gone unspent. For civilians caught up unwittingly in the violence of warfare, but not in the tsunami, such boundary policing between spaces of conflict and different forms of reconstruction is indeed consequential.

Taken together, the chapters in this section thus illustrate the ambiguity between spaces of conflict and spaces of reconstruction, and the complexly
intertwined geographies of both war and peace that emerge from them as products of power relations (and militarist cultures) that cannot be confined to clearly demarcated periods and spaces of war and peace. The next section extends this line of thought by examining the relations between wartime and post-conflict reconstruction processes as they articulate with forms of hegemony and processes of state formation. The six chapters that comprise the last section of the book, in other words, attempt to “rethink peace” by analyzing the long standing effects of war in the remaking of power relations, including but not limited to the reconstruction of the state itself, both domestically and extra-territorially. In this sense, we take a broad, inclusive view of hegemony, meant to signal, on one hand, the diffusion of conflict and “war by other means” across a number of social sites, including labor regimes, law and governance, gendered practices, and intelligence infrastructures, and on the other hand, to engage in historical-geographical and geopolitical analyses of the US project of global hegemony in particular, and its transformations in the wake of the Philippine-American War, World War II, and Iraq Wars.

The section begins with Dahlman’s analysis of the US project of reconstruction in Iraq. Of course, it is the vacillating troop “surges” and “draw downs” that have constituted contemporary reconstruction landscapes in Afghanistan and Iraq which, in some ways, have inspired this volume, and spurred the broader rethinking of geographies of war and peace that we have sketched in this introduction. For Dahlman, the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq indicate a significant departure from previous models of geopolitical engagement; rather than upholding a threatened state or re-building a failing one, the model of breaking and then remaking the state suggests a different model of militarized power, that of “reconstruction as war.” By relating the convoluted history of planning and neo-conservative posturing that replaced a functioning geopolitics of containment in Iraq with a new war of occupation, Dahlman’s chapter moves beyond critique of US policy in Iraq to explore the ethical and practical implications of this model of reconstruction as a strategy for enacting extra-territorial power. The study also provides a compelling starting point for the broader genealogy of the rise of US global power that follows, beginning with Kirsch’s study, in the next chapter, of the simultaneous expansion of counter-insurgency and American democracy in the Philippines at the dawn of the twentieth century. Focusing initially on controversies arising between overlapping civilian and military colonial regimes in Manila, he traces the emergence of intersecting geographies of war, pacification, and colonial state building across the archipelago. While contemporary debates were configured around the supposed incompatibility of empire and democracy, Kirsch’s analysis suggests a more nuanced reality in which the extension of democratic rights and individual liberties occurred alongside—even as they were framed in opposition to—the classic imperial problems of occupation and counter-insurgency.

Meanwhile, as the “American century” continued to evolve, US engagements in World War II, post-war occupation, and Cold War hegemonic rivalry, were
perceived as requiring vast inputs of geographic information and intelligence. The intellectual and institutional history of mid-twentieth century US geographical intelligence, and the role of geographers and cartographers like Edward Ullman, Edward Ackerman and Arthur Robinson in producing it under the auspices of the wartime and post-war state, is the subject of the next chapter by Barnes and Crampton. As these authors show, new practices developed during World War II by geographers within the US Office of Strategic Services would reshape not just the nature of twentieth-century geographical knowledge but also the geographies of the Cold War world, including the reconstructed landscapes of Japan, where Ackerman, fresh from teaching military officers the regional geography of Japan at Harvard’s new School of Overseas Administration, had been placed in charge of the country’s post-war environmental and resource policy. The following chapter, by Yamazaki, explores the remaking of Japan after World War II through a different lens, the social construction of Okinawa Prefecture as a site for the stationing of US troops after World War II. For Yamazaki, the history of compromise and struggle in the relations between US forces and the local population reveals how a particular “post-conflict” space can serve to reproduce hegemonic power relations as well as a highly gendered biopolitics, wherein it is not only the militarized landscapes but also the civilians’ lives that are reconstructed to articulate with the operation of military bases, and the larger geopolitics in which they are embedded.

The final two chapters in this section, by Mitchell and Dowler, respectively, are similarly concerned with the reproduction of hegemonic power relations in war and “post-war” settings, but they elicit these processes by examining social sites not conventionally counted among the domains of post-conflict reconstruction: agricultural labor relations; and gender dynamics within the military. Mitchell’s chapter, which traces the development of the bracero program for importing Mexican labor to California’s agricultural landscape during World War II, illustrates how wartime “emergency” conditions were mobilized by growers to ensure fresh supplies of indentured labor, and thus to exert greater control over their relatively fragile conditions of production. Foreign war, in this sense, provided an opportunity domestically for agricultural capital to draw the state into a major intervention and restructuring of social relations. Growers managed to reconstruct the agricultural landscape under conditions of manufactured exigency that would make the program necessary long after the war had ended, thus allowing war conditions to persist as an aberrant labor peace in the fields. A different “hidden war” is the subject of Dowler’s chapter: the doubly vulnerable conditions experienced by women soldiers in the US military amidst its war of reconstruction in Iraq and other settings. Dowler highlights a disturbing irony in US military policy and media discourse: while rules such as those that ostensibly restrict women soldiers from combat operations are enacted to protect them from “external” risk, they already face alarmingly high risks of violent attack from male soldiers within the US armed forces. The consequences of this failure of the US military, despite chivalrous claims, to protect its female soldiers, Dowler argues, include the reinforcement of patriarchal gender norms across multiple institutions
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in times of peace as well as war. The chapters in this section thus offer a range of reconceptualizations of “peace” for academic research, peace that is not simply shaped externally by military institutions but is infused with war as an internal dynamic, and organized around linked spaces, processes, and institutions of war and reconstruction.

By organizing the book into these sections we aim to highlight the practice of the social construction of post-conflict spaces, on one hand, and the manner in which these spaces both reflect and help to reproduce hegemonic power relations, on the other. However, running themes throughout the book include the false dichotomy between periods and spaces of war and peace, the significance of power relations formed in periods of war in shaping social practices in post-war settings, and the role of militarism in sustaining those relations. Thus, the intertwined spaces of conflict and reconstruction are made not just through “boots on the ground” but also through socially and culturally specific modes of narrative and practice. Collectively, the volume breaks down sub-disciplinary boundaries to illustrate the strength of geographical and critical geopolitical approaches in highlighting the ways in which socially produced spaces, boundaries, representations, and practices serve to perpetuate power relations and practices of violence across contexts usually defined simply as war or peace.

References


PART II
Geographies of War and Reconstruction
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Peace and war: two deceptively clear and bounded circumstances that provoke very different emotions and images. On the one hand is what is believed to be an unusual social situation when, for some reason or other, “politics as usual” is no longer adequate or sustainable and the horrors of war are unleashed (Wallensteen 2002: 13–17). On the other hand is either a utopian goal of a better world, or a much simpler sense of “normality,” the expected state of non-war (Galtung 1996: 31). However, if the definitions of peace and war are explored more deeply then the dichotomy quickly breaks down (Dahlman 2010). This chapter is an attempt to map a pathway into the geographic analysis of the intertwining of peace and war rather than their perceived, and desired, separation.

Defining peace and war as spatial-temporal circumstances emphasizes their disconnection with each other and hence a false dichotomy. Instead, an approach that sees peace and war as an assemblage of social processes provides an avenue into seeing how the two are intertwined manifestations of dynamic social contestation (Virilio 1986). Peace and war are intertwined because many of the same social relations are the basis of the construction of both. War is the means for the construction of a new complex of social relations and peace is a complex of social relations that produces winners and losers, and hence domination and conflict.

Peace is usually defined in one of two ways (Galtung 1996: 31–3). A negative sense of peace is the absence of war. This definition is unhelpful as it conjures up an image of a social vacuum in which a social spatial-historical situation is only understood by the lack of particular processes, those that, apparently, make war. The positive sense of peace, the construction of non-conflictual or progressive social relations, is more helpful, but not in the way that the definition is usually used. A positive peace is normally seen as a process that builds a “better” society. In that sense it is a normative definition that focuses on an end product, a re-organized society. However, seeing a positive peace as a dynamic or a set of social processes inevitably means that there are social winners and losers. A positive peace would require the redistribution of resources, wealth, and power and a redefinition of social groups in terms of their belonging and roles. A utopian positive peace would
envision a negation of inequalities between social groups. More realistically, any attempt to construct a new society means that particular roles or social positions are likely to face changes in their relative power status (Lederach 1995: 9). For example, a positive peace that eradicates discrimination on the basis of ethnic identity means that the relative power of previously dominant ethnic groups is going to decline, a trend they are likely to resist.

Therefore, and perhaps ironically, seeing positive peace as a dynamic complex of social relations highlights the very political processes that are the essence of the causes of war; competition of access to resources and institutions, and related identity conflicts. Seeing positive peace in this way not only challenges the peace-war dichotomy but also suggests that peace and war share many of the same political processes, and hence are both a competition for social resources between different social groups.

The point may be emphasized by examining different analyses of war, scholarship that illustrates the way social institutions and relations are constructed during periods of warfare. At a grand scale, Charles Tilly (1990) defines war as state-making, the process by which the modern nation-state came into being as a territorial entity with centralized institutional control. One component of this process, that was a product of the emergence of total war that impacted all sectors of society, was the need for states to provide welfare and employment institutions for widows and veterans (Skocpol 1992, Mosse 1990, Whalen 1984). The very conduct of war required a construction of social practices and institutions. In the process, social groups redefined their status and access to power and resources. Obvious examples are the new employment opportunities for women in the two world wars as well as the ability of African-Americans to make the case for full citizenship as a result of their war participation (Greiner 2005, Stephenson 2005). The high cost of casualties experienced by the colonial possessions of Great Britain in the two world wars was part of the motivation and rhetoric for national independence movements and the decline of formal empires in global north-south relations (Stewart 2008).

The cases of the social position of women and racial minorities in the United States after the two world wars highlight the interweaving of social processes across settings that ostensibly can be defined as war and peace. After the wars women often lost the employment positions that held in the war to men returning from the fighting. Though participation in the wars helped African-Americans stake their claim to full citizenship and the absence of discrimination it took the struggles of the Civil Rights Movement to make meaningful advance and the process is far from complete.

Overall, seeing peace as an attempt to construct new social relations and war as a social setting that creates and transforms society makes clear that the never-ending dynamic of competition between social groups, and the related construction of social identities, underlies the social circumstances we commonly identify as war and peace. It is in this sense that war and peace are intertwined. Moreover, this is a geographic process as politics requires a mutual construction of political spaces.
This chapter is an initial excursion that serves to highlight the false dichotomy of war and peace. The use of vignettes is aimed at provoking further inquiry rather than producing definitive results. The chapter begins with a discussion of how war is commonly represented as a progressive or developmental process. The following section introduces the concept of geopolitical landscape to show how social relations and geographic spaces are continually formed and reformed across spatial-temporal moments commonly defined as war and peace. The final section builds upon the idea of geopolitical landscapes to illustrate the host of processes that are combined to form a continual dynamic of social contestation that makes the presence of militarized geopolitical landscapes permanent. The political geography of the world is an ever-changing flux of geopolitical landscapes, a dynamic spatial expression of militarized violence; sometimes these are expressed as moments of war. To provide some consistent narrative, I exemplify the argument through a discussion of World War II.

The Representation of War as Reconstruction

War is hell, Walzer (1977: 22) reminds us. It is not only seen as a dramatic cost in life and materiel but something that is an unusual circumstance in modern society. Rather than being accepted as an extension of politics, as Clausewitz (1968:109) argued, war is either implicitly or explicitly seen as a breakdown in practice of politics; the inability of countries to resolve differences through diplomatic negotiation. Whether it is Neville Chamberlain in 1939 or President George W. Bush in 2003, war is only possible once the domestic and global public can be told that every other avenue for resolution was attempted and exhausted. (This does not necessarily mean that war was not the goal from the outset, as the British inquiry into the circumstances deemed to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq suggests, but the need to represent war as the final alternative remains and failure to make a successful case delegitimizes leaders).

The belief that war is beyond the pale of “normal” social relations requires efforts to represent war as necessary and, further more, a continuation of the overarching morality of modern society (Walzer 1977). In other words, though war is seen as the ultimate social horror, its practice must not undermine the belief in the state as the guardian or “container” of society that is moving towards a greater social good (Taylor 1994). Though just war theory provides an extensive literature and debate on the morality of the causes and practices of war, a focus upon reconstruction highlights the intersection between the prosecution of war and the overarching modern belief in “progress.” “Progress” has become a universal norm, a belief that social conditions can and will improve (Wallerstein 1984). Different political ideologies and national settings may have specific views of how “progress” may be achieved, but the traditional conservative view of arresting social change has not been palatable since the overthrow of monarchical and aristocratic regimes.
The abstract term progress is translated into specific policy practice through another term, development. The modern world exists on a belief that social inequalities, within societies and between the global north and south, can and will be eradicated through the implementation of developmental efforts (Taylor 1998). A host of international institutions (The World Bank and International Monetary Fund, especially) and national aid efforts and private charity organizations lead a host of development efforts, and similar intents and actions occur within countries. Development is one way to spin the negativity of massive disasters such as famines or earthquakes; in that they are seen as a way not to simply rebuild society but make positive change. Thus, development is a form of reconstruction, a rebuilding of society that carries the overarching rhetorical baggage of the belief in “progress.”

The power of societal belief in progress and development is a useful tool for state and cultural elites who create dominant representations of war and related forms of violence. If acts of war and organized violence can be represented as practices that fit within the broad social imperative of progress they are more likely to be accepted as acts that merit the costs. It is in this way that war is often portrayed as a reconstruction of society that is not only inevitable but good or progressive. In other words, war is often represented not as something that is destructive but a component of a rebuilding process. Or, with apologies to George Orwell, war is reconstruction. The rest of this section is an initial attempt to illustrate this point through the identification of particular situations which illustrate how arenas of conflict are represented as spaces of reconstruction. The list is not intended to be complete, and neither are the categories meant to be mutually exclusive, but it serves as a starting point to understand that war and reconstruction are intertwined in a rhetorical form as war is often portrayed as the building of society, and that the processes of war and reconstruction fuse to produce dynamic spaces

Empty Spaces: Imperialism

The geopolitics of Western imperialism, the spread of territorial control and resource exploitation across the globe was, in Agnew’s (2003: 86–93) terms, represented as Civilizational Geopolitics. The parts of the world that were “discovered” by Western explorers and subsequently claimed, “settled,” and classified as imperial possessions were declared empty spaces, or terra nullius. The existence of human beings already residing in these areas was either denied or, more commonly, a racist hierarchical classification was employed to deem the occupants as sub-human. Their destruction was not, therefore, portrayed as a matter of human-upon-human violence, but an eradication of an existing species, inferior to Western humans. The occupants that were not killed became imperial subjects and the process of ‘civilization’ was done in tandem by religious missionaries and state institutions. The violence of clearing territory for Western settlement, either by killing and expulsion or through the denial of traditional custom and social organization, was represented as the progressive reconstruction of “lower” forms of humanity towards what was perceive at the
time as the obviously superior Western model. A well-known manifestation of the attendant representation is Rudyard Kipling’s poem *The White Man’s Burden*.

**“Independent” Spaces: Decolonization**

In the twentieth century the long process of decolonization transformed colonies into, ostensibly, independent nation-states. Nation-states are seen as the dominant territorial institution of the modern world, and hence the move to independence is acknowledged as a progressive move. The Vietnam War was, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, an anti-colonial struggle (Morris 2004), something seemingly missed by the United States at the time when their judgment was clouded by Cold War ideology. Insurgency and terrorism in Israel/Palestine, Algeria, and Ireland, as just a few examples, were all justified as fights for the “natural” status of political freedom, as one form of political institution, the colony, was replaced by another, the nation-state. This form of violence was not just represented as progressive at the time; the contemporary political geography of the modern world memorializes such violence as a progressive moment in the construction of the existing society through annual Independence Day events.

**“Backward” Spaces: State-building**

From a Hobbesian perspective the modern state is seen as an institution providing peace and a barrier to social anarchy. On the other hand, the construction of states is seen as an inherently violent process (Tilly 1990). The imperial project was a global project of Western imposed state-building. However, this civilizational geopolitical process was partial and incomplete. Some parts of the globe became formal imperial possessions or colonies while others (such as parts of contemporary Pakistan) were never in the realm of Western control. The vast majority of the states that emerged from colonial control have become stable societies. However, a few (such as Somalia) have struggled to meet the criteria of modern nation-states; sovereign control over their territorial extent and the establishment of the rule of law. The role of war in the process of state-building has been examined by Tilly (1990) in reference to Western states. However, the assumption that ‘progress’ is manifest in the formation and maintenance of a nation-state has led to the resort to war in the name of enforcing the establishment of hegemonic political practices in spaces that are deemed not to have met that criteria. ‘Failed states’ or ‘rogue states’ are the terms used to represent spaces in which intervention and force may be necessary in order to build the type of institutions that fall within the criteria defining a ‘modern’ society (Klare 1995).

**“Impure” spaces: Genocide**

Genocide, and its associated practice ‘ethnic-cleansing,’ is commonly viewed as a particularly pernicious form of organized violence, one that breaches the bounds
of decency. War may be horrific, but it can also create heroes and martyrs that are recognized outside the combatant’s social group. There are no accepted heroes of genocide. However, as Bauman (2000) informs us, genocide is a thoroughly modern practice. It emerges from the bureaucratic classification of people and groups that is a necessary component of state distribution of resources and access to public goods. Modernity requires classification of in-groups and out-groups, who belongs and who does not. The construction of a modern society inevitably involves the construction of such social boundaries, which means that others must be excluded. Genocide and ethnic-cleansing are the violent manifestation of such exclusion. Hence it is not surprising that practitioners of genocide, Adolf Hitler and Pol Pot being classic examples, portrayed themselves as builders of society and modernizers ushering in a fantastic new future (Tyner 2008).

Hostile Spaces: Invasion

The practice of invasion, or violent territorial intervention, is anathema to the understanding of war as, in some circumstances, a moral necessity. Just war theory is based upon the idea that protecting a sovereign space from invasion is the main moral basis for warfare (Walzer 1977, Flint and Falah 2004). It would thus seem to be a stretch for a state to be able to represent the act of invasion or territorial expansion as not just moral but something that is necessary in the name of progress. However, the Austria-Hungary empire’s decision to launch a war against Serbia in 1914, triggering World War I, was represented as a necessity to protect the empire from collapse (Williamson 2007: 67). Though this may not be seen as progressive from a contemporary perspective, the elite of the Austria-Hungary empire saw themselves as protecting the epitome of social organization against destructive forces. Another example is the invasion of Central and Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union in World War II. This was not just a war to expel the German invaders, but to diffuse a new form of social organization. Even invasion can be portrayed as a means to construct societies in the name of progress.

Neutralized Spaces: Buffer Zones

One specific form of invasion is the construction of buffer zones. The term buffer zone implies a limited and defensive form of invasion; a form of territorial control that is not intended to lead to annexation, but will tackle a security threat. The Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon (1982–2000) is a typical example, but the rhetoric of security and protection was mobilized by the Soviet Union to justify the grander geopolitical project of the domination of ‘satellite states’ to block Western ‘aggression.’ Invasion to create buffer zones may be represented as a progressive form of society building through reference to that which is to be protected. The Zionists goal of the establishment and practice of Israel, an ethno-nationalist but profoundly modern political agenda, underlies their argument for the necessity of a buffer zone. The Soviet Union justified its much larger buffer
Intertwined Spaces of Peace and War

zone by representing itself as the vanguard of a new form of social organization under threat from reactionary forces.

‘Homeland’ Spaces: Counter-invasion

The underlying construction of in-groups and out-groups that is the basis for the nation-state leads to forms of violence that exclude a “foreign” threat either from crossing the border of the state or limits its activities within a state. Such practices are represented as necessary to protect the nation-state project and its progressive agenda. Nation-states are always looking towards a future of greater achievement and prosperity, but do so by harking to the primordial strengths of its national character (Nairn 1977). A dilution of that national character, or a failure to believe in the project, is deemed harmful and may require a violent response. The internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II is an example of the former. The Gulag system of persecution in the Soviet Union (or many other examples of internal oppression) is an example of the latter. The need for such actions is represented as a necessary act to protect the trajectory of the nation-state.

Everyday Spaces: Securitization

The homeland space is represented as a national security issue. To enable the protection of the nation-state an enhanced role of the military and other institutions of state sanctioned violence are deemed necessary. The securitization of many sectors of society (such as immigration control) is a manifestation of security forces in more and more everyday spaces (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009). The military is one such security institution and its presence in schools or in charity drives (in the US the Marine Corps sponsors a “Toys for Tots” drive every Christmas), for example, is represented as beneficial in the context of external security threats. The military is not only portrayed as protector but also the manifestation of a just, safe, and even efficient society, or the epitome of a neo-liberal form of societal organization (Cowen 2006). The presence of security forces in everyday spaces not only ensures the safety of the modern nation-state project but acts as a representation of the discipline and organization needed to make progress along the nation’s trajectory.

This section has explored some of the ways in which war and peace must be seen as interwoven social constructs that produce spaces rather than discrete and antipodean events. War is readily represented as a progressive social process. Complementary to acts of representation are processes constructing material landscapes that are simultaneously the product and arena for contested social relations (see Mitchell this volume). The next section offers an initial exploration of how war is a spatial-temporal moment that requires and facilitates the construction of new geographic settings of social relations. I term these geographic settings, forged in a context of war, geopolitical landscapes.
Geopolitical Landscapes: Intertwined Spaces of War and Construction

The social construction of space as part and parcel of social change is the foundation of contemporary human geography. The seminal work of David Harvey (1982) has provided an axiomatic framework that economic processes create semi-permanent geographic landscapes that frame particular social relations. Cultural geographers, from the work of Carl Sauer (1925) to the contemporary Marxist analysis of Don Mitchell (1996) emphasize how landscapes, at a variety of scales, are built by and, simultaneously mediate social processes. Historical geographers have focused upon the interaction between changing landscapes and social change. Political geographers have been less able to engage the notion of a complementary geopolitical landscape. While focus upon the politics of place has been a key component of political geography (Agnew 1987), the reaction to systemic political geographies that has become the norm of political geography has made it harder to address the construction of geopolitical landscapes at regional, national, and multi-national scales (though the multi-scalar analysis of post-war reconstruction in Bosnia by Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (2005) is a noticeable exception).

The short vignettes in this section make an argument for the identification and study of geopolitical landscapes that are created by, and mediate, processes of war or large-scale organized violence. At a large-scale, I emphasize war as an agent of political geographic change; the engine by which landscapes are made and re-made by the practice of conflict, and the manner in which social relations are implicated and framed. Of course, war itself is not to be reified as a social actor. Instead, war is a spatial-temporal moment in which a host of conflicting social actors construct social relations and associated geographic spaces. The vignettes are an initial exploration into war and post-war reconstruction as interwoven moments, and arenas of social conflict, that each created semi-permanent national and multi-national geopolitical landscapes.

Recognizing the work that has been done with this general goal in mind at the urban scale (Graham 2004, Fregonese 2009), my intention is to introduce the idea of geopolitical landscape at broader scales. In so doing, I continue to illustrate the false binary between war and post-war reconstruction by inter-weaving actions that were simultaneously represented as war and the construction of new, and better, social processes. The vignettes focus upon the historical period around World War Two, from the rise of the Nazi party to the formation of the Cold War.

Reconstruction as the Beginning of Conflict

The rise of the Nazi party was made possible by a social context of a war that had officially ended but was still politically live. Though formally concluded, the “stab-in-the-back” myth (the perception that Germany was not defeated on the battlefield but because of political treachery) meant that many segments of German society believed that a rightful and imminent victory had been snatched from them. The result was a sense of social duty to continue the war in other ways.
The apparent contradiction of a past-war that is on-going illustrates, in general, the interweaving of war and social change. The case of Weimar Germany also illustrates how visions of reconstruction are themselves conflictual and may sow the seeds of future war and organized violence. In a sense, World War I never ended as the Weimar Republic quickly descended into civil war, and the Freikorps emerged from the tattered remains of the German Army. Targeting Bolsheviks, outraged by a sense of political betrayal to the national cause, and concerned about territorial losses and crippling war reparations the Freikorps and the embryonic Nazi party had a vision of a strong, and racially defined, German nation. Their vision of Germany was a nation that would serve Western civilization by acting as a bulwark against Communism, and an imperial state that was able to challenge global powers. For the Nazis and their supporters it was a message of re-building Germany, for the victims it was a politics of violence and hate that led to the Holocaust and World War II. It was a political project that led to the construction of new urban landscapes, as spatial and social restrictions were imposed on Jews leading to ghettoization, expulsion, and attempted eradication, and new European and global landscapes of Nazi invasion and control.

International Reconstruction and Domestic Conflict

It was, for some, a time to celebrate liberation; the end of a six-year war, the hope of the troops to return home, and that sons and daughters would not be called-up. The images of VE Day in Europe, of celebration in the re-lit streets of London, and of grateful French civilians waving to advancing Allied soldiers are part of common European cognitive geopolitical understanding. But this was a time of tension, killing, and hatred. The process of international reconstruction of Europe, or the construction of a new geopolitical landscape that was free of Nazism was overlapping with the latent concerns over the intentions and practices of the Soviet Union. The broad process of constructing a new European geopolitical landscape was manifest in the conflict over urban spaces. The city of Trieste is a fine example of the intersection of global power competition and urban fighting. The tension between New Zealand and Soviet troops over spheres of interest and control never escalated into full-blown conflict, but the presence of the Soviets facilitated execution and retribution on “collaborators” as Communists ensured control of the city and its position within the Soviet geopolitical sphere (Stafford 2007: 344–54). The construction of a new European geopolitical landscape was manifest in door-to-door violence; the new geopolitical omelet required the cracking of more than eggs.

Domestic Reconstruction and International Conflict

In Asia, the central feature of end of World War II was the collapse of Japanese imperial control that had begun with the invasion and occupation of Manchuria and Korea in 1905. The vacuum and disorder left by the Japanese in China was
an opportunity for political and social change, namely the rise of the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Ze Dong. Civil war with the Chinese Nationalists was a necessary component of the project of Chinese Communism, a social project that still relies heavily on violence. The victory of the Communists was only partial, illustrating that the processes of, ostensibly, domestic political change may sow the seeds for persistent international conflict. The defeated nationalists fled to the island of Formosa and, after a spat of violent political confrontation with the indigenous population, established the Republic of China (RoC). The Communists maintain that Taiwan remained part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and there has been a delicate diplomatic dance within the international community of partial recognition of RoC sovereignty. PRC claims upon Taiwan (often mixed with a show of military prowess) are a matter of international concern given the implicit pledge of the United States to protect Taiwan from invasion through the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). The recent ability of the Chinese to shoot-down satellites and build a missile-defense system is seen as a threat by the West in the context of Chinese-Taiwanese tensions. For the PRC the conflict is one of unfinished domestic business, the continued process of state-building. For the US it is a potential international flashpoint that would be indicative of growing PRC geopolitical reach. In this case, domestic reconstruction is an integral part of international politics, as a landscape of relative US and PRC geopolitical influence in Asia is continually renegotiated.

International Conflict and Domestic Reconstruction

Geopolitical tensions are surely high and complex when one has to consider imprisoning an allied leader at the moment of imminent victory. As the Allies were establishing themselves in Normandy after the D-day landings, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were wrestling with how to manage the political maneuverings of General de Gaulle. The sentiment was that for De Gaulle D-Day was a matter of how to seize the initiative in French politics rather than a strategic step in the global war against the Axis powers (Beevor 2009: 16). The arguments between US and British army commanders on the one hand, and the French Army on the other regarding the timing and direction of advances upon Paris was, for the French, fueled the politics of the nature of post-war French politics, and especially competition with French communists (Beevor 2009: 480 and 497). For the Allied leaders, de Gaulle’s independent maneuvering with these “domestic” goals in mind was undermining the geopolitics of the aim for unconditional German surrender (Beevor 2009: 481).

For the French, the imminent defeat of the Nazis was a moment of geopolitical change that required domestic action. Collaborators, real and perceived, were summarily executed or otherwise punished. Women who were deemed guilty of having slept with the Nazis had their heads shaved and were paraded in the streets (Stafford 2007: 24). The atmosphere was so tense that shots were fired as de Gaulle arrived at Notre Dame cathedral (Beevor 2009: 515). The sea-change in
the European geopolitical landscape as the Nazis were on the run was the catalyst for domestic political change that blended party politics with street violence, intertwining processes of war and politics and blending the scale of the body with global geopolitical contest.

Domestic Conflict and International Restructuring

The violence on the streets of Trieste and Paris was evident throughout Europe in the closing days of World War II. Retribution against Nazis and their collaborators, vengeance by surviving Jews and political prisoners, and struggle between Communists and non-Communists was occurring in towns and cities across Europe. Churchill, especially, was envisaging the alliances of World War II morphing into the antagonisms of the Cold War. As the Nazi regime was crumbling, many members of the German political and military elite were confident they could save their hides in what they saw was an inevitable and imminent alliance with the US and Great Britain against the Soviets. Though the Allies stuck together until the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan, the intersection of conflict within the liberated countries of Western and Southern Europe and the Soviet Union’s intention to remain in Central and Eastern Europe and, probably, seek to expand its influence required addressing local and domestic violence at an international scale.

The Marshall Plan was an early manifestation of a program of post-war reconstruction that was motivated by political battles between Communists and non-Communists within domestic political arenas. Following along was the movement towards European political integration and economic development that have, over the decades, evolved into the modern European Union. The Marshall Plan was an international program implemented by the new hegemonic power, the United States, which saw its economic and political security as dependent upon economic stability and the marginalization of extreme left-wing politics within European countries. The same intertwining of domestic conflict and international restructuring remains today, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Competition remains over the geopolitical orientation of countries that were either parts of the Soviet Union or nominally independent countries within its sphere of influence. Debates over membership in the EU and NATO regarding, for example, Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states combines politics between parties arguing for more or less orientation towards Russia or the West, with a mission of expanding the membership of the EU and NATO in the name of peace and prosperity (Kuus 2007).

Though limited in their content, it is hoped that these vignettes have served their purpose. Obviously, the conflicts and social processes mentioned here are just the tip of the iceberg and the cases are more nuanced and complex than I can even suggest in this format. Furthermore, though I have focused upon the process of World War II, to allow for some connection between the vignettes, similar stories can be readily found in different historical-geographical contexts.
The purpose of the vignettes was threefold. The first goal was to provide some simple illustration that the processes of war and the domestic politics of social change are interwoven. Hence, the simple classifications of international and domestic and war and reconstruction, though used to emphasize different ways to approach cases, are exposed as flawed and simplistic. The second goal was to emphasize that the interweaving of processes of war and reconstruction requires a multi-scalar setting. The third goal was to introduce the idea that the interwoven processes of war and conflict combine to create semi-permanent geopolitical landscapes that are framed by, and give spatial form to, particular institutions and power relationships.

The following section will try and tease out some of the key processes to be analyzed to see how geopolitical landscapes are forged and deconstructed in a moment of the formal end of war and the establishment of what has been accepted as a period of relative peace. We will explore this question by pondering when World War II ended.

**When and Where Did World War II End? Identifying Different Interwoven Processes of Conflict**

The timing of the end of World War II is not a matter of trivia, or even historic quibble. It is a grey area that illustrates the interwoven social processes that link the seemingly simple social constructs of war and peace. The continuation of conflict beyond the formal end of war is very clear to those unfortunate enough to be participants. For example, Alfred Döblin (the German novelist) remembers a conversation with a girl around the end of the war:

> When the ruins are knocked down and the rubble cleared away, and when new houses have been built where everyone can have a home and they can come out of their shelters and sheds. When the economy has taken off once more, when politics are stable again, Fräulein E., you are young. You will live to see the peace. Later, when you look back at the present time, you will be astonished that you were young enough to believe that it was peace. (Quoted in MacDonogh 2007: 2)

This section emphasizes the interweaving of social processes across what are, ostensibly, historical-geographic settings of war and peace. The different end dates of World War II are posited not as historical fact, but to show that different end dates bring into focus particular processes that cannot be confined to either the war or post-war periods. The purpose is not to favor one end date over another, or one set of processes; indeed, some of these end dates clearly stretch historical understanding. Instead, the intention is a simple illustration that war and peace are different manifestations of a variety of social processes, and that different perspectives bring particular processes into focus.
World War II Ended on VE/VJ Days

The dominant and comforting narrative is one that declares the end of hostilities with the formal surrender of the Germans and Japanese. Much reproduced images of embrace in Times Square shows the joy of release from the context of war; the responsibility of service, physical separation from loved ones, release from the institutions of the military, and a re-discovery of one’s “true-self.” It is comforting because it compartmentalizes social processes into an abnormal set that are associated with the anomaly of war, and sense of returning to “normal.” It is a comforting myth because of what it denies. The denial of on-going and impending geopolitical tensions with the Soviet Union, the reality of how long it will take to demobilize troops and get them home, and desire not to consider the lingering physical and mental scars of those who have experienced conflict, or must build a life in the absences of loved-ones or the presence of those changed by the war. The forced spatial-temporal compartmentalization of war and peace plays an important role in trying to normalize everyday social relations as being, somehow, distant from geopolitical tensions and the invidious processes of militarization.

World War II Ended With the Establishment of Allied Sectors of Control

The mayhem that accompanied the end of the war in Europe had been planned for via the territorialization of Germany into sectors of control to be administered by the United States, Soviet Union, British, and the French (Stafford 2007). The administration of these sectors required the care and housing of released prisoners of war, concentration camp survivors, collaborators and those seeking revenge or justice against them, the homeless, orphaned, and otherwise dispossessed. With the memory of the famine in post-World War I Germany in mind, the goal was to seek a degree of social cohesion and welfare to prevent social discontent and political agitation.

This particular demarcation of the end of the war requires acquiescence regarding the role of military government in “peace-time.” Peace is, then, understood as an absence of organized violence but may entail the active presence of the military. Peace is, then, a time of retribution and political competition; sometimes in a violent form. The geopolitics of territorial control, and the imposition of government and social norms with military backing, blend “war” into a historical-geographical context of “peace.”

World War II Ended with the Cessation of Allied Control

The end of allied control was the beginning of a new geopolitical landscape, the one we know as the Cold War. Conceptualizing the end of World War II at this moment emphasizes the continual role of inter-state conflict in defining the overarching context for social relations. The imposition of Soviet control upon the nominally independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the efforts
of the United States government to ensure a Western-oriented government in Greece, were manifestations of the power relations and violence that led to what were defined by both the US and Soviet Union as regions of peace (with regard to their sphere), and sites of imperialism and oppression on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The establishment of military bases across Europe meant that the end of World War II required a militarization of the world to maintain a state of peace. War is imminent and peace an active process of militarization the involves processes at the scale of the body (conscription), within states (exclusive areas of military control and locations being defined by nearby military bases), states (membership in alliances and the need for politics to be contained with set acceptable parameters), and inter-state (the establishment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact).

World War II Ended with the Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the Cold War

If the processes of institutionalized war that defined the Cold War cannot be seen as a period of peace and, furthermore, are a continuation of World War II, then perhaps the conflict finally ended with the demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain. So what is peace if that is the case? Peace is an end of ideological battles, and a triumph of a dominant ideology, the end of alternatives; or as Fukuyama (1992) put it, the end of history. The implication is that peace can involve gross disparities in life-chances, given the geography of inequality across Europe. Within this understanding, peace can also be attained when there is a differential in forms of governance and institutional membership. The European Union, a vehicle for integration and inter-state peace, may open its doors to previous antagonists but not all states need be included for peace to reign. On the other hand, the politics of invitation and accession to the European Union and NATO are simultaneously an apparent pathway to guaranteed peace and a source of domestic and international political conflict (as evident in Turkey, Serbia, the Ukraine, as just some examples). War is ideological tension and the presence of foreign military at a high state of readiness; peace is a general understanding of the ideological ground rules, but tension over membership in the dominant institutional clubs that act as gatekeepers of the social norms and practices.

Highlighting the division between war and peace in this way means that war becomes understood as an anomaly again, something that is portrayed as outside the social norm. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was seen as having its roots in primordial identities that were, somehow, separate from and repressed by, modern institutions (Kaplan 1993). Kaplan’s essay helped to generate a perspective in which the war was compartmentalized as separate from dominant social processes. Though the war was troublesome for Europe because “ancient antagonisms” could arise, Kaplan’s analysis also led to the construction of a narrative in which the institutions of “peace” (such as NATO) that had been established during the Cold War, could and should be extended into the Balkans to impose peace there. The
war in the former Yugoslavia helped promote a compartmentalization of war and peace rather than posing questions of how war and peace are interwoven.

*World War II has not Ended*

The contrarian argument that World War II has not ended promotes a perspective of the continual shifting in the ability of states to project militarized power. The waning of the British capability to fight across the globe was clear with the worrying collapse of Singapore in the face of Japanese military might. British decline was stark and embarrassing with the fiasco of the Suez crisis. On the other hand, the sweep of the Red Army across Eastern Europe announced a dramatic change in the global military balance. The build-up of United States military in Great Britain began in a frustratingly slow manner for Winston Churchill. But the slow start led to a protracted engagement which seems to have no end in sight (Woodward 2004), despite the apparent strategic shift from a European Cold War theater to a Middle Eastern, and Central Asian focus (Morrissey 2010). On the other side of the globe, ongoing discussion regarding the US base in Okinawa highlights another geopolitical legacy of World War II and, especially, the subsequent occupation and strategic relationship.

This timing of the end of World War II emphasizes the pervasive and dominant processes of militarization. The level of violence may wax and wane to define periods of war and peace, but geopolitical landscapes of projecting military power remain as the effort to project military force is continual. The conclusion is that study of securitization and militarization is the key to understanding formation of geopolitical landscapes, with war a particularly intense moment and peace a fiction (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009).

*Conclusion: A Political Geography of Pyrrhic Victories*

Rather than providing definitive results or conclusions, the purpose of this essay was to provide brief illustration of the false dichotomy between war and peace, to illustrate that social and political processes are not compartmentalized into discrete historical-geographical settings of war and peace. The continual political tension, negotiation, and sometime overt conflict that are part and parcel of social change interweave social situations that are commonly labeled as war and peace. Instead of discrete categories, it is more productive to think of a continuum of social settings in which power relations and political differences always exist, but in varying degrees of consensus and non-violence compared to disagreement and violence.

The formal conclusion of a war, such as the surrender agreements at the end of World War II, is not the cessation of the politics that were manifest within the time and space of the war itself. The dynamic of war and peace is a continual process of the restructuring of space, in which dominant power relations are defined and
cemented by institutional arrangements. The continual dynamic of creating and destroying geopolitical landscapes involves periods of overt destruction and change (or wars) out of which emerge new geopolitical spaces and political relations at a variety of scales. From the example of World War II, an ideologically divided Europe was one new geopolitical space as was, at another scale, the limitations on political organization in Polish shipyards.

The formal conclusion of war is always, to some degree, a set of pyrrhic victories; as the winners (both states and social groups) create new sets of social relations that are built on a particular set of contradictions and conflicts. For example, the settlement of World War II ushered in a geopolitics of inclusion and exclusion in the newly formed institutions. A different example is the emergence of a racial politics of immigration in Britain from a restructuring of imperial relations. New political tensions, and winners and losers, emerge in post-war settings that are directly related to the issues being fought over in the war, or are an unforeseen by-product. The Cold War geopolitical spaces began to emerge during World War II at the time of the Soviet advance against the Nazis. The British reliance on troops recruited from its imperial possessions catalyzed unforeseen political sentiments that carried over into various times and spaces of decolonization. For Great Britain, victory ushered in a host of political tensions that were manifest in global and domestic arenas. For the United States, the realization of global power fundamentally changed politics and society in unforeseen ways, highlighted and warned of in President Eisenhower’s famous “military industrial complex” speech.

Geographers are ideally skilled and informed to conduct research that breaks-down the commonly held dichotomy of war and peace. Through a general understanding of the social construction of space, the particular perspective adopted by human geographers (whether feminists, critical geopoliticians, economic geographers, etc.) can trace the development of social relations across time to see how the processes underlying the causes and practices of war are manifest when war is declared over to keep old political tensions going and provoke new ones. The continual creation, maintenance, and deconstruction of geopolitical landscapes, is a reflection of the pervasive role of violence in the construction of society and space and the ways in which violence appear in contexts of peace as well as war.

References


Chapter 3
Genocide as Reconstruction: The Political Geography of Democratic Kampuchea

James A. Tyner

Introduction

From its inception as a disorganized socio-political movement, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK; better known as the Khmer Rouge) emerged as the most violent and brutal apparatus of state terror and murder since the Nazi party held power in Germany. Between April 1975 and January 1979 the Khmer Rouge carried out a program of organized mass violence of remarkable proportions. In three years, eight months and 20 days, approximately 2 million people—including native Khmers, Cambodian-born Vietnamese, and Sino-Khmers—died from starvation, disease, exposure, torture, murder, and execution. The total number of deaths approached one-third of Cambodia’s pre-1975 population.

It is well-established that the Khmer Rouge, upon assuming power in 1975, set out to destroy the existing societal infrastructure: health, education, commerce, religion, family (Chandler 1991, 2000, Kiernan 2009). However, what is less understood (or appreciated) is that the Khmer Rouge intended to construct an entirely new state and society (Clayton 1998, Tyner 2008). The objective of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and other leaders of the CPK was to make an entirely new, modern, and productive communal society. This goal of the Khmer Rouge was in fact two-fold: to first erase all vestiges of the previous society and, second, to erect an entirely new, socialist-based society. It was with this understanding that Cambodia ceased to exist, replaced by Democratic Kampuchea (as the country was renamed by the Khmer Rouge). Indeed, it was Pol Pot who declared, “There are no schools, faculties or universities in the traditional sense, although they did exist in our country prior to liberation, because we wish to do away with all vestiges of the past.”

In this chapter I suggest that organized mass political violence—genocide—was explicitly adopted by the Khmer Rouge as an instrument of post-conflict political construction. Furthermore, I maintain that a geographic-based education, as manifest in a political textbook produced by the Khmer Rouge, was

1 Quoted in Clayton (1998: 3).
2 The text in question is entitled Political Geography of Democratic Kampuchea and was published in 1977 by the Ministry of Education, Democratic Kampuchea. I sincerely
foundational to the CPK’s post-war project. As such I provide a needed corrective to our understanding of both post-conflict societies and the ‘causes’ of genocide.

Genocide as Post-conflict Reconstruction

Although the close association between ‘war’ and ‘genocide’ is well-documented, the form of this relationship remains open to debate. Genocides, for example, frequently occur during, or in the immediate aftermath, of war. This is clearly seen in the Armenian genocide of 1915, the Nazi-perpetrated Holocaust of the Second World War, and in the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Scholars assert that the upheavals and uncertainties associated with war contribute to the conditions that make possible the targeting of ‘enemy’ civilians. Indeed, Martin Shaw (2003: 44) writes that “when armed military force is being extensively used against organized armed enemies, then it is easier for leaders to take the extraordinary, generally illegitimate steps towards also using armed force against social groups as such.”

Is war, though, a precursor to genocide? Shaw, for example, is emphatic that war does not simply cause genocide and, indeed, argues that genocide itself can be regarded as a particular, degenerate, form of modern warfare.

Despite both subtle and not-so-subtle differences, the dominant narrative is that genocide occurs within the ‘spaces’ of conflict: that genocide is an extension of continuous warfare. Indeed, Shaw (2003: 5) contends that genocide may be regarded as a particular form of modern warfare. In this chapter I raise the possibility that genocide (or, more broadly, organized mass political violence) may be approached as a political instrument of post-conflict reconstruction. In the case of Cambodia, genocide was perpetrated during a period in which the war was believed over. Indeed, for the Khmer Rouge, the date of their military victory marked ‘year zero’—a tangible clue that signaled their understanding of war’s end.

And yet, to consider genocide as a form of post-conflict reconstruction will seem to many readers as farcical. Post-conflict reconstruction, it is assumed, refers to the rebuilding of the state—and its attendant apparatuses—in the aftermath of war. Hamre and Sullivan (2002: 89), for example, define ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ as “that which is needed to help reconstruct weak or failing states primarily after civil wars.” William Flavin (2003) likewise distinguishes between ‘conflict termination’ and ‘conflict resolution’. Conflict termination refers to the formal end of fighting, although Flavin is quick to note that this does not necessary mean the end of violence. Indeed, belligerents may continue the conflict albeit through guerrilla fighting or other subversive practices. Conflict resolution, conversely, is a long-term process that involves primarily civil activities such

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as social reconciliation, civil administration, governance, public security, and infrastructure development.

Whether one writes of ‘post-conflict’ or ‘conflict termination/resolution’, it is generally assumed that a ‘relative’ peace is at hand. Such a myopic understanding is misleading and fails to recognize the political contestation of ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ as state narratives.

Carl Dahlman (2010: 236) is correct in his observation that “reconstruction and recovery are executed by actors with varying capacities and specific visions of what those activities should accomplish.” John Hamre and Gordon Sullivan, for example, identify ‘four pillars’ of post-conflict reconstruction: security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and governance and participation. And yet, these four pillars, or tasks, were all utilized (and justified) by the Khmer Rouge during the post-conflict ‘construction’ of Democratic Kampuchea. Consider the first task identified by Hamre and Sullivan, that of security. According to Hamre and Sullivan (2002: 91), security “addresses all aspects of public safety … creating a safe and secure environment and development legitimate and effective security institutions”. And yet, to this end, the Khmer Rouge established a vast security network of prisons and detention facilities that were intended, according to their logic, to provide security from traitorous and treasonous activities (see Dy 2007, Chandler 1999). My point is not to critique the four tasks identified by Hamre and Sullivan; nor to suggest that these tasks are not crucial to post-conflict reconstruction. Rather, I want to emphasize the blurred boundaries between ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ and to further problematize the idea of post-conflict society as simply that period following war. Indeed, as demonstrated by the Cambodian genocide, post-war societies may be exceptionally violent—indeed, even more murderous than the period of civil war.

Dahlman (2010: 236) also contends that “If the term post-conflict is to be applied to the messy and contingent realities of life after war, then we must make a distinction based on the quality of the peace actually achieved.” But similar to ‘post-conflict’, the term ‘peace’ also remains difficult to pin down. In most Western-based societies, peace has been represented as the opposite of war. This example of binary thinking, however, obfuscates as much as it illuminates. Peace, as the opposite of war, does not necessarily entail a ‘just’ or ‘benign’ society. As Harris and Morrison (2003: 12) explain, a state not at war may still not be peaceful. Indeed, societies may exhibit high crime rates, or high infant mortality rates; people may live under oppressive conditions sanctioned by a totalitarian government. Legal regulations may restrict population movements, reproductive decisions, religious beliefs, and choice of marriage partner. To many observers, such a society would hardly constitute a ‘peaceful’ existence.

In recognition of this paradox, peace educators often distinguish between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ connotations of peace. In its negative form, peace implies the cessation of some existing or pending violence, e.g., war. Negative peace building practices, consequently, focus on the prevention of violence. Such practices may include the international deployment of peacekeepers that separate
warring factions, the support of criminal proceedings that remove repressive regimes, or the imposition of embargos and sanctions that punish repressive governments. Positive forms of peace, conversely, follow standards of social justice and involve concrete actions concerned with the building of a just and humane world (Vriens 1997: 28). In other words, positive peace building practices are those that encourage the growth of social, political, and legal institutions that address the underlying causes of conflict and violence (Borer 2006: 14). These may include measures that create new legal frameworks and understandings, support for political institutions that provide legal protection for all members of society, the revitalization of social and economic practices that address economic and food security issues, and even university courses that focus on non-violent ways of dealing with conflict (Borer 2006: 15).

Peace building efforts, consequently, exhibit an underlying tension, one that hinges on the interplay between negative and positive peace building practices. In fact, a dialectical relationship exists between the two, which may both sustain and undermine the other. Harris, for example, notes that the imposition of military solutions to conflict resolution may in fact exacerbate the underlying tensions which initially gave rise to the conflict. This “emphasis on peace through strength further alienates” groups and contributes to long-term military interventions and further legitimizes a ‘war culture’ (Harris 2002: 30). Indeed, this approach to peace building may actually deepen antagonisms and animosities among different groups, thereby hindering broader efforts at peace and reconciliation. Conversely, positive peacemaking and peace building approaches recognize that violence “resides in the culture” and tries to create the necessary political, economic, and cultural climate necessary to permanently end conflict (Harris 2002: 30).

Education is often assumed (and sometimes erroneously) to contribute toward the development of a ‘positive’ peace. As Peter Buckland (2006: 7) writes, “Education is expected to contribute significantly to rebuilding shattered societies. Policymakers assert that it can heal the psychosocial wounds of war, solve youth unemployment, deliver decentralization and democracy, build peace and promote economic and social development.” However, Buckland (2006: 7) also makes the prescient observation that “While education does not cause wars, nor end them, every education system has the potential either to exacerbate or to mitigate the conditions that contribute to violent conflict.” Educational policies may in fact contribute to, and provide justification for, the continuance of mass violence—including genocide.

The Cambodian genocide followed in the wake of civil war; the termination of conflict however did not bring about peace as this concept is normally understood. In the remainder of this chapter I argue that genocide, or more broadly ‘mass political violence’, was employed as a ‘legitimate’ technique in the post-war construction of a nation-state. This understanding is crucial, in that it highlights the ambiguous boundaries between spaces of conflict and spaces of reconstruction. However, as I conclude in this chapter, even the notion of ‘positive’ peace becomes deeply troublesome and contested.
The Killing of Cambodia

On April 17, 1975, thousands of war-hardened Khmer Rouge soldiers poured into the streets of Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital city. Coinciding with the cessation of the broader Indochina War that engulfed neighboring Vietnam and Laos, the Cambodian Civil War (1970–1975) was over. In five bloody years, the Khmer Rouge had defeated the US-supported Republican forces of the Lon Nol government. In the process, tens of thousands of people had died; many hundreds of thousands found themselves refugees in their own land—what we would now describe by the innocuous term ‘internally displaced persons.’ But for the majority of Cambodians, post-war society was anything but peaceful.

The victory of the Khmer Rouge would mark the termination of years of military conflict but not the end of widespread violence. In the weeks and months that followed, the cities and towns of Cambodia were evacuated (see Figure 3.1), their inhabitants forced onto agricultural collectives in the countryside. Hospitals, factories and schools were closed; money and wages abolished, monasteries emptied (Kiernan 2009; see also Quinn 1989, Tyner 2008). The country, in the words of Ben Kiernan (2009, 341), became a ‘prison camp state’.

Democratic Kampuchea was governed by the Central Committee of the CPK and, more specifically, by members of the ‘Party Center’ of the CPK. In 1975 the Party Center, known as Angkar Loeu (high organization), included Pol Pot,
prime minister and secretary-general of the CPK; Nuon Chea, deputy secretary-general and president of the Representative Assembly of Democratic Kampuchea; Ieng Sary, deputy prime minister in charge of foreign affairs; Son Sen, deputy prime minister for defense and security; Khieu Samphan, president of Democratic Kampuchea; Ieng Thirith, wife of Ieng Sary and minister of social action; and Yun Yat, wife of Son Sen and minister of culture (Kiernan 2009: 344).

The CPK sought to transform Cambodia into a modern, communal utopia. Accordingly, Party members attempted to replace what they saw as impediments to national autonomy and social justice with revolutionary energy and incentives (Chandler 2000: 209; see also Thion 1983). In their attempt to create—not recreate—a utopian society, the leadership of the Khmer Rouge embarked on a massive program of social and spatial engineering (Tyner 2008).

Both in theory and in practice, party leaders drew on the lessons of Mao Zedong’s 1956–1958 ‘Great Leap Forward’ in an attempt to foment a complete and rapid transformation of Cambodia’s economy. Agricultural production was to take center-stage, with hard currency earned from rice exports to be used to finance industrialization. The impetus behind this policy was, in part, drawn from Khieu Samphan’s doctoral dissertation, *Cambodia’s Economy and Industrial Development*. Although not a template in the strict sense, the president of Democratic Kampuchea’s earlier scholarly work did provide guidance in subsequent policy formulation. Khieu Samphan wrote that Cambodia’s economy was backward, locked in a feudal and pre-capitalist mode of production. This condition, he maintained, resulted from Cambodia’s unequal and dependent integration into the French colonial economy and the continuance of unfair trade relations. Consequently, the Khmer Rouge leadership believed that most, if not all, of Cambodia’s problems were derived from its subordinate position in an international economic system that was primarily dominated by France, China, and the United States. Therefore, having achieved military victory in 1975, party members sought to achieve both total independence and self-reliance for their politically weak post-conflict government.

Elsewhere I have argued that the Khmer Rouge’s post-conflict program was one of an ‘erasure’ of space (Tyner 2008, 2009a). According to Henri Lefebvre every “society to which history gave rise within a framework of a particular mode of production, and which bore the stamp of that mode of production’s inherent characteristics, shaped its own space” (1991: 46–7). Consequently, dominant economic systems, such as feudalism or merchant capitalism will be manifest on the landscape. However, since each mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode of production to another mode must entail the production of a new space (Lefebvre 1991: 47). Spaces of feudalism give way to spaces of merchant capitalism; spaces of merchant capitalism are transformed into spaces of industrial capitalism. In an on-going dialectical process, as revolutions transform one economic system into another, societal spaces reflect the accumulated burden (or remnants) of previous societies and modes of production. The spaces of Cambodia in 1975, accordingly, would have revealed vestiges of
an indigenous and pre-capitalist, or feudal, Khmer society, a French colonial-
mercantilist presence, and a newly applied veneer of Western industrial capitalism
(Tyner 2009a: 13). Such accretions would have been most pronounced in the cities
and larger towns, but other, more peripheral regions would have likewise reflected
elements of feudalism, capitalism, and colonialism.

The post-war spaces of a defiled Cambodia—modern banks, schools, and
even hospitals—were an anathema to the Khmer Rouge leadership. Rather than
reconstructing a war-devastated society, and building on the landscapes of previous
modes of production, the Khmer Rouge explicitly attempted to erase time and space
to construct (in their minds) a pure utopian communal society (see Figure 3.2). This
is seen most clearly in the Khmer Rouge’s decision to forcibly evacuate Phnom Penh
and all other urban areas of Cambodia (McIntyre 1996). But it is also seen in the
justifications for the mass violence of all facets of daily life. And most significantly,
the Khmer Rouge’s attempt to erase space as a post-conflict construction program is
seen in the promotion of education throughout Democratic Kampuchea.
(Geographic) Educational Policies of the Khmer Rouge

Within any post-conflict society, the promotion of ‘social and economic well-being’ is foundational. According to Hamre and Sullivan (2002: 91), this task entails “fundamental social and economic needs, in particular, providing emergency relief, restoring essential services to the population in areas such as health and education, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiating an inclusive and sustainable development program.

The Khmer Rouge well understood the importance of education in their post-conflict construction of Democratic Kampuchea. Indeed, education was vital to their revolutionary project in that it would provide support and legitimacy for associated political and economic programs. When the Khmer Rouge stood victorious on the streets of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, they constituted neither a centralized, efficient political party nor military force. Their victory was the haphazard by-product of the culmination of a series of concurrent revolutions, social movements and the wars in neighboring Vietnam and Laos. Ben Kiernan (1996: 16) is blunt in his assessment: “Pol Pot’s revolution would not have won power without [the] US economic and military destabilization of Cambodia.” In short, they achieved victory not because they were united in principle or ideology with the Khmer populace. In fact, the socialist revolution enacted by the Khmer Rouge was not the end-result of a popular uprising. It was not a ‘pure’ communist revolution but instead the culmination of brutal military practices that garnered political control through terror (Tyner 2008: 104–105).

The context of the Khmer Rouge’s ascendancy and subsequent need to “create legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions” (Hamre and Sullivan 2002: 92) is thus critical to our understanding of educational practices forwarded within Democratic Kampuchea. Having achieved ‘military victory’, the Khmer leadership understood that they would have to centralize power and, most significantly, to ‘build socialism’. This conception, Thion (1983: 25) explains, is derived from the theorizing of early post-Leninist Marxian economists who realized that revolutions do not always take place after the final phase of capitalist revolution and, therefore, the concentration of productive forces must be achieved under revolutionary control. In Cambodia, however, prior to the Civil War preconditions for revolutionary action were not present. Following independence in 1953, most Cambodians were reluctant to become involved in rebellious politics. Furthermore, given than many of Cambodia’s peasants actually owned the lands upon which they tilled, communist propaganda was largely ineffective.

With such a precarious hold on the populace—and its own political power—the Khmer Rouge leadership sought to solidify their position through various means. On the one hand, the Khmer Rouge utilized a practice of state-terror (see Kiernan 1985, Quinn 1989, Chandler 1999, 2000). Within Democratic Kampuchea, for example, the public display of torture and execution served to reify the authority of the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, the systematic violence and the killing of its own
populace were understood by the Khmer Rouge as a prelude to the construction of a moral and properly ordered post-war society (Tyner 2008: 167).

On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge turned to education—generally considered a ‘positive’ peace building exercise—as a means of establishing both legitimacy and political control. However, education under the Khmer Rouge entailed both destructive and constructive practices (Clayton 1998). First, and in conformance with other practices, the Khmer Rouge sought to dismantle the pre-existing educational infrastructure. Prior to the Khmer Rouge’s rise to power, for example, Cambodia was home to 5,275 primary schools, 146 secondary schools, and nine institutes of higher education (Clayton 1998: 5). Indeed, under the former head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, education was geared toward professional preparation and was viewed as an important step away from neocolonial dependency (Clayton 1998: 6).

Under the guidance of the Khmer Rouge, however, this infrastructure was literally demolished. According to David Ayers (2000: 118), the first phase of the CPK’s educational agenda was to dismantle and eliminate the French-imbued education system of the old society. Consequently, “the Khmer Rouge destroyed 90% of all school buildings, emptied libraries and burned their contents, and smashed nearly all school laboratory equipment” (Clayton 1998: 6). And those buildings that were left standing were converted into other uses. The Royal University, for example, was turned into a farm, while the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Higher Technical Institute was converted into the Khmer Rouge’s Central Political School and prison (Clayton 1998: 5–7). Perhaps most symbolic, a former high school (Tuol Svay Prey) was converted into a detention and torture facility; at this site, now known as Tuol Sleng prison, approximately 14,000 people were detained, tortured, and eventually killed (see Chandler 1999).

Apart from the physical infrastructure of education, teachers were also eliminated. Anywhere from 75% to 90% of all teachers at all levels were killed during the genocide. As one example, of the 1,000 academics employed at the University of Phnom Penh prior to 1975, only 87 survived (Clayton 1998: 8).

Concomitant to these destructive practices, the Khmer Rouge forwarded a number of (in their view) constructive practices. This marked the second phase of the CPK’s educational agenda: the reconstruction of the nation-state, with the intent to ingrain in students a desire and capacity to build and defend the country (Ayers 2000: 118). In particular, the Khmer Rouge leadership proposed a new educational system, one that was dedicated to the formation of a national political consciousness (Clayton 2005). As detailed in the CPK’s ‘Four Year Plan to Build Socialism in All Fields’ (Chander et al. 1988: 114), the Khmer Rouge envisioned a curricula that would provide “a system of learning through the collective and in the concrete movement of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism.” Education was to be offered at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels—for a total of nine years. General subjects were to include reading and writing, arithmetic, geography, natural science, politics, and the history of the revolutionary struggle (Chandler et al. 1988: 114).
David Ayers (2000: 118) suggests, however, that the “educational agenda of DK’s leaders was entirely hostile to the development of education.” He bases his conclusion, first, on the fact that the promotion of self-reliance within the economic realm precluded social development. Teachers, for example, were recruited from among the most ‘loyal’ party members; most, in fact, had either very little or no training. Students, when not engaged in forced labor, were forced to learn in makeshift shelters, in stables, or in the fields. Educational materials were virtually non-existent, and most students learned lessons through rote memorization of war-related songs and slogans (Ayers 2000: 118–19). In explaining the ‘failure’ of education under the Khmer Rouge, Ayers (2000: 119) concludes that “the educational policies pursued by the DK regime were a direct manifestation of an ideology that enjoyed no political or social legitimacy in Cambodia.”

But this, of course, is exactly the point. Given the lack of political and social legitimacy, the Khmer Rouge explicitly sought to justify their political and economic programs through education.

Education in general, but geographic education specifically, is far from a neutral activity. Indeed, with respect to the latter, it is now well-understood that the teaching of geography fulfills both a general and a more specific role in social production (Huckle 1985). Geographic instruction, firstly, provides students with basic knowledge about people and places: the ‘facts-and-figures’ of geography, or the traditional ‘capes-and-bays’ form of knowledge that appear on maps and in text-books. However, there is also a ‘hidden curriculum’ (or subtext) in the teaching of geography. Indeed, geographic education may facilitate the construction of ‘imagined geographies’ upon which a social sense of identity rests can be manufactured and circulated by the state through its institutions, orders, and discourses (Morgan 2003: 445; see also Gruffudd 1995, Kashani-Sabet 1998). Indeed, notions of geography, territory and national space are crucial in understanding the development of nationalist politics (Gruffudd 1995: 219).

This is exemplified, for example, in the re-drawing of political maps following war. According to Morgan, states reinforce the ‘obviousness’ of the national territory through the creation of the palimpsest of the national map. In this fashion, “citizens are ‘corralled’ into certain national and/or political identities through the creation of discursive power effects around the lines on the map” (Morgan 2003: 445). And, in fact, following the victory of the CPK, a new map appeared, one that symbolically spoke to the new state of Democratic Kampuchea. Elsewhere I argue (Tyner 2008: 123) that this map—along with numerous other maps that were proposed by the Khmer Rouge—provides important insights into the place-making strategies that undergirded the post-conflict violence of Democratic Kampuchea.

The Khmer Rouge’s map portrays the administrative divisions of Democratic Kampuchea. At the broadest scale, Democratic Kampuchea was divided into seven geographic zones, identified by cardinal compass directions: North, Northeast, East, Southwest, West, Northwest, and Center. These zones were apparently derived from military designations established by the Khmer Rouge during the war (1970–1975). These zones, significantly, did not conform to any pre-existing
political division of Cambodia. The Northeast, East, and Southwest zones, for example, including the former eastern portion of Stung Treng province and the provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, eastern Kompong Cham, Kandal, southern Kompong Speu, and Kampot.

The political geography of Democratic Kampuchea as delineated on the map is highly significant (see Figure 3.3). Certainly, one sees evidence of the militarized society promoted by the Khmer Rouge. The fact that political divisions, for example, were derived from military necessity is certainly important. However, the map also reveals how the Khmer Rouge sought to erase previous regional identities, to be replaced by an imaginative geography that suppressed regionalism and provincialism in favor of a broader nationalism. The entire political geographic organization of Democratic Kampuchea was based on an abstract system composed of cardinal direction points and numbers and, in the process, the Khmer Rouge’s cartography signified ‘egalitarianism’ in that all regions were identical;

Figure 3.3 Map of Democratic Kampuchea, 1976, prepared by the DK Ministry of Education (Photo courtesy of the Documentation Center of Cambodia Archives)
there was nothing to distinguish one zone from the other (Tyner 2008: 124–5). Consequently, the “overall effect is to build up a national imaginative geography, an imagined space in which other practices in the name of the state are justified and legitimated” (Morgan 2003: 445–6).

The production of geographic knowledge, whether in the form of maps or texts, thus assumes a primary place in post-conflict (re)construction. State schooling practices serve to establish and reinforce specific ideologies of nationalism. In turn, these practices may be used to justify and legitimate political processes and practices—including mass violence and genocide. It is to this function of geographic education, within Democratic Kampuchea, I now turn.

**Political Geography: Khmer Rouge Style**

Although agricultural and industrial development were to be the cornerstones for Democratic Kampuchea’s post-conflict economy, education was to be the foundation (Clayton 1998). In part, the importance of education is related to the place of children within the new society. A traditional saying in Cambodia holds that ‘clay is molded while it is soft’ (Locard 2004: 143). According to Henri Locard, this slogan was often used to signify that only young children could be selected by the CPK to become loyal servants of Angkar. Another slogan, reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s ‘blank page,’ claimed that ‘Only a newborn is free from stain’ (Locard 2004: 143). This idea, in fact, was developed by Pol Pot, who said of the young: “Those, among our comrades, who are young, must make a great effort to re-educate themselves. They must never allow themselves to lose sight of this goal. You have to be, and remain, faithful to the revolution. People age quickly. Being young, you are at the most receptive age, and capable to assimilate what the revolution stands for, better than anyone else.” (Locard 2004: 144).

Given that education within Democratic Kampuchea was, in part, designed to cultivate a proper political consciousness (Clayton 2005), it is not surprising that the Khmer Rouge produced school texts. Education in general, but textbooks in particular, often carry a certain political cache. As Carmen Luke and her co-authors (1983: 112) write, “The significant role of textbooks in education … is a function of their ability to ‘make meanings more explicit’ in a manner which places those meanings ‘above criticism.’” Furthermore, as James Blaut (1998: 46) writes, the production of textbooks “make[s] it certain that children will only read those facts in their textbook which are considered to be acceptable as facts by the opinion-forming elite of the culture.” In short, the school text embodies the “authorized version of society’s valid knowledge” (Olson 1980: 192). Textbooks for the Khmer Rouge, therefore, imparted an authority to which students were expected to respect without question, and thus complemented the role performed by the secretive ‘Angkar’.
In Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge were known to have published at least three text-books, including two books on geography. The first, a general geography text, was intended for first grade use; the second, a text on political geography, was designed for second grade use. It is the latter text that occupies my focus for the remainder of this chapter.

In 1977 the Ministry of Education published a second grade text entitled “Political Geography of Democratic Kampuchea.” Numbering 72 pages in length, the text is composed of twelve ‘lessons’ or chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the nation and people of Democratic Kampuchea; the second chapter details the organizational structure of Democratic Kampuchea, including its provinces, regions, zones, and districts. Lessons three through eleven cover the various provinces of Democratic Kampuchea. Between 1975 and 1979, the state of Democratic Kampuchea (as administered by the Khmer Rouge) was composed of 19 provinces; these were further divided into 112 districts, 1,160 communes, and innumerable villages. These provinces were also aggregated for administrative purposes into larger regions and zones.

The text, in effect, constitutes a fairly traditional regional geography of Democratic Kampuchea. Lessons three through eleven are identical in structure. Each lesson begins with a brief summary of the province(s), followed by a (repetitive) lesson summary and series of questions. Lesson four, for example, identifies Kandal Province as being “situated around the intersection of … four rivers” and having Takhmao as its provincial town” (page 21). These brief summaries give further elaboration on neighboring provinces and/or physical features. In short, each lesson begins with the basic ‘site-and-situation’ of the province. Next, the text informs students of the various districts which compose the provinces, along with specific communes. Stung Treng Province, for example, consists of four districts, including Siem Bok; this latter district is further composed of three communes. Lesson chapters are illustrated with photographs. As a regional geography, however, the text is far from idiographic; rather, it is normative in approach, commanding students to learn not only the political (i.e., administrative) divisions of the country, but also the politics behind the establishment of Democratic Kampuchea.

Having established the basic political boundaries of each province, lessons subsequently inform students of the relevancy of each location to the overall revolution. Thus, with respect to Kandal Province, students learn that Democratic Kampuchea’s “poor peasants at all revolutionary strongholds in Kandal Province stood up to struggle against the secret agents, soldiers, police, and the exploitative class of all forms, who infiltrated, repressed, and slaughtered our brothers and sisters” (p. 22). Likewise, students learn that for both Siem Reap Province and Oddar Meanchey Province, “our people … [but] particularly the poor peasant farmers, joined the rest of the people in the country in the revolutionary struggles against the American imperialist, its puppets, and the traitorous Lon Nol clique.

3 A math text was also produced.
with bursting energy and enthusiasm” (p. 53). Chapters conclude with ‘lesson summaries’, in which the main points of the preceding relevancy sections are repeated, followed by ‘suggested’ questions for discussion. One question, for example, asks students: “During the period of over five years of revolutionary war, how did our people in Preah Vihear province participate in the struggles?” (p. 62).

Lessons are brief, direct, and repetitive. They entail basic geographic concepts (i.e., site and situation), followed by political lessons designed to promote a particular geographic imaginary of both the revolutionary struggle and the contemporary state of Democratic Kampuchea.

Significantly, these lessons provide insight into the establishment of citizenry for Democratic Kampuchea. Students learn who was to be included within the state, and for what reasons; likewise, students learned whom was to be excluded, with corresponding reasons. Consequently, these lessons could be applied in the students’ everyday lives, as a means of providing justification and legitimacy to other Khmer Rouge spatial practices, such as detentions, forced labors, and executions (see Tyner 2009b).

The Khmer Rouge well understood the reconstruction of Cambodia’s geography. Indeed, as indicated in the political geography text book:

over the past two thousand years under the administration of the feudal and capitalist class and the iron yoke of the old and new colonialists and the foreign imperialists, our Kampuchean nation has nothing remained but an empty shell and a mere label. The true nature and essence of the national unit were entirely shattered. For the nation suffered territorial losses and the country and people became subservient to foreigners. Furthermore, everything associated with the national identity from politics, economics, culture, arts, literature, and traditions to social order, attitude and behavior, language, clothing fashion, and so on were foreign imports or were transformed by foreign influences. (p. 2)

Lesson One, therefore, is quite clear as to whom was to be included in Democratic Kampuchea. The lesson explains that the “people of Kampuchea are Kampucheans of all ethnic origins, including the Khmers and all ethnic minorities who are based in regional localities and other areas throughout the country and who were born and have earned their livelihood from farming in the territory of the Democratic Kampuchea since a long time ago” (p. 3).

However, the text also notes that the ‘nation’ consists of “people of all ethnic backgrounds who are collective laborers and peasants who have a long history of audacious struggles against the oppression and exploitation of the feudal and capitalist reactionaries and the invasion of foreign imperialists and colonialists of the old and new kinds” (p. 1). According to this ‘second-grade’ text book, here is a clear geo-political statement as to who was to be included or excluded from Democratic Kampuchea.

The lesson is brutally self-evident; from the Khmer Rouge’s point of view, a complete erasure of space was required. The Khmer Rouge ideologues were not
content with retaining, or building on, the past inscriptions of previous modes of production and spatial practices. Rather, the Khmer Rouge were compelled, and believed themselves to be justified, through the use of genocide as a post-war political tool of (re)construction. The transformation of Cambodia into Democratic Kampuchea was, from the perspective of the CPK, literally to ‘smash’ all pre-existing histories, geographies, and societies. Consequently, the Khmer Rouge explicitly attempted to erase both history and geography to create (in their geographical imagination) a pure, communist-based national utopia (Tyner 2008, 2009a,b).

Citizens were to be economically and or politically useful; citizens were to exist solely for the state. The Khmer Rouge saying ‘If you live there is no gain. If you die, there is no loss’, approaches this conception of the sovereign’s right over life and death. This is the lesson that is taught in the second-grade text book. It was, in fact, a lesson on territorial sovereignty whereby the body-politic was predicated, literally, upon the spatial discipline of populations. For the Khmer Rouge, the territorial integrity of post-war Democratic Kampuchea hinged upon the presumed moral integrity of its populace.

The principal expression of sovereignty resides, to a large degree, in the power and the capacity to dictate who may live and who must die (Mbembe 2003: 11). Following Michel Foucault (2003: 240), in the classic conception of sovereignty, the right of life and death was one of the sovereign’s basic attributes. In other words, to say that “the sovereign has a right of life and death means that he [sic] can … either have people put to death or let them live. Life and death, therefore, are removed from the realm of the ‘natural’ and fall within the field of governance. Foucault suggests, also, that the sovereign cannot grant life in the same way that he or she can inflict death. The right of life and death, therefore, “is always exercised in an unbalanced way: the balance is always tipped in favor of death.” Consequently, the “very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to kill: it is at the moment when the sovereign can kill that he [sic] exercises his right over life” (Foucault 2003: 240).

The killings that were sanctioned and justified by the Khmer Rouge were designed, in part, to centralize authority; likewise, the tortures, forced confessions, and executions were enacted to justify and legitimize the sovereignty of the CPK. Hence we see in Democratic Kampuchea, that mass violence (including torture and murder) had a clear and distinct post-conflict purpose: a systematic eradication of persons who did not conform with the imagined geographies of a sovereign Democratic Kampuchea (Tyner 2009b: 17).

**Conclusions**

When fighting ceases, it is often assumed, peace is at hand, and a process of reconstruction begins. Unfortunately, the reality is decidedly more complex. Earlier I noted the dichotomy between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ forms of peace.
The latter implies the termination of conflict, while the former relates to standards of social justice and involves concrete actions concerned with the (re)construction of just and humane geographies. This dichotomy, however, crumbles in the context of the Cambodian Genocide. Indeed, the lessons of Democratic Kamplucea are especially relevant in our theorization of post-conflict societies and reconstruction. The Khmer Rouge justified their actions and condoned the death of millions of their own citizens. These deaths occurred via both direct violence (e.g., murder and execution) and structural violence (e.g., starvation, inadequate health facilities). And the spatial practices that permitted such violence were justified and legitimated in terms of promoting a just and egalitarian society. Ironically, in their post-conflict practices, the Khmer Rouge claimed to establish a universal understanding of right and wrong: all people were to be equal and the distribution of goods was to be just and equal (Tyner 2009: 193).

In the aftermath of war, the Khmer Rouge proposed and implemented a geographic-based pedagogy, an educational curricula designed to formulate a specific geographical imagination. To date, while research has examined the overarching educational philosophy of the Khmer Rouge, no scholar has analyzed the specific text books produced by the Khmer Rouge. This chapter, as part of a larger project (Tyner 2008, 2009a,b), constitutes the first such effort to evaluate and understand the promotion of a geographic identity through a reading of a 1977 political geography text produced by the Khmer Rouge. The text, while traditional in orientation with an emphasis on regional geography, was explicit in forwarding the Khmer Rouge’s justification and legitimacy of both its political rule and organized mass violence. Significantly, we read in this political geography text an explicit attempt to construct a new society following a lengthy and brutal civil war. The Cambodian genocide, accordingly, gives weight to the argument that the promotion of education is a significant, although complex, post-conflict practice. However, it also becomes clear that in some instances, genocide itself emerges as a program of post-conflict (re)construction.

References


Many authors have argued that there is no clear line between conflict and post-conflict contexts (see the Introduction to this volume). War and peace may be two discrete moments on a continuum, or part of a cycle of conflict. Conflict can continue in peacetime as war by other means (Dahlman 2009). In this chapter, we concur with this argument, but place it in a specific context: that of two humanitarian emergencies. In turn, we make a parallel argument; that no easy distinction can be made between a humanitarian disaster created by a tsunami and one created by conflict when they occur in a single location. The impacts of such ‘dual disasters’ are inseparable and interact with one another to produce particular political and social relations that, in turn, shape prospects for recovery, peace and justice. In short, just as war and peace are mutually constituted, so too are the outcomes of natural disasters that overlap with extant conflict.

This chapter explores post-conflict reconstruction in a context that is also one of post-tsunami recovery in Aceh, the Indonesian province at the northern end of Sumatra that was the highly publicized scene of the 2004 Indian Ocean Basin tsunami. In the wake of this natural disaster, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) artificially divided the effects of the dual disaster. This analytical division was operationally integrated in the international humanitarian response to these disasters. In effect, ‘victim categories’ have been created and maintained, separating conflict-affected and tsunami-affected communities. The generous funding for post-tsunami reconstruction sits in stark contrast to post-conflict efforts to repair and reconstruct houses, restore livelihoods, and rebuild infrastructure in areas where it was destroyed by the war between rebels of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the GoI since 1976.

The negligence on the part of aid agencies to support local authorities in trying to quickly overcome these disparities may well have persistent effects on the political stability of post-conflict Aceh. Despite half a decade of peace in the wake of the tsunami, everyday practices of intimidation and violence that characterized the period of armed conflict continue to govern relations in some conflict-affected communities. In particular, those former low-ranking fighters, or foot soldiers of the rebel movement, that could not reap the post-conflict political and economic benefits that many of their commanders did, feel disadvantaged and left out of the spoils of peace and tsunami aid. Given the ambivalent effects of the tsunami
and of the international tsunami response on conflict in Aceh, lessons for future post-conflict situations and a call for a more context-sensitive international aid intervention are discussed.

We examine how a conflict, a natural disaster, an ensuing peace agreement, and international aid to all of the above overlap and intersect in Aceh, Indonesia. We further demonstrate how aid agencies and media environments contribute to international humanitarian responses in diverse disaster settings. In numerous ways, the tsunami put Aceh back on the international map, newly visible after decades of civil war and restrictions on travel for foreign media and tourists. The massive influx of international aid agencies providing assistance also created an incentive for good behaviour on the part of all parties to the conflict. This in turn played a part in stabilising the political conflict at the time and opened up more political space for reconciliation (Kelman and Gaillard 2007; Waizenegger 2007; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010).

Using the example of Aceh, we juxtapose the generous tsunami response with the comparatively underfunded and invisible silent disaster, namely the effects of the conflict which have been quietly ignored in the post-conflict period by many aid agencies much as they had been during the conflict phase. Media coverage conditions the priorities of donor governments, private donors and aid agencies in delivering humanitarian assistance; and the performance of aid agencies on the ground. Accordingly, the 2004 tsunami was treated as the most salient humanitarian crisis despite three decades of deadly conflict and its attendant economic and social consequences for civilians in the area. Conflict affected communities including many former combatants have received little, if any, assistance after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (or MoU, the technical term for the peace agreement) in Helsinki, Finland in 2005. Tsunami survivors, in contrast, have seen their homes rebuilt, sometimes twice over. These post-conflict disparities pose potential threats to precarious peace in Aceh, especially as international aid flows have slowed or stopped (Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010). Just as conflict and post-conflict can be seen as a ‘continuum of violence’ (Cockburn 2004), so too can the dual disaster in Aceh be conceived of as both, post-tsunami and post-conflict.

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1 The MoU, or peace agreement, was forged between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) in August 2005 after almost three decades of war. It stipulates that the Free Aceh Movement would have to demobilize its forces and that the GoI would remove all police except those conducting normal activities, and all military forces. A general amnesty would be granted to GAM rebels who would receive compensation for reintegration; the Aceh population would also get compensation for loss of property and human rights abuses resulting from the conflict. A devolution of power from the centre to the province is also outlined in the MoU, allowing for the formation of local political parties and ensuring provincial entitlement for up to 70% of all revenues from hydrocarbon deposits in the region (Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010).
The methods employed for this research include interviews and meetings over four years with aid personnel from the intergovernmental/United Nations sector, Indonesia government staff at the agencies responsible for reconstruction (BRR) and reintegration (BRA), local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international NGOs, political representatives at both national and provincial scales, civilians affected by the conflict and those affected by the tsunami, as well as local journalists. The study draws on four seasons of fieldwork exploring international responses to the tsunami and the end of armed conflict in Aceh (2006–2009).2

Salient and Silent Emergencies

The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami generated one of the deadliest rapid-onset disasters in recent history. It was broadcast globally, albeit unevenly in a geographical sense. Tourist videos and cell phone footage were circulated and witnessed worldwide, though Aceh was (like Myanmar) arguably the least visible site of devastation, with its strict limitations on foreign visitors. The tsunami affected 20 countries and received an unprecedented international response. The vast number of journalists that reported from the disaster scene stirred a global relief campaign of unprecedented scale: $13 billion in aid was pledged globally. Never before had the international public and foreign governments donated as much money for disaster-response to a single disaster-event. And never in history had an aid agency announced that it had received more than enough funds, subsequently halting the acceptance of further tsunami-earmarked donations.

The tsunami graphically highlighted the fact that humanitarian aid is not distributed proportional to global needs (Vaux 2006; Darcy and Hoffman 2003). While funds for tsunami relief in 2005 totalled five times the amount of aid actually needed (475%), concurrent emergency appeals, most notably in Africa, have been insufficiently covered (many only to 30–40%) (IFRC 2006).3 The tsunami was a ‘perfect storm’ for the media: dispossession and death were dramatic and devastating. Victims of the disaster were not protagonists of their fate, but rather caught unaware, producing an innocence that deepened media dramatization (Jeganathan 2005). In Aceh, the media could ‘see’ the tsunami’s destruction

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2 In 2007 both authors conducted interviews and focus groups together in Aceh. In 2006, Waizenegger did preliminary research for the Asia Pacific Foundation, based in Vancouver, Canada. Subsequent fieldwork in 2008 and 2009 was conducted by Waizenegger, in consultation with Hyndman who did comparative fieldwork in Sri Lanka on a grant sponsored by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). We are grateful to SSHRC for its generous support of this research.

3 February 2005 already, private and governmental donors had donated US$ 500 per person affected by the tsunami. By comparison, during the same period international donations to each person affected by 18 years of war in Uganda amounted to 50 cents only (Wynter 2005).
and the human need produced in its wake; it was a ‘headline disaster’ whereas the longer, slower demise of communities due to conflict made the transition to ‘disaster’ much less apparent. The conflict in Aceh, in contrast, had been a largely ‘forgotten emergency’. This situation has led to unnecessary suffering and death, due not only to international neglect and a lack of assistance in conflict-affected places, but also due to unreported violence (Tapol 2004). Until the 2004 tsunami, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) largely prevented international journalists and researchers from entering, covering, or studying politics, human rights, or humanitarian need in Aceh.

At the time the tsunami struck, the province of Aceh was still under a state of martial law due to open armed conflict between the troops of the Indonesian Government (GoI) and the separatist rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM). Aceh is characterized by a long history of strong resistance against European colonialists and their local allies (Reid 2006). The most recent round of hostilities was marked by widespread repression and human rights abuses on the part of both the Indonesian Military Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) and the GAM rebels. During the rule of President Suharto, feelings of exploitation soared among Aceh’s population in 1971; huge oil and liquid natural gas deposits were discovered near Lhokseumawe and Lhoksukon in North Aceh. Exploration was followed by the construction of the biggest refinery in the world at the time, financed as a joint venture between the Indonesian state-owned Pertamina and ExxonMobil (Reid 2006; Ross 2003).

The people of Aceh were largely left out of the royalties and prosperity that followed from this resource extraction, leading to the emergence of GAM, an independence movement founded by a small group of Acehnese elites. Its armed struggle was rapidly suppressed by the TNI. With growing battle forces during the ensuing decades, the TNI and GAM committed gross human rights abuses against suspected collaborators with the enemy party (Schulze 2004; HRW 2001). Within what the TNI considered a context of guerilla warfare, counterinsurgency strategies were perceived as the only chance to counter GAM. Yet this practice fuelled the hatred and nationalism among a large part of Aceh’s population against Indonesian rule and the army. In turn, this anger sustained the recruitment and support for GAM’s armed resistance (Sukma 2004). After 19 months of heavy fighting following the TNI’s largest military operation since East Timor, the

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4 We have produced two films based on this research. The second, related to the media’s role in international aid relations, was completed in November 2009 and can be viewed online at http://www.vimeo.com/7490800 (password: Lhokse).

5 According to Olsen et al. (2003), funding levels are a function of the intensity of the media coverage, the historical legacy or geo-strategic interest that donor governments have in a particular region on political, economic or security-related grounds, and the power of aid agencies present in the specific region experiencing a humanitarian emergency to attract eyes and ears and to open the hearts of the international community—the so-called ‘stakeholder commitment’.
conflicting parties agreed to hold peace talks in 2005. The tsunami did not cause peace, but it accelerated its negotiation which was in planning at the time of the disaster (Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010).

Over 130 donor countries and approximately 200 aid agencies from abroad offered tsunami-related assistance, adding to already significant local and national relief efforts (Telford and Cosgrave 2006). Eight months after the tsunami, the conflicting parties in Aceh agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding for peace (MoU) that also facilitated the international tsunami response by providing better access to the region. The MoU also devolved more governing power to Aceh Province to increase its autonomy, and provided a very modest transition package to assist ex-combatants with reintegration into civilian society.

When the tsunami hit, a GAM rebel leader and political opponent of the Government of Indonesia, Irwandi Yusuf, was in Keudah Prison in Banda Aceh. As his cell was flooded, he was one of 40 prisoners to get safely out of the prison on December 26, 2004. Some 238 others perished in the locked facility as it filled with water (Mydans 2007). In 2006, Irwandi was elected governor of Aceh and Muhammad Nazar, the former head of a GAM-sympathetic organization, SIRA, became his vice-governor. In mid-2007 a new party formed in Aceh (Partai Aceh—PA) that is mainly made up of former members and supporters of GAM. The first provincial elections were held in April 2009. Partai Aceh won these elections in a landslide victory. Most of the seats in the Aceh provincial parliament are now held by members or sympathizers of the former guerrilla movement.

Since the MoU in 2005, the number of incidents related to the conflict between GAM and GoI has declined dramatically. However, violent incidents outside this context of war have gradually and continually risen. A dramatic increase in violence occurred during the campaign in the run-up to the provincial elections in 2009 (World Bank 2009: 19). At the time of writing, the newly inaugurated PA legislators are under heavy pressure to live up to the expectations of their constituencies in order to maintain the level of conflict and violence at current low levels. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected with strong support from Aceh (more than 93%, the highest among all Indonesian provinces), and hailed as Aceh’s peacemaker (The Jakarta Post 2009), the national political landscape has further consolidated five years of peace in Aceh (CPCRS 2009b: 2f).

Many respondents in interviews held in 2007 noted that “the tsunami changed everything” (Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010). When asked what effect the tsunami had on the peace process, informants in 2007 observed: “The general direction for

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6 The Centre for an Aceh Referendum (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh – SIRA) was originally mainly made up of students that were demanding a referendum on the political status of Aceh within Indonesia (independence) following the fall of Suharto. Despite efforts at independence, SIRA was very close to GAM. Today, SIRA has retained its name when it formed its own local political party, but changed its content to ‘the Independent Voice of the Acehnese People’ (Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh – SIRA).
peace was there but the tsunami helped a lot” (NGO trainer, interview 5, 2007). Another said that “yes, the tsunami made a difference ... GAM leadership in Sweden had a change of heart post-tsunami” (former political prisoner and refugee living abroad, interview 8, 2007). A third remarked that “thanks to the tsunami, Indonesia is willing to embark on change ... The tsunami is the key to change the fences between Jakarta and Aceh” (leader of a new political party, interview 13, 2007). Echoing other analysts of this peace in the wake of the tsunami, these respondents all suggest that the tsunami accelerated peace negotiations and was a catalyst for the peace agreement, but not a cause of reconciliation. The devastation and destruction of the tsunami opened up new political space that accelerated international negotiations and agreements, a form of ‘disaster diplomacy’ (Kelman and Gaillard 2007). However, pre-disaster political trends were equally crucial to this outcome as were the spatial dimensions of the dual disasters (Le Billon and Waizenegger 2007).

While peace in Aceh seems to be lasting, post-conflict relations are nonetheless fragile. According to Collier et al. (2006), on a global scale 40% of all civil wars result in post-conflict relapses, and most of these occur within five years after the cessation of armed hostilities. At the time of writing, peace in Aceh is five years old. Given the extraordinary circumstances of the dual disaster in Aceh, and the enormous influx of tsunami aid, an extended period greater than five years might be needed to ascertain the tenacity of the peace-founding MoU. As one respondent told us in 2007, “The seeds [for peace] were already planted pre-tsunami in 2000. We need to see that the peace agreement follows through for five to ten years, not just two years as we have now” (NGO lawyer, interview 2, 2007). Peace needs to persist and prove that it is not a mere lull in a very extended conflict.

On the local level, the post-conflict context has been calmed to some extent by the integration of former rebels into the provincial political sphere. Yet, the effect of the influx of unprecedented funds aimed at rehabilitating the province from the effects of the tsunami cannot be ignored. A number of former high-ranking or well-connected members of GAM did get access to some of the spoils of peace through recruitment and participation in the Indonesian Government agencies in charge of rehabilitation and reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi—BRR) and rehabilitation and peace (Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh—BRA) and others have also significantly benefited from tsunami funds by engaging in businesses related to post-tsunami reconstruction. Some among them are now well off (Aspinall 2007; 2008; 2009a; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010). These former members of GAM are not merely reaping a peace dividend (Aditjondro 2007), but more significantly they are reaping tsunami reconstruction dividends. In addition, some are now profiting from their ties to people holding a political office and the favors of such allegiances. Aspinall (2009a: 1) captures how former guerrillas have capitalized on tsunami reconstruction and peace dividends:

In post-Suharto Indonesia, … construction projects are a major focus of collusive and predatory behaviour, and kontraktor (contractors) are prominent not only in
business but also in politics. The case of Aceh presents a striking illustration of how politics, coercion, and corruption infuse Indonesia’s construction sector. … former guerrillas have, since the 2005 Helsinki peace deal, become centrally involved in Aceh’s economy and politics, with many of them achieving dramatic success as construction contractors. … former combatants have used their powers of intimidation and political influence to achieve this success …

New Wars? Post-conflict and Post-tsunami Aceh

Echoing international aid policy, activists have repeatedly stressed the importance of a more conflict-sensitive aid intervention (Culbert 2005). In Aceh, the post-tsunami challenge was to rehabilitate communities and rebuild infrastructure in ways that did not fuel the former conflict or disrupt the new peace. Tensions, for example, have been created by excluding ex-combatants from the spoils of peace; many rank and file fighters have seen no peace dividends. Put another way, how could tsunami aid consolidate a new and still fragile peace? Concerns about the impact of aid on conflict by humanitarian agencies, however, were by and large, “…not so evident in the field.” (Burke 2008: 53). Despite invocations by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono after the MoU to link tsunami recovery programs with conflict recovery and reconciliation efforts (GoI 2005), few international aid agencies in Aceh did so (see also Tsunami Evaluation Coalition report of Flint and Goyder 2006). Beyond the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the World Bank and those few Non Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHAs) that had already run programs in conflict-affected communities in Aceh before 2003, few took advantage of the post-conflict setting and assisted conflict victims that were not affected by the tsunami. In short, even as the peace process gained ground, the conflict context remained largely absent from the programming of NGHAs.

7 The most striking example of conflict insensitivity on the part of aid agencies resulted in a security incident on March 21, 2007. In Nisam Antara Sub district, a former GAM stronghold, Save the Children hired four government soldiers (TNI) to guard a school at their project site. These soldiers were subsequently beaten up by local members of the Aceh Transition Committee (KPA), the organization representing former GAM combatants (World Bank/DSF 2007).

8 Funded by the European Office for Humanitarian Assistance (ECHO), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

9 They include, inter alia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) the Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Peace Brigades International (PBI), the World Bank and the Dutch organization Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking – HIVOS) (Zeccola 2009).
Despite policies of institutions such as The Multi Donor Fund (MDF), which explicitly tried to avoid a worsening of regional disparities and imbalances “... between urban and rural, and coast and hinterland and or conflict and/or non-conflict areas” (MDF 2006), the exclusive focus on post-tsunami destruction played out geographically. People along the densely populated coast got help while those in the hinterland largely did not. While almost everybody living in Aceh during the course of the war was affected by conflict to some degree (see World Bank 2007, 2008), those most intensely affected were more likely to live farther inland (see Figure 4.1).

In the eight-month period of ongoing conflict between the tsunami and the MoU (December 2004 and August 2005), the dual disasters in Aceh can be depicted as a complex emergency.\textsuperscript{10} For political reasons, however, they have not been dealt with as such by international aid actors. At the time the tsunami hit the coasts of Aceh, the GoI was party to the conflict and hence very concerned about keeping conflict-related issues out of the tsunami aid space, and, aid agencies out of spaces of conflict. This was enforced by the GoI through military escorts and control of aid agencies and by setting an example to international aid agencies by expelling

\textsuperscript{10} IFRC definition of a complex emergency: disasters that result from several different hazards or, more often, to a complex combination of both natural and man-made causes and different causes of vulnerability. See http://www.ifrc.org/what/disasters/about/types/manmade/conflict.asp#dc for an elaboration of complex emergencies.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4.1.png}
\caption{Conflict and Tsunami-affected Areas of Aceh: The black bombs represent conflict-affected areas; the larger the bomb the greater the impact. The black colour along the coast shows tsunami-affected areas. Adapted from UNORC (2009)}
\end{figure}
the UN Refugee Agency (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—UNHCR) from Aceh in March 2005. The Head of another UN agency in Aceh explains these sensitivities during this period as follows:

We were very much definitely aware of our obligations, like within the UN … we have a very good relationship with the government of Indonesia. So we had to be very aware of the concerns of the GoI and had to focus on the areas that they had identified and so on…We were recommended to go in areas that we should operate in and we then developed our own policies to say these are the areas we would operate in and then there were only the areas along the coast. – Head of a UN agency. (interview 18, 2008)

As one eyewitness describes, during the emergency period it was “… strictly forbidden to let any assistance cross the line between ‘humanitarian’ tsunami IDPs and ‘political’ conflict IDPs” (interview 36, 2008). While the concept of ‘humanitarian crisis’ applies to both situations in this context, any risk to these multimillion dollar tsunami projects was avoided. Fierce policing of boundaries around tsunami aid reflected donor wishes and jurisdictions and not necessarily human need on the ground.

In retrospect, we also observe, however, that refraining from engagement in the more political humanitarian crisis of conflict at the outset was conducive to successful talks among the warring parties and eventual peace. This was especially apparent among international NGHAs that gained the trust of the GoI and were no longer seen as meddling in politics or working on the side of GAM, as they were during the conflict and in the context of the HDC-facilitated peace-negotiations in 2002 (Zeccola 2009).

Hidden in the Limelight of the Tsunami: Aceh’s Silent Disaster

On a sweltering morning on December 21, 2005, I watched six young men stride onto Blang Padang sports field in the heart of Banda Aceh, the capital of Indonesia’s Aceh province. Clad in black uniforms and matching berets, each held an assault rifle across his chest. They marched toward six other men, all dressed in khakis, white polo shirts, and white baseball caps emblazoned with the initials AMM—Aceh Monitoring Mission. On cue, the young men, former

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11 Given its experience in East Timor, a region that succeeded in gaining independence from Indonesia, the GoI mistrusted foreign agencies and feared their involvement could alter the power balances in the ongoing conflict in favour for the opponent. UN agencies and INGOs can only set up operations and provide aid with the permission of the host government, in this case the Government of Indonesia and a party to the conflict in Aceh when the tsunami hit.

12 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, formerly known as the Henry Dunant Centre.
fighters of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), handed over their guns. The AMM monitors, drawn from European and Southeast Asian nations, proceeded to cut the weapons apart with the help of two table saws ... very few international journalists were present for the weapons decommissioning. That struck me as odd, because the tsunami and the peace agreement are like twins joined at the hip. And for the next few years, physical rebuilding and peace-building will be closely intertwined challenges – Field report from Michael Renner, Worldwatch Institute (2006: 2).

Renner’s (2006) observations one year after the tsunami aptly highlight the discrepant media attention to the ‘natural’ compared to the ‘man-made’ disaster. Many authors have demonstrated that funding levels for aid are conditioned by media attention (Bär et al. 2006; Gasser et al. 2006; Olsen et al. 2003).¹³ In Aceh, conflict-related issues and needs remained hidden in the media limelight of the tsunami, in the post-tsunami and now the post-conflict/post-tsunami era. Aid for conflict-affected communities has amounted to only about 2% of tsunami-related donations, approximately US$ 230 million (Barron 2008).

Since many project managers of aid agencies had a background in engineering, they had the technical expertise to deal with reconstruction, yet many lacked the necessary knowledge of the political geography of Aceh and of humanitarian crisis management in complex emergencies to act in a context and conflict-sensitive way (interviews 9 and 16, 2009). Having been sent on a tsunami reconstruction mission, they generally did not take the less obvious issues and needs related to the low level conflict seriously. These rather ‘technical’ aid workers “... quickly set the norms of behaviour around responding to an environmental event” (Zeccola 2009: 28).

... most of the international organizations that came in had very little to no understanding what was going on here before the tsunami. And also the fact was that most of them did not work in areas that had been significantly impacted by the conflict either. Many actually came and left and never understood that at all. – Country Director of an aid agency. (interview 30, 2008)

I was really shocked by how many people just sort of stepped off a plane here and had no idea of what was going on. I remember being cornered by the regional head of a UN agency arriving here and it was blatantly obvious he had no idea that there had been any conflict in Aceh at all. – UN Consultant (interview 16, 2009).

¹³ There is ample anecdotal evidence of the correlation between media coverage and the behaviour of both, private and governmental donors, but a few studies have systemically assessed if there is such a thing as the ‘CNN effect’ for charitable giving do not allow for a deduction of generalities (Minear et al. 1996; Robinson 1999, 2002; Olsen et al. 2003; Breeze 2005; Brown and Minty 2006).
If international aid agencies were uninformed about the conflict in which they began their tsunami humanitarian response in December 2004, they appeared equally indifferent that they operated in an emerging context of post-conflict after the MoU was signed in August 2005. Contributing to the lack of knowledge on the part of a number of aid workers and managers of aid agencies vis-à-vis conflict-related issues, two phenomena were key to this situation. First, the practice of earmarking of donor dollars; and secondly the fact that aid agencies were overworked and overwhelmed by demands of tsunami-focussed media and donors in a setting of fierce inter-agency competition.

In a context characterized by donor lack of awareness about the Aceh conflict, when the tsunami struck, donations were made because of the dramatic death and devastation of the tsunami. These funds were specifically earmarked to assist survivors of the tsunami, and could not be used otherwise.

… there hadn’t been the perspective: ‘Oh what a poor country having been struck by 30 years of conflict and now on top of that the tsunami’. No, the tsunami was there within a vacuum of what and where actually Aceh is. – Former Head of an aid agency. (interview 9, 2009)

Depending on a donor that was—like most funders—flush with donations earmarked to the tsunami, the manager of a branch of the local relief NGO Woman Volunteers for Humanity (Relawan Perempuan untuk Kemanusiaan—RPUK) complains:

As the tsunami struck, all the aid that used to be dedicated for conflict victims experienced a change in mandate with the only target group now being tsunami victims. And this was very strict: they [the donors] showed us a map and told us only to work in areas that were impacted by the tsunami. They draw a line around the coast dividing those regions that have not been affected by the tsunami...They said you are not allowed to help in these areas outside the line because your mandate is for tsunami victims only. – Head of a chapter of a local humanitarian aid agency. (interview 40, 2008)

For aid agencies, the only possibilities of using tsunami donations for any other population group in need other than those affected by the tsunami required either renegotiation of the conditions tied to these funds with their donors, or application of ‘creative’ and more flexible management of these funds. Most aid agencies, however, stuck to their tsunami agenda. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam Great Britain (GB) were two of few exceptions. According to MSF’s 2005 financial interim report, the agency was very successful in seeking permission of individuals who contributed to MSF’s tsunami relief efforts to use their funds to support other work conducted by the organization in other emergencies and
forgotten crises, including in Aceh’s highlands (MSF 2005). Oxfam GB and several other British NGHAs also tried to renegotiate the conditions tied to their funds vis-à-vis the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in order to be able to work on conflict-related issues with their donors. However, they were unsuccessful (interview 14, 2009).

Trying to cross the great divide between these two humanitarian emergencies, and to use tsunami-earmarked funds more flexibly, some agencies were able to assist people directly affected by the tsunami but also those who lived in tsunami-affected areas that were destroyed by conflict where houses and villages had been burnt. This approach became a necessity for some aid agencies, as a very exclusive focus on tsunami-affected populations represented a serious security risk for their staff (Kennedy et al. 2008; interviews 24, 28, 30 and 38, 2008; interview 17, 2009). The compromises many aid agencies had to make in Aceh with regards to their humanitarian principles have begun to reverberate. Referring to the cumulative incidents of extortion, threats and ‘rip-offs’ that most operational aid agencies had to face, a Program Manager of an NGHA asserts:

I think this is mainly a result of the uneven and the unjust way aid often was distributed combined with high prices due to inflation. Some did not receive anything, so they just try to take it by other means. – Program Manager of an NGHA. (interview 28, 2008)

Asked why the American Red Cross (ARC) was particularly strict in excluding conflict-related needs outside the tsunami-affected areas from its mandate, its Country Officer explains by referring to the ARC’s experience following the response to the attacks of the World Trade Center in New York:

… trying to use funding that had been donated for 9/11 victims to any other population groups around that might have been indirectly affected raised a number of questions among donors as to the concept of donor intent is that we provided the funding for the 9/11 victims. So if you don’t follow that particular intent, then you raise certain potential legal issues. That’s where a lot of organizations are very risk averse to avoid legal problems with potential intended beneficiaries of funding might raise questions as that they did not directly suffer so should not get anything that should be for those who have been directly impacted. – Country Director of the American Red Cross in Indonesia. (interview 30, 2008)

14 The majority of donors who had originally designated their donations for the tsunami have agreed to de-restrict their donations to MSF. Eventually, more than 75% of their funds that were originally earmarked for the tsunami could be used for other emergencies, including for assisting persons affected by the conflict in Aceh (MSF 2005).

15 See Zeccola (2009) for a more detailed analysis of aid agency decision-making under these complex circumstances in Aceh.
When responding to the tsunami three years later, the ARC and many managers of other North America headquartered aid agencies, were reminded of the expensive legal consequences for the ARC and the damage that was done to its image for straying beyond its mandate. Its staff was hence very reluctant to apply flexible interpretations of donor intent to being able to assist persons in need other than those affected by the tsunami (interview 30, 2008; interview 17, 2009).

Ironically, the larger international governmental organizations, rather than international NGHAs (or non-governmental agencies, also called INGOs) were the ones to straddle dual mandates and assist in both humanitarian emergencies, despite the latter’s greater flexibility and independence. The greater responsiveness of private agencies, at least in theory, did not happen in this context, suggesting that many NGHAs lacked the will or sense of necessity to broaden their humanitarian agenda, even in a post-conflict context that begged for resources to stabilize the peace. This analysis, however, has to be seen against the backdrop of litigiousness that private organizations face, the donors to whom they are accountable, and the fact that most aid agencies were already overstretched by pressures related to the management of an abundance of funds and critical media to address the needs of tsunami-affected coastal communities. For NGHAs in particular, with huge amounts of public donations to spend, the biggest fear was failure to deliver programmes, rather than worrying about how aid flows would affect the dynamics of conflict (Burke 2008: 54).

Tsunami funds donated far exceeded the absorptive and distributive capacities of aid agencies as well as the needs of coastal populations affected by the tsunami, at least in terms of humanitarian, short-term aid. Aside from the notable exception of MSF, however, aid agencies did not halt the reception of ever more tsunami donations as they were a) used to never receiving sufficient aid; b) incapable of judging at which point they had received enough or c) simply taking advantage of this unique opportunity for ‘business startup or expansion’. Aware of perpetual high media attention, their perceived performance and success in branding and distinguishing themselves from other aid agencies in Aceh would determine future funding levels in other places, aid agencies did everything to show quick results (Buchanan-Smith 2003; Ogrizek 2007; Cottle and Nolan 2007). Hence, they saw their reputation riding on what happened with Aceh’s tsunami affected coastline; for many, “… the conflict was a thorn in the side of the tsunami program” (Zeccola 2009: 16).

The ‘Success Story’ of Tsunami Reconstruction

Four years after the tsunami tragedy, Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Director of Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency (BRR) celebrated the post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh as a ‘success story’. Reflecting on the achievements of the international community, on New Year’s Day 2009,
Mangkusubroto proclaims: “… we have shown the world that real recovery in a short time after a natural disaster is possible” (UNORC 2009).

Tsunami-induced dispossession could be addressed relatively quickly compared to the longstanding structural poverty inflicted by the conflict.16 Victims of the conflict were disproportionately disadvantaged by low levels of assistance and by the burden of aid-induced inflation:

... conflict combined with poverty leaves little space for hope. And loss of hope was even reinforced due to unfulfilled promises: people thought they [would] get assistance after the MoU, but conflict affected communities had to wait a long time to see any assistance coming up the mountains. – Program Manager of an aid agency (interview 28, 2008).

The conflict victims often ask: why is there discrimination? Their position is that they are both victims, with only difference that one is victim of a natural disaster and the other one of a political disaster. Why do those affected by the tsunami receive much more attention than those affected by the conflict? – Head of a chapter of a local aid agency (interview 40, 2008).

There was way too much money for the tsunami and much too less for conflict. NGOs on the coast would have more money than they could handle, which led to increased competition amongst them. That was a real bidding war that was going on here. In contrary, few kilometres inland you had conflict affected who didn’t get anything. There has been a lot of jealousy amongst these groups and also between villages, as conflict victims had the mindset and were aware that they are still victims. They complained as they saw the tsunami aid coming very quickly, but conflict assistance only slowly trickling down. The disparities are still there. – Program Manager of an aid agency. (interview 28, 2008)

As a result of the exclusive and enormous post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation effort, longstanding disparities in development patterns between the relative prosperous coastal areas and the underdeveloped hinterland have been exacerbated. Since the MoU was signed in 2005, only isolated GAM-GoI security incidents have occurred. Violent squabbles and security incidents revolving around localized issues of power, natural resources, employment- and business contracts continue, however, and are increasing in number, especially in regions that were most affected by conflict. Many of these have emerged post-conflict, both from poverty-related grievances and perceptions of injustice relating to the imbalanced distribution of peace dividends and post-tsunami reconstruction. The disparate levels of access among former GAM to business opportunities in the construction,

16 Rehabilitation of land and livelihoods precluded by conflict is far slower. Accordingly “... natural disaster-damaged infrastructure on average was being repaired about 50% faster than conflict-damaged infrastructure” (World Bank 2007: 88).
mining, and logging industries and related spoils of political office have likewise created significant tensions (World Bank/DSF 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; Serambi 2008; CPCRS 2009b; Aspinall 2009a; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010).

Many local informants during the course of our research feared that these localized conflicts of greed and grievance were reflective of tensions in the war between the GoI and GAM (McCulloch 2006). They expressed concern that they could undermine the ongoing peace process in some parts of Aceh where conflict intensity was high. Foreign investors who were deterred from investing in the province during the war could once again back off over the next decade (World Bank/DSF 2008c; IFC 2008; interview 23, 24, 40, 2008; interviews 10, 15, 16, 2009). These findings point to the continuum of violence that characterizes so-called ‘post-conflict’ sites (Cockburn 2004). As an Acehnese activist, who is currently employed with an international NGO to conduct peace-mediation trainings in Acehnese villages stated:

The root of today’s conflicts lies in injustice because until now there is no justice; secondly, poverty ... 70% of our population live in the villages and again 70% thereof are poor. A lot of social tensions and squabbles persist amongst those communities. Their sense of injustice can easily translate in anger. – Acehnese mediator for an INGO and member of the advisory committee of the Governor of Aceh. (interview 10, 2009)

Peace may be holding, but without justice, a sense of fair treatment and hope, it is rendered more precarious. Dahlman’s (2009) idea that ‘post-conflict’ can refer to war by other means is prescient here. A majority of people in Aceh have not benefited from international aid. Practices of intimidation, corruption and illegal taxation by ex-combatants have emerged after the MoU, and some evidence suggests that they have increased (Aspinall 2009b; interviews 4, 23, 24 and 38, 2008; interviews 18 and 19, 2009).

The conflict regions are those that are left behind by the assistance, which has led to jealousy; people already see a two-class victim society emerging, although both are victims: those affected by the conflict and those affected by the tsunami. – Head of a local Human Rights Agency. (interview 4, 2007)

Many ex-combatants have not been helped all. They are frustrated with the aid delivery system. This is now leading them to demonstrate their presence towards the villagers. – Head of a chapter of a local Aid Agency. (interview 40, 2008)

While the internationalization of the disaster through foreign funding and the increased presence of foreign eyes and ears did facilitate and galvanize political stability, it has also contributed to injustices which may constitute an impediment to long-term stability. Many of the ongoing conflicts at the local scale are directly related to the way international post-tsunami aid has been targeted and
implemented. An abundance of aid that has been difficult to spend with care by aid agencies has fuelled greed, social divisions and constituted an easy prey for thuggish preman, many of whom were former members of GAM (interviews 28 and 40, 2008; interview 18, 2009). Moreover, the two separate, starkly contrasting ‘aid scapes’ established in Aceh for the ‘dual disaster’ (conflict and tsunami), as well as the unchecked distribution of reintegration funds to former combatants have contributed to disparities and feelings of injustice (Avonius 2007; Morel et al. 2009; Waizenegger and Hyndman 2010).

Blurring the Categories of Disaster and Conflict

In the introduction to this volume, Scott Kirsch and Colin Flint define reconstruction in the wake of war as a process of conflict and militarized power. They seek to challenge the false dichotomy of conflict and peace where these are viewed as temporally and spatially discrete. Rather, one aim of the book is to show how war and peace are mutually constituted. In this chapter, we have tried to advance this project and the idea that just as conflict and post-conflict are not mutually exclusive, but rather, co-produced, humanitarian disasters—human-made and environmentally-induced—cannot be analytically separated when they occur together in a single location. They too are mutually constituted and part of the political landscape.

Post-conflict and post-tsunami disasters in Aceh overlapped geographically and were mutually constitutive in the political tensions that have arisen from the disparate distribution of peace and tsunami-reconstruction dividends at the end of war. Well-paid jobs in the Indonesian government organizations established to oversee reconstruction and rehabilitation (BRR) and reintegration (BRA) were given to a select number of former GAM commanders. Other well-connected former combatants profited, both legally and illegally, from the lucrative tsunami reconstruction business. Many former GAM foot soldiers have seen little if any assistance in their transition to civilian lives, creating resentment and conditions for criminal activities that provide livelihoods to these former combatants.

17 (Indonesian) Originally this word referred to irregular or demobilized soldiers (Ryter 2000); nowadays the word is used in reference to (political) ‘gangsters’ or ‘bandits’ often associated with the extortion of illegal rents or involvement in illegal businesses or related conduct (Lindsey 2001).
The tsunami victims were the lucky ones … At least they got help.
– Ida Wati, former GAM rebel (cited in Honorine, September 10, 2007)

The pressures to spend the glut of tsunami donations accountably included spending them on tsunami survivors and on time. This contributed to the lack of attention paid to the political context in which aid was dispensed. The subtle transition from a conflict to a post-conflict landscape was largely ignored by the international aid community; that sector was consumed by demands of its own: mandates, the media and donors. This violates a cardinal principle of aid provision in contexts of war, namely that international aid organizations ensure that aid is ‘conflict sensitive’ (Culbert 2005).

How aid is distributed in the context of a conflict and during the tsunami disaster remains a pressing political and planning issue for international aid agencies and national governmental organizations. They must ensure that they do not, unwittingly, fuel the conflict in which they work on reconstruction and reintegration. Assurances that international assistance is delivered in a ‘conflict sensitive’ manner are key in this context, yet, post-conflict, we found no evidence of this among the tsunami aid providers we interviewed over four years. Likewise, providing aid that supports peacebuilding and reconciliation in a post-conflict context is equally vital. The media frenzy and tsunami of dollars that poured into Aceh created a unique situation that largely ignored three decades of war for years after the tsunami. Since 2007, there have been numerous donors and aid agencies engaged in post-conflict programs in Aceh,18 and various post-conflict strategies have been formulated.19

In 2008, with the official deadline of tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction approaching, and hundreds of millions of tsunami-earmarked funds unspent (Schiller 2008: 33), discussions of ‘insuring’ post-tsunami reconstruction ‘investments’ by providing aid to conflict-affected communities in the hinterland, irrespective of their history in the conflict, emerged (interview 28, 2008). These talks did not discriminate between ex-combatants and civilians or between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected, and are currently being translated into practice by the provincial government. It remains to be seen, however, if a more comprehensive approach by international aid agencies to support governmental rehabilitation and development programs for the entire Province of Aceh will actually be achieved in a non-discriminatory way.

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19 One by the BRA, a second in the Aceh Recovery Framework by UNORC, and a third in the Multi-Stakeholder Review (MSR) led by IOM and the World Bank.
Conclusion

The tsunami of aid in the aftermath of the waves graphically highlights the inequities produced by the distribution of humanitarian aid at the global level. The international media played a clear role in influencing the funding decisions of donors. In Aceh, the transition from a landscape of conflict to one of post-conflict was largely irrelevant to an international aid community consumed by difficulties related to their inadequate capacities to spend the unprecedented level of donations accountably and managing media publicity in the highly competitive aid arena in Aceh.

At the outset of the international disaster response, GoI restrictions, as well as a lack of awareness of the conflict on the part of aid agencies and their employees resulted in the obligation that their funds were only to be used for tsunami survivors. For aid agencies, this complicated humanitarian response. After the GoI finally and explicitly invited aid agencies to expand their area of operation to include assistance to conflict-affected communities, there was plenty of time for aid agencies to react. Most did not. At the beginning of 2007, as the BRR itself moved on to broaden its mandate to also cover conflict recovery alongside their initial mandate of tsunami recovery, its head, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, acknowledged these shortcomings: “How can we only carry out reconstruction process in coastal areas, while 5 kilometres away there is an area destroyed by conflict?” (Serambi 2007: 1). Given the opportunities for aid agencies to market and brand themselves under the media spotlight, one exclusively dedicated to the tsunami, many NGHAs were lacking the political will to broaden their agenda and area of operation to also include people and places exclusively affected by the conflict.

The tsunami of aid at once accelerated and supported the peace process in Aceh, and ignored conflict-affected communities that did not live along the coastal strip, contributing to their marginalization. This chapter has argued that an abundance of aid and media attention can have adverse affects, especially when it distinguishes between a worthy humanitarian crisis—the tsunami—and a less deserving one—the impact of the conflict on civilians and post-conflict demobilization. The problematic distinction between humanitarian need in post/conflict contexts and post-tsunami contexts has been as important and deleterious as the neat but false distinction between conflict and post-conflict.

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Chapter 5
Not Peace, Not War: The Myriad Spaces of Sovereignty, Peace and Conflict in Myanmar/Burma

Carl Grundy-Warr and Karin Dean

Introduction: Control Over Space in Myanmar/Burma

Myanmar/Burma is territorially the largest state in continental Southeast Asia. However, the territories that constitute the modern state in the present international system of sovereign States have never functioned as one, internally sovereign, political unit. An administrative map of Myanmar/Burma presents only one side of the story—that of the SPDC or the State Peace and Development Council, the de facto government of Myanmar/Burma—and more precisely, the government’s ambition to achieve an internally sovereign state. For much of the period since Burma/Myanmar’s independence on January 4th, 1948, large parts of the new territory, particularly at the state’s eastern and northern borders have been under the de facto control and authority of ethnic armies and related administrative apparatus resisting the establishment of the new geo-body. Thus even prior to full military rule since the coup of March 2, 1962—that in various forms has lasted until today—the Burma Army or (by the Burmese term the ‘tatmadaw’) were the government’s “dependable custodians of the Union” (Silverstein 1977; Callahan 1997). “As the military has asserted, ‘Only if the Armed Force is strong, will the Nation be strong.’ The tatmadaw is, according to its slogans, the ‘mother and father’ of the people” (Steinberg 2010: 101). Thus, since the beginning of military domination of the country’s political scene, the tatmadaw became the self-proclaimed pillar of all ‘national’ struggles (Selth 1996).

Mary Callahan in her book on tatmadaw’s history (2004) has noted that state-building in Myanmar/Burma has, since independence, been based upon successive military-state efforts to extend the geographical and functional ‘reach of the state.’ These efforts to spread state control across the entire territory inherited from the

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1 Hybrid reference to Myanmar/Burma is intended to maintain neutrality in the choice of the country’s name. While some organizations and exile-based groups still refer to the country as Burma, Myanmar (which is the choice of the military government since 1989) has been recognized by the UN as the official name of the state and is also widely used inside the country.
British colonial authorities have constituted both carefully drawn policies as well as coercive measures to overcome the protracted resistance put up by the various groupings mobilized into political parties and their armed wings. Low impact guerilla warfare has lasted for 60 years, for example, in the eastern parts of the country and is still persisting, although in greatly reduced capacity, and Myanmar/Burma today is more unified than it has ever been. This has been achieved by the slow but steady advance of the tatmadaw into the former guerilla-held borderlands either by force or through what the ethnic opposition calls ‘divide-and-rule’—by agreeing to various ceasefire deals with different armed groupings. This has lead to a bewildering array of spaces, each with different types of authority and dynamics contingent upon the particular sets of actors and the political geography of the moment.

De facto contingent politics and territorality constitute power alignments that are extremely important in analyzing not only politics, but also ethnic, social and cultural geographies, as well as amalgams of authority relating to politico-economic development within Myanmar/Burma. The multiplicity of groupings in de facto control of spaces—achieved primarily through the maintenance of armed forces—is by a large share of analysts and in world news agencies merely mentioned as the “ethnic question,” while they focus on the confrontation between the opposition (NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi) and the military junta. Yet it is vital to grasp the realities of the country’s political geographies, which make Myanmar/Burma a geo-body full of contradictions and potential fault-lines.

Without understanding the ‘national geo-body’ of Myanmar/Burma as a complex composite of ongoing contingent political situations, it is difficult to discuss issues of conflict, peace and reconstruction in a constructive way. For as Mary Callahan (2007: 48) observes, post-1988 Myanmar/Burma contains “extreme configurations of political authority”, which range from complete SPDC and Myanmar/Burma military (tatmadaw) “occupation” to certain ceasefire situations of “near devolution” whereby particular ethnically-based political organizations are virtually sovereign within specifically designated territories. Between the “extremes” there are many shades of grey and what Callahan (2007: 49) terms “networks of coexistence” referring to “emerging political complexes that involve various government and non-government actors in ongoing contestation, negotiation, discord, cooperation, and/or complicity over the nature and composition of political authority.” These “networks” may involve a complex assortment of government/military agencies, warlords, various military and paramilitary units, gangsters, foreign firms and syndicates, religious groups, drug and human traffickers, and non-governmental organizations fighting the above.

The political landscape indicates that the Myanmar/Burmese military junta recognizes that different deals and power relations are required to wield more influence in contexts where certain ethnic and political parties continue to control patches of territories, or have powerful and supporting outside allies (political or business partners). Thus, in the last two decades, Myanmar/Burma politics has been characterized by changing relationships within and between former adversaries in
the form of ceasefire arrangements, which have “blurred the alignments in national politics even more in the operational field” (Smith 2007: 41). Whilst many of these so-called networks lack formal institutionalization—and a representation on “official” maps—it is imperative to appreciate that they are intimately related to the control over space and its differing degrees of militarization, the ceasefires and localized political arrangements on the ground.

There is a need for the international community and external agencies to recognize the longer-term potential significance of the new political and territorial alignments of the various ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups, and to adopt strategies of engagement with different parties. Kramer (2009a:4) calls to stop isolating and “demonizing the ceasefire groups,” but the relations are complex. For example, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), discussed in detail later, have, through ceasefire, wanted to solve the persisting problems through peaceful means, yet the international community has not extended them any assistance (EBO 2010). However, the non-ceasefire Karen National Organization or KNU is receiving both moral and material assistance in the form of support to their civilians in the ‘rebel’-held areas. The emerging “networks of coexistence” (Callahan 2007:49)—many being able to emerge due to the ceasefire conditions (South 2003; 2004; 2007; 2008)—are essential in any peace-building initiatives. The leaders of the ethnic political opposition and community based organizations have for years been building various civil society networks—of peace, development, education and empowerment—gradually and slowly expanding the space for alternative control, that of the local communities that have been subject to long-term protracted warfare. This is an on-going process of deterritorializing power into a medium in the hands of local communities with potential for empowerment. Power and control over space lies at the heart of discussions about a country that Kramer (2009a) validly labels as the state of “Neither War Nor Peace.”

Post-1988 Military-centered State-building and Ceasefires to Maintain ‘the Union’

Effectively the current era of military rule followed the brutal repression of the pro-democracy uprising in key urban areas of the country in 1988. On September 18, 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was formed and it abolished the 1974 constitution together with all organs of state power, and set out to re-fashion the military regime and build (a militarized form of) national unity. The SLORC established a form of political and military territoriality that was based on Law and Order Restoration Councils (LORCs) at different territorial levels of administration, including state/divisional, district, township, and ward/village-authorities, which ostensibly were meant to cover all seven divisions (taining in Burmese) and the seven designated ethnic states (pyi-neh in Burmese) of the country. In reality coverage in the pyi-neh was extremely fragmented in practice due to the effective administrative control of ethnic political parties and
armies not within the so-called ‘legal fold’ by the military regime. The ‘national’ political geographic project of holding the Union together is one of the ways in which the military seeks to both extend its “reach” and also justify its continued hold onto power.

Until 1988, the main emphasis was on warfare rather than on forms of accommodation with different ethnic political and military organizations (Smith 1995; 1999; Lintner 1990). Since 1988 the picture has become one in which the ruling military regime has been willing to forge various agreements, partnerships and deals with a plethora of groups in order to continue its efforts to extend the reach of the state whilst gaining greater access to vital natural resources in the vast ‘peripheral’ zones. Paradoxically, the era of ceasefires has also witnessed extremely brutal repression against pro-democracy uprisings in 1988 and 2008, and the long-term suppression of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and Aung San Suu Kyi. Low-intensity warfare has continued in the remaining pockets of armed resistance, particularly in the west (targeting the Muslim Rohingya) and in the eastern borderland—targeting non-ceasefire groups, such as the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the Karen National Union (KNU), and remnants of the Shan State Army (SSA), particularly Shan State Army-South (SSA-S). The military junta’s paranoia concerning potential “external enemies” and “threats” is often used as an additional reason to bludgeon ethnic armed resistance operating near to international borders. To fuel ongoing military strategies, the tatmadaw expanded its troop numbers, military equipment and operational deployments around the country (Selth 1996). In 1990 it was suggested that by abandoning the military regime’s policy of crushing the ethnic insurgencies, the then 200,000-strong army could be reduced to a border protection force as small as 20,000–30,000 (Selth 2001: 12). Instead, the number has doubled, and increasing amounts of troops are deployed in territories where the ruling government has gained control either by force or through ceasefire negotiations. Without any “real” external enemy or security threats, the tatmadaw doubled in size since 1988 to active forces of about 428,250, ranking it twelfth in the world (Naing 2008). While the Army expanded, almost every other public institution degenerated, with the situation being particularly grave in health and education. The mishandling of the economy by the military regime is explicit in every economic indicator, and is visually evident in many banal daily practices, deprivations, government price—market price disparities, shortages, misallocations, confiscations, expropriations,

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2 Estimations of expenditures spent on armed forces, health and education vary. According to a report by DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary (2005), an international law firm, 30–50% of the government’s budget is spent on the armed forces, while health receives 3% and education 8% of its budget. The IMF (1999/2000) estimate is 0.3% of GDP on education, quoted in the same report. Another source quoted in the report is Social Watch that also shows how public health and education expenditures as percentage of GDP have decreased over the years: health from 1.1% of GDP (1990) to 0.4% (2001); and education respectively from 2.4 to 1.3% of GDP.
corruption and black markets. Yet at the same time, it is also the case that the tatmadaw operates some of the best schools, clinics, and hospitals, and it is involved in every sector of the economy. As Steinberg (2010: 102) puts it: “Every substantial enterprise needs someone in the military establishment to ensure that the economic gears run smoothly.”

Since the late 1980s, and particularly since 1989 and the first ceasefire arrangements, the SLORC/SPDC has been preoccupied with forms of reconstruction based upon its particular vision and imaginary of the national geo-body and the nation. This is based upon “Three National Causes”: “the non-disintegration of the union, the non-disintegration of national solidarity, and the perpetuation of national sovereignty” (Government of Myanmar 1994). The fact remains that the central state has never exercised full administrative, judicial and executive power throughout its territory, thus the notion of a united “National Union” is more accurately understood as an ongoing state- and nation-building proclamation (Lambrecht 2004:153). “Peace and development” is central to the military junta’s vision, provided that these help promote the “Three National Causes” (Yan Nyein Aye 2000). Herein is the fundamental contradiction of state- and nation-building, because the military’s version of national unity and one Union is not shared by the different ethnic political parties (and armies) that are currently engaged in ceasefire arrangements, or maintaining armed resistance against the government.

The military’s presence and entrenched involvement within the political, economic and social fabric of the country is apparently even greater now than at other times in recent history (Callahan 2004; Lintner 2009). This ‘new era’ has been ushered in by the moving of its capital into Naypyidaw in 2005. The images of yearly military parades in the new capital, under the huge statues of the three historical Burman unifying kings, have also been emitted to the outside world (by the otherwise secretive regime). This is a part of the national (re)invention that the military regime is currently enacting—involving a rewriting of history and portraying itself as the champion of internal cohesiveness and (consistently) as the glue that can hold the country together and protect national unity (Ganesan and Hlaing 2007; Steinberg 2007, Callahan 2004). It is also (re)fashioning its own internal notions of legitimacy; refurbished as “discipline-flourishing democracy”, distinct from external support of democracy embodied in the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi that are presented as (potentially) the West’s puppet regime. Myanmar’s/ Burma’s “disciplined democracy” is based upon proven military strength in bolstering national security, and state-centered functional power and patronage through military institutions (Steinberg 2010; 2007; Callahan 2004; Selth 1996).

Under the strict conditions of the National Convention, a process tasked with drafting a new constitution revived in 2004, the military showed no will to consider any of the “proposals concerning the distribution of legislative powers between the centre and the regions” (Bowman 2007:4) initiated by the two largest ceasefire groups, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP). Such attempts were viewed as leading to disunity and disintegration by the military regime—well-illustrated in the response to the
proposal by a high ranking Myanmar government official who said: “Why do you want to build separate houses while we are building one house where everybody will have his room or his floor?” The plebiscite of the military drafted constitution voted an overwhelming ‘yes’ at the military drafted polls in 2008, and the elections of 2010 were set to legitimize the military’s role for once and all, albeit with more political and economic space for groups “associated with the military” (South 2010). Furthermore, the election laws released only in mid-March 2010 made it unlawful for a political party to have a prisoner as a party member—that after systematically arresting opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi.

**Militarized Landscapes**

The current military regime of Myanmar/Burma has rather successfully created an image of itself as having “... been pursuing the ostensible policy of peace-making with ethnic minority groups” (Walsh 2000). This understanding has emerged from the quantity of ceasefire agreements with a multitude of outfits ranging from well-established ethnic political resistance organizations to various splinter groups to local militias.

Between 1989 and 1995, a total of 15 organizations agreed to brokered ceasefire arrangements with the then ‘Prime Minister’ General Khin Nyunt (Smith 1999). With different groups, the ceasefire terms have varied. Zaw Oo and Win Min (2007) argue that the ceasefires were negotiated in three phases, with the first wave (starting in 1989) garnering the best deals—more rewards and fewer restrictions—in hope of attracting more ethnic groups into negotiations. This wave included mostly the groups formed by the ex-members of the Communist Party of Burma located in Shan State, plus the New Democratic Army—Kachin (NDA-K) in Kachin State. The second (1991–92) and third (1994–95) waves of ceasefires were less accommodating (ibid.), although the restrictions also depended on the size and type of the group. The largest and most significant of the later agreements were the ceasefires with the KIO/KIA and NMSP because of these groups’ staunch political agendas and history of well organized armed resistance.

Nevertheless, administratively, Myanmar/Burma maintains seven (ethnic) states and seven (Bamar) divisions, but the categorization of existing administrative units as ‘States’ is highly misleading in terms of actual autonomy. The SPDC administrative subdivisions preside over the States and divisions, named after the corresponding ethnic state (e.g. Kachin State Peace and Development Council, Arakan State Peace and Development Council), or division (e.g. Irrawaddy Division Peace and Development Council, etc.). The head of any State/Division Peace and Development Council generally holds two posts—that of the council chairman and that of the regional commander of the respective military command. For example, the Chairman of Kachin SPDC is also the Commander of Northern Command. These commanders, mostly graduates of either Defence Services Academy or the Officers Training School, all have ranks of brigadier-general.
or major-general and are appointed by the Senior-General Than Shwe, the paramount leader of the ruling regime, in close consultation (and with occasional compromises) with his close aides and the army commander in order to keep them content. At the margins of these ethnic states, the ceasefire groups were allowed to maintain their arms, armies, and control, in many cases with cross-international border connections.

The past two decades have witnessed enormous transformations in the military, political, economic and social landscape, partly as a result of the ceasefire and border development strategies employed by the military junta. Typically, the way the military junta has described its role and aims of “national unity” is to literally guide the so-called “national races” out of the “darkness” into a new bright era of “peace and prosperity” (*New Light of Myanmar*, 14 February, 1994; 13 February, 2001). The way the state media highlights the salvation of these “national races” indicates the ethnocentric nature of the Three National Causes and the military-centric notions of national reconstruction.

**Political Map of “Ceasefires” and “Reconstruction” Post-1988**

The ceasefires produce a complex mosaic of continuously changing ‘autonomous’ spaces in Myanmar’s/Burma’s ethnic states, each with varying types and levels of authority and dynamics contingent upon the particular sets of actors and the political geography of the moment. According to Than (2007: 191–2), the reconstruction effort extends over 18 regions in Myanmar’s western, northern and eastern border zones in all seven states and two divisions, covering 83,000 square miles (nearly 32% of the country’s area) and encompassing 5.3 million inhabitants in 68 townships (out of 324 townships in the country).

One of the peculiarities of the situation for outside observers is that of the assumed ability of the SPDC to reach into every part of the geo-body, which has in fact never been the case. Ceasefire conditions permit some of the former ethnic armies to retain their arms, police their own territory, or use their former armies as private security forces to protect both legal and illegal business operations. Tatmadaw units are often disarmed at the entrance to territory patrolled by these ethnic armies; while upon exiting the territory, they receive their weapons again. Even in Yangon, the Wa and Kokang leaders freely move about with armed guards wearing the uniforms of drug barons’ armies and paying little attention to the law enforcement officers they inevitably encounter.

Consideration of how militarization has produced differentiated political geographic circumstances is more meaningful than acceptance of an “official” political map of the formal divisions and states as basis for analysis. Thus we offer a more nuanced classification of spaces: firstly, “liberated areas” of non-ceasefire groups prone to active guerilla war; second, “ceasefire areas”; and third, “partially securitized spaces” and/ or semi-autonomous zones. This is in addition to the “government-controlled areas”, which is the largest share of the geo-body of Myanmar/Burma today. Whilst such categorization is still arbitrary in that there
are several areas where overlapping conditions may exist, these categories enable us to discuss the different forms of militarization and possibilities for actual “post-conflict” reconstruction.

“Liberated Areas:” In Retreat

This section details the remnants of the so-called “liberated areas” which for almost five decades dominated the political and social landscapes of various border regions, such as the base area of the mostly Christian-led Karen National Union (KNU) or ‘Kawthoolei’ (“Land of the Lilies”) or the symbolic territorial heartland of the Karen ‘Revolution’ (Rajah 1990; Fallah 1991; Smith 1999; Thawngmhun 2008). Prior to 1988, the tatmadaw’s dominant counter-insurgency strategy was the “Four Cuts” (pya ley pya) deployed to “cut off” sources of food, funds, intelligence and recruits to ethnic insurgent groups, having extremely dire consequences for the civilians who were ordered into so-called strategic hamlets (byu hla jaywa) or relocation sites near to Myanmar/Burma Army positions. “For the tatmadaw in the Four Cuts campaign there is no such thing as an innocent or neutral villager. Every community must fight, flee or join the tatmadaw” (Smith 1999: 260). In practice, many villagers remained in the core “liberated areas” under the de facto administrative rule of self-styled ethnic pseudo-governments with their own ministries, taxation and revenue apparatus, “national” language, education, and health services (see Rajah 1990; Fallah 1991; Smith 1999; Thwe 2003). Another geo-economic angle to the “revolutionary spaces” (as Mathieson 2010 terms them) was their “external” “inter-national” relations with neighboring states. Situations like this existed along the Burma-China border for the Kachin Independence Organization (Dean 2002; 2007) and along the Thai border for groups such as the Shan State Army (SSA), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and KNU (Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002). Indeed, as Ananda Rajah (1990: 116) aptly put it, the ethnic opposition armies to the tatmadaw “fully understood well the language, as it were, of the nation-states and … the symbolic value and strategic importance of borders.”

By 1988, the geopolitical tide turned unfavorably against ethnic organizations along the eastern border with Thailand. The break-up of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) effectively removed one of the most resource sapping insurgencies faced by the tatmadaw. By 1990, the SLORC had signed numerous cross-border natural resource exploitation concession and trade agreements with companies in China and Thailand. For instance, along the Thai border, logging contracts led to rapid unregulated timber extraction, plus the opening up of many new logging tracks into previously remote terrain. In turn, these tracks could later be utilized by the tatmadaw to make inroads into insurgent-held land. Whilst the KNPP and KNU also made cross-border resource deals, the fact was that their natural territorial refuges were being squeezed. Pragmatic inter-state geo-economics and the willingness of neighboring states and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to practice “constructive engagement” with Myanmar/Burma
aided the tatmadaw’s coercive political geographic task of removing ethnic oppositional armies in the borderlands.

Through the 1990s the “liberated zones” became fragmented as many insurgent bases were lost to tatmadaw offensives. Many field-reports, independent monitor surveys by human rights groups, and thousands of testimonies by ordinary villagers present a deeply disturbing picture of violently transformed human landscapes. For instance, an aptly titled document *Wholesale Destruction* (KHRG, April 1998) catalogued 192 completely destroyed and partially burned villages in just one year in Papun and Eastern Nyaunglebin Districts of Karen State. By the end of the 1990s, many parts of the former “liberated zones” were designated as “prohibited zones” or as “free fire zones” where civilians could be shot on sight as suspected rebels by the tatmadaw (Grundy-Warr 1998; 2002; 2004; Grundy-Warr and Wong 2002) and civilians are often regarded, wrongly, as combatants (Lang 2002; Tangseefa 2007), with rape against women and girls used as a weapon to terrorize civilian populations (SHRF and SWAN 2002); and where internal displacement has become common (see various reports by the TBBC, KHRG, and other human rights monitors). As a direct consequence of the dramatically and coercively altered political landscape, many hundreds of thousands of villagers became forcibly displaced, either internally or across international borders (TBBC 2009).

**Ceasefire Zones: Vacillating**

Aside from the war zones, the second type of spaces constitute ceasefire areas where the armed ethnic groups retain and administer the agreed ‘autonomous’ territories through a system of state-replicating institutions overseeing education, health, communications, public and external relations, and so on. Their territories are explicitly manifested by army checkpoints and hoisted flags and an “official” channel of communication opened with the Myanmar/Burma government via the group’s representative offices at the tatmadaw controlled territories. The presence of ceasefire territories corresponds to the retreat of liberated areas, being a direct consequence of the establishment of ceasefires and the break-up of the Shan state based Communist Party of Burma (CPB) that opened a door to new local geopolitical alignments with several of the CPB remnants and other armies operating in Northeast Myanmar/Burma. The two largest and strongest ceasefire groups that have a history of adherence to their political agendas and determination to achieve a sort of autonomy for their respective ethnic states, are the KIO (established in 1961) and the NMSP (established in 1958) in Kachin and Mon States, respectively. Both groups’ “liberated areas” were turned into pockets of ceasefire territories in 1994 (KIO) and in 1995 (NMSP). Both groups maintain armed wings, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Mon National

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3 The KIO and the NMSP are not representatives of the entire Kachin/Mon peoples or the respective States.
Liberation Army (MNLA) that maintain armies and military organization under the ceasefire.

Ceasefire agreements have stopped fighting but these have not brought about political solutions as desired by these ethnic organizations. Both groups, as representatives of the ceasefire groups, spearheaded the move to gain more autonomy for their respective states by presenting a proposal to the military authorities at the National Convention reconvened by the then PM Khin Nyunt in 2003—of no avail. While the ceasefires are primarily ‘military accords’ that have helped to retain a degree of peace (with arms) or a period of less conflict during which there has been some much needed ‘physical reconstruction of the war-devastated areas’ (TNI 2009:15), these have, on the contrary to any hopes for positive outcome, enabled the Myanmar/Burmese Army to gain territory and control.

In Kachin State, the tatmadaw has almost doubled its troops and located closer to the KIO/KIA controlled area. Since the ceasefire, the number of the tatmadaw battalions in Kachin State has increased from 26 in 1994 to 41 in 2006 (KDNG 2007a). In Mon State, the number of junta’s battalions have tripled (from that of about ten to 30), during the 14 years of ceasefire, according to Nai Kao Rot, a former MNLA deputy army chief.4 While the KIA 2nd Brigade in Western Kachin State (the Hukawng Valley and surrounding hills around Danai) is totally surrounded by the newly gained territories of the tatmadaw, those belonging to the KIA 1st and 3rd Brigades, in Northern Kachin State and at the Sino-Myanmar/Burmese border, respectively, provide an anomaly in the international system of sovereign states with an ethnic armed group controlling and administering sections of an international boundary. For comparison, during the KIO/KIA peak, militarily speaking, the Myanmar/Burmese military only ventured into a quarter of the 89,000-square-kilometer Kachin State (mainly towns and areas along the railway) and controlled only 60 km of the 2,200-km Sino-Burmese border (Smith 1999: 360). The area then under the KIO’s influence—or the ‘liberated areas’—encompassed nearly 40,000 km, and by 1980s, over 30,000 people. The KIO ran five high schools, ten middle schools, 119 primary schools, and two hospitals complete with X-ray facilities and operation theatres (Lintner 1997). The KIA fielded more than 8,000 regular troops, organized into four brigades.5

In the absence of the KIA armed resistance—resulting from the ceasefire agreement in 1994—the SPDC has appropriated more space for multiple benefits of control, natural resource exploitation, profiteering and rent-seeking. The struggle to control space continues with the Myanmar/Burmese army now having an upper hand. The most straightforward method for appropriating extra space is through

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4 Reported by Lawi Weng “If Attacked, Mon will Wage Guerrilla War,” Irrawaddy 12.03.10 (www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18026) accessed 12.03.10.
coercive land confiscation from local populace ‘for the army.’

These violent transformations of the physical and human environment frequently involve quasi military—business joint venture partnerships with considerable powers to enforce, extract, expropriate and expel whatever they need from civilian populations. Huge hydro-power projects are another doubly convenient tactics of simultaneous military state building and resource extraction. For example, the planned 152-meter-tall hydropower dam at the Irrawaddy confluence, 40 km from Kachin State capital Myitkyina, intended to transmit electricity back to China, creates loss of livelihood and also displaces the local populace from what the Kachin view as the heartland of their culture (KDNG 2007b). Even through education, the SPDC exercises territoriality. By not accepting high school certificates from the KIO-administered schools at the ceasefire territory, young people interested in getting a certificate (necessary for anyone who wants to continue education) must move to the Myanmar/Burmese military controlled territory to attend school.

The Myanmar/Burmese military regime’s increased territorial access to a large swathe of Kachin state has resulted in a complex political ecology. In addition to the hydro resources, the state is rich in jade, gold and forests. Maclean (2008) terms the notion of “extractive enclaves” existing in all spaces of the country—but which have become more numerous as a result of ceasefires and the tatmadaw’s territorial advances into ethnic borderlands. His analysis reveals the temporary and coercive nature of natural resource ventures. Among the various forms of resource exploitation in Kachin State, logging has been particularly pervasive—fuelled by the Chinese ban on logging in the adjacent Yunnan province in 1996, followed by China’s nationwide ban two years later. Extensive deforestation is gradually

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6 This happens on ad hoc basis and is frequently reported by the grassroots community and the Kachin news groups. See KDNG (2007a) for a report on land confiscations in Hukawng Valley, or an example of such news “Burmese Army confiscates land and popular ‘Stone Dragon’,” Kachin News Group, 12 July 2008 (http://www.kachinnews.com/News/Burmese-Army-confiscates-land-and-popular-Stone-Dragon.html accessed 08.02.10) on land confiscations in Putao. Both areas have largely been opened up to the Myanmar military after the 1994 ceasefire.

7 An in-depth analysis of the adverse effects on the environment and local populace, caused by the various natural resource exploitations, is beyond the scope of this paper but is thoroughly reported by some environmental organizations and local community groups. The Global Witness, an international NGO, reports on logging (2003), based on its researchers’ field interviews and observations. The 81-page report by the Kachin Development Networking Group (KDNG 2007a) examines the impacts of gold-mining in Hukawng Valley, and its 64-page report (KDNG 2007b) considers the prospects of the planned dams on the Irrawaddy. The Kachin News Group (KNG) (www.kachinnews.com) reports regularly on new mining/logging concessions given out by the military authorities to the Chinese and other businesses, and has posted some videos on logging, mining and deforestation at the world’s largest tiger reserve at Hukawng Valley, on its channel at Youtube (http://www.youtube.com/user/KachinNewsGroup).
increasing even as it threatens to have an adverse impact on the livelihood of the farmers of the area, in addition to its negative environmental implications.

In 2002, the military regime offered up to 18% of the entire Kachin State for mining concessions that has transformed gold-mining from independent Kachin entrepreneurship providing livelihoods into a large-scale industry controlled by non-Kachin concession holders (KDNG 2007a). Mining concessions have been granted mostly to Chinese companies and military-allied groups from outside Kachin State. State-sponsored infrastructure improvements such as the new roads that have been built in Kachin State and the upgrading of the World War Two Ledo Road, are intended to facilitate logging and resource extraction. In a similar fashion, describing the expropriation of gem-mining sites in Mogok, near the Mandalay division border with Shan State, Maclean (2008: 47) notes that all the tatmadaw had to do was plant flags, erect fences and keep out the local inhabitants. Mining enclaves such as these are often jointly controlled by state companies, ethnically-based companies, Chinese (local or external) and other foreign investments, as well as causing internal migration of laborers from different parts of Myanmar/Burma. As Maclean (2008: 56) observes, the combination of ceasefires and the entrepreneurial turn of the military regime has produced a dynamic map with multiple layers to convey how momentary economic alliances anchored to particular resources have created “mosaics of territorial control.” This has also created conditions of unregulated and rapid natural resource exploitation with consequent environmental degradation of many areas in ceasefire zones (ERI and KESAN 2003; ERI 2007).

Adding to the complexity are the highly differentiated types and spaces of the so-called reconstruction and development, produced by the mosaics of territorial authority. Although complex in itself, the Kachin ceasefire is one of the more clear-cut type—it is a ceasefire agreed between the Myanmar/Burmese military government and an ethnic political organization with demands for some sort of political-cultural autonomy in Kachin state: The KIO staunchly reminds the military regime of the (Panglong) treaty on a federal union and ethnic rights signed in 1947 by the Burmese independence architect Aung San and some ethnic representatives, including the Kachin. Regardless of some internal misgivings—accusations of the KIO/KIA behaving like an opaque military organization, having internal power struggles and even coups, plus almost unavoidable personal benefits of some leaders resulting from the ceasefire—the organization adheres to a political agenda. The fragility of Kachin—SPDC relations and of the ceasefire has been widely reported in the media (see Leithead, BBC 2010).

A similar tone in their political agenda is maintained by the New Mon State Party (NMSP), whose leader Nai Hong Sar, in an interview with the Independent Mon News Agency (July 2009), made the following statement: “The reason that we all, Mon, Kachin, Karen and Shan, have taken political action, is to gain rights for our nationalities. To be precise, our aim is to gain the right of self-determination of
Mon State and for Mon people … The reason we made a ceasefire agreement was to solve the political problems over the table.8

By far the strongest of the ceasefire armies, which has considerable autonomy over a large swathe of territory near the China border, is the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has derived wealth and power from opium cultivation and production, while a number of its leaders have been indicted by US law enforcement authorities for alleged drug trafficking. In 2005, the UWSA banned opium, following the bans by other large opium-growing groups (National Democratic Alliance Army ban in 1997 and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army ban in 2003) in the same region. These bans were attempts to gain international political recognition and support for the development of their impoverished regions after decades of war and isolation. The much publicized projects for reducing poppy cultivation and banning opium in the Kokang and Wa regions, supported by the UNDCP (now UNODC), and international aid money, have successfully diminished poppy production, but the “alternative development” schemes to diversify agriculture have had mixed results.

The evidence from UWSA controlled territory suggests that ceasefires have enabled considerable international involvement in particular forms of alternative development, but there are still considerable difficulties in addressing the real problems and needs of the rural poor; who are also subject to *ad hoc* and often arbitrary military rule by the *de facto* ceasefire authority, including mass relocations. And it is clear from the growth of the methamphetamine industry over the last two decades that some ceasefires have also enabled “shadow” economies to diversify and develop highly lucrative transnational trade networks (Lintner 1994; Kramer 2007; TNI 2003; 2005; 2009; SHAN 2005; UNODC 2007). The blurring of lines of sovereignty enables simultaneous internationally-sanctioned so-called development programs to exist side-by-side with clandestine cross-border narcotics operations (Kramer 2007; TNI, January 2009).

Even though the ceasefire areas have reduced reported incidences of open conflict and human rights abuses in the zones they affect, ceasefires are inherently uncertain. The Myanmar/Burmese military government’s pressure since April 2009 to disarm and transform ceasefire groups into Border Guard Forces under its command, while demonstrating the military’s determination to opt for the solution suitable to its version of State building, has opened up a possibility of collapse of some of the ceasefires after 15 to 20 years of precarious persistence. The deadline given to the KIO/KIA and the NMSP, as well as to the UWSA, was gradually extended, since April 2009 and throughout 2010, because none of the groups have agreed to surrender weapons and transform their armies into a unit under *tatmadaw*. Significantly, these groups see maintaining arms as the only possible path for protecting their demands, desires and ambitions in the state of Myanmar/Burma.

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The remark by Nai Hong Sar, the leader of NMSP, by comparing the situation for the mainstream opposition, National League for Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi—without an armed wing—and the ethnic ceasefire groups with troops and weapons, may seem simple but explicitly describes the \textit{de facto} situation:

\begin{quote}
\textit{We have to hold onto our arms to help reach our goal, as we can’t gain our rights making only verbal demands - we have to have an armed group. No political party can accept handing over their arm force to the SPDC. As we all know today, there will be no hope and no rights for us... We can look at National League for Democracy (NLD). Although the NLD gets full support from the people, we can see it can’t do much in terms of political activities. Right now we can carry on our political movement because of our army. If we handed over our arm forced to them, there would be no way for us to carry out political activities. This is has been our experience. After the Mon People’s Front disarmed, we lost all of our opportunities.}
\end{quote}

Nai Hong Sar, interview with \textit{Independent Mon News Agency}, July 2009, emphasis added

Although the NMSP/MNLA and the KIO/KIA ceasefires appeared stable—with the networks of coexistence and political complexes of business, trade and territoriality—both groups have prepared for resurgence of an armed struggle in the tense political situation in 2010 where the SPDC has been requesting them to disarm. Violent skirmishes between the Myanmar/Burmese military and another ceasefire group, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a Kokang militia already happened in 2009 and sent a reported 37,000 civilians fleeing across the border into China (Kramer 2009b). Importantly, one of the issues that provoked fighting was the refusal of the MNDAA to allow \textit{tatmadaw} soldiers to inspect their arms factory. Such an incident is indicative of the confusing contemporary geopolitical landscape where \textit{de facto} sovereignty and ground-rules of ceasefires are sometimes contested or altered by one or more of the parties. It was the United Wa State Army (UWSA) that sent troops to the Kokang region to mediate between the SPDC and hostile factions of the Kokang. The UWSA action as a peace mediator between the local \textit{tatmadaw} command and leaders of another ceasefire group speaks volumes about the much vaunted political integrity of the geo-body of the country in these ceasefire zones.

The SPDC may claim that only the military regime and \textit{tatmadaw} can guarantee the solidarity and togetherness of the national realm, in fact the government and Myanmar/Burma Army hold only fragmentary authority in several of the ceasefire zones. Indeed, the reality is more of “shadow” sovereignties (Nordstrom 2000) with groups like the UWSA becoming legitimized in a \textit{de facto} manner. As Callahan (2007: 48) observes, the UWSA situation is one of “near devolution” where the territories under Wa command are strictly ruled from the party headquarters in Panghsang. The scope for non-governmental and civil society involvement in the Wa areas may actually be much less than in the SPDC-controlled territories, for the
UWSA has its own brand of autocratic and military discipline. Thus, “devolution of sovereignty into competing networks of authority and accumulation … crosscut the regime’s civil and military bureaucracy at some moments and bypass them entirely at others” (Maclean 2008: 143).

**Partially Securitized Spaces and Semi-autonomous Zones**

Finally, there exist semi-autonomous areas created by splinter groups of the ethnic political organizations/armies, seeking individual—and, duly, rewarded—“economic” benefits. Again, similar to the ceasefire areas, their stretch has expanded at the expense of the retreating “liberated areas”. Technically, these are also ceasefire areas, but ones in which the regime has more influence. Thus we can talk about the “securitization” of the regime. The territories of these groups are smaller and less clearly demarcated, with the zones of influence overlapping with that of the regime authorities with who they closely collaborate in exchange for certain privileges. The military has set these groups on a high pedestal, engaging them as the main body of ethnic representatives at the National Convention: a politics which the existing ethnic political opposition view as an example of the junta’s divide-and-rule policy. Groups such as the Karenni National People Liberation Front, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, the Mon Peace Armed Group, the Kayinni National Progressive Party, Kayinni National Solidarity Organization, belong to this type. There are other groups gaining influence and getting stronger in their respective regions, courting the military for various business and privileges (e.g. the Pa-O National Organization). These groups should not be confused with those organizations still without ceasefires, or whose ceasefires have broken down, such as the Karenni National Progressive Party, which is still opposing military rule.

These groups are characterized by Nai Hong Sar, the general secretary of the NMSP, as “groups which have weak political views” (IMNA, July 2009). Several of these immediately agreed to the military regime’s Border Guard Forces plan—thus, again, being set as exemplary ethnic organizations by the military government. While these territories are “partially securitized” for the regime, the blurring of the boundaries—unlike the borders enforced by guards and checkpoints between the tatmadaw and main ethnic ceasefire groups—enables multiple and overlapping authorities. This opens up new aspect of insecurity for the local populace who live under double, or triple, authorities.

**Degrees of Local “Non-compliance”, “Resistance” and “State Evasion”**

Such fierce contestation of space, and aspirations to enforce control, literally, by any means, has meant many adverse consequences for ordinary people. Any cartographic depictions of the borderlands should attempt to reveal the highly differentiated, volatile and kaleidoscopic qualities of the ongoing political and
military situation in the eastern borderlands, and contain many “silent geographies” of the ‘470,000 people who are estimated to be internally displaced in eastern Burma alone’ (TBBC 2009: 3, emphasis added). The same report indicates that there are some 111,000 civilians ‘estimated to be in hiding from the SPDC’, and another 128,000 villagers who have been forcibly relocated into ‘strategic hamlets’, relocation sites or in areas near to Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) bases or army garrisons. Earlier reports indicated that there were as many as 365,000 persons living in ‘temporary settlements in ceasefire areas controlled by ethnic minority groups’ (such as the DKBA) (TBBC, October 2004). These figures are truly enormous as they relate to a predominantly rural-cum-forest upland zone characterized by small settlements engaged primarily in peasant subsistence or small-scale farming activities.

The human landscape being portrayed is one of constant flux, of people on the run, of active low-intensity warfare in some places, and unstable militarized security or double (triple) authority in other places, of peculiar patches of ceasefire, and uncertain zones of ‘hiding’. It is a landscape of fear, of insecurity and doubtful stability. As things stand, any reconstruction would be like building houses of granite on quicksand. Yet, is this the full picture?

There are significant examples of “networks of noncompliance” and differing degrees of “state evasion” (after Scott 1989) by peasant villagers living in the ethnic borderlands employed vis-à-vis different authorities affecting their lives and livelihoods (Malseed 2009). According to this idea, ethnic peasant groups have an almost natural antipathy towards central states, or indeed any authority structures that greatly impinge upon their daily lives, including ethnic political parties, such as the KNU or the DKBA. As Kevin Malseed (2009: 369) puts it, “Any resistance group that began mimicking a state was soon likely to find itself, like an overly authoritarian village head, facing mutinies and fractures.”

While many Karen border villagers do not have a strong sense of being a part of a Myanmar/Burma national geo-body, many also resist “behaving like a state” amongst their own ethnic political parties. It is hardly surprising to find that the centralized and coercive advances by the SPDC/tatmadaw into the rural ‘Karen’ borderlands are met with various forms of localized non-compliance.

Daily village life is affected through numerous and repeated demands on labor, time and resources, by the nearest Township Peace and Development Councils or army battalion. State controls on land and the revoking of ownership rights of farmers who do not comply with requisition orders or agree to particular crop demands, are a common means of control in the countryside (Hudson-Rodd and Nyunt 2001: 6). The frequent and multiple demands made upon ordinary villages, whether they are in situ or relocated, means that there are so many changes in the human landscape that go unrecorded they are almost regarded as something that is ‘normal’ within militarized zones. As “normal” is the adamant opposition of such arbitrary restrictions and encroachments into everyday life by the local populace.

The most extreme form of non-compliance and “state evasion” is organized hiding to avoid forced relocation or other military demands. Such strategic
displacements are “more temporal and psychological than spatial” for the hiding villagers always stay in areas near to their villages and fields (Malseed 2009: 377). These actions require “coordination, mutual understanding, resourcefulness, and incredible resilience” and the villagers often refer to themselves as “bgha khay gk’ mwee” (literally, “people who run around the area”) (Malseed 2009; Hull 2008). Such “everyday forms of resistance” help to “challenge state-centered notions of hegemony, consent and power and contest the colonization of the ‘political’ by the state” (or by ethnic political parties), and help us to contemplate “more radical readings of the political” (Routledge 1996: 510). And in this specific case, civilian non-compliance may actually be more significant than armed resistance in helping to “keep spaces beyond effective SPDC and tatmadaw control” (Malseed 2009: 380). Similar to Skidmore’s (2004) notion of “veneers of conformity” (and non-conformity) within urban centers, rural villagers’ use degrees of “not supporting”, ranging from not fully obeying commands to strategic hiding in order to evade or diminish the state’s “reach”.

Conclusion

Our chapter focuses on the significant dynamics of what we call “geo-body politics” in Myanmar/Burma—whether in ceasefire, non-ceasefire or “partially securitized zones”—much of the tension concerns the control over historically contested space of the geo-body, where the mightiest actor is the regime, that is, the Myanmar/Burmese army, tatmadaw, in terms of traditional power, but it is by far from being the only actor with ability to control territory, resources and people. An ongoing and critical dimension of the de facto political map is the effort by certain organizations to maintain (or create) “traditional homelands” where “their people” are able to continue to study in their mother tongue, and practice customary rights over land and environmental resources. This chapter reveals that the conditions along the war/peace spectrum in Myanmar/Burma are generally tilted towards a militarized peace, the latter itself generating and transforming the dynamics—that transcend any clear-cut ethnic and political fault-lines.

Under this thick veneer of militarization of just about every aspect of life in Myanmar/Burma, there are nevertheless alternative non-military and non-state power sources. These are the ordinary villagers whose banal struggles to maintain livelihoods and retain space for continuing cherished cultural practices remain hidden from ‘official’ maps. There are many examples of people remaining resilient, even under the extraordinary violence of counter-insurgencies, the “four cuts”, militarization, martial law and various gradations of peace or war. It has been possible for civilian groups, home-grown non-governmental organizations, religious bodies, and ordinary villagers to create alternative ways of seeing and being even within a highly militarized environment.

What we have tried to reveal is a complex political-economic- and social map of a geo-body state under conditions of “not war, not peace” with real but
highly restricted spaces for community-level reconstruction projects and with some (re)emergence of localized associational networks, civil society groups and home-grown NGOs (Saw 2007; Hlaing 2007; Than 2007, South 2007). The latter are swamped in size and significance by militarily-protected, tightly-controlled resource joint ventures, and a large “shadow economy” that requires militarization, collusion, corruption and coercive forms of authority to thrive (Nordstrom 2000; Kramer 2007). Mary Callahan used a Burmese saying relating to “walking on the edge of a dah” (knife or sword) to illustrate the fragility, vulnerability and dangers involved in forging local-level community and non-governmental initiatives throughout Myanmar. It is a tricky, perilous and subtle exercise for NGOs and community-based agencies “to carve enough of a zone of autonomy from predatory state and non-state elites without endangering themselves, their staff, clients, or programs” (Callahan 2007: 52). To some degree, it is possible for localized community schemes to undermine “the ideological and practical basis of centralized military rule” by “creating spaces for the development of community autonomy” (South 2007: 169). Regardless, there are more resilient forces of traditional power operating to reify existing “networks of accommodation”—between the SPDC, ceasefire political parties, and militia groups. Here the economic impetus of ceasefire natural resource exploitation is an important factor continuing to provide material support for ongoing forms of military rule (state or non-state), enhance military-business joint ventures, and highly lucrative legal/illegal cross-border trade alliances.

Furthermore, the Myanmar/Burmese military is not a unified actor but under the façade constitutes several cliques, political, power and business interests beyond the scope of this current paper. What this chapter has hopefully made clearer, though, is the relevance of localized economic, social and cultural politics and relationships in any (post-war) reconstruction in Myanmar/Burma. Understanding and addressing the various localized politics necessitates factoring in their historico-political evolution and the very contingent politics of the moment. That said, at the heart of the various forms of militarization and political struggles lie contested territories constituting thousands of ordinary villages, where people would ideally like to live in peace, grow rice, sustain livelihoods, and maintain their cultural ways of life, uninterrupted by the war, the state and various militias. The struggle is not about the control of the state of Myanmar/Burma per se, but about much lesser ambitions—those of controlling the patches of the land and resources perceived to belong to the contestants.

Any considerations of the future political shape of Myanmar/Burma should not sidestep these long-standing “geo-body politics” and should take account of the numerous struggles of many thousands of ordinary bodies striving for forms of peaceful reconstruction even within current unstable conditions of “not peace, not war.”
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In May 2006, Leo Docherty, serving as a Captain in the Scots Guards, is sitting with a group of Afghan elders at a ‘shura’ or meeting in Sangin, Helmand province, Afghanistan. His unit is there as part of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), charged with mentoring his Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts, giving an ‘Afghan face’ to operations. His unit is also showing an armed presence in the town, though he is aware that ‘this in itself might cause offence’ (Docherty 2007: 140) and he’s alert too to the ‘clumsy, ill-informed nature of our presence’ (p. 148). It is very hot. Docherty’s team is trying to promote the idea of policing to the gathering of elders, of setting up an auxiliary police force as part of an attempt to establish security in the town. Sangin, he knows, is the centre of the province’s opium trade with which the majority of individuals at the meeting (including the police) have some sort of connection. The realisation grows of the impossibility of finding alternative ways to those through which he and his unit have to conduct business, and he reflects on the briefings he’d received prior to his deployment and conversations he’d had with a woman working for the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). She had been optimistic about the National Development Strategy for Afghanistan, about microfinance lending and quick impact projects, and he reflects that he had shared her initial enthusiasm. But sitting in Sangin, he becomes ‘irate with disappointment’ (p. 150).

No plan has developed for security and development and they are sitting there, a visible potential target for the Taliban, aware that unless the local population see some sort of progress, any support for the ISAF presence will evaporate and the population may well turn against them. ‘Where the fuck is the DfID bird now?’, he asks himself in his frustration (ibid).

A month previously, serving in Afghanistan as the Commanding Officer of 3 PARA (the Parachute Regiment), Colonel Stuart Tootal reports dealing with similar frustrations. Early in their deployment, in April 2006, he accompanies a patrol around the town of Gereshk. They patrol in soft hats rather than helmets and he notes the smiles of the children, the ‘mildly interested curiosity’ of the adults and the ‘looks of suspicion and hostility’ from younger men (Tootal 2009a: 43). The insurgency against ISAF forces in Helmand will explode two months later, but
for the time being they are safe enough to enter the town’s hospital and be guided round by a doctor who mentions the hospital’s needs for basic drugs and facilities, including laundry. Tootal’s group notice an industrial washing machine sitting in a corridor, still in cellophane wrapping, and one of their number, an officer in an Engineers regiment, mentions that his men with their requisite plumbing and electrician training could easily get it working. ‘Within the space of a few hours on the ground we had identified a quick-impact project that would make a small, but near immediate difference to the lives of some of the locals’ he writes (ibid, p. 44). Reflecting that Afghan support for British military presence would be secured if they could bring security and development, and mindful that this was going to be a ‘mammoth and long-term task’, he writes that quick-impact projects, ‘like getting the washing machine working, could go a long way to gaining goodwill and consent’ (p. 46), that one concrete act would be worth more than a thousand empty promises. When he suggests his plan, the reaction of the DfID workers charged with reconstruction surprises him. ‘The department countered with thin arguments that any small-scale immediate help on our part would generate a dependency culture among the Afghans’, and he is dismayed at the comments of one official ‘that they didn’t do bricks and mortar’. They also raise ethical issues about the military doing work that should be left to NGOs. Tootal recalls that he ‘didn’t mind who did it as long as someone did’, particularly given that the NGOs were prevented from working as a result of the security situation. He, like Docherty, reports his very great frustration at a situation where 

lofty ideals of an intangible western-style society with a functioning bureaucracy, national health service, women’s rights and higher education meant little to a populace where the majority of government officials couldn’t read, village schools were burnt to the ground by the Taliban and the most basic ailments went untreated because of a lack of access to drugs. (Tootal 2009: 47)

Two months later, as the violence in the province escalates, DfID staff are withdrawn, having never visited the hospital.

These two accounts of different events from the same time and context both make the case for the intractability of reconstruction in Afghanistan as a development issue requiring military support. This chapter takes these and other accounts by serving British personnel caught up as protagonists in that period of post-conflict reconstruction, and asks what understanding of the intersections between conflict and reconstruction these individuals develop in their reflections on their experiences. Both the accounts quoted above mark a specific moment in Afghanistan, when a (supposedly) planned, linear progression between conflict and post-conflict, violence and reconstruction, stalled. At this point, in the late spring of 2006, personnel such as Docherty and Tootal were settling into deployments on the understanding that their presence would establish the security required as a precondition for the developmental and governance work that would swiftly follow. As we know, and as their books then go on to tell us, that securitisation
never happened and from June 2006 British and other NATO forces in Afghanistan were, in effect, fighting a war rather than winning a peace. This chapter looks at the personal reflections of those involved as protagonists in that moment and in what followed, and focuses on British military personnel (primarily but not exclusively soldiers) in order to bring their specific understanding of their position and experiences to bear on the problematising of ideas of war and post-war, reconstruction and post-conflict.

These personnel, and those that preceded and followed them, were charged with the assertion of military power across space, and the metanarrative of NATO deployment through ISAF in Afghanistan is most commonly interpreted as just that. Through the establishment of the authority of the Afghan National Government and thus the legitimacy of the state of Afghanistan, US and NATO interests in central Asia would be served. These metanarratives, however, are of less concern to those writing of experiences of deployment than the fact that a deployment billed initially as a ‘hearts and minds’ operation soon turned into, as Docherty terms it, a ‘clusterfuck’. The narratives focus on the specifics of military engagement in the attritional, asymmetric conflict characterising the violence and its effects in Afghanistan. So whilst these military personnel could be seen, en masse, to be enacting the colonial present (Gregory 2004) through the application of political will on a grand scale as agents of the state, they are also, individually and very personally, labouring with all that this brings—destruction, death, physical and mental injury. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to bring one of many narratives of participation in conflict and reconstruction to bear on the problematising of that distinction. This was (and remains, at the time of writing) a military deployment portrayed as reconstructive of the Afghan state by NATO governments, and which for its protagonists looked (and still looks) a lot like a war.

**Afghanistan and the Logic of Deployment**

Initial hopes about the extension of the ISAF mission across Afghanistan, and of the stability this would readily bring, were framed around the idea of NATO deployments as potentially reconstructive. The UK’s then Defence Minister, Dr John Reid, is quoted in announcing the deployment of British forces to Helmand in early 2006 under Operation Herrick in terms that suggested the possibility of a benign engagement: ‘If we are here for three years to accomplish our mission and have not fired a shot at the end of it, we would be very happy indeed’ (quoted in Tootal 2009: 20).

The logic of British deployments turned, in official foreign policy statements, on Afghanistan’s strategic significance for British interests in the region, in terms of anti-terror strategies (Afghanistan having been a base and training area for Al Qaida), transnational crime (because of the Afghan origins of over 90% of the heroin sold in the UK) and in terms of a wider and more nebulous idea of regional stability ‘which affects the UK’s interests’ (Cabinet Office 2009). Following the
removal (or, in some areas, disruption) of post-Soviet Taliban control of the country, in December 2001 a UN mandate established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which focused for the period to 2003 on the area around Kabul, in tandem with the wider reach of US military forces engaged in counter-terrorism activities. The mandate of ISAF was extended across the country from 2003 when responsibility for ISAF was passed to NATO, with the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to promote security and development, and to assist in the establishment of the Afghan National Government elected initially in 2004 under the leadership of Karzai. For the period 2001–06, UK forces contributed to the ISAF in Kabul and to the PRT in Mazar-i-Sharif in the north of the country.

ISAF numbers grew to around 20,000 by mid-2006. At this point, and just before the events that Docherty and Tootal describe, UK forces were given lead responsibility for the ISAF in Helmand province in the south of the country, and an initial 3,500 British troops were deployed. In the words of the British government, they were met by a ‘complex insurgency’ which responded ‘more aggressively than expected’ (Cabinet Office 2009: 8). The lack of the rule of law and absence of authority of the national police force, plus attempts to overthrow the provincial government through asymmetrical engagement by opponents, meant that NATO forces were swiftly drawn into direct conflict rather than being able to contribute to reconstruction work or the building of local capacity to push forward reconstruction. By the summer of 2007, British troops numbered 7,800 of the ISAF total in Afghanistan of 58,000 drawn from all NATO members plus 14 other countries. By summer 2008, 8,100 British troops were deployed, and the UK remains the second largest contributor to the ISAF. Other ISAF contributors in Helmand have included Estonian, Canadian, US, Danish, French and German forces. Costs in lives and money have been high; in the financial year 2008–09, operations in Afghanistan had cost the British government £2.6 billion, compared with the £207 million on development and stabilisation spending for the same period. As of mid-June 2010, 298 British personnel have been killed, as have over a thousand US personnel, and (we should assume) thousands of Afghan citizens, both as direct casualties of conflict and indirectly through the effects of famine, disease and impoverishment.1 The post-2006 situation is summed up thus by the UK government:

Governance is beset by corruption and lack of capacity, which is compounded by the lack of security. The combination of insecurity, poverty, lack of good governance and social and economic development, and perception of widespread corruption, deepens the challenge of persuading the people to

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1 The UN (2010) estimate 784 conflict-related Afghan civilian fatalities for the period August-October 2009. Reliable figures, or event estimates, of the number of civilian fatalities in Afghanistan, as a consequence of the war, are virtually impossible to determine; for a discussion of fatality enumeration and its problems, see the Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, run from the School of International Studies, Simon Fraser University.
back their government over the Taleban. In a recent poll, only 4% of Afghans said they favoured the return of the Taleban; but too many remain ambivalent, waiting to see which side gains the upper hand. As a result of all these factors, the insurgency has not been delivered a decisive blow. (Cabinet Office 2006: 9)

The specific roles of British forces deployed under Operation Herrick have been multiple and various, but key amongst these has been the mentoring and training of the newly-established Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. It is these mentoring activities, which have extended to include direct combat, that provide the parameters through which many British units have undertaken operations in Afghanistan.

The Uses of Military Memoirs

The engagement of British troops in Afghanistan has, predictably, been communicated to the British public in a variety of ways. In conjunction with newer forms of writing enabled by internet technologies and the highly managed and mediated accounts reported through broadcast and print media, a more traditional form of communication, the military memoir, has played a significant role. Published memoirs—the accounts of military personnel of specific military engagements—have long been key sources of public information about war, about specific conflicts, and about the military experience and its aftermath. In its contemporary form, this is a high sales-volume, popular, non-fiction genre with distinct market segment appeal; in 2008, for example, the ‘true military and combat stories’ sector was worth over £3 million (Stone 2009). As representational texts their influence extends beyond their immediate readership. Narrative tropes emanating from memoirs circulate in news media discourse, in film and television drama, and the imagery and tone of computer and video games. In turn these feed back into memoirs, which are alert in style and content to wider cultural imaginations of war.

Yet they remain a distinctive genre within the larger body of literature around the human experience of war (Hynes 1997; Vernon 2005; Harari 2008). They are distinctive in their selectivity; not all combat participants write them. They are distinctive in the mediation processes that surround the production of the published text through the interventions of the publication process as well as through the self-censorship that many memoirists report. They are distinctive in their reception as a genre by the wider public, dismissed by some as fictionalized and self-aggrandising and voraciously read by others as authentic accounts of war. They are important sources for historians tracing narratives of war with reference

2 This chapter draws on a the work of an ESRC-funded research project ‘The social production of the contemporary British military memoir’, 2009–11, Rachel Woodward and K.Neil Jenkings, ref: RES-062-23-1493.
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to documented experience; histories of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, for example, draw heavily on accounts by senior personnel such as Admiral Sandy Woodward and Colonel Nick Vaux. They are also a source of data for social scientific investigations of armed conflict and military activities more widely (see for example Newsinger 1994; King 2006, 2009), its broader cultural resonance (see for example Newsinger 1997; Dodds 1996, 1998), and the intricacies of military experience and the identities it shapes (see Higate 2003; Woodward 2000, 2008; Duncanson 2009).

As a data source, we have to be alert to the potential and limitations of these texts. They can provide, often like no other source (including oral interviews), close-textured and finely-grained details of specific activities. They constitute ‘flesh-witnessing’ (Harari 2008), the lived embodied experience reported to the reader as authentic. The conventions of the genre can often produce extremely graphic descriptions, not just of the activities of combat itself, but of the landscapes and geographies of those actions and the tactical specificities of armed engagement. Their limitations as a data source are obvious. They rely on the fragility of human memory and the partiality of individual engagements in larger events. The genre demands certain stylistic conventions in the reporting of armed conflict. They invariably struggle with the limits of communication of extreme events. But despite their partiality and selectivity, they remain a data source like no other, in that they can be used to inform accounts of armed conflict both as reports of lived experience and as socially situated records which go on to shape wider public imaginations. In this chapter, we draw on them as a unique source to investigate the understandings of one set of protagonists in the Afghan conflict of the relationships and distinctions between states of conflict and states of reconstruction within that territory, and of the experiences of the use of legitimized violence as part of the process of nation-building.

Memoirs of Afghanistan

Written for a range of reasons—the recording of events, the vindication of personal actions, the coming to terms with participation in war—memoirs emanating from the Afghanistan conflict have started to fill the shelves of British bookshops. As of the time of writing, we have been able to identify a total of 14 published memoirs written by people serving with the British armed forces in Afghanistan from 2006 to the present. See, for example, Matt Croucher’s Bulletproof: One Marine’s Ferocious Account of Close Combat Behind Enemy Lines (2009) or Doug Beattie’s An Ordinary Soldier: Afghanistan, A Ferocious Enemy, A Bloody Conflict, One Man’s Impossible Mission (2008) and Task Force Helmand: A Soldier’s Story of Life, Death and
Combat on the Afghan Front Line (2009). Then we have Jake Scott’s Blood Clot: In Combat with the Patrols Platoon, 3 Para, Afghanistan 2006 (2009), Patrick Hennessey’s The Junior Officers’ Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars (2009). Stuart Tootal prefers instead a technical military term for proximity to peril in Danger Close: Commanding 3 PARA in Afghanistan (2009), a strategy seen also in Mark Hammond’s Immediate Response (2009), a reference to the Immediate Response Team in which, as a Chinook pilot, he took part. Leo Docherty’s title Desert of Death: A Soldier’s Journey from Iraq to Afghanistan (2007) plays on both the effects of war and the location of his Afghan journey in proximity to the arid Dasht-e-Margo. As Dahlman notes, Afghanistan illustrates how the ‘transformative process of moving beyond conflict is not linear but rather reveals the situated geographies of authority and violence that keep a country somewhere between war and peace’ (Dahlman 2009: 245). In the accounts of those charged with the establishment of authority and the prosecution and experience of violence, the titles alone indicate a perception amongst this set of protagonists that a movement beyond conflict is so very far off.

Yet the texts themselves offer a far more nuanced and contingent account of this conflict than their titles alone would suggest. They speak to the ‘architecture of enmity’ (Gregory 2004, following Shapiro 1997) emergent in and constituted through this Afghan war, an ‘antagonistic binary’ pitting a ‘civilized’ West led by the US against an undifferentiated Islamic world (Gallaher 2009: 75). This antagonistic binary ‘allows the US to lump together and ignore differences between Taliban, Al Qaida, journalists, refugees, and ordinary civilians’ (ibid). The writers of these memoirs are working in the interests of the great hegemon, and caught up in the imaginative geographies of the colonial present so clearly outlined by Gregory. However, they are doing so in full awareness of the impossibility, both moral and practical, of using binary divisions to assess their interactions with an Afghan other. In the rest of this chapter, we sketch out with reference to a selection of these memoirs the representations made of the conflict and of the range of participants within.

Great Expectations, Great Games

The trinity of security, development and governance as objectives for the ISAF deployment in Helmand is reported in the memoirs in a variety of ways, and to interpret them we have to be alert to the conventions of the genre in order to read these differences appropriately. Matt Croucher, in a memoir detailing actions during deployment as a Royal Marine in Iraq and Afghanistan, offers an unproblematic logic for deployment: ‘we were there to build a new Afghanistan - but primarily to protect people back in the UK from the terrorists being trained there’ (Croucher 2009: 155). Jake Scott, arriving in April 2006 as part of the first 3 PARA deployment, has a similarly straightforward explanation:
The aim of this Battle group was to help the Afghan Government and people to ensure there was no interference by Taliban forces as they slowly built the security to their region. Once they had the security and stability then development and reconstruction would get underway. (Scott 2008: 48)

Leo Docherty, deployed at the same time, sees reconstruction as a more central part of the mission, and is enthusiastic:

I’m increasingly thrilled at my involvement in an important cutting-edge project. I’m mustard keen on the idea of ‘nation building’ and getting involved with the Afghans. I consume as much background information as I can on the region. (Docherty 2007: 48)

Enthusiasm for reconstruction work is represented in these memoirs as tempered with a parallel enthusiasm for direct combat. Stuart Tootal describes his regiment’s perceptions, in the pre-deployment period, that the Afghanistan operation would involve little if any direct action. Many in 3 PARA were thus ‘concerned that it was being billed as a peace support operation’, ‘that Afghanistan might turn out to be another damp squib’, ‘another anticlimax’, for they wanted to go on operations ‘and be tested in combat’ (Tootal 2009: 20). He reports a concern that the combat talents of the Parachute Regiment would be wasted, as they felt they had been wasted in Iraq.

By the time Patrick Hennessey is deployed in Spring 2007 as an officer with the Grenadier Guards tasked with leading an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) working with the ANA, he has high expectations of seeing some action:

We landed in Kandahar with high hopes. The whole battalion, 600 men, mustard keen to get stuck into the unfamiliar and exciting task of working alongside the Afghan National Army (ANA) for seven months. A task which promised as much action and fulfilment as the last few years [in Iraq] had failed to deliver. (Hennessey 2009: 7)

Yet on arrival, he is bored, ‘stone-throwing, chain-smoking, soldier-purging bored’ (ibid.). He reflects how glad they should have been at the start of the deployment for the lull and the time ‘to get our heads around what everyone soon referred to as omlette’, but the weeks pass and ‘what we were dreaming of was getting out there and having a fight’ (ibid., p.11). He reflects back further to the pre-deployment period, and the thoughts of himself and other junior officers on what their mentoring role in Afghanistan would entail, and why they were reluctant to participate.

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4 ‘Omlette’ being a variant on the pronunciation of the acronym for the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT).
The problem was all in the name: ‘mentoring’ and ‘liaison’ sounded like holding hands and building bridges. If we’d wanted to build bridges we’d have joined the Engineers; we were combat soldiers, teeth arm, and our culture demanded more. If they’d called the task OBFET (Operational Blow the Fuck out of Everything Team), then every battlegroup in the Army would have been creaming for it, but the Afghans might have objected. (Hennessey 2009: 14)

The expectations of participants vary with the roles that they perform. Mark Hammond’s crewmen on his Chinook helicopters deploy to Afghanistan as trained aviators rather than soldiers, and ‘at this time none of us were prepared for the Afghanistan we had encountered, but least of all them. We had come into theatre expecting to be peacekeeping and helping to rebuild communities—the level of opposition was unexpected’ (Hammond 2009: 116).

Yet as both Patrick Hennessey and Stuart Tootal note, wider public knowledge in the UK of ISAF activities in Afghanistan is slight, so when in June 2006 the reports of a journalist, Christina Lamb, are published in the Sunday Times newspaper detailing the engagement in direct action of the paratroop regiment which Tootal commands, this debunks ‘any misconception that the UK was conducting a peace support operation in Afghanistan’ (Tootal 2009: 100). This alternative interpretation of the situation, he says, generated considerable anger within British central government although he as CO had no issue with this new emphasis.

The expectations and early experiences described in these memoirs are framed also with reference to a geographical imagination of Afghanistan haunted by the ghosts of the colonial past and its personification in the present. Doug Beattie, a Captain in the Royal Irish Regiment deployed initially at a time when development and reconstruction work was still in operation in Helmand, introduces an individual working for the US’s Poppy Eradication Programme as ‘the epitome of the well-read, well-travelled adventurer’ who ‘insisted on wearing an old-style pith helmet that lent him a colonial air’ (Beattie 2009: 8). Leo Docherty, clearly enthused by the new Great Game, discusses a ‘special adviser’ to the provincial governor, a ‘bright young orientalist’ employed by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office in a role that harks back to the days of British Colonial India, when ‘the ability of a single confident Brit to discreetly control the reins of local governance was the necessary foundation of the entire imperial project’ (Docherty 2007: 70). Patrick Hennessey, a junior officer, tells of a pre-deployment party for friends before his departure, billed on invitations as ‘The Great Game Round III’. Then, as the deployments commence and the security situation deteriorates and the memoirs describe the range of contacts their authors are engaged in, other references come into play in order to make sense of the fighting; alongside those to films of the Vietnam war, the attack on British troops at Rorke’s Drift by a numerically superior force of Zulu fighters made famous in the film Zulu starring Michael Caine, provides what a number of writers see as an appropriate visual reference.
Seeing the Enemy

The primary role of ISAF and thus British forces in Helmand, once it was clear that enabling reconstruction had slipped down the agenda because of the insurgency, was the securing of district centres around the province in order to establish the legitimacy of the emergent Afghan state through provincial governors and district chiefs. It is the maintenance, resupply and defence of these district centres and platoon houses in the towns of the province that are the sites of the most sustained armed combat for British troops, their presence provoking a reaction from an enemy described under the catch-all term ‘the Taliban’. Representations of ‘the enemy’ in soldiers’ accounts are always interesting for the extent to which the ‘othering’ of an enemy in order to dehumanise him or her and thus facilitate killing has to be tempered with a healthy respect for the opponent’s military skills for fear of underestimating his or her capabilities for executing effective, lethal force. Matt Croucher’s memoir is a case in point. Early in the memoir, recounting a reconnaissance mission that is blown apart, quite literally, by Croucher’s triggering of a trip-wired grenade set in ambush, he predicts that soon ‘the ragheads will be crawling out of their ratholes’ (Croucher 2009: 4). The representation of the enemy as bestial and pestilent is continued further in his account as he tells the reader of his understanding at the point of his initial deployment of the enemy, the Taliban, whose ‘evil regime’ had sent the country back into the Dark Ages. Music was banned, women were stoned, children indoctrinated. The bastards even blinded the lion in the local zoo by chucking a grenade into the enclosure. I had never met a member of the Taliban, but already I hated them more than anyone else on earth. (Croucher 2009: 155)

There are echoes here of what Gregory (2004) terms the destructive power of orientalism’s imaginative geographies. But the briefing Croucher receives early in the deployment, which he also reports, emphasises that the enemy should be underestimated at his peril, being ‘very professional’, ‘sharp’, and ‘above all bloody brave. These men will keep coming, and, gentlemen they don’t mind dying’, says the officer in charge of the briefing (Croucher 2009: 156). The idea of their willingness to die has a profound effect on Croucher.

An enemy collectively termed ‘ragheads’, (also, for Patrick Hennessey, ‘Telebaddies’ or ‘Terence’6) is, moreover, understood as a fluid and complex entity. Hard-core dedicated fighters identifying with the Taliban as an organised political

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5 Croucher’s subsequent actions in containing the effect of the blast with his body and thus preventing fatalities in his unit earned him the George Cross, a medal awarded for valour.

6 ‘Telebaddies’ is a play on a British television children’s programme ‘Teletubbies’; Terence adopts a naming strategy circulating in popular representations of the Vietnam War, of the Viet Cong named Victor Charlie, or sometimes plain old ‘Charlie’.
and military force are understood as working with individuals drawn from two other groups. Thus ‘the enemy’ is recognised as a disparate and complex entity including individuals identifying as Pashtun who are perceived to be motivated less by an anti-NATO objective than a resistance to the idea of a centralising Afghan state. Then in addition there are the ‘$10 Talibs’, local farmers deployed (willingly and otherwise) when the agricultural cycle permits, to resist the presence of ISAF troops. There is recognition that a policy of eradication of the opium poppy, the significant cash crop for farmers in the province and the source of a livelihood for much of the local population, would potentially be counterproductive, and possibly responsible for driving farmers deprived of their livelihood straight into the arms of the Taliban (Tootal 2009: 25). So, as Jake Scott (2009) remarks, although there may be little obvious visible difference (for ISAF troops) between ‘the enemy’ and ‘civilians’, behind similarities of dress there are recognised complexities and ‘the Taliban’ as an enemy is not monolithic. Troops on operations become reliant on the superior skills of their ANA mentees in identifying Taliban fighters from the wider population.

Furthermore, the very presence of British and other NATO forces is reported in a number of memoirs as a motivation for resistance amongst a civilian population:

... the more we moved into and patrolled this quiet area the more we would turn and piss off the local people. It did have an influence of Taliban but we would start to turn the locals against us constantly moving through their small towns in our large, heavily armed vehicles and with an aggressive look. (Scott 2009: 64)

Once the populace has been ‘turned’, metaphors of pestilence return. Mark Hammond, arriving in Helmand in August 2006, sets up his subsequent narrative by talking of the potential for volatility in the province through the words of a friend, who remarks, ‘Mate, if you keep prodding a hornets’ nest some hornets are going to come and have a pop at you’ (Hammond 2009: 27). Similarly, Stuart Tootal reports that he has little doubt in his mind ‘that our arrival had stirred up a hornet’s nest in a province that many had considered quiet until then’ (Tootal 2009: 254).

Yet for all this, memoirs rarely report the detail of face-to-face encounters with enemy fighters. For all the ambushes that troops experience across Operation Herrick, the enemy remains largely faceless and absent from view. Bloodstains may show where enemy fighters have been wounded and killed, and the sudden cessation of enemy fire as a result of troop action on the ground or close support from the air may indicate that the enemy has been stopped, but ultimately the memoirs present an illusive enemy, complex in its constitution and intimately interlinked through fluid allegiances with a civilian population and with the forces of order (the ANA and ANP) of the nascent Afghan National Government. This is indeed ‘war amongst the people’, a mode of warfare identified as progressively more dominant over the past 20 years by General Sir Rupert Smith, himself a senior British soldier whose experiences commanding British troops particularly
in Bosnia confirmed for him a quantum shift in the nature of contemporary warfare and the nature of one’s enemy (Smith 2005).

This movement towards the war amongst the people, and the challenges that this brings, is reflected in the memoirs. They express quite clearly soldier anxieties about these challenges, primarily in the avoidance of civilian casualties, but also in terms of the damage that ordnance brings to the fragile civilian infrastructure of the towns, villages and farming compounds of Helmand province. Here, in terms of representations of the enemy, the blurring of the boundary between states of conflict and of reconstruction is most evident, lived and experienced by the soldiers daily. The distinctions identifiable within a group labelled ‘enemy’ are sufficiently clear to the soldiers for these memoirs to stand as testaments to the instability of the binary distinctions of ‘enemy’ and ‘ally’, ‘combatant’ and ‘civilian’.

Afghan Allies

Charged with mentoring and liaison with their Afghan counterparts, it follows that a number of these memoirs have much to say about their authors’ duties with units of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Drawn from the disparate linguistic and cultural groups within the Afghan state, the ANA is presented as a fledgling force which includes both experienced fighters from previous conflicts with both the Taliban and the Russians, and complete novices attracted by the employment opportunities that ANA membership offers. The ANA had been given initial training by US forces (resulting in differences in operating procedures which the British mentors have to work round) and then sent to their bases located next to the forward operating bases of ISAF troops. The accounts of Docherty (2007), Hennessey (2009) and Beattie (2009) are explicitly about their liaison activities with ANA, and communicating through interpreters they set to work on this task and emerge with narratives reflecting both despair and admiration for their Afghan counterparts. Docherty’s counterpart, Captain Hameed, tells him that he’s ‘been fighting all my grown life with the Shura-i-Nazar’ (Docherty 2007: 83), but shows little evidence of being able to handle his weapon correctly and is reluctant to go out on the daily patrols that his mentor sees as essential to the mission in Helmand. Beattie (2009), who on his second tour of Afghanistan in 2008 is attached to an ANA battalion, reports his regular frustrations with what he interprets as laziness and disorder, potentially life-threatening for him as his patrols and resupply tasks come under heavy fire. Hennessey’s frustrations are similar, but tempered with admiration:

They couldn’t shape their berets. They didn’t get up early and they stopped everything for meals, for prayer, for a snooze. They had no discipline. They smoked strong hashish and mild opium. They couldn’t map-read. They had no tanks, no planes, no order to the chaos of their stores. Their weapons weren’t accounted for. Their barracks weren’t health and safety compliant. They wore
what they wanted, when they wanted and walked around holding hands. They lacked everything that British Army training believed in and taught – and fuck me if most of them hadn’t killed more Russians than we had ever seen.

I loved them.

I liked that they had more balls than I ever did to just stand up and say ‘why’ or ‘no’ or ‘I don’t care if there is a war on and a massive IED threat, I like watermelon so I’m going to steal a car I can’t drive and run a Taliban checkpoint in order to go to the market.’

I couldn’t train them at all. (Hennessey 2009: 17)

Hennessey despairs of their casual attitude to their military role, but is astute in recognising that the context in which individuals in the ANA had honed their skills marked their distinction from British personnel. Those he identifies as potential troublemakers in the ANA battalion to which he’s attached turn out to be the best soldiers, and he interprets their pretence at not knowing how to handle their weapons as ‘taking the piss because why would they bother to handle their weapons ‘safely’ when all they used them for was firing at Taliban, not manning gates in Surrey with empty magazines’ (Hennessey 2009: 21).

Those working with ANP recognise the issue of corruption, the fluid relations between members of the police and the complexities of a local economy built around the production of raw opium, and the scale of the task that faces them as they seek to support what they understand to be policing within a context where such fluid economic and social relations conform to very different logics and purposes (Tootal 2009; Docherty 2007; Beattie 2008). Invariably, personal relationships between British and Afghan troops and police develop, and range across the spectrum from animosity and dislike to something like friendship. Doug Beattie’s account is very interesting in this regard, for the way in which he explores his relationship with Shahrukh, an ANP major he works with during 2006. Sharukh, is ‘brave, loyal, fierce, honourable, entertaining’ (Beattie 2008: 285), a man distinct from his Afghan colleagues whom Beattie, a hardened soldier with over 20 years’ military experience, comes to trust ‘with his life’ (p. 233). Sharukh is killed during an operation in Garmsir in September 2006, an operation during which Beattie himself is injured. The death of Sharukh hits Beattie hard: ‘I wanted to cry’, ‘I felt like a child in need of comforting, as if I had lost a relative’ (p.292). Reflecting on his Afghan experience back in the UK, post-deployment, he draws parallels between his perception of the loyalties of the Afghans with whom he’s worked, and his own loyalties and motivations. He sees them as fighting for loyalties on a scale much smaller than the nation state: ‘it was about the family, the village, the tribe. People they knew and respected’ (p. 297). In that sense, they were actually not much different from himself.
In Afghanistan I wasn’t really fighting for Queen and country. I was there for my regiment, for my colleagues, for my friends. And increasingly, despite the difficulties and general wariness, some of the Afghans had become my friends. Perhaps that was why I found it so hard to put them out of my mind. Perhaps I felt we Brits had an obligation. We had started the job and now we needed to finish it. (p. 297)

The Intractability of Militarized Reconstruction

Invariably, as individuals, the personnel deployed to Afghanistan do not get to finish what they set out to achieve. Within the genre of the military memoir, narratives of personal reflection and vindication figure as frequently as those of action, adventure and mission completion. Within the Afghanistan memoirs, these personal reflections are particularly poignant around the question of the ultimate utility or otherwise of the contribution of their authors as soldiers to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

For Patrick Hennessey, an officer who left the Army after his Afghanistan tour, his book shows a journey from initial excitement at his first taste of direct combat, through to a realisation that the conflict has the potential for endless continuation. Early on in his account, he equates his deployment with tourism, the previous combat experiences of the men now fighting as part of the ANA forcing

us to remember that we were the tourists here. We were action-starved soldiers who had flown in for our seven months of glory. The afghans were in no rush – they lived it all year every year. (Hennessey 2009: 19, typography in original)

The rotation of British troops was

brilliant in principle, except that at every rotation of Op Herrick a fresh bunch of British soldiers arrived hungry for some action and started a frenzy of planning and grand ideas, involving the tired Afghans who had just accompanied the previous lot. (ibid)

He leaves Afghanistan during Ramadan, and his Afghan commander marks his departure with a final Ramadan feast and a

bear hug which has me choking back emotion because he’s a good lad and we’ve fought side by side for 6 months and I feel like a tourist who’s had his fill and is going back home and I assume he is just talking about the british army in general or the regiment when he looks at me and smiles that we’ll be back in afghanistan fighting again soon.

Hennessey assures him not
and he shakes his head and scares the fuck out of me by pointing straight at me and practically quoting Dorothy Parker as he reeks off some Pansher Valley wisdom – they sicken of the calm, who knew the storm. (Hennessey 2009: 304, typography in the original)

With the potential for this conflict’s endless continuation lying within himself, we as readers are left to wonder about war’s endless ability to reproduce itself through its effects on people such as him. Reconstruction is pushed firmly from the frame.

Docherty’s memoir too was written after his resignation from the Army following formal censure for his public condemnation of the management of reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. In his memoir, he is scathing of the ‘clusterfuck’, the ‘pantomime’, the ‘series of disjointed ill-considered directives from headquarters’ which constituted the reality of his deployment, and which had shattered the illusions he had had on initial deployment of ‘all the well-meaning reconstruction stuff’. The idea of reconstruction, he concludes, is ‘an egotistical folly’ on the part of British forces (Docherty 2007: 164–5). Although his account may be read as an indictment of the management of reconstruction as a military-led objective, it may also be read as a broader commentary on the advisability or otherwise of the idea of military involvement in non-military development objectives. There are echoes here of Sandra Whitworth’s arguments, questioning whether soldiers are necessarily the best choice for peacekeeping or post-conflict support (Whitworth 2004). Through Docherty’s descriptions of his descent into disillusion, from being ‘mustard keen’ to a state of despair, we are led to ask this too, not because of the limits of masculine militarism, as Whitworth suggests, but because of the intractability of a military operation purporting to be a development project.

Stuart Tootal, a senior British Army officer and thus a man whose opinions have public purchase, is adamant. ‘We did not win the war, we did not bring about peace or reconstruction’ (Tootal 2009: 255). Memoirs such as Tootal’s, then, can be seen very clearly as part of a wider critique problematising the intersection between conflict and reconstruction, and of the difficulties of economic and social development as a military or militarized process. Tootal resigned from the Army after his Afghan deployment, partly because he felt that he had no interest in further promotion and the tasks that this would entail. But he also cited his frustrations with the inability of his forces to undertake the reconstruction work with which they had been tasked, because of what he perceives as a lack of support for this at the highest levels within the British government.

His overall assessment, in his memoir, is that the demands of the provincial government of Helmand, which as a commanding officer of an ISAF force he was obliged to attend to, required in turn a kinetic, offensive strategy for deployment through the securing of platoon houses and operating bases over a wide geographical area within this large province. Spread so thinly, the consolidation by troops of a core, stable area where reconstruction and development could be pursued could not be ensured. Ultimately, then, this memoir points to how the
tactical requirements of a conflict situation made strategic objectives for post-
conflict reconstruction all but impossible.

These military memoirs are useful, we contend, for extending our understanding not just of the Afghanistan war, but also of the issue underpinning this edited volume concerning the relationships between conflict and reconstruction. They do this primarily through their disruption of the idea of a linear progression between the two states. But in addition, in reporting the activities of those performing in the service of the distinction between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ which underpins the imaginative geographies of the colonial present, they unsettle the idea of reconstruction as an established explanation for deployment in the first place (an explanation that these memoirs themselves, at least initially, tend to subscribe to). Through a reading of these memoirs, then, an open question hangs over the deployment of ISAF personnel in Afghanistan, regarding the viability of the initial proposals for reconstruction and whether this was ever, in fact, a primary objective for the deployment of ISAF troops.

Bibliography


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Chapter 7
Militarising Spaces: A Geographical Exploration of Cyprus
Paul Higate and Marsha Henry

Introduction: Developing a Critical Military Geography

Our objective in this chapter is to contribute, both empirically and theoretically, to engagements with a critical military geography, thereby making visible military authority and power as it is manifested in and through spatial practice, as has recently been argued for by Woodward (2004; 2005). We draw on findings from an exploratory study conducted in Cyprus, where qualitative fieldwork was used to investigate social and militarised relations between and amongst non-conflict British military personnel and local civilians. The analysis reveals some of the spatialised ways in which militarisation is produced and reflected in a unique and diverse cultural, social, economic and political climate that is simultaneously a space of conflict and post-conflict processes. In so doing, we explore intra-military and military-civilian relations as a way to show how military power produces particular geographies, and how these relations and geographies cannot be neatly separated into conflict/post-conflict periods or spaces. These geographies produce and effect a number of different relationships between those at ‘home’ and those ‘abroad’. In outlining the way in which militarisation shapes social and geographic spaces, we also reveal some examples of resistance and contradiction to power practices, which challenge stereotypes of soldiers and civilians as passive recipients of military power. Our empirical focus in the chapter is on the under-researched socio-military aspects of the British armed forces presence in Cyprus, whilst our theoretical contribution is to expose the ways in which militaries make social landscapes. These empirical and theoretical lines of enquiry proceed on the understanding that a military presence is always in the making, and therefore contingent and subject to contestation, and in some situations, can lead to unexpected outcomes (Woodward 2004).

1 The concept of ‘non-conflict’ is potentially slippery given ongoing operations conducted in the name of the ‘war on terror’. However, it used here as shorthand for the British military’s routine, everyday activities in Cyprus that are perceived as different by local people from those undertaken during the ‘war phase’ of the occupation of Iraq in 2003, whereby the base was seen as a busy ‘staging post’.
The chapter begins with a brief sketch of the concept of militarisation within the context of the sub-field of military geography. Discussion then turns to how military establishments are both constituted by and productive of space. These theoretical and conceptual comments are followed by a brief sketch of key events in Cyprus’ history and colonial past, followed by a description of southern Cyprus, the focus of the three example spaces that we analyse. The rationale for selecting these particular spaces is discussed, prior to introducing a more in-depth reflection on the genesis and sustaining of each militarised space alongside a number of tentative findings. We conclude by suggesting that militarised spaces produce a diverse range of geographies and thus social relations, some of which resist the symbols, signs and power of military presences, others of which are intended to resist the excesses of military personnel themselves and that often arise contingently and spontaneously. Even in ostensibly non-conflict settings, such spaces do not fit neatly into conflict/post-conflict categories. Rather they are a product of on-going social constructions that blur distinctions between war and peace.

*Militarisation*

There are many definitions of militarisation, however, most definitions prioritise process and action over ideology. For example, scholars have argued that militarism, is generally shorthand for those ideologies linked with the ‘glorification of war’ (Shaw 1991; Vagts 1959), while those who define militarisation tend to link it with social pervasiveness and preparedness for organised violence (Enloe 2002; Gillis 1991, Shaw 1991, Smith and Smith 1983) others suggest that militarisation and militarism are inextricably bound (Bernazolli and Flint 2009a; 2009b; 2010). Conceptual work that has sought to disaggregate these ideologies of militarism into their component parts view them as a package of mutually reinforcing values, argued to consist of: a belief in the armed forces as the ultimate resolver of tension, a Hobbesian and masculine view of (man)kind, an understanding that hierarchies produce effective action, and the notion that a state without a military is pre-modern and naïve (Enloe 2002: 23). Enloe has argued that the related concept of militarisation, is more broad and inclusive, as it refers to the ways in which ideologies of militarism ‘are driven deep down into the soil of a society’ shaping social relations in unexpected, unacknowledged and ‘unconscious’ ways (2002: 24). In this way, militarisation moves beyond ideology to reveal the ways in which the military, as an institution, is productive, rather than merely oppressive. Yet another way to conceive of militarisation is to see it as a process leading to ‘militaristic behaviour’ or ‘ideological militarism’; in this way, militarisation is seen not to follow militarism, but rather as a precursor (Shaw 1991: 71; Smith and Smith 1983). Militarisation has also been described as ‘the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence’, drawing attention to the challenges faced by those who advocate the use of force or military violence (Gillis 1989: 1; Woodward 2005: 7). Accordingly, pervasive militarisation may also give rise to civilian resistance, as the protests
of the 2003 invasion of Iraq across Europe demonstrates. Others have argued that attempts to separate definitions of militarism and militarisation reduce the multiplex ways in which ideology and process are mutually dependent (Bernazolli and Flint 2009a, 2009b, 2010).

Our interest here is to take the complicating definitions of militarisation and to introduce a spatial lens, following on from scholars who have called for more critical military geographies (Woodward 2004, 2005; Bernazolli and Flint 2010). Furthermore, we take the call to make visible the process of militarisation in everyday contexts, by giving space to examples of individual and collective resistance and contradiction. Woodward argues that the presence of the military can ‘colonise territories, areas and spaces’ with particular implications for social relations, and we examine this colonising gaze and impetus within the context of British military spatial presence in the southern part of the island of Cyprus (Woodward 2004: 19). In the specific context of Cyprus, thinking spatially about geographical and sociological matters can help to illuminate the hitherto unseen and unacknowledged impact of a non-conflict military presence on those communities who experience active and ongoing ‘impositions’ of this kind (Woodward 2005: 3). Woodward frames this active creation of militarised space in the following way:

[m]ilitary activities create spaces, places, environments and landscapes with a distinct moral order…militarism and military activities in non-conflict situations exert control over space in ways and through means which frequently render this control invisible…this control is both material and discursive. (Woodward 2004: 3)

Woodward further argues that the geosocial reach of militarism is significant such that ‘[c]onfigurations of … social relations across space … are shaped by militarism’ and ‘the controls exerted by militarism … operate across a range of contexts’ (Woodward 2004: 3).

Quite literally then, military establishments take place (Gregory 2004) in ways that point to the organisation’s significant consumption of both material (physical) and discursive (social) spaces. For example, different branches of the armed forces require a range of spaces including: runways, docks, accommodation quarters, weapon/personnel testing areas, leisure facilities, roads, railway tracks, mountains and urban areas (Woodward 2004: 1–12). These different spaces have an important genealogy, as is evidenced by their ubiquitous appearance in the media. For example, they are iconically represented in Hollywood (and other) films, television programmes, history documentaries and public radio broadcasts. As such, the institution itself, or the resonance of militarisation through signs, symbols and artefacts, is rarely absent from one or other segments of the entertainment industry, and the media more generally. However, most of these depictions also reveal the productions, contradictions and resistances that are the effects of the spatialised power practices of the military. Our concern is to explore
the challenges faced by militarisation in its production of social relations that are particularly useful to the organisation’s strategic aims. In so doing we illustrate how these aims show consistencies and nuances across what are artificially classified as conflict/post-conflict spaces. Prior to providing details of the method and findings, it is important to establish the broader social and spatial context for our study. Why Cyprus?

Cyprus: A Conflict in Limbo

Cyprus’ recent conflict is often argued to be partially rooted in its colonial past (Cockburn 2004; Richmond 2004; Papadakis 2005). Historically, Cypriots have continually struggled to be independent of both those considered to be foreigners and those closer to home (including Greece and Turkey). Although Cyprus has been home to a range of ethnic groups, one particular legacy of British colonial rule was the establishment of two sovereignties, that of the Greeks in the south and the Turks in the north and some have argued that colonial interventions are at the root of the last 30 plus years of conflict and political division (Pollis 1973, 1979; Gregoriou 2004; Hadjipavlou 2006). Even though Cyprus gained independence from Britain in 1960, within four years the island was in turmoil (Pollis 1973, 1979). In 1974, when Turkish forces invaded the northern part of the island of Cyprus, the current conflict is said to have begun and until today remains somewhat sedimented by the presence of a border or buffer zone (see Figure 7.1), administered by the United Nations (Papadakis 2005; Richmond 2004). The social, military and spatial deadlock was formally challenged, when in April 2004, a referendum was held in order to try to reconcile over 30 years of stalemate between two predominant ethnic groups. Polls revealed that 76% of the Greek Cypriot community rejected a proposal to reunify the divided island under the Annan plan (the island would have come to be known as the United Cyprus Republic), while 67% of the Turkish Cypriot community were in favour of reunification (Hadjipavlou 2006: 10; Lacher and Kaymak 2005). As a result of the rejection of the Annan plan, the island remains separated by the Green Line, a border established by a British commander in 1963, and the decades-old ceasefire monitored by the peacekeeping support operation known as the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continues. Struggles around Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot identities have been playing out within the context of a peacekeeping operation alongside of thousands of troops deployed throughout the heavily militarised island (Constantinou and Richmond 2005; Seretis 2005). ² Despite independence from Britain and a crystallised state of conflict, one military

² There are Turkish Army bases in the north as part of the Turkish Cypriot Security Forces (GKK), Greek-Cypriot forces in the south as part of the Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG), British Army Bases in the south, and a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission, the headquarters of which is in Nicosia, the divided capital.
remains ever present, yet curiously absent from the majority of bicomunal and political conversations—that of the British military forces, whose presence is a result of negotiations made prior to independence from colonial rule. While the island is home to many thousands of military personnel, it is in and around the British military bases that much of the power of militarisation is felt and seen, although in paradoxical ways. In day-to-day terms, individuals and communities have learned to live with the contradictory experiences of security/insecurity signalled by many different forms of militarisation in both the north and the south of the island (Papadakis 1996, 2005).

Juxtaposed with this large military presence, somewhat incongruously, the island attracts significant numbers of tourists on account of its warm climate, sandy beaches and its proximity to northern Europe. Cypriots in the north and the south rely heavily on the income generated by holiday makers, as well as the growth in second and retirement homes for Germans, British and Scandinavian expatriates (Sharpley 2003). In many ways, Cyprus has continued to be economically dependent on the monies generated and maintained by northern European tourists, especially those former colonisers: the British. Given that Cyprus is a divided island, is heavily militarised and is also a holiday destination, it appeared to us to hold an interesting set of possibilities for exploring militarisation and social relations conceived of through the spatial lens within a non-conflict setting.
Case Study Spaces

Our specific focus is on the British military presence in three distinct and discrete spaces. They are the Sovereign Base Area (SBA), the military-designated Out of Bounds Area (OOB), and the British controlled element of the Buffer Zone (BZ) in the central city of Nicosia. The rationale for selecting these spaces turns on identifying territories that were diverse in respect of the dominant groups occupying them. To these ends, the SBA contains a mix of civilians and military personnel; the OOB are characterised by the exclusion of military personnel; and, finally, the BZ is a space that excludes civilians, and contains only military personnel. Thus, the SBA could be seen as a semi militarised space. The second, that of the OOB, could be seen as an empty or evacuated space, empty of military personnel who are prohibited to occupy this loosely defined territory, and therefore, a form of demilitarised space. Third and finally, the BZ was a space from which civilians were prohibited, and in this way constituted a putatively militarised space.

Method

In keeping with Rachel Woodward’s suggested approach, we chose particular militarised spaces and set out to describe ‘what was there and what was where’ through the use of an ethnographically informed-approach (Woodward 2004, 2005). Given that our fieldwork in Cyprus was a pilot study, our data is exploratory, experimental as well as partial and situated. Further, the findings presented here should be seen within the context of the limited number of participants, and for this reason attention is directed to the validity of the analysis, rather than its overall representativeness (Mitchell 1983: 187–211). Our use of a theoretical sampling approach was designed to elicit thematic breadth and depth as one way to investigate the nexus linking socio-spatial relations and militarisation. Further, the research team consisted of a male and a female with no ethnic connection or ability to speak either Greek or Turkish; our outsider status has shaped our data in particular ways (see for related discussion Henry, Higate and Sanghera 2009). Yet, one member of the team had previously worked in the British military and thus was sometimes able to attain ‘insider’ status when interviewing military personnel providing a particular perspective on the meanings generated by participants (Higate and Cameron 2006). Findings are based on qualitative data collected from fieldwork conducted in Cyprus in September 2004. Here, we used observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups, and met and talked with tourists, bar and restaurant owners, community leaders, feminist activists, and military personnel. Our purposive sample (Arber 1993) of 31 people included British military personnel, United Nation civilian and military personnel, British civil servant administrators, bi-communal activists, feminist groups and members of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities more generally. These interviews were tape-recorded where possible, or alternatively hand-written notes were taken; both sets of data were analysed shortly after return to the UK. We complemented
this approach to data collection through informal discussions with individuals opportunistically selected on account of their relationship with, and proximity to our case study spaces. Finally, we made detailed field-notes of our own experiences of moving between and within militarised spaces and took photographs where permitted. This helped us to develop a spatial sensitivity, and as outsiders to the island, we felt that a receptiveness to spatial novelty would heighten the extent to which militarised spaces might move from invisibility to visibility (Woodward 2004: 3). We start now with a discussion of the Sovereign Base Areas.

**Background: Spaces of the Sovereign Base Areas**

Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960 and began its campaign for independence in 1950. The island’s independence was brought into effect in 1960 through the Treaty of Establishment (ToE). This document created the 99 square miles of the SBA (Constantinou and Richmond 2005). The rationale for claiming the 99 square miles rested on the strategic and militarily significance of the location of Cyprus, in terms of its geographical proximity to Asia, Africa and Europe within the context of the colonial aspirations of the UK. The SBA are comprised of the Western and Eastern SBA. These two areas are home to a significant number of British military personnel living and working in and around Royal Air Force Akrotiri and the Army Garrisons of Dhekelia and Episkopi. Approximately 8,000 (mainly Greek-) Cypriots live within the two SBA (Constantinou and Richmond 2005). Only those who can demonstrate a historical link to the area ‘are permitted’ to live within this designated area. A selection of the ‘main objects to be achieved’ in the SBA according to the Treaty of Establishment included: effective use of the SBA as military bases; protection of the interests of those resident or working within the SBA; to prevent new settlement of people in the SBA. Most strikingly, the Treaty of Establishment allows the UK SBA authorities to use:

> Without consultation or notification…roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of troops to and from the UK, [and to use] the bases, the sites, the installations and the British training areas in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. (Constantinou and Richmond 2005: 71)

The status of the SBA is one of ‘sovereign British overseas territories’ where the designated British authorities have—in principal—freedom to do as they wish with regard to their geo-political interests in the region. The European Convention on Human Rights has only been in place since 2004, with questions remaining over the significance of the SBA, spaces in which ‘free and fair elections’ are yet to be held (Constantinou and Richmond 2005). The appointment of the head of the SBA by the British Secretary of State for Defence reveals something of the centrality of the military prerogative to the occupation of some of the geographical area within the Republic of Cyprus by the British. Thus, the functional imperative of the SBA turns directly on the extent to which military-operational effectiveness
of the bases can be maintained. The broader context to the SBA is described in the following way:

The anomalous existence of the UK bases in Cyprus is a legacy of British colonial rule over the island, a compromise over the stated British intention to keep Cyprus as a colony and its practical inability to retain local consent and enforce this objective militarily. (Constantinou and Richmond 2005: 68)

The rules embodied in the ToE around the criteria by which individuals are permitted to occupy space, together with the overall authority to use the SBA in ways determined by distant British administrators, represent the continuing legacy of a colonial presence. In these terms, the 8000 residents in this area might be said to occupy a kind of militarised-liminal space (Hubbard et al. 2004: 5), as much the ongoing product of colonial violence as it is a zone of peace. Here, the mongrelised judicial system to which they are subject could problematise citizenship rights (neither EU, British or Greek-Cypriot), and appears to trail in the wake of the functional imperatives of militarisation. As Constantinou and Richmond (2005: 67) view it:

The base regime can be criticized from two angles; first as an expression of out-and-out imperialism, and second, as an anachronism, exacerbated by the politics of the island itself, the region, and the Cold War. The rhetorical and aesthetic construction of the UK bases … have effectively reproduced the bases as a soft imperial or singular political space.

Though the residents’ everyday experiences are likely to be ones whereby these issues are largely ignored—evident from a number of our Greek-Cypriot participants comments—nevertheless, the lives of SBA residents unfold against the backdrop of the latent power of the ‘sovereign authorities’. If military operational effectiveness demanded it, local residents could be displaced from their homes into other areas. How might we read this particular landscape?

Reading the SBA Landscape  The SBA are spaces associated with the comings and goings of British military personnel, the sights and sounds of military air traffic, the visible presence of ubiquitous SB Police Officers patrolling in their four-wheel drive vehicles, and a parallel militarised and leisure sector have come, over three decades, to represent the everyday, often unremarkable features of a non-conflict space of military power. As such, this space shapes social relations in ways that are deeply political and grounded in the military-strategic intentions of the occupying power. Despite the hyperbole of the military in the geographical spaces surrounding the actual base buildings, it was also possible to forget about the military in many of these spaces. In some cases, local life continued almost as if the British military was not present. For example, when individuals drive or walk just a few streets behind the main strip of restaurants, cafes and bars, adjacent
to the main access gate for Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri, a traditional village high street is visible. The high street has a small local shop, a church, post-office and caters to a Greek-Cypriot clientele. The visual landscape on these small streets reveals no symbols or resonances of British militarisation. The landscape is one that appears ‘authentically’ civilian and ethnically Greek evidenced by signs in the Greek language.

Though it is possible to encounter the occasional reminder that one is in the proximity of one of the two SBA (indicated through the presence of a number of heavy stones, emblazoned with bronze plaques), the border remains invisible. The absence of a solid physical border creates the experience of a ‘free’ and ‘open space’ when moving between the Republic of Cyprus (citizen space) and the SBA (militarised space); and yet the border of the SBA is both discursive and material. The links between the material and the discursive came into sharpest focus in our work when a Greek-Cypriot participant discussed how he refused to show his driving licence to a British soldier at a checkpoint on the Limassol-Paphos Road. He spoke of the ‘infringement of rights’ grounded in a deep sense of injustice and refused to recognise the authority of the troops at the checkpoint.

Given the anomalous rights of the residents within the SBA and the latent power and control of the overseeing authorities to which they are subject, the lack of a defined boundary is somewhat ironic. It was clear from our reading of the SBA landscape, and the places in which the stones appeared, that SBA was synonymous with military base. In the proximity of RAF Akrotiri, and the army garrisons of Episkopi and Dhekelia, SBA signs loomed large and in contrast, were not in evidence when away from military installations. That they featured in the vicinity of other indicators of militarisation—including bars with such names as ‘Base Inn’—further reinforced the sense that one occupied a space configured by a strong military presence. Here, the extensive CCTV surveillance facilities, the many kilometres of razor wire and the abundance of concrete traffic calming and anti-blast blocks, left the researchers in little doubt of Britain’s commitment to its ‘strategic’ role in the region. At the same time, the extensive security arrangements were sublime, and quickly assimilated into our consciousness. It is, for example, simultaneously possible to traverse parts of the island for days continuously without seeing an abundance of military personnel or military landmarks. However, our ability to maintain a heightened, yet subtle, awareness of these militarised symbols likely mirrors the experiences of others living within, and adjacent to the SBA.

**Administering the SBA** All of our participants discussed the history of British colonialism and its connection with the current presence of the British armed forces and the geographical areas designated as Sovereign Base Areas, in contrast to discussing their feelings about the conflict/postconflict situation within the

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3 One of our Greek-Cypriot participants referred to the stones as indicating a ‘solid structure’ to the SBA border demonstrating the impact of stone on the psyche of the individual.
context of the island itself. In particular, over half of our participants questioned the legitimacy of the British government in continuing to use an agreement from over 30 years ago as the basis for carving out independent space within another country. As one participant asked ‘what right do they have to be on our land?’.

In many discourses, these spaces come to be legitimated through a historical discourse of Empire, tradition and entitlement. For example, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw the bases being used as a military staging post, as well as a key site for intelligence gathering activities. Concerns, echoed around the world, were raised by many of our participants regarding the UK’s close alliance with the US, and the associated anxiety that the British bases on the island might have become targets for Al-Qaeda.

The interviews we carried out with middle and high-ranking British civil servants and military participants who worked in various capacities to support the SBA indicated a keen level of sensitivity towards local SBA residents. Here, our British participants articulated the functional imperatives of the SBA in a measured manner, speaking of the inevitability of the space and the activities that took place within them. However, a local Greek-Cypriot participant interviewed in the coastal town of Limassol (a short distance from RAF Akrotiri) outlined what she interpreted as strategies of appeasement with regard to the contestability of the space. With some dry humour she suggested that: ‘the British [military] are doing such a good job … they are giving [money] to “the donkeys”, to the blind, the poor, and everyone else they can think of!’ She added that this was a very ‘English way to do diplomacy, to buy people off … to divide and rule’. In her view, the ‘occupiers’ had honed subtle but effective strategies to placate ‘troublesome locals’ who questioned the geo-political role of the British. In the view of three British civil service and military participants, locally employed Greek Cypriots were considered to espouse ‘contradictory’ sentiments towards their employers. Here, it was suggested that whilst local people were ‘extremely grateful’ to be employed on the bases on relatively good wages with the promise of a highly competitive pension scheme, ‘they will happily come to work in the morning… and then “slag off” [criticize] the British [from their homes] in the afternoon.’ Implicit in this British military discourse that constituted Greek-Cypriot ‘moaners’ as subjects of a certain kind, was the idea that Britain’s role in the world could not be easily grasped by the basically ‘well meaning’ but ‘simple’ residents of this relaxed Mediterranean island famed for its ‘good food’, ‘hospitality’ and ‘sandy beaches’.

The control of overseas sovereign territories by a foreign power—such as in the case of Cyprus—tends to invoke a series of different controversies than

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4 Intelligence gathering remains a central role of the British (and US) military in Cyprus.

5 Similarly, during the Gulf War of 1991, it was suggested that the island of Cyprus was within range of Scud missiles originating from Iraq. This potential vulnerability had a detrimental impact on the islands tourist industry that is commented on to this day.
those encountered in the domestic setting (Woodward 2004: 19); the SBA’s are no exception. In the final analysis, the geo-political complexities of the modern world were problematically understood by our civil service and military participants as largely outside of the intellectual universe of ‘unsophisticated’ islanders.

**Resisting the SBA Presence: the Antenna Protests**  As you approach RAF Akrotiri a series of vast aerial farms on either side of the only public access road is visible. One particular radio antenna, hundreds of feet in height, soars into the air, dominating the environmentally sensitive salt flats and wetlands on which it is placed. This antenna has acted, quite literally, as the lightning conductor of discontent regarding the continued presence of the British bases on the island. In July 2001, violence broke out in response to the construction of the largest of the radio antennas. A police station was destroyed near Akrotiri and 40 police officers were injured in the protest. The antenna continues to fuel many concerns turning on the overall symbolism of the antenna constructed with little or no consultation with the local residents (Constantinou and Richmond 2005). The main point of contention relates to the extent to which the radiation emitted from the radio antenna is harmful to the health of local people. Here, scientific evidence has been mobilised by both sides, with one senior ranking British participant arguing that ‘radiation levels are higher in the centre of Bristol [when compared with RAF Akrotiri]’. In contrast, a local Greek-Cypriot told us that ‘the surveys carried out by EU scientists have shown how [the antenna] are detrimental to people’s health.’ Another participant living and working in Limassol suggested that the ‘goodwill of the [Greek-Cypriots to hosting the bases] had been ignored’. This mirrored other comments that the British ‘have never paid rent [to the Republic of Cyprus]’ for the privilege of occupying the SBA, that arguably, have included (according to another resident of Limassol) ‘some of the most beautiful parts of the island.’

The protests organised by relatively small groups of activists, local residents and political representatives demonstrates the ways in which militarisation, although invisible in many contexts, can be engaged with on a variety of levels. Military spaces, in this sense, are not merely taken for granted, normalised and incorporated into the social imaginary by all those living in and around military sites. A multitude of actors relate to military spaces and dominant discourses in paradoxical ways that serve to at least tactically contest the encompassing power of militarisation in everyday life.

**The SBA and Militarising Social Relations**  The space of the SBA was shaped by a moral ordering that linked militarisation with colonialism. This is suggested by

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6 Constantinou and Richmond (2005) are forceful in their condemnation of the British occupation of the island in the SBAs.

7 There is a debate here around the extent to which the ‘more beautiful parts of the island’ have remained that way as the military’s presence has prevented tourist driven development (Constantinou and Richmond 2005).
the use of discourses where the essentialised traits of local employees working on the base at RAF Akrotiri were framed in negative ways. Here, the Greek-Cypriot residents/employees of the SBA were frequently referred to as ‘passionate’, with the British implicitly framed as measured in the ways they conducted themselves. The centrality of administrative rationality (Woodward 2004: 96) to the situated views and beliefs of the British overseers of the SBA was apparent. Taken together, the discourses drawn on by a wide range of formal and informal participants formed a consistent narrative of othering. The subjectivities of those reproducing and sustaining their position of moral authority might be argued to represent a further example of divisions influencing relations on a global scale. Scholars writing on colonial relationships in other contexts have commented on the ways in which Westerners construct themselves in ‘flexible positional superiority’ in relation to the Other (Said 1978: 7).

In this way, our British military/civil service participants appeared to self-identify as members of an institution whose role was ‘natural’ with regard to exerting authority over discrete territories ‘belonging’ to the motherland (Said 1978: 3). They had embarked on a ‘mission civilsatrice’ (Paris 2002) that appealed explicitly to the ultimate triumph of (British) reason over (Mediterranean) emotion. Their struggle to legitimise the military presence was ongoing and as ‘rational’ governors, they expressed consternation at the lack of gratitude shown towards them by local Greek Cypriots who were employed on the base at Akrotiri on ‘generous pay and generous pensions’. Here, responses to the militarised social and political economy of Akrotiri can be seen as somewhat mixed (Woodward 2005: 11); both tolerated and resisted simultaneously by a number of participants. The local people involved in the antenna protests frequently do so as part of a larger critique of militarism (Woodward 2004: 128). In this case it was argued by two respondents that many who turned up were members of the Green Party. The military case almost always appeals to the ‘greater strategic good’ and ‘national security’ by suggesting that success in future conflicts and the protection of the UK and allied citizenry is paramount (Woodward 2004: 133). This power-discourse is difficult to resist and helps to explain how so many spaces, particularly environmentally sensitive sites, can be ‘justifiably’ polluted through military activities. The constructed imperatives of militarism maintain power relations within what are, ostensibly, post-conflict spaces.

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8 Whereas our SBA administrators referred to the locals as ‘passionate’, a number of informal British expatriate participants made similar comments about ‘the locals’, reflecting the commonality of the ‘othering’ discourse.

9 It is estimated that the military is responsible for 25% of global aviation fuel consumption. Within the context of the growing concerns around global warming, this puts it into the category of ‘super polluter’ (Woodward 2004) and represents yet another element of the destructive impact militarisation can have on the environment and its people.
Background: The Out of Bounds Areas  In 1994, Danish tour guide Louise Jensen was raped and murdered in Cyprus by three soldiers of the 1st Battalion, Royal Green Jackets\(^\text{10}\). This tragic incident marked a turning point in the military-civil relations on the island. Indeed, it looked as if the continued goodwill of the Cypriot government in hosting the British military might have been withdrawn altogether in response to the deep dismay and anger of the islanders. As Constantinou and Richmond put it:

> From the British military’s perspective, the bases in Cyprus are one of the few remaining assets it has. Although, from the opposite side, the social outgoings of the military personnel in holiday resorts like Ayia Napa have been a constant source of embarrassment for the British army and periodically fuel local animosity. (2005:76)

In the decades leading up to the death of Louise Jensen, bars and clubs represented spaces shaped by the excessive leisure-driven social relations of militarisation. For example, one participant, a Greek Cypriot who used to own a bar close to RAF Akrotiri, reflected on what he perceived as extreme levels of alcohol consumption by individuals from the base. He said: ‘[I]t used to be [the case] that there were [many] parties … 20 people would come in and say “20 Brandy Sours and 20 bottles of wine”’. Another bar owner (based in Limassol) made explicit the national dimension to high levels of alcohol consumption: ‘I can’t understand why British squaddies resort to [alcohol] excess and violence…with other nationalities (French or German)…this just isn’t the case…and it effects how other people see them [the British soldier].’ Whereas the SBA configured social relations in a more obviously demarcated sense, the off-duty activities of military personnel spontaneously came to colonise particular districts of Limassol, Paphos and Ayia Napa. The most notorious of these was (and continues to be) ‘The Strip’,\(^\text{11}\) a road in Limassol five kilometres in length bordering the coast on one side, and on the other, explicitly created to facilitate late-night drinking and partying. The multitude of bars, clubs, restaurants and fast-food outlets jostle for customers drawn in by the promise of ‘spicy’ and/or ‘topless girls’, ‘pitchers of John Smiths’ or ‘all-day-English-breakfasts.’ We were told by one Greek-Cypriot female that the presence of squaddies ‘influenced where people could go to relax’ as their presence was often seen to create a negative atmosphere for families. No doubt these spaces of excess shaped the social practices of the local people as well as tourists, and the many (other) military personnel shunning the extremes of the overseas party scene.

Although militaries have long prohibited soldiers from entering various establishments and geopolitical spaces deemed ‘insecure’, the death of Louise

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\(^{10}\) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/97849.stm (accessed 10/02/06).

\(^{11}\) Somewhat ironically, one of our senior military participants described ‘The Strip’, as a ‘war zone’.
Jensen gave new meaning to the policy of naming areas as off limits to military personnel. Spaces marked out of bounds then became spaces of risk for professional security as well as criminal prosecution, and the spaces continued to hold a legacy of empire and colonialism within them. For example, the excesses of military personnel were framed by some participants as a further example of the imperialistic impulse of the British military because soldiers’ behaviours within these pleasure sites was framed as antisocial and ‘arrogant’. One participant argued that British soldiers displayed a ‘lack of respect for Cypriot people who continue to live here, long after the soldiers return home’.

The Military Resists: Demilitarising the Spaces  
Ironically, a good number of military bases are located in premier tourist destinations; indeed, the lure of travel and ‘carefree sex with ‘exoticised others in sun-drenched destinations’ has long been presented as a draw to the potential recruit (Enloe 1989; Bickford 2004). It is unsurprising then that a posting to Cyprus might be considered a lucky break for younger, male soldiers, especially when contrasted with any one of a number of dreary garrison-town alternatives in the UK. This is in some ways true for female soldiers also, who shared with us their happiness at being posted to a site ‘close to home’ and within ‘civilised Europe’ where the ‘risk was much lower’. A posting to the Mediterranean island also brings a number of benefits to service personnel, including an abundance of subsidised alcohol. In these terms, there are few other overseas postings that provide the opportunities for much of what the licentious soldiery is famed for in terms of the trilogy of ‘booze, birds and brawling’ (Hockey 1986). The parallel tourist spaces of Cyprus shape social, and in particular gender, relations in ways that the military may find functional, but with limits dictated by the importance of maintaining sound civil-military relations. Mindful of the fragility of these relations, particularly within garrison towns, armed forces typically resort to one of two strategies to curtail rumbustiousness or (worse), or at least attempt to displace the off-duty excesses of their personnel. In the first strategy, those in the charge of the military are restricted to barracks. The second, more widely used sanction is to stipulate certain bars, clubs and other areas as out of bounds. These spaces are then placed under surveillance (ironically by Military Police),13 with fines and imprisonment held out as possible punishments for transgressors. This has been the approach of the British military and the British peacekeeping contingent under control of the United Nations in

12 The derogatory and sexualised term ‘Scanda-Gash’ has been used by servicemen to describe female Scandinavian tourists who visit the island in significant numbers during the summer months.

13 During one of the author’s days in the armed services, an RAF police officer explained with some boyish glee how police colleagues competed for patrol duties covering OOB areas (including brothels) as they could enter these premises with impunity in their search for transgressors.
Cyprus. (See Yamazaki, this volume, for discussion of a similar process of urban landscape production around the US bases on Okinawa island).

Discursive Constructions of the OOB

Two illustrative OOB-designated areas were considered in the research. The first was located in Nicosia and applied to the British Contingent (BRITCON) of the UN currently serving in the Buffer Zone within the city walls of the old town. All British UN personnel were made aware of these areas as part of the induction to their on- and off-duty time on Cyprus. They were further reminded through the display of a photocopied map and the names of OOB bars and clubs on notice-boards in their places of employment. The OOB areas for the UN BRITCON are enshrined in Routine Orders meaning that personnel have no excuse for transgression as they form the central part of their everyday activities and duties. The second cluster of OOB areas are those that lie in and around the tourist resort of Ayia Napa. Rather than identify a number of OOB bars and clubs, the boundaries of the space are signalled by a series of hotels, apartments, rent-a-car establishments, clubs, restaurants, fast-food outlets and a police station. The photocopy accompanying the OOB instruction contains a basic road map of Ayia Napa, with the various establishments and their location on the map ringed around the outside of the town. The establishments shown are in-bounds, but proceeding beyond them means that military personnel have transgressed, and are now subject to potential surveillance and sanction. Even the act of approaching the OOB is warned against as one of the instructions on the photocopy reads: ‘The establishments shown are in-bounds, however they are very close to the OOB areas’ (emphasis added). The OOB areas are enshrined in Standing Orders for British Forces Cyprus and the key extract (paragraph 127) reads as follows:

127. In order to minimise the risk to personnel when moving outside the security of the Sovereign Base Areas, Out of Bounds (OOB) Orders have been imposed which are mandatory for all personnel subject to the Service Discipline Acts. This includes all Service personnel and UKBC and all dependants, 14 whether on permanent, attached or temporary duty with British Forces Cyprus.

The source of the risk referred to in order 127 (above) was, according to one senior military participant referring to Eastern European ‘criminal gangs’, some of whom were determined to relieve young servicemen of money. For example, the following military participant informed us that operating in this (and other

14 In this extract we note that the ‘dependants’ of service personnel are also prohibited to occupy these spaces, effectively excluding many thousand of British individuals who live and work on the island from its prime beaches and other tourist facilities.
areas on the island) were argued to be ‘Pontiacs, who are Greek Orthodox Russians…[and other groups that targeted servicemen included] prostitutes, street gangs, vigilantes, the mafia, undesirables, [male] Greek-Cypriot yobs…’ The construction of the Russian ‘gangster’ figure ‘lurking’ in the tourist areas of Cyprus was heightened by the story of a young serviceman who was apparently ‘frog-marched to the cash-point’ where his money was stolen. This incident, along with the killing of the Danish tour guide, appeared to form the basis for prohibiting ‘squaddies’ from entering certain spaces on the island. The apparent risk drunken soldiers posed to civilians was tackled by commanders through the representation of particular leisure spaces as contaminated by threat and risk to personnel in their charge. This strategy can be seen as an attempt by military commanders to resist, or at least redirect the excesses of troops. In addition, some bar owners moved their premises from the demilitarised OOB to uncontrolled areas, and in so doing actively resisted the spatial limitations that shaped the militarised political economy on which they relied.

Our consideration of the links between militarisation and space within the context of the OOB demonstrate the ongoing accomplishment of the military authorities to mobilise a discourse with particular resonance for a British military audience. Here, mention of ‘criminal gangs’, ‘Russian Mafia’ and the generalised ‘threat’ from residents of Eastern Europe is planted in the fertile ground of recent memories of the Cold War (Agathengelou 2004). Making sense of this militarised representational moment is a key theme of Woodward’s (2004) work where she refers numerously to the nexus linking armed forces, space, place and the carefully managed portrayals by military’s seeking justification for their physical presence.

Thus, in order to be ‘effective’, the banning of military personnel and their dependents from prime tourist areas against the backdrop of the ‘work-hard/play-hard’ culture of the military is likely to require a strategy that goes beyond the threat of a fine or imprisonment. These comments have a particular salience within the context of Ayia Napa, a ‘play-space’ (Measham 2004) with strong hedonistic appeal for younger people on account of its internationally renowned music, club and drug scene. Given the military’s paternalistic impulse, particularly towards its more junior members, it is easy to see how the OOB space of Ayia Napa has been the focus of protracted discursive work as integral to a technology of exclusion directed at its own people. These discourses invoke the mafia and illegality set against other competing discourses of the island as a sun drenched tourist destination (Agathengelou 2004). The sense of fear and anxiety generated through these discourses may have a particular potency as it draws on, and dovetails with well-established beliefs about particular ‘others’ that circulate in

15 Of course, the natural ‘derring-do’ of young risk-taking servicemen may be sparked against the backdrop of excessive alcohol intake and the frisson of potential transgression.

16 BBC Radio 1 regularly broadcasts DJ ‘sets’ from Ayia Napa during the summer months, a resort that is ranked alongside the highly rated (and somewhat infamous) Ibiza.
the oral culture of the military.\textsuperscript{17} The deeper underpinning of the British military’s attempts to dissuade service people from entering these spaces reflects, in our thinking, their concern that transgressors may begin to identify with a \textit{civilian} drug/dance culture. This militarised discourse is effective because it counters the epicurean draw of the ecstasy fuelled dance/rave scene through the promotion of fear\textsuperscript{18} leading—ultimately—to a demilitarised space, but one that is framed in relation to processes and spaces of militarism.

\textbf{Background: The Buffer Zone} \hspace{1em} The last space we wish to highlight is generated from the ‘Green Line’,\textsuperscript{19} variously named as the ‘Partition Line’ (Cockburn 2004: 67) or the ‘Atilla Line’ (Peace Pledge Union, undated). This line was drawn in the wake of the Turkish invasion in 1974, dividing the island into two discrete entities, each very different in terms of its level of economic development, and social and cultural characteristics. The boundaries of the physical space of the BZ were created on the 16 August 1974 from the two ceasefire lines either side of the Green Line. The Buffer Zone is 180 kilometres in length and covers around 3\% of the island’s surface area. It varies in width from less than four metres in Nicosia to some seven kilometres near Athienou. Our interest is one particular element of the BZ, that of the UN BRITCON-controlled area within the old city walls of Nicosia.

\textbf{Reading the BZ}

As you enter Nicosia from the north, approaching the Buffer Zone, you are immediately confronted with ‘Paphos Gate’, a military observation post in flaking and faded UN-blue paint. The British controlled boundary—made up of a mix of dilapidated and renovated houses—is interspersed with similar observation posts, as it snakes through the city cleaving it into two sharply contrasting spaces. At one point, it is possible to climb a small platform and peer through an observation hole into the deeply politicised space of the BZ. There is little to see through the border but crumbling buildings bearing the scars of neglect and war. Only recently did the Turkish military remove a mirror from their side of the BZ, a metaphorical statement that had urged onlookers from the Greek-Cypriot side to ‘reflect’ on their own position. The physical layout of the BZ is complex with a number of old gates leading up to the actual crossing. There are two major crossings in Nicosia, one for foot passengers and the other for cars. The foot passenger crossing is next...

\textsuperscript{17} Like many organisations, though in a heightened sense, the military is characterised by a strong oral culture such that the story of the ‘Pontiac’ is likely to be rapidly disseminated, quickly gathering the status of truth.

\textsuperscript{18} It is worth bearing in mind that the consumption of alcohol in the armed forces is celebrated whilst the consumption of ‘drugs’ is condemned outright.

\textsuperscript{19} It is rumoured that a British Colonel used a green chinagraph pencil to highlight the line: hence the ‘Green Line’, although this seems doubtful given the plethora of ‘Green Lines’ in other parts of the world.
to a building known as Ledra Palace, where a number of peace activities have been held, and also the temporary home of many United Nations peacekeepers.

A Space of ‘Pure’ Militarisation? The particular element of the BZ, bordered by Nicosia’s city walls contains only British army UN peacekeepers (at the time of the fieldwork 2004); civilians are excluded from this space.20 A number of our civilian participants referred to the BZ as a ‘dead space’ or ‘no man’s land’ with the inference that this area was devoid of life, or ‘frozen in time’ (Papadakis 2005). They commented on the invisibility of UN troops on the island more generally, and unlike many other missions, UN personnel tended to exist outside of the general consciousness of all but those in closest proximity to the BZ and other UN installations.

Buffer Zone Life The Buffer Zone has been in existence for over 30 years. Its purpose, in line with the UN mandate, has been to keep the warring factions at a safe distance from one another. Here, UN military personnel exist as troops only insofar as their occasional responses to ‘trivial’ Buffer Zone excursions, or traded verbal abuse from either side, allows them to be.21 It is only then that their role takes on a military inflected immediacy, otherwise their lives are largely routine, and interspersed with regular patrolling and observation from the vantage point of rooftops in their sector. For the most part, working in the BZ was mundane and lonely; poor living and eating conditions were the norm when stationed in some of the more remote parts of this space. In military terms, the tasks were seen as relatively easy and low risk.

On a visit, a junior British UN officer pointed to the vibrancy of the space within the context of intra-military social relations. Whilst we have seen how the space has been referred to by some of our civilian participants as ‘dead’ or ‘frozen in time’, this perception is not necessarily held by the military personnel who live and work within the zone. British army members of the UN contingent not only patrol the deserted, rubble-strewn streets of the BZ, but they also use these ersatz training facilities to hone their military skills and physical capital through regular runs and other exercise. In addition, some of the junior members live within the BZ in a 1970’s style crumbling concrete shopping centre that had been decorated with murals over the years by successive international contingents. A modest gymnasium had been created, together with a bar, replete with the ubiquitous ‘girly’ images plastered on the walls, and a well-used pool table. Office space also existed here, and military administrators were noted to be busy at work.

20 However, in other areas of the Buffer Zone, including UN HQ (Ledra Palace), civilians have regularly met within the context of peace talks and other activities of rapprochement. Also, there have been meetings between city officials and engineers in regard to sewage, water and building maintenance.

21 There have been deaths in the Buffer Zone, however, an example of which is the killing of two young Greek-Cypriot males by Turkish soldiers in 1996.
This exclusive space had a further dimension shaping the uniqueness of the environment. In a smelly and partially flooded underground basement of the shopping centre-cum-accommodation block is a car-park. It contains around 40 unused Toyota cars, abandoned by the Greek-Cypriot Toyota dealer when the Turkish army invaded the north and pushed onto Nicosia in 1974. Whilst the cars had been largely destroyed by over-zealous partying soldiers of previous contingents, catching sight of these vehicles (some were untouched) represented a surreal moment. Indeed there was a real sense that the BZ had indeed been ‘frozen in time’. Yet, old shops adjacent to the accommodation had been converted into makeshift workshops in order that a number of the Toyotas could be restored to their former glory. In addition, at various points within the BZ, British troops were observed creating impromptu displays of 1970s artefacts they had retrieved from shops that had been rapidly vacated 30 years earlier. A great pride was taken in restoration work and subsequent display as a way to occupy the time of these British UN troops who had little else to look forward to during duty hours, particularly now as the BZ experienced few serious infractions within the context of improved north/south relations. These soldiers were particularly interested in capturing the cultural milieu of the past and participating in overtly civilian activities within the space.

The political beliefs of our ‘onlooker’ civilian participants shaped their perception of the moral order of the BZ. For example, the Turkish Cypriot participants we interviewed saw the BZ as a symbolic space in which UN military personnel—hardly considered to be soldiers at all by many amongst this group of participants—lived and worked. Overall, the BZ, at least from the perspective of our civilian participants could be considered as an ‘impenetrable and unknowable space’ cut off from their own material experience (Gregory 2004: 117). Our concern was to make sense of the productive impact of its intra-military social relations with regard to the ways in which the space was used. Those (on the outside) that perceived the space as somewhat prosaic, or ‘dead’, were unaware of the creative social practices that occurred within and that could be seen as distant from that typically associated with the military. Thus, the British army UN controlled space had been comprehensively reordered from a prime site of consumerism (a former shopping-centre), to one of industrious heritage where soldiers displayed a natural curiosity of the 1974 invasion through abandoned artefacts. The soldiers within the BZ resisted the stereotypical perceptions in evidence from civilians on either side of this dividing space who assumed that their experiences revolved solely

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22 One of the authors was told of a similar garage full of new cars of 1974 vintage in the border town of Famagusta.
23 A crossing point was opened in 2003 allowing individuals from either side, for the first time in 30 years, to venture into one another’s territories. For some, this meant returning ‘home’ to retrieve sentimental items such as photographs left in re-occupied properties.
24 UN soldiers were considered as somewhat emasculated when compared by a number of our Turkish-Cypriot participants with Turkish soldiers.
around militarised social relations and military practice. Once again, it is possible to note the unpredictable dimensions to militarised social relations in respect of the ways in which this particular group of British army UN personnel challenged the expectations placed upon them by outsiders. Here, the nexus linking militarisation, space and social relations is shown in its diversity through the ways in which it was negotiated, created and sustained in creative rather than military-destructive ways. In this way, the spatial and social power of militarisation was not only challenged by the activities of a small group of military personnel, but as actively converted into an alternative form of occupation and habitation that involved a reliance on civilian, although perhaps stereotypically masculine, practices of everyday life.

Some Conclusions

In this chapter we have considered non-conflict spaces shaped in diverse ways by militarisation on the island of Cyprus. Hence, even spaces that are deemed zones of peace are seen to be the product of militarisation. They include spaces where civilian and military personnel intermingle (the SBA), a space that explicitly excludes military personnel (the OOB), and finally, a space that includes only military personnel (the BZ). Whilst our paper might be argued to highlight somewhat benign, non-conflict forms of militarisation (Woodward 2005: 10), it is the unremarkable features of the SBA, for example, that provide the foundations for colonial inflected social and material practices that ultimately serve to support and add legitimacy to the role of force in resolving tension (Enloe 2002). Examples of resistance serving to shape social relations in specific ways noted in the SBA, include the antenna protesters and the act of micro-resistance by one participant in refusing to relinquish his driving licence to a soldier at a temporary SBA checkpoint. In discussing the SBA we have tried to show how militarised space is fabricated space, not in terms of its falseness but rather that: ‘it is validated by its own regimes of truth and it produces acutely real, visibly material consequences’, and also that ‘[its] currency—its values, transitivity, and reliability: in a word its “fact-ness”—is put into circulation through the double-headed coin of colonial modernity’ (Gregory 2004: 3). This is as true for spaces commonly considered as being ‘peaceful’ as it is for spaces of active conflict.

In terms of the OOB, the military’s attempt to colonise space should be viewed as an ongoing struggle contingent on reconciling the competing demands of sound civil-military relations with the military prerogative. In attempting to ‘demilitarise’ particular spaces deemed to engender excess, the military resists aspects of social relations that are—somewhat ironically—a product of its own gendered culture (Higate et al. 2003; Morgan 1994). Other examples of resistance indicated above point to the importance of the militarised political economy whereby local business people were noted to relocate their premises from a space of demilitarisation to one of militarisation. The continual imposition of militarism within particular
spaces, and resistance to this process, offers one angle from which to disrupt the comfortable but false dichotomy of conflict/post-conflict.

Finally, the troops in the BZ were shown to be involved in creative social practices engendered through resisting the boredom that accompanies soldiering in times of peace. Here, the meanings attached to militarised spaces typically shaped by a calculative rationality, are transformed into a reflective set of experiences for those involved. That these military personnel might be encouraged to reflect on the trajectory of the ‘Cyprus situation’ through the material remnants of the conflict may represent a first for many soldiers. In this way, soldiers may not always be encouraged to develop an insight into the historico-political circumstances of their deployment to various parts of the world.

In this chapter, we have tried to contribute towards critical military geography through further developing the concept of militarisation and examining the ways it might be manifested through some empirical examples. It is hoped that our take on military geography may encourage others to think creatively about militarised spaces in order that they are brought from invisibility to visibility as one element of an overall strategy to problematise their violent impositions. Such violence, and its pervasiveness, illuminates the discursive strategy behind labelling certain spaces as being “post-conflict.”

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Chapter 8
Paying the Price for Freedom:
From Destruction toward Reconstruction in
Northern France, 1940–1960
Hugh Clout

Introduction

As early as 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte envisaged the seaport of Boulogne-sur-Mer as the departure point for French troops to invade England across the narrow sea separating the European continent from its largest offshore island. His ambitions were never realized but the 50-meter Grande Armée Column, built between 1804 and 1823 on the site of his military camp, symbolizes the geopolitical significance of this location and affords views in all directions: north-westward across the Channel to England, southward across Picardy to the French capital in Paris, and eastward across Flanders toward the heart of the continent. In August 1940, Adolf Hitler visited Boulogne with ideas of invasion in mind. In the hinterland of Boulogne and the neighbouring ports of Calais and Dunkirk, the départements of Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Somme were of critical significance to the French economy, containing flourishing industries, rich farmland, busy fishing ports and important coal mines (Figure 8.1). During World War I they witnessed some of the most deadly encounters on the Western Front: names such as ‘Flanders Fields’, ‘Artois’, ‘Vimy Ridge’ and ‘The Somme’ are etched into the collective memory of Britain and the Commonwealth countries. The sites are visited by countless groups of schoolchildren and tourists each year. After the Armistice had been signed on 11 November 1918, the volume of material destruction could be reckoned: 434,200 buildings had been destroyed or damaged across the three départements, representing 55% of all the war-torn properties in France. By January 1929, most damage had been repaired and the régions dévastées were making major contributions to the national economy once again (Clout 1996). Migrants from Belgium, Poland and other parts of Europe had replaced farmers, miners and factory workers who had perished or had simply moved away. However, the industrial economy of northern France was hit hard in the economic crisis that followed the financial crash of October 1929.

Little more than a decade after the crash, the European continent was plunged into war once again when German ambitions for territorial expansion were expressed. However, in less than a quarter century, the mechanics of warfare had
been transformed. The stability of trenches, close combat with appalling loss of life, and use of horses to move guns and equipment, had been replaced by widespread mechanization in the form of armored vehicles, lorries and aircraft permitting rapid movement and aerial bombardment. A very different geography of warfare came into being. Given their strategic location for German invasion into France, and potentially toward England, the northern départements suffered intense damage, however their fate has received less scholarly attention than, for example, territory in the hinterland of the Normandy Landings of 1944 (Clout 2006, 2008, 2009).

This chapter will trace the impact of destruction in Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Somme during World War II, to identify the challenge posed by emergency tasks during the course of the war and in its immediate aftermath, and to chart how definitive reconstruction was conceived and implemented. In general terms, these processes occurred in sequence; however emergency accommodation was required from the very first German attack and after every subsequent wave of destruction, and planners did not wait until liberation to devise reconstruction schemes. The historical reality proved to be more complex than the familiar three-fold sequence
suggests of war, emergency measures, and reconstruction. Furthermore, many reconstruction plans were subjected to substantial revision because of local opposition thereby giving rebuilt settlements a different appearance from the original intentions of their architect-planners.

**Invasion and Destruction**

After the experience of German invasion during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and in World War I, the French constructed major defensive features—known as the Maginot Line—in northern Lorraine and Alsace, and installed lesser defenses along the Rhine. When the next invasion occurred, the Germans selected routes through southern Belgium and entered northern France on 13 May 1940 along the valley of the Meuse to the west of the Maginot Line. As terrified refugees from the Netherlands and Belgium streamed southward, French forces attempted to block the enemy’s advance at bridging points and road junctions. The ensuing encounters and aerial bombardment caused the first wave of wartime destruction in Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Somme, as well as in adjacent départements (Figure 8.1). Over 500 buildings were destroyed at the fortified town of Maubeuge in the Sambre valley, and further west almost 650 buildings were lost at Valenciennes as a result of bombing and subsequent fires (Delattre 1943; Anon. 1996). The order to evacuate Lille, Roubaix and Tourcoing had been given on 10 May but when the German bombs fell these towns were full of Dutch and Belgian refugees; over 1,000 buildings were destroyed in Lille and its suburbs (Detrez and Chatelle 1953: 176). Confronted by the German advance, members of the British Expeditionary Force turned back toward the beaches of Dunkirk. In their retreat, codenamed Operation Dynamo, the Allies destroyed roads and bridges and flooded low-lying farmland to slow the enemy’s advance. The Germans retaliated with widespread bombing of Dunkirk, Boulogne and other northern ports, but did not prevent 340,000 British and French soldiers being ferried to English harbors. As the enemy moved southward, panic-stricken citizens fled from Amiens into the surrounding countryside prior to widespread bombing on 18–19 May (Gerbod 1974: 390). Fires raged for five days across the city center west of the cathedral, destroying almost 3,000 buildings (Josse 1967: 24). When the Germans entered Amiens on 20 May, fewer than 5,000 inhabitants remained out of a residential population of 90,000. Toward the mouth of the Somme, Abbeville experienced heavy bombing on 19–20 May; 1,800 buildings were lost in the ensuing fires but the great church of Saint-Vulfran survived (Legrand 1990: 26). Serious damage was also inflicted at four other bridging points on the Somme and at scores of settlements along invasion routes taken by the Germans into Normandy, toward Paris, and onward to the river Loire (Dufournet 1946; Voldman 1986: 81). When the Armistice was signed on 22 June, three-fifths of the 2,409 administrative areas (communes) of northern France had experienced damage (Vincent 1943: 14–15). A total of 43,000 buildings in Nord, Pas-de-Calais and Somme were destroyed completely, and a
further 150,000 damaged, representing 49% of all the damage inflicted in France at this time (Archives Nationales Fontainebleau—hereafter ANF—790641/15, 30/6/49). Despite widespread devastation, many northerners started to return home in late June 1940, creating an enormous demand for emergency accommodation.

Under the Germans, Nord and Pas-de-Calais were treated differently from the remainder of the ‘occupied zone’, being administered from Brussels (Cointet 1998). Immediately to the south, a ‘forbidden zone’ was delimited from the mouth of the Somme eastwards. Movement of goods and people between the two parts of Somme département required permission from the German authorities, and neither postal nor telephonic communication was allowed. These restrictions were relaxed slightly in the autumn of 1941, as the Vichy regime in the ‘free zone’ collaborated with the Germans, and more significantly in the spring of 1943. Whatever their administrative status, factories, mines, farms and ports in the three northern départements were exploited to support the German war effort. Their airfields were enlarged to handle war planes, and massive military installations were built by the Todt Organization along the Channel coast as part of the Atlantic Wall, with long-distance guns targeted on Kent. Coastal villages between Boulogne and Calais, and around the mouth of the Somme, were demolished to make way for these installations (ANF 770810/1, 11/11/45; 870772/5, 28/1/47). Submarine bases were constructed at Boulogne and Dunkirk, and commercial and fishing installations were converted for naval use. Beginning in 1943, giant bunkers were built to launch V1, V2 and V3 missiles on south-east England (Bougard and Nolibos 1988: 375). These economic and military sites were bombed in sporadic Allied raids from 1941 to 1943, with engineering works, railway yards and aerodromes in the suburbs of Lille suffering much damage. A direct hit on a power station in 1942 terminated electricity supplies and caused widespread unemployment across the conurbation (Detrez and Chatelle 1953: 241). As a result of these attacks, destroying residential areas as well as intended strategic targets, a further 2,000 buildings were totally destroyed in northern France by the end of June 1943, with a comparable number being damaged (Vincent 1943: 14–15).

Allied bombing raids on northern targets intensified during the second half of 1943 and prior to the Normandy landings in the following year. All the concrete bunkers were put out of action in these raids but V1 missiles were launched from simple ramps hidden in woodland. The coastal resort of Le Portel was bombed in September 1943 to give credence to the idea than an Allied landing might take place near the narrowest crossing of the Channel (Leprêtre 2003). In January 1944, women and children were evacuated from the coastal zone, known as the ‘red zone’, to areas of central France. During the second week of April 1944, Allied bombers launched a massive raid on the Lille-Délivrance marshalling yard, which controlled goods traffic across much of the railway network of northern France, destroying 1,000 houses and damaging a further 2,600, especially in the suburb of Lomme where damage was likened to the impact of an earthquake (Detrez and Chatelle 1953: 247). Wide stretches of the railwaymen’s ‘garden suburb’ (cité-jardin) collapsed like ‘a house of playing cards’ in the bomb blasts (Ibid. 248). In
May and June, the marshalling yards of Longueau were targeted again, with stray bombs causing further damage in nearby Amiens (Chélini 2003: 201).

As the Allies advanced from Normandy, German troops sabotaged surviving industrial plant across northern France. Hitler gave the order for ports along the Channel coast of France to assume ‘fortress’ status and be defended at all costs as the Allies targeted Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. The first two ports were liberated in late September 1944 but the ‘Dunkirk pocket’, extending 20 kilometers along the coast and 8 kilometers inland, remained in German hands for a further seven months (Odonne 1983; Porhel 1995). As a defensive measure, the low-lying polder lands were flooded once again, mainly with fresh water but with sea water in some places (Anon. 1948: 218). A total of 13,000 Germans and 25,000 civilians endured daily bombing raids on the ‘Dunkirk pocket’ until the Germans surrendered on 9 May 1945. Dunkirk had the dubious ‘privilege of being the French town occupied for the longest time’ by the Germans (Pouille 1986: 172; Chatelle and Moreel 1954). More than 80% of its central area and port had been destroyed, over 100 wrecks blocked the harbor, and only six of its 185 cranes remained in working order (Nouveau 2006).

It was estimated that 83,000 buildings had been destroyed completely in the three départements by the middle of June 1945, with a further 297,000 damaged but liable to repair (Vincent 1946: 8–9). Yet, taken together, these 380,000 buildings represented only one-fifth of the total volume of damage recorded in France at the end of the war, since the geography of destruction had been reconfigured to include areas such as Lower Normandy and many strategic points that had escaped relatively unscathed during earlier phases. Subsequent statistics, collated four years later, raised the number of buildings destroyed in the three northern départements to 108,400 and the total suffering damage to 393,700 (ANF 790641/9, 30/6/49). The volume of damage inflicted on northern France during World War II (502,100 buildings) exceeded the legacy of World War I when 434,200 buildings had been damaged or destroyed across the same stretch of territory.

The Emergency Phase

Unlike areas that experienced damage only in the later phases of the war, the northern départements endured an especially long ‘emergency phase’ that began in June 1940 and continued throughout the German occupation and for several years after liberation until permanent replacement of buildings could begin. Six weeks after the Armistice, legislation was passed on 5 August 1940 to enable owners to claim compensation from the State for minor repairs that would be undertaken during the following four months, thereby ensuring that at least some sinistrés (those who had suffered loss during the war) would have shelter for the winter (Roger 1941). However, only small claims of less than 100,000 francs were acceptable and the State covered only half of the cost of each repair. Subsequent legislation (11 October 1940, 12 July 1941) enunciated principles
for claiming compensation for rebuilding destroyed property, and stipulated that official plans should be drawn up and approved by authorities in Paris before definitive reconstruction of settlements might commence (Ibid). The fact that the Germans commandeered supplies of building materials for their own use added a further complication. However, by the summer of 1942 four-dozen planners were drafting reconstruction projects for more than 80 devastated villages and towns in Somme. Indeed, some plans were advancing toward official approval despite property units having to be reorganized which ‘required a major change in local habits and customs’ (Anon. 1942). Progress was slower in the two other départements whose special administrative status until the conclusion of the war restricted access by French planners. Nonetheless, by July 1942 ten experts had been selected to work on 20 projects in Nord, and investigations were also starting in Pas-de-Calais. These early schemes would, of course, have to be reworked as a result of subsequent destruction.

Emergency accommodation was required in large quantities as refugees returned to their war-torn homes after 22 June 1940 (ANF 840593/6, 30/11/45). This challenge was passed to the General Secretary for Industrial Production, Jean Bichelonne (lifespan 1904–1944), with responsibility for allocating raw materials in wartime, who established the Service Central de Constructions Provisoires in August 1940. With no possible knowledge of how long the war would last or where future destruction would occur, the Service Central specified regulations for constructing temporary accommodation from timber components or from materials salvaged from ruins. In order to simplify the process, a small number of standardized designs were devised and attention was directed to insulation against heat loss, appropriate arrangement on estates, and provision of schools, shops and other facilities. In this way, it was hoped that ‘the desolate monotony of camps established after the 1914–18 war would be banished and aesthetic considerations safeguarded’ (Buis 1944: 24). Groups of temporary buildings would be laid out in cités provisoires, where water supply, sewerage and other requirements could be managed. Legislation in April and July 1941 gave the Service Central a virtual monopoly on producing components for huts and other forms of temporary accommodation, however local authorities were responsible for engaging contractors to install them. During the relative calm that followed the wave of destruction in 1940, 178 cités provisoires had been erected by March 1944 in the three northern départements (Figure 8.1). Undoubtedly they provided decent accommodation for their residents, but some were criticized for displaying ‘a sense of imagination rather than genuine professional technique’ (Guillon 1944: 26; Roy 1944). By contrast, many smaller clusters of huts were poorly constructed and provided draughty, damp and generally miserable accommodation. As time passed, increasing numbers of sinistrés had to endure damp cellars or overcrowded ruins, as a result of widespread bombing in the latter phases of the war.

The Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l’Urbanisme (MRU) was created in November 1944, following the Normandy Landings in June and the subsequent German retreat across northern France. It was placed under the direction of
engineer Raoul Dautry (1880–1951) and assumed responsibility for emergency work, planning permanent rebuilding, evaluating compensation claims and overseeing reconstruction (Voldman 1997; Abram 1999). Despite this centralized approach, there was much room for local variation in implementation. In each département, a délégué was charged with marshalling an appropriate workforce including laborers, qualified builders, office staff, accountants, architects and planners. Often with very poor office accommodation, few vehicles and extremely limited resources, a bewildering array of emergency tasks had to be tackled simultaneously: ruins had to be demolished or made safe, damaged buildings repaired, bomb craters and tank traps filled, mines and explosives removed, and temporary accommodation provided for sinistrés and growing numbers of refugees who moved back to their ruins as soon as this was safe, namely when landmines and unexploded munitions had been cleared. Given the magnitude of the challenge and the limited resources at the disposal of the MRU, it is hardly surprising that many sinistrés were frustrated with what they found.

The emergency labor force was composed of local civilians, migrants from other parts of France, and German prisoners of war who performed a variety of tasks prior to general repatriation in 1947. For example, in October 1945, unemployed local factory workers, who had been thrown out of work by bombing raids, were considered to be sufficient to cope with most forms of emergency work around Lille and Cambrai, but migrant workers were necessary at Maubeuge, Valenciennes, Douai and especially Dunkirk (ANF 770810/1, 8/10/45). At this time, three-quarters of the 3,000-strong emergency workforce in Nord was composed of local men, especially unemployed dockers and other workers, but a further 750 laborers had been recruited from Paris. The northerners were judged to be hard workers, although men employed in the Dunkirk pocket insisted on leaving at weekends to visit their families. By contrast, Parisian workers were ‘very different from the others’, frequently complaining, occasionally pilfering and ‘organizing their own timetable’ by working ten hours a day, seven days a week and then disappearing to Paris for a week or a fortnight without authorization (Ibid).

Living and working conditions of emergency workers were harsh at all times and became even worse in winter. Former army barracks and other huts were grouped into special work camps to accommodate between 200 and 500 men apiece. Most huts housed four men to a room but American barracks were used as dormitories of 20–25 beds and large Swiss barracks slept 40–45 men to a hut (ANF 770810/1, 8/10/45). In November 1945, insufficient blankets and lack of heating were rendered worse by ‘the glacial wind and rain in our northern region’ (ANF 770810/1, 11/11/45). Many dormitories were without chairs, tables or cupboards for placing clothes and other possessions (ANF 770810/1, 8/10/45). At that time, most camps around Dunkirk had no electricity or piped water supplies, and toilet facilities were rudimentary. Additional huts were awaited from England but there was no news about when—or indeed if—they might arrive. Living conditions were sometimes tense; at Boulogne, 250 Spanish and Arab workers had to be
separated from their French counterparts and placed in a special camp, and at nearby Le Portel 200 emergency workers were obliged to sleep in whatever ruins or shelters they could find since no huts had been installed by November 1945 (ANF 770810/1, 11/11/45). Some migrant workers opted for this tough existence away from home, having returned from enforced labor in Germany or action with the Resistance only to confront ‘a drama in family life’ when they found a newborn child that they knew could not be their own (Ibid). Residential conditions for emergency workers gradually improved during 1946 and refectories, reading rooms and other facilities were provided at larger work camps.

Prisoners of war formed an important source of emergency labor, part of which was deployed on the dangerous task of identifying unexploded munitions and land mines. Most of these were planted in known minefields that were marked with warning signs—and for some minefields detailed German maps were in existence—but other explosives were scattered at random or had been placed in booby-trapped buildings. One estimate suggested that 30,000 ha. were mined, with half of that total in Nord (Nadaud 1946: 6). Allied military engineers undertook early mine clearance and provided training for French civilian experts who belonged to a specialist branch of the MRU known as the Direction de Démangeage, set up in February 1945 (Conseil-Général du Nord—hereafter CG—Rapports 1945: 7). These démineurs removed hazardous materials identified by German POWs and arranged for these substances to be carted away for controlled explosion. Once a site was judged to be cleared, POWs were deployed to undertake a further check on foot. Mine-detecting equipment was sparse and rudimentary, and accidents were frequent. By November 1946, 334 POWs and 47 experts had been killed on mine-clearance work in the three départements, and a further 506 POWs and 136 experts had sustained serious injuries (ANF 900615/3, 30/11/46). Nonetheless, by the end of 1947 mine clearance was largely over, with 233,000 land mines removed from the Dunkirk pocket alone (Blanckaert 1995: 170). Isolated examples would continue to be found on beaches, in sand dunes, marshes, farm land and residential areas for years to come. Prior to general repatriation in 1947, guarded teams of POWs performed many other emergency tasks, ranging from demolition, removing rubble, draining flooded land, filling bomb craters, and erecting temporary accommodation (ANF 770810/1, 8/10/45). Some of these duly changed their status to become ‘free workers’ employed in the coalmines (CG Nord 1948: 180).

Emergency housing continued to be required in growing quantities as bombing raids intensified toward the end of hostilities. In 1943 the Service de Constructions Provisoires had admitted that supplies of building materials, under strict control by the Germans, were inadequate to satisfy demands for shelter in Nord. In October of the following year, the département had received components for over 3,500 huts but construction rates were desperately low since roofing materials, pipes and other pieces of equipment were not available (ANF 770809/2, 1/10/44). The situation worsened daily as the devastation inflicted on the Dunkirk pocket increased. After the German command surrendered in May 1945, many sinistrés
had no alternative to living in damp cellars or ruined military defenses. Even when peace had returned, the task of providing emergency accommodation was rendered difficult by incomplete deliveries of wooden components and buildings. By January 1946, huts had been built on many sites around Dunkirk but access roads and sewer pipes were lacking, and supplies of water, electricity and gas still had to be installed (ANF 770810/1, 11/1/46). Another source indicated that only one-sixth of the emergency housing needed in northern France had been installed at that time (Nadaud 1946). During a visit to Lille in September 1946, François Billoux (1903–1978), then Minister for Reconstruction, received many complaints about delays in providing temporary housing in the city’s devastated suburbs, such as the commune of Lomme where Allied bombing raids on the Lille-Délivrance marshalling yards had destroyed one-third of the housing (ANF 870772/2, 20/9/46). As late as December 1946, members of the general council in Nord were told: ‘In our towns and villages thousands of men and women are still living in squalor or wandering from place to place in search of shelter, and are losing hope’ (CG Nord 1946: 385). Supplies of wooden components had been delivered to sites around Douai but a shortage of carpenters meant that they had not been erected in the second half of 1947 and had started to rot (CG Nord 1947: 107).

Prefabricated houses were obtained by the French government from the USA and Canada, which supplemented domestic supplies and were delivered through Boulogne and Calais. When assembled properly, these houses were greatly appreciated by local people since they contained bathrooms, indoor toilets and separate kitchens that many sinistrés had not known before the war. At Abbeville and doubtless elsewhere, they would still be lived in half a century after being put up (Legrand 1993: 23). Unfortunately, some of these North American designs could not cope with the cold and damp of northern France. After the particularly harsh winter of 1946–47, frustrated residents at Boulogne declared: ‘These houses were not planned for a climate like ours; they let in humidity through the roofs, window frames, walls and floorboards. We have had a terrible winter: ice formed everywhere inside the houses; in the morning we had the surprise of walking on ice that cracked on the floors. When the thaw came, water ran from the windows on to the floor, right into the middle of the room; fiber-board internal walls were damp, especially in the bedrooms, creating a disaster since the bedding was all damp, clothes in wardrobes became stained, and furniture was covered with mold’ (ANF 870772/6, 9/3/47). Temporary accommodation was most certainly necessary but was no solution to the housing crisis created by World War II.

By January 1946 about half of the ruins and rubble across northern France had been cleared, and twelve months later the task was almost entirely completed (Nadaud 1946; CG Nord 1947: 11). Over 90% of all bomb craters and tank traps had been filled and mine clearance was almost over. By contrast, less than half of the German military installations had been demolished, partly because of the difficulty of the task but also because they provided a much needed supply of temporary accommodation (CG Nord 1947: 13). A quarter of all war-damaged buildings had been repaired in the three départements by the start of 1946, with
progress being much more rapid in Pas-de-Calais (40%) than in Nord (10%) or Somme (15%) (Nadaud 1946). By the summer of 1949, 52% of damaged buildings had received permanent repairs, with temporary repairs made on a further 25%, but the remaining 23% were untouched. Over three-quarters of damaged buildings had been made good at Amiens and Douai, compared with half at Boulogne and Calais, and less than a third at Dunkirk and Valenciennes (ANF 790641/15, 30/9/49). Most forms of emergency work were, indeed, over by the time permanent reconstruction began, but the challenge of making necessary repairs still had not been fully met.

**Permanent Reconstruction**

The task of planning for definitive reconstruction had been initiated in 1940 and 1941 when laws were passed on compensation, repairs and rebuilding. However this spate of legislation had an important precedent in the law of 14 March 1919 to guide the rebuilding of devastated villages and towns and to plan the expansion and equipment of urban centers undergoing rapid population growth. For example, in 1922 architect-planner Alfred Agache (1875–1959) and engineer Georges Bechmann (1848–1927) had started work on an extension plan for Dunkirk and seven surrounding communes, which identified zones for housing, manufacturing, port expansion and agriculture, recognized the need for new roads to cope with growing traffic, and advocated constructing additional housing on military property (Bonduelle 1995; Pouille 1997). Eight years later, a project was put forward for remodeling and extending the fishing port of Boulogne (Bataille 1983). In the immediate aftermath of the destruction of 1940, architect-planners were selected to prepare schemes for permanent reconstruction. Almost all of these experts had trained as architects in the fine arts tradition and subsequently acquired expertise as planners (Monnier 1990; Doutriaux and Vermandel 1997). Their schemes should avoid what were recognized as errors—or at least missed opportunities to innovate—during the great reconstruction of the 1920s when rebuilding in similar styles and form to what had been lost (‘à l’identique’) had been favored (Bordecher 1940: 24). According to the planning charter of 1943, ‘The architecture of reconstruction is to be considered as the expression of the renaissance of the country. The architect-planner must penetrate the spirit of the region, by studying its architectural history, and must try to reconcile the exigencies of the spirit of modernity whilst retaining the imprint of local traditions’ (cited in Richez 1997: 690). Architect-planners had to find an appropriate compromise between ‘regionalism’, which employed traditional styles, building materials and street layouts, and ‘modernism’, which favored concrete and steel, air and light, and wider streets to cope with growing numbers of motor vehicles (Vera 1942). As the following case studies reveal, just how those compromises were worked out and brought into reality depended on the training and views of reconstruction planners, and on their working arrangements with local mayors, town councils,
groups of *sinistrés* and the architects who designed individual buildings. In a few instances, these relationships were relatively good enabling reconstruction to proceed much as planned, albeit modulated by flows of compensation funds and the varying availability of building materials from year to year. However, in the majority of cases, relationships proved problematic, with plans being revised substantially or even rejected, and some key personnel being replaced.

True to their architectural training at the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, most architect-planners produced emphatically traditional first designs for rebuilding 220 devastated towns and villages across northern France (Leconte 1943; Drobecq 1943). As early as November 1940, the town council of Valenciennes expressed its willingness to take an active part in planning for reconstruction and for conserving those timber-fronted buildings that had escaped the flames (Richez 1997). No fewer than eight reports were drafted to inform whomever André Muffang (1897–1989), then commissioner for reconstruction, would designate as the town’s architect-planner. This person proved to be Albert Laprade (1883–1978) who, in 1941, was charged to produce a reconstruction plan for Valenciennes and seven surrounding *communes*. His original proposals were challenged vigorously by members of the town council and he was obliged to make many revisions. His plan respected the pre-existing street pattern in the town center and advocated constructing tall townhouses around the Place d’Armes and rebuilding the town hall (*hôtel de ville*) behind its surviving façade. Laprade’s revised scheme evoked much of what had been in place before 1940 and, after more local debate, was approved in Paris in 1943.

The next challenge involved reorganizing property units (*remembrement*) and designating compensation areas for activities that could not be accommodated in the refashioned town center. This hurdle was surmounted in 1947 and a local architect, Vandenbeusch, was selected to supervise other architects who would design urban blocks and individual buildings. However, in 1952 Eugène Claudius-Petit (1907–1989), Minister for Reconstruction since 1948, replaced Vandenbeusch with Jean Vergnaud who had been a pupil of Laprade’s but was also influenced by the modernist ideas of Le Corbusier (Doutriex and Vermandel 1994). Vergnaud soon appreciated that Laprade’s revised design would not cope with additional traffic flow, parking facilities or provision of public open space, and he made substantial changes. The initial idea of rebuilding the town’s theater was rejected and its compensation funds were directed to the very costly reconstruction of the town hall. Proposals for town houses in traditional styles to face the *hôtel de ville* across the Place d’Armes were abandoned, and a vast linear structure was designed with shops, offices and apartments to occupy that space. Reconstruction of the town center was considered to be complete in September 1959, when the last temporary shop was dismantled in the Place d’Armes, however wooden huts would continue to be occupied for many years in outer parts of Valenciennes.

The reconstruction of Abbeville, near the mouth of the Somme, was subject to similar controversies and changes of personnel. Following bombing and extensive fires in May 1940, local architects sketched details of the ruins before clearance
Reconstructing Conflict

began in September in order to assist with compensation claims (Legrand 1993: 11). In May 1941, architect-planner Jacques Gréber (1882–1962) started to draft a reconstruction plan ‘in a style that corresponded perfectly with the tastes of the time, entirely turned toward our past’ (Tambuté 1951: 93). His project sought to ease traffic flows, especially along the main highway (route nationale 1) between Paris and the Channel ports, but included many traditional features. For example, the central square was to be surrounded by shops beneath arcades, with the kind of brick façades and slate roofs that had been present before the war (Gréber 1944). Five years later François Billoux (1903–1978), then Minister for Reconstruction, visited the town and was greeted by widespread complaints about lack of activity. Shortages of raw materials and inadequate funds hindered operations and further revisions to the plan were introduced in November 1950. When Eugène Claudius-Petit, then Minister, inspected the site two months later, he announced that Gréber’s design would be abandoned and the task of planning Abbeville entrusted to a young and untried Parisian architect, Clément Tambuté (Legrand 1993: 45). The Minister insisted that if his nominee were not accepted by the town council, then the resources that had been identified for Abbeville would be diverted elsewhere. Faced with this unveiled threat the council had no option but to accept. Property reorganization (remembrement) forged ahead and the town was given a much more functional road pattern, wider streets, and an array of apartment buildings rather than individual houses with gardens. Many residents complained that Tambuté’s modern designs were executed using poor quality bricks rather than high quality materials and building stone that Gréber had hoped to procure (Ibid. 47). In addition, they argued that Tambuté’s preference to build apartment ‘bridges’ across streets produced ugly buildings that stifled views of Saint-Vulfran church. Despite all this controversy, over 700 replacement buildings had been constructed by the end of 1953 and two years later most shopkeepers were installed in permanent premises.

On the Channel coast, the idea of replanning the fishing port of Boulogne had preceded wartime destruction and its liberation in September 1944, when only one-tenth of its housing remained habitable (Bataille 1983: 368). As early as 1930, a project had sought to extend harbor facilities and in 1941–42 an idea was advanced to focus dispersed fish-handling activities at a modern cité industrielle de la poisson in the Capécure district. These proposals remained at the heart of the reconstruction plan prepared by Pierre Vivien (1909–1999), a young architect originating from Amiens and a political ally of De Gaulle, who was appointed architect-planner for Boulogne early in 1945. After studying the town’s history and physical site, Vivien submitted three sets of proposals to the municipal council whose members supported the idea of rebuilding the town and the fishing port in an integrated way. They accepted a provisional plan in May 1946 but soon demanded changes. Following earlier proposals, Vivien’s project concentrated fishery installations at Capécure, but also called for the channel of the river Liane to be reconfigured allowing 20 ha of land to be reclaimed. It reorganized road and rail access to the port, allocated land for industrial activities and residential
overspill, and equipped the town center with wider shopping streets than before (Leprêtre 2002). It also proposed four 11-storey apartment blocks along Quai Gambetta, which would require substantial remembrement and drastically alter the appearance of that part of town. After much local debate, Vivien’s wide-ranging plan for rebuilding Boulogne and reorganizing its major economic activity received approval in Paris in 1950. Combining a certain respect for tradition in the town center with notable innovation along the waterfront, it shaped the reconstruction of the town in the following decade.

Further north along the coast, the task of planning to reconstruct Dunkirk began late in 1940, with Gaston Bardet (1907–1989) preparing plans for the agglomeration and M. Fenzy being entrusted with the town itself. At the same time, two local architects, Jean-Marie Morel and André Caubel, put forward their own vision (Bonduelle 1995: 230). In May 1942 the task was passed to two Parisian planners, Jean Puget and Robert Canaux, who sketched their ideas in 1943–44 for the future of the town and its surroundings. One of their collaborators was Théodore Leveau (1896–1971) who, in 1945, was nominated chief planner for rebuilding Dunkirk. He was well aware that the quality of housing in inner parts of the town had been exceptionally poor before 1940 and he insisted that much future residential development would have to take place beyond the limits of the municipality (Leveau 1948: 230). Like Agache and Bechmann before him, he stressed the importance of zoning and recognized four types of planning zone: low-rise apartment blocks, shops and offices in the town center; lower density residential development on former military land; industrial activities (on the fringes of Dunkirk and in surrounding communes); and the commercial port (Vermandel 1997). Part of the pre-war street pattern was retained in his scheme, although carriageways were widened, and new thoroughfares were introduced to cope with additional traffic. This composition responded to the wish of local people that building heights should be kept low and satisfied the planner’s duty to improve living conditions and manage traffic flows.

After a number of revisions, Leveau’s plan was accepted by the municipal council in March 1948 and by the authorities in Paris a year later. However, it would be modified again as a result of differences of opinion between Leveau and Jean Niermans (1897–1989), who had been appointed chief architect for the town in 1946 and adopted more of a ‘modernist’ approach than his colleague. Recalling his visit to Dunkirk in 1940, Niermans declared: ‘The enclosed town [within the remains of the fortifications], with little sunless courtyards that lack air, is outdated. The present population and future generations need open spaces and fresh air, with no more miasmas or the smell of sewage in stinking courtyards’ (ANF 790657/13, 1/12/49). He proposed providing large communal courtyards behind low-level apartments equipped with terraces and flat roofs. This design would require a fundamental reorganization of land holding and gave rise to widespread opposition from sinistrés who had been attached to the old pattern of single-family houses, with sloping roofs and individual gardens. After sustained debate, the ideas of Niermans were accepted and remembrement began in 1949.
By January 1952, two-thirds of Dunkirk had become a vast building site, in which 645 dwellings and over 200 shops were already complete. Brick was used extensively in the ‘red neighborhoods’, evoking the predominant building material from before the war, but concrete had an important place in the structures and façades of the ‘blue neighborhoods’ (Louquet 1997). Reconstruction continued until the late 1960s and created a spacious town center with residential densities much lower than those before the war and streets that now appear excessively wide for the volume of passing traffic (Nouveau 2006).

At the age of 32, Pierre Dufau (1908–1985) was chosen by the municipality of Amiens in October 1940 to produce a reconstruction plan for the city (Breitman 1989). The young architect had lived in Amiens as a boy and was aware that this historic textile center was stagnating economically. In his own words: ‘I prepared the [reconstruction] plan for Amiens according to my own ideas. My ideas were simple and straightforward. A hundred hectares had been devastated, 5,000 houses destroyed, and people were living in cellars. I had to move fast and I needed to avoid undue expense’ (Dufau 1989: 48). However, he had another objective: ‘to take advantage of this stroke of misfortune to revive the town’ (Ibid). On 14 July 1941, Dufau announced his first plan, which revealed his Beaux-Arts training, with an array of new streets, tree-lined avenues and vistas opening on to the west face of the cathedral and other surviving monuments (Rosier 1943: 39; Doutriaux 1997). These proposals were far too ambitious for the city’s councilors, property holders and shopkeepers, and so Dufau was obliged to make major revisions to accommodate their concerns and the impact of further destruction toward the end of the war. He was duly summoned to Paris to explain his ideas to Raoul Dautry. After a frank exchange of views, which became etched on Dufau’s memory, the Minister gave his approval and recommended the revised plan to the city council (Dufau 1989: 57). As Dufau recalled, this was only ‘a pale reflection of the original project’ but it proposed wider streets and new alignments to accommodate traffic flows, blocks of apartments rising to three, four or five storeys in place of low-rise accommodation before the war, and overspill areas for relocated activities. These revised ideas gave rise to more local opposition but the ‘patient action of the authorities, and especially of the municipality, produced results’ (Josse 1967: 27). Under the efficient management of Commandant Fonace, remembrement began in 1945 and 4,150 property units were consolidated into 1,650. Once this process was completed in March 1947, MRU délégué Yves Cazaux announced that permanent reconstruction could begin. It would last 15 years and provided almost 5,000 residential units, as well as shops, offices and a remarkable 104-meter high concrete tower, designed by Auguste Perret (1874–1954), which faced the rebuilt railway station (Durand-Souffland 1947; Anon. 1958; Abram 1997). Despite these major achievements, Amiens continued to experience a grave housing crisis fuelled by migration from the countryside and the post-war baby boom. The wooden huts along its outer boulevards and on patches of open ground would remain in use for many years (Trogneux 1997).
For four years after its destruction in May 1940, a range of ideas circulated about the reconstruction of Maubeuge. An initial project involved destroying the remaining ramparts and was followed in 1943 by a grandiose scheme by Paul Janin to create a vast central square where the ruins of the town had been (Joly 1995: 159; Hilaire 1997). In all, 15 proposals were made and gave rise to great controversy in the town council. This difficult situation confronted André Lurçat (1894–1970) when he was appointed to the combined position of chief planner and chief architect (Cohen 1995: 243). Despite being a graduate of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris, Lurçat was an avowed ‘modernist’ who was communist in political persuasion, had worked on projects in the USSR, and subsequently was involved with the Resistance in France, before being ‘parachuted into’ Maubeuge by the then Minister for Reconstruction, Raoul Dautry (Saddy 1976: 24). This authoritarian action exacerbated concerns among local townspeople frustrated by the lack of firm decisions in earlier years. As Lurçat declared later: ‘My first concern was to create a climate of confidence concerning the utility of planning and the solutions that the [planning] technician could bring’ (Lurçat 1954: 112). He achieved this by involving local people in a ‘planning committee’, holding weekly meetings, and expressing his views through the local press. His ideas ran counter to earlier proposals and involved retaining Vauban’s ramparts to attract future generations of tourists, abandoning the notion of a great central square, introducing a network of wide streets, zoning the town center for shops and residential accommodation, and relocating industrial and administrative functions beyond the ramparts (Figure 8.2). His public information campaign proved its worth and 800 people attended the meeting at which his radical reconstruction plan was accepted. Indeed, ‘the architect-planner, whose presence had been resented at first’, was ‘not only held in esteem but was liked by the whole population’ (Saddy 1976: 24). Combining the historic ramparts with a strikingly innovative reconstruction scheme that made abundant use of standardized components as well as brick façades, Maubeuge was fashioned into a truly distinctive modern town without parallel in northern France. Far from demonstrating the outworking of a standard formula dictated by the MRU, these case studies reveal how complicated the reconstruction of settlements across northern France proved to be.

Conclusion

With their rich resource endowment and wide array of manufacturing activities, the three départements of northern France had made an important contribution to the German war effort, and following their liberation would be called upon to play an essential role in the recovery of the post-war French economy. Having supplied two-thirds of the nation’s coal output during the 1930s, the northern coal mines had been exploited intensively to supply German demands but suffered much less material damage in World War II than between 1914 and 1918 (Flatrès 1980: 171). As early as December 1944, they had been taken into government control by edict.
of De Gaulle’s provisional government, and were duly incorporated into the wider nationalization of the coal industry on 17 May 1946. The subsequent ‘battle for coal’ would be critical in the system of national economic planning that disbursed Marshall Aid Funds and steered the recovery of the national economy (Bruyelle 1982). Each of the six basic sectors—coal, electricity production, transportation, cement, steel making, and the manufacture of agricultural machinery—that received priority investment in the First National Plan (1947–1950) was strongly represented in northern France. By contrast with heavy investment to modernize the productive capacity and transport system of the three départements, the reconstruction of war-torn towns and villages remained in its infancy in the late 1940s. By the summer of 1949, only 2.5% of the buildings that had been destroyed
had been rebuilt fully, with a further 6.8% in the process of reconstruction. Perhaps not surprisingly, preference had been given to industrial and commercial premises, of which 45% had been or were being reconstructed, by comparison with 7.0% of dwellings and agricultural buildings, and only 0.5% of town halls, schools and churches (ANF 740641/10, 30/6/49). One-tenth of all rebuilding was accomplished already or was in progress in Douai, compared with 4.4% at Dunkirk, 1.6% at Amiens and only 0.2% at Valenciennes (ANF 790641/15, 30/9/49; Chomette 1956). These differences were due in part to the variable complexity of the task but also reflected the specific interaction between architect-planners, councilors and sinistrés in each town.

After this slow start, reconstruction accelerated after mid-century, with 90% having been completed in the summer of 1955, by which time three-quarters of the accounts for compensation claims had been closed (CG Nord 1955: 385; Tarrel 1957; Chélini 2003: 215). As a result, local people moved into rebuilt houses and apartments across northern France. Every opportunity had been taken to improve living conditions, through building design and provision of water supplies and sewerage systems. Rates of completion varied substantially; for example, only 80% of rebuilding had been finished in and around Dunkirk, compared with over 90% in eastern parts of Nord département (CG Nord 1955: 385). By virtue of its strategic location and economic significance, northern France had paid a heavy price to regain its freedom, expressed not only through damage and destruction but also through the seemingly endless years of temporary accommodation. All that was coming to an end in the late 1950s and completely new residential schemes were being built to house the nation’s growing population that was produced by natural increase and net immigration, and was fuelled by what would prove to be ‘30 glorious years’ of economic dynamism. Their fresh façades of brick and concrete resembled the manifestation of post-war reconstruction but the logic behind their installation was totally different since it reflected new growth in population and economic activity rather than replacing or making good what had been destroyed or damaged.

The experience of northern France demonstrates just how contested and complicated the process of reconstruction proved to be, with conflicts between architect-planners, councilors and sinistrés contrasting with planning procedures advanced not only by the MRU as the war was drawing to a close but also by various war-time organizations. The three-fold time-line of destruction, emergency housing, permanent reconstruction did not correspond neatly with conditions of war and peace. Emergency work and provision of temporary accommodation occurred during the years of war and both continued during the early years of peace, with very little permanent reconstruction being accomplished until five or more years of peace had elapsed. In short, this case study of destruction and reconstruction shows that there is no clear and sequential demarcation between ‘war’ and ‘post-war’ but rather an array of overlapping and widely contested conditions.
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PART III
Hegemony and Conflict: Rethinking Peace
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The United States today finds itself immersed in the difficult reconstruction of two countries that have yet to see peace. The invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 have yielded “reconstruction” periods during which conflict has escalated, leaving tens of thousands of civilians dead. These interventions are a significant departure from previous models of Western involvement in conflict zones. While interventions such as Vietnam or Bosnia were premised on upholding a state or rebuilding a failed one, respectively, the US-led campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq, confounds war and post-war goals. In fact, the goal of regime change for both Iraq and Afghanistan meant that the US would pursue war and reconstruction at the same time—breaking, then remaking, both states. As a reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan has been mistaken as a war to defeat Al-Qaeda. Afghanistan was less a war against terrorists than a war against a state that “sponsored terrorism.” It was a war undertaken to make Afghanistan safe for the west. That it also removed a repressive regime was a fillip to the war’s propagandists. But for many Afghans it merely replaced one form of violent oppression with another.

Seen in this light, Afghanistan provides a fitting prequel to the war in Iraq. The 2003 invasion also had the primary intent of regime change. As this chapter seeks to illuminate, the US engaged reconstruction activities, including infrastructure, democratization, and economic recovery, not after war but as an extension of war. Reconstruction activities in Iraq diverged widely from conventional post-war tasks because the invasion was meant to build a new state on what was left of the old one. Breaking the state was prerequisite to remaking it. The US military operations to remake Afghanistan and Iraq were followed by increasing levels of civil disorder, civilian deaths, and political dysfunction. This marks another reason why these reconstructions differ from previous post-war episodes: the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan reverse the spatio-temporal order of state failure and war followed by foreign intervention. Focusing on the case of Iraq, this chapter will argue that the desire to rebuild the Iraqi state according to US geopolitical interests long preceded the invasion, which was undertaken to break and re-make the state. The resulting state failure that led to civil war and ethno-sectarian conflict was not, however, part of that plan, although it had been predicted. This further blurred the tasks of reconstruction and war fighting. And it was as a consequence of the invasion that the Iraqi population was forcibly segregated, producing the tenuous “peace” that reigns today.
No Time for War

In conventional terms, reconstruction is a period of renewal and rebuilding in societies broken by war. As such, reconstruction is often subsumed under the mantle of peace along with related tasks, especially peacekeeping, socio-economic development, and political reform (Dobbins et al. 2003; Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003; Fukuyama 2004). The assumed temporal order of reconstruction following a period of war is complicated, however, by the persistence of wartime agendas, identities, and legacies (Dahlman 2009). The continuing politics of war insinuate themselves in every post-war activity. Partisan interests and criminal networks beleaguer, or wholly capture, key post-war tasks, such as renovating political institutions, targeting economic investment, and ensuring the rule of law and protection of rights. Even if ballots can replace bullets, it is also true that reconstruction and other tasks are not entirely post-war.

As an act now familiar to modern history, reconstruction means less the restoration of the status quo ante than the remaking of a state according to the geopolitical interests of the major actors. The actors involved in reconstruction may be domestic ones, as in the post-bellum US and in post-World War II Russia. Quite often in the twentieth century, however, reconstruction, in the common meaning of the term, is actually a form of post-war intervention by other states. The purpose of reconstruction, however much intended to ease suffering and achieve stability, must also be recognized as the exercise of geopolitical interests (Judt 2005). Eastern Europe was rebuilt by the Soviet Union to expand and consolidate its post-war sphere of influence. The Marshall Plan achieved its vision of an allied Western Europe qua NATO frontier. Vietnam rebuilt Cambodia to quell the violent instability on its western border and to expand its influence in Southeast Asia (Gottesman 2004). The United States, NATO, and their allies engaged in reconstruction across the Balkans under the rubric of a “stability pact,” signaling the priority of transatlantic interests over others.

The discourse of reconstruction and nation-building invokes a very powerful temporal sequence of wartime and post-war activities. It unfolds from the binary logic of war and peace and, as such, compels us to value post-war activities in positive terms that oppose the destruction and misery of war. By this logic, once war is ended, everything that comes after it must be part of the peace. Post-war activities thus take on the mantle of our most positive connotations of peace as a charitable concern for human needs, a fostering of tranquility, and a desire for justice. Venerable institutions like the Red Cross, international war crimes courts, and the relief agencies of the United Nations rose to these challenges and occupy a vaunted status as our best approximation of a Kantian peace. Post-war activities have also become entwined in the projects of development after the Second World War, idealized as assistive nation-building projects free of imperial interests (Dobbins et al. 2003; Ignatieff 2003).

But peace has another meaning as the political language of victor and vanquished. In this view, only war can bring peace, a new geopolitical order with a
hierarchy of places and a new organization of power. The idea that the ante bellum was peaceful is thus false, the origins of enmity and danger are found in the status quo ante. This is the peace described by Nicholas Spykman in *The Geography of the Peace* (1944), a new world order of spheres of power, subordinate places, and inevitable conflict. Such Orwellian connotations that war is peace call forth the constant, vigilant militarism and dogged self-interest that are valued as the means to victory and its moral obligations of armed strength and patriotic sacrifice. Post-war activities are thus an extension of war-time goals (Clark 2001). By the same token, there is a peace-is-war critique that views humanitarianism as imperial militarism (Chomsky 1999; Ignatieff 2003) and the institutions set up after war as providing nothing more than the victor’s justice (Bass 2000).

How, then, do we assess the contending visions of what comes after war? The muddling of ideal and real goals during a post-war era are, in some ways, captured by the distinction between negative and positive peace (Galtung 1996). While a positive peace desires the constructive process of achieving a pacific and just society, negative peace is characterized by the cessation of war’s violence without resolution of its basic conflicts. It is during this period of negative peace—the mere absence of war—that conflicting agendas are brought to bear on a series of post-war tasks. Whatever was captured by force of arms—government, population, resources—usually remains the captive of post-war politics.

If the post-war period is recognized as the continuation of war by other means, then the qualitative characteristics of conventional warfare give way to an ambiguous geopolitical period in which military, diplomatic, and humanitarian interests are subsumed by these unresolved differences. It is here useful to invoke Mary Kaldor’s typology of old wars and new wars, which describe idealizations of conflict rather than actual historical periods (Kaldor 1999). Old wars are characterized by the European nineteenth century battlefield, on which formal uniformed armies perform ritualized acts of violence that are generally set apart from the rest of society. Decisive victory leads to new political qua territorial realities and the soldiers clear the battlefield. These are also the spatial assumptions on which are organized the prospect of containing conflict through the laws of war and ameliorating destruction through reconstruction.

New wars, by contrast, lack most of these formalized characteristics or approximate them in improvised fashion. The battlefield is often embedded within the lived spaces of the population and the line between combatant and civilian is made unclear by irregular mobilization and the intentional targeting of specific groups. New wars also lack clear beginning and end points, but instead wax and wane, changing over time. These ambiguous conditions make it more difficult to clearly identify a time after war, a neutral territory, and a post-war political order. At risk, therefore, is the distinction between war and post-war that is necessary for building a positive peace.

The distinctions needed to separate war from reconstruction are basic temporal constructs in war planning. In Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the United States prepared for old war but instead confronted occupation and insurgency that shares
much with the model of a new war. Defeating the Taliban was conceived of as an operation against the weak and semi-formal forces of a ruling regime. So, too, was regime change in Iraq thought of in terms of conventional battlefield victories—military domination leading to political capitulation. In both cases, however, guerrilla formations led to insurgencies and rival factionalism precipitated civil war. These outcomes have fundamentally challenged the temporal epistemology of US war fighting. As a result, the distinction between war and post-war operations has collapsed in Iraq.

The joint operation doctrines that guide US military operations imagine warfare as a temporally linear series of phases during which military efforts rise and fall (see Figure 9.1). These doctrines imagine a pre-war period (Phase 0) during which military planning shapes conditions for eventual engagement. This phase gives way to a deterrent show of strength (Phase I) followed by the build-up and execution of dominating military force (Phases II and III), which includes the tasks typically thought of as war. Phase IV, stabilization, is the period intended for conventional post-war tasks during which the military continues to provide security and the demobilization of enemy forces. During this period, the military “may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of

Figure 9.1 A notional diagram from the US Joint Operations Doctrine showing the arc of “military effort” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008:IV-26)
other supporting/contributing multinational, OGA, IGO, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2008:IV-29). Finally, military forces transfer duties to civil authorities and redeploy (Phase V). The same timeline guides other military operations. The joint operations doctrine for “peace operations,” i.e., peacemaking, peace building, and peacekeeping, qualifies Phase IV “dominance” to mean “enforcement of the mandate” rather than “full spectrum superiority” (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2007:III-7). Yet both require total military control of the operational environment. War planning, however, failed to anticipate the full reality of conflicts that spread beyond conventional battlefields. Achieving a situation that could be called “post-war” has proven a significant challenge for the most powerful military in history.

An Already-Long War

In most respects, the doctrinal sequence of challenge and response, tension and release, violence and victory, reflects the certainties of old wars. The narrative arc of war has a definite beginning, middle, and end. It has heroes and enemies. Yet Clausewitz also recognized the seriality of war; that “the conquered state often sees in [defeat] only a passing evil” that becomes the impetus for later war (Clausewitz 1968 [1832]:108). If the 2003 invasion of Iraq is properly recognized as part of a serialized war, then it was not as part of the Global War on Terror first articulated by Bush after September 11, 2001 but instead the latest in a series of regional conflicts that began in the wake of the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran (Wilson and Kamen 2009). The result was that Iraq, extensively armed by the Soviet Union and France, went to war with Iran, itself equipped by the United States during the reign of the Shah, in the autumn of 1980. The Iran-Iraq war, which lasted eight years, was the longest war of the twentieth century. The threat that Iran would overrun Iraq, disrupt oil supplies, and diffuse Islamic revolution in the region caused the Reagan Administration to reverse the US diplomatic isolation of Iraq and provide Saddam Hussein with intelligence and weapons against Iran (Battle 2003). The Iran-Iraq war produced no victor but a UN backed ceasefire halted the war. Iraq’s oil-exporting and civilian development programs were set back and its public debt rose to over $80 billion (Cleveland 1994: 370–74). Iraq chose to rearm, spending US$10 billion on military preparations instead of repaying its war debt, of which US$60 billion were due to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was justified by Saddam Hussein as retaliation for Kuwait’s over-production of oil that was driving down the revenues needed by Iraq for reconstruction. Iraq claimed Kuwait as the nineteenth province of Iraq, thereby cancelling Baghdad’s debts and gaining an oil outlet lost during

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1 Reagan’s dealings with Iraq led to the memorable video of Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld shaking hands with Saddam Hussein in Baghdad in December 1983.
the previous war with Iran (Cleveland 1994: 432–44). The potential for invasion against Saudi Arabia triggered Operation Desert Shield, which fielded more than 500,000 Coalition troops, mostly US soldiers joined by those from several dozen countries. The November 1990 UN Security Council resolution provided the US led Coalition with the clearance it sought to push Iraq out of Kuwait, which it did during the Persian Gulf War that began on 16 January 1991. The 42 days of bombing against Iraqi targets in Kuwait and Iraq was followed by a 100-hour ground war that began on 24 February. Estimates suggest about 2,500 Iraqi civilians were killed during the war, along with 20,000–26,000 Iraqi troops (Conetta 2003). Most of Iraq’s infrastructure was demolished during the 41,309 air strikes from Coalition planes during Desert Storm (Cohen 1993: 418). This destruction led to a new round of reconstruction within Iraq that allowed Saddam Hussein to further consolidate his rule over much of the country.

The Gulf War was among the first post-Cold War conflicts. Although the “liberation of Kuwait” was rapidly achieved and quickly forgotten in the US, the conflict between the US and Iraq nevertheless continued during the 1990s, during which the war and post-war periods became difficult to distinguish. The mission to remove Iraq from Kuwait devolved into a series of violent confrontations once the primary Coalition military operations had ceased. The ambiguous war that last throughout the 1990s obscured the fact that the 2003 war actually began in 1991 and that the aftermath of that earlier war contributed importantly to the civil war after 2003. Soon after Iraqi troops were pushed from Kuwait, the southern and northern regions rose in rebellion against the Iraqi government, Shi’a and Kurds determined to end the Ba’thist regime. As the US watched from Kuwait, the remaining Iraqi Republican Guard crushed the uprisings, and killed thousands in the south. Many Shi’a hid in the swamps while 68,000 fled to southern Iran and more than 45,000 were taken into refugee camps across the Saudi border. Operation Southern Watch, a Coalition-patrolled no-fly zone meant to limit Iraqi attacks on Shi’i civilians did not prevent the violent oppression and ecological devastation exacted upon the southern provinces during the 1990s.

In the north, the counterattack triggered the exodus of 2 million Kurds and others, of whom 1.5 million crossed into Iran and more than 400,000 more became trapped on the mountainous border with Turkey, which refused their entry (Graham-Brown 1999: 21–4). The international response to the crisis in the mountains was to broker a UN-sanctioned safe haven, placed under a no-fly zone to exclude Iraqi air attacks. The response to the immediate humanitarian crisis was a joint operation between the US military and Disaster Assistance Response Teams from the US Agency for International Development. The safe haven collapsed in 1996, however, when war erupted between the two major Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK. The no-fly zone, Operation Northern Watch, remained as a fixture in the recovery of northern Iraq, which became a de facto state during the 1990s. The no-fly zones were not authorized by the UN Security Council but were imposed by the US and its allies as an extension of the “humanitarian mission” given in resolution 688.
In the north and south of Iraq, the confusion between military and humanitarian interests became acute, with little or no meaningful reconstruction. The UN Security Council, meanwhile, required Iraq to submit to an intense inspection regime of its “weapons of mass destruction,” namely chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, as well as missile systems (United Nations Security Council 1991). The following seven years were characterized by constant diplomatic flare-ups between the Iraqi government and inspectors working with the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iraq frequently blocked the access of inspectors to some sites, which drew additional admonitions or resolutions, sometimes followed by a show of force by US and UK warplanes.

Following the end of the Kurdish Civil War in 1997, the Kurdish party leaders were brought together in Washington to reconfirm US support for the establishment of Kurdish rule in northern Iraq. The Kurdistan Regional Government, a reinvigorated version of the Kurdish Autonomous Region created in 1970, facilitated the reconstruction of the northern areas. The Kurds under this arrangement were finally able to take advantage of the UN Oil-for-Food Program that redirected Iraq’s oil revenues towards humanitarian aid. Beginning in December 1996, 13% of proceeds from Iraqi oil exports went to the Kurdish north. The Kurdish government continued its own exports from northern oil fields, directing those funds to rebuilding and developing Iraqi Kurdistan while further arming Kurdish militias.

The Kurdish parties also became beneficiaries of the US foreign policy establishment, which committed itself to regime change in Iraq in 1998. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 had broad support in Congress and was signed by President Clinton in October. It reads like a draft of the George W. Bush administration’s later case against the Saddam Hussein regime because it was precisely that. The 1998 law was, in fact, a response to pressure from neoconservatives in the Project for the New American Century to seek regime change in Iraq. In letters written to Clinton, Senator Trent Lott, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich, the group argued that containment of Iraq was failing to address the threat that Iraq would pose if it developed weapons of mass destruction. The United States and its allies had the authority under existing UN resolutions, they believed, to use military options to protect “our vital interests in the Gulf.” In the short term, the Iraq Liberation Act gave Kurdish and other opposition parties funding to further the goal of regime change.

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2 The authors of the 29 May letter to Lott and Gingrich were: Elliot Abrams; William J. Bennett; Jeffrey Bergner; John R. Bolton; Paula Dobriansky; Francis Fukuyama; Robert Kagan; Zalmay Khalilzad; William Kristol; Richard Perle; Peter Rodman; Donald Rumsfeld; William Schneider, Jr.; Vin Weber; Paul Wolfowitz; R. James Woolsey; and Robert B. Zoellick. The letter of 26 January to President Clinton also included Richard L. Armitage.
The inspections regime continued to experience interference and obstruction by Iraqi officials after late 1997. The US Coalition redeployed troops to the Gulf in February 1998 in preparation for possible confrontation with Iraq. The growing stalemate over inspections reached a crescendo in December 1998 with Operation Desert Fox in which US warplanes bombed numerous targets thought to house Iraqi weapons programs and to diminish Iraq’s defensive capabilities. It also targeted Saddam Hussein himself. The targeting of Iraqi sites had drawn heavily from UNSCOM reports, however, furthering the view that the inspections regime was a continuation of America’s war on Iraq (Arkin 1999). The attack had come six weeks after the Iraq Liberation Act had been signed and, although the targets were almost all destroyed, neoconservatives continued to suspect that Iraq would quickly rebuild its programs. Yet, Saddam Hussein’s regime had abandoned its nuclear program and destroyed its chemical weapons stocks in 1991 and gave up its biological program by 1996 (Special Advisor 2004). Although Saddam Hussein might have one day resumed weapons programs, there was no evidence of that in the years after 1999. Iraqi obstruction of weapon inspections was meant to hide its vulnerability to attack, particularly by Iran. Neoconservatives instead misread Iraq’s motives and harbored doubts about containment as an effective strategy even though sanctions and the war of attrition had rendered Iraq effectively defenseless.

Transformative Geopolitics

The confusion of war and post-war activities in Iraq had served US interests during the 1990s. The intelligence gathered after the 1998 Desert Fox strikes, however, convinced US military planners that containment might actually topple the Ba’thist regime in Baghdad (Ricks 2006: 18–24). The prospect of a political vacuum in Iraq was worrisome to military commanders who recognized the dangers that such an outcome might present. Marine General Anthony Zinni, then head of US Central Command, organized war-games in April 1999 to consider post-Saddam contingencies. The outcomes of this exercise brought to the fore many of the problems that would later plague the post-2003 occupation. Desert Crossing found that regime change would need massive inter-agency coordination, including an immediate start to shaping political dynamics within and around Iraq. The preparation for regime change was conceptualized as a complex contingency operation, a Clinton-era policy to guide US planning for militarized peace operations. Desert Crossing foresaw the need for the US military and civilian agencies to contend with Iranian influence, power struggles among internal

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3 This refers to the Duelfer Report summarizing the results of the Iraq Study Group, a massive inspections team created by the US after the 2003 invasion to search for weapons programs.

groups, the risk of internal fragmentation, regional instability, and the need for economic revitalization (Zinni 1999).

Later that year, the UN Security Council disbanded UNSCOM, replacing it with the UN Monitoring, Inspection, and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC). The UNMOVIC inspectors would not return to Iraq until late November 2002. In the meantime, the campaign for the 2000 US presidential election largely ignored Iraq, and Bush and Cheney belittled nation building as an operation unbecoming of warriors. Once in office, the new Bush administration installed a number of the neoconservatives from the Project for the New American Century. Among those who had promoted the idea of regime change in 1998 and criticized Clinton and Zinni’s containment policy was Paul Wolfowitz, the new Deputy Defense Secretary. In February 2001, just weeks after taking office, Bush ordered the largest strikes since Desert Fox to remove Iraqi air defenses claiming the mantle of existing UN Security Council decisions. The 1991 Gulf War was thus continuing under its third US president and entering its second decade. Bush officials, however, had done little with regards to the outcome of Desert Crossing. They did not expect containment to result in regime change but neither did they plan to use force.

In a story that is now well known, the attacks of September 11, 2001 opened the door to the neoconservative view that the US needed to abandon containment and actively eliminate states that might support terrorism (e.g., Woodward 2004). Wolfowitz and others argued for an attack on Iraq within days of September 11, but were sidelined by the focus on the Taliban and Afghanistan (Ricks 2006: 30–31). By November, General Tommy Franks, the head of Central Command who replaced Zinni, began planning for an attack on Iraq. The White House was fully engaged in war planning by the next month although administration officials dissimulated a more cautious stance. Bush began to frame the war plan in terms of an epic narrative, moving forward under the force of its own temporal imperative. In his State of the Union speech to Congress in January 2002, Bush reworked the residual effect of September 11, of loss and heroism, into a new over-arching geopolitical narrative that decontextualized a decade of war with Iraq by remapping it as part of the Axis of Evil that was “arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush 2002b).

The Global War on Terror was becoming a serialized conflict, in which Afghanistan was simply the first chapter. The neoconservative’s propaganda campaign, meanwhile, readily found overly ambitious journalists who would print any of the false information invented to link Saddam Hussein’s regime to weapons of mass destruction and terrorists (Finnegan 2007). The public hoodwink largely worked and public opinion was willing to accept a policy change on Iraq (PIPA 2003). The keystone of Bush’s foreign policy was preemption, which served to reverse the temporal order of challenge and response. In his speech at the Military Academy at West Point in June 2002, Bush faulted containment as a policy that was ineffective at stopping the threat of weapons of mass destruction. He would seek “to confront the worst threats before they emerge” (Bush 2002a).
It is, of course, opaque to argue that the shift from containment to preemption was caused by the attacks of September 11, 2001. Writing in response to 9/11, Fredric Jameson cautioned that “historical events are never really punctual—despite the appearance of this one and the abruptness of its violence—but extend into a before and an after of historical time that only gradually unfold, to disclose the full historicity of the event” (Jameson 2002: 301). The same applies for US policy on Iraq. Ultimately, the idea of regime change was national policy sought by both Clinton and Bush administrations, albeit through very different approaches. Wolfowitz and the neoconservatives in The Project for the New American Century who organized the war in Iraq were not simply reacting to September 11. They had long hoped for the chance to remake Iraq. As journalist Naomi Klein surmised, the invasion and occupation of Iraq were not two separate events but “two parts of a unified strategy—the initial bombardment was designed to erase the canvas on which the model nation could be built” (Klein 2007:331). Remaking Iraq meant first breaking it.

**Phase Zero**

The chaos that engulfed Iraq after the 2003 invasion was often criticized as stemming from a lack of planning for what to do after the Saddam Hussein regime was removed. This imagines that better planning would have led to a better outcome in Iraq, which is not necessarily true. War is a chaotic and unpredictable act. Moreover, there was extensive planning across many US government agencies. Most notably, in February 2002, the Department of State convened the Future of Iraq Project to draw on US and Iraqi expertise about what problems the US would confront after regime change. Other US agencies began planning in the summer and autumn of 2002 after the publication of the Bush administration’s policy on Iraq in August 2002, *Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy*. The National Security Council tried to integrate the military’s Joint Staff with diplomatic and post-war experts (SIGIR 2009a: 10–11). US Central Command assigned two Army Majors who had served in peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo to review Phase IV reconstruction operations. Potential issues were also identified by the CIA, the Army War College, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SIGIR 2009a: 11–14).

The larger problem with the pre-war planning of post-war Iraq was thus not a lack of planning, per se, but the Bush administration’s particular geopolitical vision of what the war could accomplish (cf. MacGinty 2003). The various expert assessments produced during 2002 clashed with the expectations of a far more ideological Bush administration, namely the neoconservatives. For Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, the invasion would be a “liberation” of Iraq that would not require a lengthy occupation. In contrast, the planning undertaken by agencies such as the National Security Council and the Department of State proceeded on the basis that post-Saddam Iraq would be difficult to govern and produce a long
occupation. The administration’s vision, eventually spelled out in its national security policy on Iraq, was the judgment of a small coterie in the office of the Vice-President and the Office of the Secretary of Defense that eventually produced the war plan (Packer 2005; Ricks 2006). Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in fact, established his own Office for Special Plans to develop plans for postwar Iraq that were never shared with the other agencies (SIGIR 2009a: 10).

The idea of liberation meshed well with the Bush administration’s criticism of nation building. Military operations could be limited to regime change because, it was assumed, Iraqis would welcome US troops. Governance responsibilities would be quickly given to Iraqis themselves, thereby avoiding the “culture of dependency” that neoconservatives saw in other post-war interventions (SIGIR 2009a: 8). Reconstruction responsibilities would be taken over by the new government of Iraq, funded by oil revenues, and outsourced to private contractors. Military planning, therefore, did not extend much beyond defeating the weak Iraqi army and removing Saddam except to provide relief for short-term humanitarian needs, such as food and water. A war of liberation envisioned a quick peace rather than a long war, extended occupation, and nation building. The warnings gleaned from Zinni’s 1999 war games had been ignored, not least because of Wolfowitz’s personal animosity towards the general.

The administration was also reluctant to widely discuss its war plans, in part because of the growing public uncertainty about the war in Afghanistan and international pressure for the US to seek diplomatic solutions at the United Nations Security Council. This delayed the original invasion plans set for October 2002 and UN negotiations led the government of Iraq to allow UNMOVIC inspectors to return in November 2002. The inspection teams remained in Iraq until the eve of the war, during which time they found no evidence of banned weapons.

By the end of 2002, war planning had been entirely subsumed under the Department of Defense, and post-war planning efforts were minimal. The small staff assigned to Phase IV reconstruction planning was augmented by a few additional personnel and renamed JTF-IV, Joint Task Force for Phase IV. Separately, President Bush approved the Secretary of Defense’s proposal for an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). The president’s decision superseded all previous inter-agency planning, effectively halting all other government activities. In early January 2003, the Defense Department hired Jay Garner as head of ORHA. Garner was a retired Army general who had run Operation Provide Comfort, the humanitarian effort in Northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. He was trusted by the military but he began work with no staff, no resources or funding, and no approved plan to implement, with less than two months before the invasion began.

At the same time, OHRA began to struggle with JTF-IV over control of post-war plans. The Bush Administration had created two competing structures for reconstruction, and assistance from other agencies was hindered by the creation of OHRA. When Garner finally learned of the Future of Iraq Project, he tried to hire its director and others who had been engaged in the civilian planning
Rumsfeld blocked the hiring of those he thought were too critical of the neoconservative’s planned war of liberation. Garner’s work at ORHA was still in its early stages when the war began on 20 March 2003, with an aerial assault on Baghdad and Iraq defenses, followed the next day by a ground invasion. Less than two weeks later, US Central Command renamed ORHA as the Coalition Provisional Authority, which would be the UN-recognized ruling authority in Iraq until sovereignty could be transferred to an interim government in June 2004. The Bush administration had effectively reduced post-war planning to a minor military operation, which was then given the responsibility to oversee Iraq.

From Liberation to Occupation

The war plan set in motion to topple Saddam Hussein viewed reconstruction as short-term responses to potential humanitarian disasters, such as war-related displacement or food and water shortages. The initial reconstruction contracts ordered by USAID were designed to meet the immediate needs of a liberated population, ie, water, public health, transportation, electricity, banks and currency. More than US$1.5 billion was spent by USAID during the first months after the invasion, funds taken from the US$2.48 billion approved by Congress in April 2003. The reality of post-invasion Iraq, however, was not jubilant liberation but rising violence amid the collapse of Iraq’s governing institutions. Implementing even short-term reconstruction tasks ground to a halt in the face of a rapidly eroding security situation. Liberation, in short, was failed policy.

A change in US policy was announced with the arrival of Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer, who replaced Garner as head of the CPA in May 2003. Bremer’s first act was to legally establish the US as an occupying rather than a liberating force. The Bush administration had shifted policy away from the rapid withdrawal expected after liberation and put off indefinitely the transfer of authority to Iraqi authorities (SIGIR 2009a: 69–73). The temporal structure of the war plan had given way to an entirely unscripted occupation. The US plan to liberate Iraq shifted towards a larger and more ambitious plan to overhaul the country’s governing institutions and economy. Under Bremer, the reconstruction plan grew from minimalistic humanitarian contingencies to a full-scale reconstruction program, far larger than the nation-building exercises of the 1990s that had been maligned by candidate Bush.

The new reconstruction plan was to achieve “a stable, prosperous, and democratic Iraq” (CPA 2003:3). The CPA set out a new strategic plan that identified four core objectives: a safe and secure environment; restoring basic services to levels which promote stability in Iraq; creating the conditions for economic growth; and enabling the transition to transparent and inclusive democratic governance. More telling, the language of the CPA’s strategic plan shifted toward an indefinite temporality, describing the US involvement in Iraq as one that will take “as long as necessary” (CPA 2003: 4). The strategic plan was partly intended
to attract funds during the Madrid Donor’s Conference in October 2003, but the US government was largely on its own and provided US$18.4 billion to Bremer’s reconstruction plan. New agencies were created to spend the funds but contracting and procurement proved too slow. When the CPA ended its mandate in June 2004, less than US$400 million had been spent (SIGIR 2009a: 113–14).

The end of the CPA mandate was also pushed by growing Iraqi resentment at the occupation, as well as pressure by the UN Security Council to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government and proceed with constitutional reforms and elections. While the CPA moved towards these goals, the security situation worsened in Iraq. The CPA had disbanded the Iraqi Army and laid plans to rebuild Iraq’s security forces. Many of the former army troops had joined an insurgency that slowed reconstruction projects while increasing their cost. Starting in October 2003, the US-led coalition, renamed the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), tried to quickly train new Iraqi security forces. These units failed to confront the insurgency during April 2004 as attacks on Coalition troops and civilians increased. The MNF-I refined its approach to preparing Iraqi security units but this took much longer to accomplish while the insurgency grew. Iraq’s first elections were held amidst insurgent violence in January 2005, which established a transitional government in April and a constitutional referendum that October. In November 2005, the National Security Council published a strategic document to achieve the original CPA goal in Iraq of establishing a stable and democratic Iraq (NSC 2005). The primary concern, however, was the deteriorating security situation.

Iraq’s parliamentary elections were held in December 2005 and produced a new government led by a largely Shi’i coalition of Islamist parties. The new government had yet to form when, in February 2006, the al-Askari mosque in Samarra was bombed. The bombing brought into the open a civil war between ethno-sectarian communities, while insurgents continued to fight against US troops. As violence escalated, a new government formed behind Nouri Al-Maliki. The al-Maliki government and Iraqi security forces were ineffective at combating the rising violence. The US government instead shifted its plans once again to cope with a changing reality on the ground in Iraq. Stemming the tide of inter-communal violence would start to look more like nation building than earlier reconstruction tasks, such as infrastructural renovation and institutional design. Earlier assessments, such as Zinni’s Desert Crossing and the inter-agency groups formed by the National Security Council, had clearly identified ethno-sectarian violence and Iraq’s fragmentation as a possible outcome of regime change. Now the US military, and a dwindling number of Coalition allies, was facing the more daunting task of quelling the violence while political reconciliation remained a work in progress. General John Abizaid, the new Commander of Central Command, had already begun referring to Iraq as “the long war” in 2004, long before the war formally transformed into a counterinsurgency.
Reconstruction is War

Three years after the invasion of Iraq, the US-Iraqi conflict was a different animal in two important respects. First, the unified political allies that neoconservatives expected to find in a post-Saddam Iraq never materialized. Political reconciliation was painfully slow and the larger political parties were working as much on establishing local and regional dominions as they were on creating a centralized political authority. Insurgent groups, including Ba’thists, former military officers, and tribal leaders, were carving out fiefs in the center of the area known as the Sunni triangle, although their motivations were frequently mischaracterized as fundamentally ethno-sectarian. In the south, rival political groups claiming to represent large parts of the Shi’i community struggled for control over the major cities. The two Kurdish parties in the north continued to rule over their de facto state, albeit with a better equipped peshmerga militia than they ever had. The benefits that had accrued to them during their decade long de facto statehood was, in fact, the same thing that made a unified Iraq a Kurdish priority—Turkey would never allow an independent Kurdish state to emerge from a disintegrating Iraq. Second, and consequently, the civil war that was engulfing the country threatened to tip the balance towards fragmentation, threatening to leave the United States as the only political player in the country that was investing in a unified country. Political pressure in the United States was mounting for yet another change in policy on Iraq. The overriding concern, however, was that of restoring security while the political process continued.

The foreign policy arm of the Democratic Party was especially unhelpful in resolving the failing war in Iraq. They portrayed the conflict in Iraq as one of deep-seated ethnic antagonism. Returning to the “lessons” of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, they drew conclusions in keeping with the first Clinton term, namely to stay out of ethnic civil war. Madeline Albright, who had argued for a more muscular implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement at the start of the second Clinton term, was less sanguine about the prospects for Iraq’s unity. Albright viewed Iraq as a problem of ethnically defined centrifugal forces: “it’s an artificial country which has to be kept together, but the differences between the Kurds, the Shi’as [sic] and the Sunnis are massive” (ABC 2004). This, of course, ignored that Iraq had possessed multiethnic urban communities and misrecognized the divisive policies imposed during the twentieth century by British colonial, Arab nationalist and Ba’thist rulers as the consequence, rather than the cause, of communal differences (Stansfield 2007). President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Leslie Gelb, had earlier reached a more drastic conclusion, arguing that Iraq ought to be divided in three: “The lesson is obvious: overwhelming force was the best chance for keeping Yugoslavia whole, and even that failed in the end. Meantime, the costs of preventing the natural states from emerging had been terrible” (Gelb 2003). Senator Joe Biden repeated the same idea in 2006. Former Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith and Dayton negotiator Richard Holbrooke both raised the specter of having to partition Iraq. They were joined by Republican
Senators Trent Lott and Kay Bailey Hutchinson, who were equally comfortable with the idea of forcible segregation. The Iraq Study Group, which was convened at the request of Congress, considered a “divide and quit” strategy in their 2006 report and rightly concluded that it would produce a humanitarian catastrophe and violent, forcible expulsions (James A. Baker III et al. 2006).

For the Bush Administration, the ambitious reconstruction of Iraq that had been initiated by Bremer’s CPA was not attainable and the idea of “victory” had diminished to little more than leaving behind a stable and relatively friendly country. The Pentagon sought a new way to fight the insurgency and began by reevaluating its counterinsurgency doctrine, which had not been updated since the Vietnam War. The officer most closely associated with the result, the new Army Field Manual 3-24, was General David Petraeus, who had first commanded a combat brigade in wartime during the 2003 invasion (Petraeus and Amos 2006). The new counterinsurgency doctrine was the result of decades of intellectual debates within the Army about the lessons that should be drawn from Vietnam, itself the subject of Petraeus’ PhD dissertation in international relations at Princeton. The new doctrine sought to identify the causes and social organization of insurgencies as militarized political movements against a government. It recognized that insurgent groups have different and competing motivations for engaging in armed fighting. Most importantly, Petraeus’ doctrine saw counterinsurgency as a primarily political problem—in fact, “80% political”—that military action tended to antagonize. The local population was also seen as unattached to the insurgency. Counterinsurgency succeeded when political and military operations coincided to provide local populations with greater benefits than could insurgents. To this end, reconstruction was war or, as Petraeus described it, “money is ammunition” (Petraeus 2006).

Counterinsurgency also invoked an entirely different sense of battle time than the conventional Phases 0 to V. This was laid out clearly in the new Joint [Services] Operations Doctrine for Counterinsurgency, which described a notional timeframe in which political and military operations could “clear” insurgent elements from an area, “hold” it, by providing meaningful security for civilians, and finally “build” effective rule of law and responsive governance. These activities have considerable overlap and the concept is one of transition towards building tangible economic development and effective government. More significantly, the counterinsurgency doctrine is highly spatial and describes areal clear-hold-build operations as mechanisms for the diffusion of government authority. Atop the local terrain, the doctrine seeks to analyze social networks as a “threat evaluation tool,” depicting social topologies between traditional groups, resources, governing authorities, insurgents, and Coalition military units. In this rendering of the enemy, insurgencies are not hierarchical structures as much as horizontal networks, whose density, connectivity, and centrality are determined by multifarious social relationships (see Figure 9.2).

The counterinsurgency doctrine relies less upon conventional military activities, which have become known as “kinetic”—read lethal—operations. Instead, the emphasis is on post-clearance, non-kinetic “unified action” of military-
civilian actors engaged in reconstruction. Kinetic operations are meant to create space and time for reconstruction, which is now a political project of delivering local-state authority in the form of material aid. In Afghanistan, reconstruction tasks were handled by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which were run by military officers and included civilian officials from the Departments of Justice, State, Agriculture, and USAID. As formed in Iraq during 2005, State Department officers headed PRTs that included representatives of the same civilian agencies, along with military personnel or contractors to provide security (Perito 2007). As conditions worsened in Iraq, reconstruction tasks became exceedingly difficult and ineffectual and PRTs were less effective in establishing government authority.

In January 2007, US President George W. Bush announced “The New Way Forward in Iraq” (Office of the President 2007b). The centerpiece of the new policy was to change the US military presence over the following year by what became known as “the surge.” It called for an increase in ground combat brigades whose mission would be to quell the violence that was complicating political negotiations among Iraq’s political factions. The surge was meant to accomplish the clear and hold tasks necessary to begin building central government authority, such as police, utilities, and public administration, in insurgent areas. The Iraqi PRTs were to be a key part of the counterinsurgency doctrine and they were directly embedded with Combat Brigade Teams (the basic military command unit in Iraq) stationed on Forward Operating Bases. President Bush chose

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Figure 9.2  Petraeus’ Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency (3-24) depicts war and reconstruction activities within a social network model of insurgency (Petraeus 2006: B-12)

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5 In addition to the publications of 10 January, the policy was described in a Presidential Address and Senior Administration Background Briefings on the same day. They emerged from the National Security Council’s Iraq Strategy Review released in January 2007.
General Petraeus as the new commander for the Coalition in Iraq, effectively putting him in charge of implementing his own counterinsurgency doctrine.

Although the surge was formally intended to give Iraqi politicians time to reach key compromises, it was also the result of two more pressing problems for the Bush administration. First, the elections in November 2006 ended the Republican domination of the House and Senate for the first time since 1994. Second, and related to the first, support for the war among the American public was at its lowest level since the invasion in 2003 (Pew Research Center 2008). Facing Congressional and public opposition for the first time, the Bush war plan would be measured by a series of benchmarks for the Government of Iraq and codified in legislation.6

Ethnic Cleansing and Negative Peace

In September 2007, a series of reports suggested that the surge was failing in its mission. The Government Accountability Office, legally responsible for assessing the plan’s progress, found that the Government of Iraq had achieved only three of the 18 benchmarks and partially met an additional four (GAO 2007). Most of what had been accomplished related to the surge in Baghdad, formally known as the Baghdad Security Plan or Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law).7 The Bush Administration’s assessment of the benchmarks was only slightly better (Office of the President 2007a). Crucially, however, even the White House recognized that the goal of reducing ethno-sectarian violence had not been achieved. The assessment of a Congressionally mandated Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, headed by retired General James Jones and staffed by retired military officers, found that the ethno-sectarian violence was beyond the control of Iraqi security forces (Jones 2007).

The poor political progress in Iraq during 2007 was, however, accompanied by a significant reduction in attacks on security forces and civilians. The reduction in civilian deaths to about 700 in December from 3,500 in January gave way to a much calmer security situation in Iraq since then.8 Credit was quickly given to the surge for having provided the additional military presence necessary to calm ethno-sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad (Jones 2007). Counterinsurgency tactics appeared to have aided the shift among Sunni Arab tribal leaders away from al-Qaeda. Coalition troops were joined by growing numbers of Iraqi security forces, who contributed to a reduction in violence. Since Obama’s election, the drawdown and exit plan was credited with having dissipated the source of insurgent support. However, another factor may better explain the decrease in

7 The other two met or partially met benchmarks had achieved legislative rights for minority parties and movement towards semi-autonomous regions.
8 Updated running statistics are compiled in the Brookings Institute’s Iraq Index.
ethno-sectarian violence: ethnic cleansing violence had already forcibly separated Iraq’s communities before the surge even began.

As a geopolitical strategy, ethnic cleansing is premised on the ideology that different identities cannot coexist in the same political space. The rendering of communal identities as incompatible, however, runs counter to the claims of modernization. Iraq was a relatively modern society, especially in the heavily urbanized areas, which had expanded under decades of oil revenues. It is also true that Iraq’s Arabist military and Ba’thist leaders had built an enormous security state whose primary concern was countering the traditional leadership in the north and south of Iraq. Yet this was not so much the ethnification of Iraq as the oppressive rule of a centralized clique of secular, modernist elites and military officers. Baghdad and other large cities had many multi-ethnic neighborhoods. After the 2003 invasion, the residential pattern began to change in response to the ethnification of Iraq, as politics became more closely aligned with ethno-sectarian identities.

Violence against civilians peaked prior to the surge. Civilian fatalities during the last half of 2006 reached a high of about 3,500 deaths per month. When the surge began, that number had already dropped to 2,500 and continued to decline during and after the surge, which ended in the first half of 2008. The number of displaced persons tells the fuller story of ethnic cleansing. The civil war that raged during 2006 and 2007 produced massive numbers of displaced persons. At the end of 2009, there were 2.6 million internally displaced persons in Iraq and more than two million refugees who had left Iraq, living primarily in Syria and Jordan. In the province of Baghdad, there were more than 65,000 internally displaced, most of who were Shi’a from other provinces. The exchange of populations decreased the number of mixed neighborhoods and limited inter-communal contact (DeYoung 2007). The US Government reported that more than 50% of Baghdad’s population had been displaced (SIGIR 2009b; 2010).

British journalist Patrick Cockburn argues that the Shi’a parties had gained control of Baghdad prior to the surge (Cockburn 2008). A study of Baghdad’s nighttime light signatures shows that Sunni areas had largely depopulated prior to the surge and reports show that this was the period of increased Sunni displacement out of Baghdad (Agnew et al. 2008). Most of the IDPs, moreover, stated that they were fleeing because of direct threats to their lives rather than the indirect effects of war (IOM 2008). During the surge, the ethnification of Baghdad and other cities was compounded by the Coalition’s construction of barrier walls around already ethnically cleansed neighborhoods. In field operations, combat brigades and PRTs sought to clear insurgents but did little to quell the inter-communal struggle for control of urban areas, rural fields, and key economic infrastructure in smaller cities like Balad. The Kurdish authorities encouraged resettlement of Kurds into abandoned towns along the “green line” that separated the north from the rest of the country. In Kirkuk and other towns that had undergone “Arabization” by the Ba’thists after the 1970s, Kurdish parties sought to produce dominant majorities in case of decentralization or partition.
Conclusion

Three decades of US interventions in Iraq have thoroughly blurred the empirical distinctions between war and reconstruction. The war in Iraq began long before and will continue long after the 2003 invasion. Regardless the falsehoods sewn in making the immediate case to invade Iraq, the US–Iraq conflict has its origins in the Cold War and has been shaped largely by US strategic interests in the region. Yet the historical and geopolitical setting of Iraq does not provide a satisfactory timeline to events in this conflict. In some ways, the long-running US–Iraq conflict looks like a war movie shown with its reels out of order. Instead of war followed by rapprochement, US–Iraq cooperation in the 1980s gave way to war in 1991. From 1991 war to 2003, the US–Iraq war is defined by a long period of vacillating humanitarian and military interventions. We expect ethno-sectarian conflict to lead armed intervention rather than emanate from it. Intervention is supposed to prevent state failure, not precipitate it. Reconstruction is thought to come about once the violence subsides. Instead, reconstruction came in the midst of civil war and was, itself, a form of warfare. The temporal order of war and peace is not simply upset, the two concepts have run together.

The war in Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan, brings to light the ethical and practical problems of using reconstruction as a means of warfare. The US counterinsurgency doctrine embeds reconstruction within combat brigades and subsumes post-war tasks as explicit tactics for ending an insurgency. Reconstruction as war diminishes the possibility of achieving positive peace in two ways. First, it curtails the possibility of pursing transitional justice and reconciliation that have become the ideal of post-war reconstruction (UN Secretary General 2004). Aid becomes ammunition; war fighting and victory subsume justice. Second, reconstruction as war places a higher value on security—the use of violence against violence—than on strengthening interpersonal and inter-communal ties. When reconstruction is the extension of war by other means, then it follows that the polity being “rebuilt” will be less likely to move beyond the terms of the violence that overwhelmed it in the first place. The overt militarization of what we idealize as justly distributed humanitarian assistance and liberalized political and economic structures blurs the possibility of achieving a truly post-war society. It is right to question the efficacy of reconstruction—in its practical and moral credibility—especially when it is brought to bear at the point of a gun.

A critical approach to reconstruction and recovery efforts must take into consideration the fact that reconstruction is rarely a return to the status quo ante. Rather, it is taken as an intentional, if not always successful, opportunity to remake a state and society according to the interests of the agents that undertake reconstruction. Reconstruction provides an opportunity to revise governing institutions, economic functions, and the social order. The reality, however, is that reconstruction is often an incomplete process fraught with the terms of a conflict that continues in the absence of armed warfare.
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Reconstructing Conflict


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On October 18, 1901, the forces of empire and democracy—seemingly contradictory impulses within the American colonial state in Manila—reached accommodation in an early legal skirmish that tested the efficacy of the new civil authority in the Philippines. The cases of Oakley Brooks, an Army “camp follower” charged with abandoning his work contract for a more lucrative position, and a Mr. Finnick, already convicted of defrauding the government, would be of no special interest except for the conflict of jurisdictions that they brought to light. The civil government had been installed on the 4th of July of the same year, with due pomp, under the governorship of William Howard Taft. But in many parts of the archipelago, where the US Army remained in charge as it attempted to come to grips with persistent insurgencies, Taft’s government was not sovereign in a practical sense, while in still others, including many of the islands’ upland interiors, the project of territorial sovereignty, never fully realized by the Spanish, remained incomplete. At stake, in both cases, was whether military authority over prisoners could be questioned by civil courts, i.e., habeas corpus protection against illegal imprisonment. Given President McKinley’s (1898) pledge to substitute “the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule” in the Philippines, the cases of Finnick and Brooks, the first of their kind, were thus important checks for the new state apparatus, and, as Taft saw it, for the promise of transplanted, American-style democracy in the archipelago.

They were also seen as vital by the occupying US Army, which had triggered the controversy when it refused to produce Brooks for a (Philippine) Supreme Court ordered hearing. Given the ongoing conditions of the war, the Army’s Commanding General in the Philippines, Adna Chaffee, argued that, by relinquishing any legal authority to the civil sphere in the archipelago, “we arm the enemies of the United States [and] inspire them with hope” (Chaffee to Taft 1901a). On October 11, Chaffee (1901) submitted for Taft a memorandum of “propositions believed to be established as fundamental principles in a state of war, and which ought to be recognized by Civil Courts,” in which he laid out a case against the extension of habeas corpus rights. The ensuing exchange is illuminating, both for its formative character in US imperialism and counter-insurgency doctrine and for the intersecting geographies of war and “post-war”
reconstruction in the Philippines that it reveals. How these geographies were bound together in processes of colonial state formation, and in the extension of democracy at multiple spatial scales, is the subject of this chapter.

Habeas Corpus

In his efforts to establish fundamental principles of understanding between military and civil regimes in the Philippines, General Chaffee’s first proposition sought to define the dimensions of the Philippine-American War in absolute spatial terms:

A state of war exists throughout the entire Archipelago. In some parts hostilities are open and active, in other parts, inactive or the country is in a state of pacification with the Army, as we say, in observation. In all parts there may be found sentiments by some of the people, the number not known, which are opposed to the governing authority and such sentiments are always found conducive to hostile action. Therefore a state of war exists in a technical sense everywhere in the Islands.

Thus, “the full power and influence of the Army, physical and moral, ought not to be lessened by the action of any Civil Court” (Chaffee 1901).

The Army’s refusal to produce the bodies of Brooks and Finnick, in this sense, spoke to more acute anxieties over the extension of liberal rights promised to Filipinos in the pacified provinces, and over the relations between those rights and its conduct of the war. As Chaffee (1901) saw it, “I do not think it is permissible in a state of war for the inhabitants in rebellion to be permitted to think that they can escape any of the consequences of a violation of the laws of war, by an appeal to the Civil Courts, which would be the case were it permitted that writs of habeas corpus could be availed in any case of arrest for such cause by military authority.”

He listed an array of US case law references to support the contention that the “civil laws of the conquered territory” should be considered valid and binding only so far as do not impair the supremacy of the national authority (Chaffee 1901). The administrative powers of the Civil Governor and Philippine Commission, Chaffee argued, were not, and could not be, co-extensive with those of the Commanding General under conditions of war.

Taft, a trained jurist, responded two days later, contesting the premise that the Philippines were in a state of war throughout the archipelago — Taft limited the condition to “four or five provinces” — and challenging the absolute status that Chaffee had derived from the conditions of general insurrection that he described. Brushing aside Chaffee’s case law (“The Supreme Court cases referred to in your memorandum do not seem to be in point”), Taft acknowledged that “we are still under military government in these Islands,” but insisted that the power of the President, as Commander in Chief, to establish civil courts in “territory conquered or recently in a state of war” must be conceded (Taft to Chaffee 1901a). What
was needed, Taft argued, was “a careful working out of concurrent jurisdiction between the civil and the military, and the provision for the establishment of a civil government with civil liberties, all under the power of the President as Commander in Chief” (Taft to Chaffee 1901a). Taft’s own status as Governor-General, under the US War Department (and in turn, the President), underscored the degree to which contradictions between civil and military governance were to be resolved through evolving executive powers.

Meanwhile, Taft’s notion of concurrent jurisdiction in the Philippines, wherein the expansion of liberal rights across international frontiers occurred not following military conquest but alongside it, embodied the contradictions of the imperial democracy that America was becoming. How would this new model of sovereignty take shape in the Philippines? Taft argued that President McKinley’s April 1900 Instructions to the (second) Philippine Commission, which called for the inauguration of “governments essentially popular in their form as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops,” constituted the initial framework (in Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 136). This creeping republicanism within American imperialism, limited from the outset by the presumed “capacities” of the Filipino people but containing, nonetheless, a prospect of autonomy and independence, mapped a dynamic, scalar framework for the emerging Philippine polity. But it was a blueprint that required new sorts of relations between war and the expansion of democracy. As Taft interpreted for Chaffee, the late President’s Instructions had called for:

an anomalous form of military government in these Islands. In the mind of the President, the so called war which was here being conducted was peculiar and needed peculiar remedies. He evidently thought that large parts of the territory would become free from hostilities and that it would greatly aid the Army in subduing the remainder if object lessons in the benefits of American civil government could be offered to those who were still resisting the authority of the United States. He accordingly directed the Commission, first to establish municipal governments, then provincial governments and finally to recommend the form of a central government whenever the Commission should be of opinion that it could be safely transferred from Military to Civil Control. (Taft to Chaffee 1901a)

So called war? As we will see in greater detail below, much had changed since President McKinley (1898) had pledged to Filipinos, before the outbreak of the Philippine-American War, the “full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples.” In March 1900, when the Taft Commission

1 While the first Philippine Commission had been appointed in 1899, under Cornell University President Jacob Schurman, to investigate conditions in the Philippines and make recommendations, the second commission, under Taft, was invested with both legislative and executive powers on its establishment by McKinley in 1900.
had been dispatched to the Philippines, McKinley and his generals had been slow to recognize the conditions of widespread but clandestine guerilla warfare into which the conventional war had evolved. Within months, following changes in military leadership, they had come to accept these developments, but McKinley remained convinced that democratization should be central to the US strategy in the Philippines. McKinley was assassinated the next year, falling to an anarchist’s bullets in Buffalo, New York, in September, 1901, the month before the Brooks and Finnick controversy emerged, making his vision of democratic object lessons for Philippine insurgents, as Taft had put it, ever more a matter of interpretation and practice.\(^2\)

For the Army, the establishment of municipal governments was viewed as both a product and a tool of pacification; the diffusion of democracy was counted among the tactics of counter-insurgency. But for Taft, it was the military arm that could be expected to take on a secondary role in relation to the civil government in the Philippines, starting in the pacified provinces. Taft envisaged a gradual, perhaps imperceptible transition between war and peace, wherein the work of waging war gave way to “the suppression of insurrection and brigandage … and the maintenance of law and order” (Taft to Chaffee 1901a).

This progression, however, depended on a heterogeneous geography—one characterized by simultaneous, but geographically differentiated, constellations of war and peace, even as the broader horizon of peace was itself premised on the extension of liberal democratic rights. McKinley’s promise of civil and property rights, Taft insisted, was not made:

> with reference to governments to be established in the distant future after peace had been completely restored throughout the Archipelago; but with reference to those governments which the Commission was to establish in the progress of pacification and to those laws it was to pass as the legislative branch of the Military Government.

The President intended the Commission gradually to establish real civil governments in territory deemed by them to be fitted for it and gradually to relegate the army to the position which it occupies at home in time of peace, that of a power auxiliary to ordinary peace authorities and that in such real civil governments, it becomes the power and duty of the Commission to protect the individual from a violation of his civil liberty by furnishing for the purpose the usual means known to Anglo Saxon countries, that of the writ of habeas corpus in civil courts. (Taft to Chaffee 1901a, emphasis added)

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\(^2\) McKinley’s assassination, as Benedict Anderson (2005) reminds us, was no singular event; rather, it was part of a string of at least 13 major political assassinations worldwide between 1894–1914, mainly by anarchists, that were themselves fundamentally transforming the nature of war and peace.
**Habeas corpus** for Brooks and Finnick, it can be taken from Taft’s response to the Army’s refusal to publicly produce the individuals, was essential to the kind of imperial power that Taft sought to articulate in Manila, a model of sovereignty that would teach, transform, and, at least in some ways, internalize new subjects as it expanded. How Filipinos would respond to these “object lessons” in both war and democracy, and re-work them for their own purposes, would in turn shape not just the American colonial reconstruction of the Philippines, but also an emerging US model of global engagement in the twentieth century. The historical geography of state formation in the Philippines during the “Taft Regime”—the period (1901–1913) wherein Taft served consecutively as Philippine Governor-General, US Secretary of War, and US President, climbing the ladder of executive positions in charge of American colonial policy in the archipelago (and elsewhere)—thus offers a glimpse of the diffusion of democracy as a global strategy for the US, i.e., an imperialist geopolitics. With lenses trained on subsequent Philippine political history, we will see that it also provides a lesson in what Antonio Negri (1999) calls **constituted power**, a concept that helps to illuminate the conservative recasting (or capture) of revolutionary moments.

It would be misleading, however, to project the emerging tensions between the forces of empire and democracy in American foreign policy in terms of a neat mapping of conflict between civil and military spheres in the Philippines. Although dual state formation under the Taft Regime, as Patricio Abinales has shown (2003; see also Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 123–5), would evolve into distinct geographies of sovereignty in the Philippines along civil and military lines, relations between them were complex and dialectical. The chapter continues by tracing the development of ideologies and practices of American “progressive military occupation” amidst continuing guerilla warfare in the Philippines, the first US counter-insurgency fought in distant lands. Among a range of new military, political, and juridical practices, American counter-insurgency efforts included social and spatial strategies which, while appealing chiefly to local class interests, were also geared toward an escalating, scalar expansion of democracy in the Philippines, and thus, it was believed, toward the stabilization of peace out of precisely the conditions of war.

In their creative reading of Machiavelli, Hardt and Negri (2000: 162) describe a world wherein power “is organized through the emergence and interplay of counter-powers,” and social conflict provides both the “basis for the stability of power and the logic of the city’s expansion.” This link between the continuous production of conflicts, on one hand, and the appropriation of new territories,

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3 On the continuities between early twentieth century US imperialism in the Philippines and subsequent US extraterritorial practices, see Drinnon (1997); Tyner (2007); Adas (2009).

4 The notion of (colonial) state **formation**, in this sense, refers to the ongoing development of state institutions as an effect of social, political, and economic processes. A useful introduction to the concept can be found in Painter and Jeffrey (2009: 19–43).
on the other, defines the *democratic expansive tendency*, which Hardt and Negri (2000: 164–72), though concerned chiefly with theorizing an emerging form of global capitalist sovereignty, apply explicitly to the historical development of the American, constitutional concept of sovereignty, wherein “sovereignty is defined as radically democratic within an open and continuous process of expansion.” “When it expands,” they argue (2000: 166), this sovereignty “does not annex or destroy the other powers it faces but on the contrary opens itself to them, including them in the network.” And yet, in practice, whether in the American West, post-Civil War American South, or across the Pacific Ocean, this process of inclusion has been marked by contest, negotiation, contingency and compromise, and has been structured profoundly by the mobilization of boundaries, racial categories, and declared exceptions. As the US grappled with its own “democratic expansive tendencies” at the dawn of the twentieth century, its tactics of pacification and counter-insurgency frequently blurred the lines between war and post-war reconstruction.

**War and Pacification**

While foreign military occupations, from Cuba and Puerto Rico to Guam and the Philippines, were among the most dramatic features of the new American inter-oceanic empire following the Spanish-American War, notions of military occupation as a progressive—even emancipatory—political force, were not new concepts in the American experience. Indeed, in the aftermath (and during) the US Civil War, the Union’s military occupation of large parts of the South (1863–1877), set in place, in principle, to protect the rights and physical safety of ex-slaves amidst dramatic social upheaval and regional transformation, helped to create (and to name) the modern idea of reconstruction, as discussed in the introduction to this volume. Arguably, it also helped to establish the ideology of war as a liberating endeavor for the next generation of American soldiers and statesmen. For some contemporaries, the more apt (and critical) comparison for military occupation of the Philippines was the military conquest of Native Americans in the American West, where the institution of property regimes, public education, and other transformative governmental policies had been carried out alongside geographically expansive processes of “internal” colonialist settlement (cf. Salter 1899). For still others, particularly among the small cadre of American colonial officials in Manila, British imperialism provided the best model of colonial occupation and governance to emulate, even as problems of contradiction between empire and democracy, frequently evoked in the harangues of American Anti-
Imperialist League activists, sparked contentious and persistent debates within the US (c.f. Schurz 1899; Twain 1901). In the Philippines, however, while the figures of the soldier and the teacher—at times embodied in the same individual—would play, as in the American South (and to a lesser extent, the West), a pivotal role in defining the nature of military occupation, Americans encountered vastly different social and cultural formations, as well as a ready-made insurgent organization (and incipient state) forged in the recent rebellion against Spain.

In a sense, both Chaffee and Taft were correct in their assessments of war conditions in the Philippines. But neither vision could capture the complexity, and shifting geography, of the war on the ground. The Philippine-American war had broken out shortly after the (December) 1898 Treaty of Paris, wherein Spain’s surrender of the Philippines was formalized in the “sale” of the archipelago to the US for a sum of $20 million, and the first Philippine Republic was, in the international legal view, repudiated. Following a relatively swift conventional victory for the US over Philippine Republican forces, however, the American Army, as one military historian described it (Linn 1989), struggled to occupy the territory its forces moved through so easily in the first stages of the conflict. High levels of exhaustion among American troops, and sickness rates reaching 60% in some units, were among the persistent problems encountered by the Americans (W. Anderson 2006; Linn 1989). The disappearance of visible resistance, and the concomitant rise of guerilla warfare, constituted another.

As the war devolved into a number of smaller, regional scale conflicts, Filipino resistance incorporated a range of tactics designed to drag out the war with the Americans. These included an emphasis on raids and ambushes, efforts to engage in combat only when guerillas possessed clear superiority, and the reliance on small units that could strike and disperse, regrouping later (Linn 1989). Insurgents also relied on sandahatan, or local village militias, to harass American communication and supply lines, and it was the relations between guerillas and village populations that most confounded the US Army. Guerillas frequently circulated between regular army and militia posts, blending into rural communities in towns and villages. Where insurgents exercised power, they taxed villages for material support and sought to intimidate those who would collaborate with the Americans. So deep were the connections between the insurgents and rural village populations in the first years of the war, Linn (1989) points out, that when Americans did begin to make significant advances in the conflict, in both military and political domains, in 1901, they learned that many of the appointed village mayors and presidentes were, in fact, militia leaders. But in March, 1900, even as the second Philippine Commission was appointed, under Taft’s leadership, to usher in new forms of civil government in parts of the Philippines, US Army garrisons across the archipelago—reflected in this map of troop locations (Figure 10.1)—found themselves exposed, in a war of far flung outposts and dangerous patrols, to widespread guerilla resistance. Whether or not the guerillas’ influence in the villages constituted terrorism, as Taft would describe it, it was clear that the
Figure 10.1 US War Department, “Location of Troops in the Philippine Islands, March 31, 1900.” The southern part of the archipelago is inset in the upper right of the map. Courtesy, Library of Congress
civilian population had been caught in the middle of the conflict, and they were to be squeezed from both sides.

In December 1900, following McKinley’s re-election—widely perceived as a blow to the Philippine resistance, which had in some ways pinned its hopes on a popular electoral rejection of the Republican Party’s imperialist foreign policy—the US Army adopted a more aggressive counter-insurgency strategy. In fact, it instituted elements from the 1863 code of warfare, known as General Order 100 or the Lieber Code (Lieber 1863), developed to govern the Union Army’s relations to civilians and guerillas during the US Civil War, as the era of Reconstruction emerged in geographically piecemeal fashion amidst the dynamics of war, liberation, and occupation (Foner 2005). While the “new” code in the Philippines stressed the Army’s obligation to protect civilians who accepted American authority, it also justified punishing those who did not, even those who, by Taft’s accounting, had been terrorized into providing material support for insurgents. The Army’s project of pacification was thus built around the carrot and the stick. On one hand, it would accelerate the establishment of municipal governments, local police forces, and schools; it would build and improve roads, bridges, and trails; and it would institute a host of aggressive (though at times oppressive and controversial) sanitary measures designed to improve the public health (see W. Anderson 2006); on the other hand, as it continued to prosecute the war, the Army would destroy crops and, in some parts of the archipelago, relocate civilians to concentration zones and camps in the effort to cut off insurgents from their means of material support (see Linn 1989; Sibley 2007). The conditions engendered by the counter-insurgency, not surprisingly, were ideal for producing disease and famine, particularly in a country which had already experienced severe crises of malnutrition during the 1896–1898 rebellion against Spain (Ileto 1998). Filipino historians have estimated that more than 500,000 civilians would die under such conditions between 1899 and 1902 in Luzon and the Visayan Islands, in addition to another 100,000 deaths in Mindanao.6

The brutality of the war, including Americans’ use of torture and summary execution, has been well documented (see Welch 1974; Smith 1986; Kramer 2008). Pouring over news reports of official body counts, the writer and anti-imperialist Mark Twain (1901), aghast, found that only the so-called “mercy” of “the long spoon”—the bayoneting of wounded enemy soldiers after victorious battles—could explain the high ratio of Filipino soldiers killed-to-wounded (at nearly five-to-one over a ten-month period); he found support for the thesis in

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6 Abinales and Amoroso (2005) base these estimates, which include the effects of the devastating cholera epidemic of 1902, on the findings of the Philippine–American War Centennial Initiative. Other historians, noting the persistence of cholera epidemics before and after the war, place the casualty numbers far lower (see Gates 1984). That the statistics—perhaps ultimately unknowable—remain controversial should not obscure the tremendous scale of suffering in the Philippines brought on by the war and war conditions.
a young soldier’s published letter to his mother. The reconstruction of the Philippines as an American colonial (or “insular”) territory, clearly, cannot be viewed separately from this history of violence, and yet the integration of war and “post-war” geographies in the archipelago is less well known. This process of integration remains nonetheless vital for understanding the operation—and transformation—of American power in the Philippines.

The relations between institutions of war and peace were by no means those of simple opposition between military and civic regimes; indeed, the two were complexly interwoven across multiple social and geographical sites. As the American counter-insurgency began to register significant gains, such as the surrender of some 20,000 hungry guerillas in the Ilocos province in the first months of 1901, the Army made use of its own legal apparatus to offer the Filipinos object lessons of a different sort than Taft was to advocate. Army courts and commissions were utilized extensively in areas under martial law, often trying, convicting, and meting out punishments (including numerous executions) with little or no evidence (Linn 1989). The Army provost courts were also utilized as a tactic for disrupting the insurgents’ civilian infrastructure. By arresting and threatening to convict even those civilians who had merely paid the guerillas’ taxes—arguably the legitimate taxes of the Philippine Republic—Filipinos could be leveraged to inform on militia and guerrilla leaders. Military courts, as part of the work of pacification more generally, were thus closely coordinated with military strategy.

This counter-insurgency strategy was largely effective in building a post-conflict society even as the conflict itself persisted. Municipal governments were rapidly established during the spring of 1901, particularly after the March 1901 capture of General Emilio Aguinaldo, erstwhile leader of the Philippine Republic. After the 4th of July formal transfer of sovereignty from the Army to the Philippine Commission, noted above, with Taft installed in the hybrid executive position of Governor-General except in areas of ongoing and persistent conflict (where martial law remained in effect under Chaffee, the newly appointed US military commander), the American-style democratization of the Philippines was rapidly accelerated. Civil governments were regularly established within just one month of provinces being declared formally pacified, providing new resources and rewards for Filipinos within the machinery of the American colonial state. For some, jobs, training, and the power of arms in the paramilitary Native Scouts and Philippine Constabulary provided their own rewards. For others, notably members of the wealthy ilustrado class, the offices of local democracy would provide the key to a lasting peace dividend. As Abinales and Amoroso (2005: 125) have argued, “This peculiar consolidation of colonial rule through ‘democratic means’ hastened the conversion of Filipino elites to the American side. Once they had judged the war a lost cause, they looked for a way to come out of it with their wealth and status.

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7 Based on the reports of General Arthur MacArthur, Twain (1901) also noted that Filipino losses during this period of 1900 were 3,447 killed, 694 wounded; during the same period, Americans suffered 268 soldiers killed, 750 wounded.
intact. One clear way was to take up the American offer to help govern.” That governance, however, would entail its own peculiar institutional geography.

Geographies of Colonial State Formation

On October 17, 1901, Governor Taft responded to General Chaffee’s propositions about the conditions of war in the Philippines, and to his claim, in connection with the incarcerated Brooks and Finnick, as to the impracticality of providing habeas corpus protections anywhere in the archipelago, not by fiat but by compromise. Writing on behalf of the Philippine Commission, Taft proposed, first, that Brooks be produced in court for the scheduled hearing as to the legality of his detention, but second, that Finnick be remanded to prison under his existing sentence without further inquiry. More significantly, the Commission would, henceforth, “forbid the issuing of a writ of habeas corpus against a military officer or soldier for the release of a prisoner in his custody in the provinces of Batangas, La Laguna, Tayabas, Samar, Cebu and Bohol and in all unorganized provinces” (Taft to Chaffee 1901b; see Figure 10.2). While this provision simply echoed Taft’s earlier argument about the geography of rights in pacified versus not-yet-pacified spaces, the Commission would amend the code further, he pledged, to allow for exceptions to the writ of habeas corpus in all other provinces if the Commanding General—or any military officer in command of a department or district—would certify that the prisoner was being held either as a prisoner of war or as a member of the Army or civilian employee (camp follower) of the Army subject to its regulations (Taft to Chaffee 1901b). Taft thus held his ground on the provision of habeas corpus in the pacified provinces, but in straddling the apparent chasms between empire and democracy, and between war and post-war, he did so in a way that would be palatable for Chaffee, with the Army’s powers of exception built-in. Chaffee agreed to the terms the next day (Chaffee to Taft 1901b).

The timing of this high-level head butting, which lead to the articulation of Taft’s notion of concurrent jurisdictions between civil and military regimes in the Philippines, deserves some additional consideration. On September 28, 1901, less than a week before Chaffee had argued that the extension of habeas corpus would effectively “arm the enemies” of the US and “inspire them with hope” (Chaffee to Taft 1901a), the Army had suffered its most costly attack in the war to date on the island of Samar, the so-called Balangiga Massacre. The surprise attack at Balangiga, a response to stringent “enforcement” of General Order 100 imposed on Samar (which had included the relocation of civilian populations and destruction of crops and livestock), killed 48 American soldiers from a company of 76, wounding most of the others. The Americans responded swiftly with a campaign of unparalleled brutality in Samar and southern Luzon in the Fall and Winter of 1901–1902, razing Balangiga to the ground, and subsequently many other villages as well, in a scorched earth campaign that would make Samar—and the Philippine-American War more broadly—virtually synonymous with war
atrocity in American public memory, particularly after controversial US Senate (and court martial) hearings in 1902. Small wonder, then, that Taft found it prudent to clarify the distinctiveness of the civil public sphere under his administration at this historical moment—the onset of the Samar campaign—whatever the Army’s powers of exception. The war in Samar also made conditions of overcrowded, re-located populations, poor sanitation, and food shortages even more acute, setting the stage locally for the devastating cholera epidemic of 1902, in which, throughout the archipelago, an estimated 137,000 Filipinos would perish. Although sporadic resistance to American rule would continue, particularly in Muslim Mindanao, for more than a decade, the cholera epidemic in some respects signaled the end of the fight for the Philippine Republic, and in particular, the end of significant ilustrado participation in that struggle, for “once it became clear to elites that the Americans had gained the upper hand in their battle with Filipino revolutionary forces, they readily switched sides to preserve and expand their local power” (Abinales 2003:

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8 Abinales and Amoroso (2005) again base these estimates on the findings of the Philippine–American War Centennial Initiative, while another source (Sibley 2007) places the death toll from the epidemic closer to 200,000.
The collaboration, as Abinales puts it, was decisive, politically as well as militarily. Even as several regionally-organized insurgencies persisted, they occurred alongside an accelerated process of state formation under the authority of the Philippine Commission, and the “self supporting Philippine State” in Manila, as the Americans in charge would proudly cast their endeavor, was at last able to embark upon the extensive, scalar state building enterprise that McKinley—and Taft—had envisaged. By 1903, with the assistance of Filipino caciques, who would use the expansion of local municipal governments and democratic elections as a means of entrenching themselves in power institutionally, the Americans had established 1,035 municipal governments and 31 provincial governments (B. Anderson 1998; Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

The American colonial state in the Philippines thus emerged with a bifurcated administrative geography: a civilian regime in the pacified provinces, governing primarily the lowland populations (categorized as “Christianized” or “civilized”); and a military regime in the “unpacified” regions, many of which had never been fully subjected to Spanish colonial governance. These latter “Special Provinces”—the designation was adopted from the late Spanish period—consisted of the Moro Province, focused on the Muslim population of Mindanao island and the Sulu archipelago, which remained under Army rule, and the Cordillera (later, Mountain) Province in northern Luzon island, populated chiefly by animists, which was placed under the new Philippine Interior Department, under the direction of its authoritarian Secretary (and Philippine Commissioner) Dean C. Worcester (with an important paramilitary and policing role for the American-officered Philippine Constabulary). Considering that the Special Provinces constituted roughly 40% of land area in the archipelago, were rich in resources, and inhabited by a relatively sparse population of roughly 800,000 “Mohamadans,” whom the Americans did not classify as Filipinos, and 600,000–700,000 “wild peoples,” compared to 6-to-7 million “civilized” Filipinos under the civil regime, it is hardly surprising that the Special Provinces were seen by some American colonials as an ideal site for the marriage of Philippine resources with American capital and know-how. Colonial officials in the Army, Constabulary, and Interior Departments would jealously guard the Special Provinces from what they saw as encroachments from the civil regime, especially after the rise of the Nacionalista Party and the national Philippine Assembly, created to serve as an elected “lower house” to the American-dominated Philippine Commission, as political forces in 1907. By 1908, some of these American colonials, reacting to the souring of relations with elite Filipinos in Manila, openly argued for annexation of the Special Provinces in the event of Philippine independence (Abinales and Amoroso 2005; Sullivan 1991).

In this dual model of colonial state formation, we can discern multiple social and geographical sites wherein the US experimented, in this critical early twentieth century global engagement, with different models of both democracy
and imperialism. But while the US may have inherited some designations—and institutional geographies—from its Spanish predecessors, along with a range of governmental and geographical knowledges, in other respects the US departed significantly from the traditions of Spanish rule, particularly in expanding Filipino participation in democratic governance and civil service, and in building a universal system of public education in the metropolitan language (Abinales and Amoroso 2005; B. Anderson 1998). In part, this was a matter of ideological necessity; performing the role of liberators against Spanish despotism had been a powerful rhetoric within the US, before, during, and after the inter-oceanic battles of the Spanish-American War. During the first decade of the new century, in the face of sharp criticism from American anti-imperialists (in addition to Filipino nationalists) over whether a constitutional democracy could behave like an empire in its foreign policy, American exceptionalism required that the colonial state must be seen as a progressive one, characterized by political and cultural tutelage, educational reform, and enlightened governance that included a significant role for state scientific knowledge production. While it is not possible to offer a full accounting of these developments here, it is nonetheless useful to highlight something of the range of political institutions and innovations during this period of dual state formation to shed light on the interplay—and hybridity—of empire and democracy in this context.

The expansion of democracy under the civil regime in the Philippines was realized in a number of different forms. These developments can be usefully understood by reading them through Negri’s theorization of the movement from constituent to constituted power, as a mystification or subversion of actual democratic tendencies through mechanisms of political representation and state sovereignty (Negri 1999; see also Frank 2000). For Negri, this transition is characterized by the capture of the creative, disruptive, and revolutionary qualities of constituent power, akin to Spinoza’s potenza, into the static, conservative or reactionary forms of constituted power, or potere. Although the relations between these two forms of power never comprise a fixed and finite process—the seeds of each are internal to the other—the institutionalization of power that Negri describes as constituted power is particularly visible in the instruments of the modern democratic state, even as these dynamic and conservative forms of power continually shape each other in wave after historical wave. And yet, the “people’s

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9 These experiments, however, were not limited to state authorship. On Rockefeller Foundation sponsored public health programs in the Philippines, see W. Anderson (2006). Neil Smith (2006, personal communication; see also Smith 2003) has reminded me that, while the Philippines remains the largest American venture in formal colonialism, it was also a critical site for experimentation in informal (economic) imperialism.

10 See, for example, Adas (1998); Resurrección (1999). As Paul Kramer (2006: 5) argues, questions of race, and of the fitness of Filipinos for self-government, were widely seen in the US as definitive issues in the debate over the American position as a colonial power, and the colonial state in Manila was thus organized precisely “around new forms of knowledge-production, including the generation of novel racial formations.”
Negri (1999: 148–9) insists, always “lives before its formalization.” While Negri builds his concepts chiefly through western examples—notably, he expounds at length (1999: 141–89) on the American Constitution (and Federalist debates) as a means of understanding the limits and filters imposed on popular sovereignty—his general concepts are equally useful for understanding colonial and post-colonial settings, albeit under potentially quite different conditions of revolution and reaction. In the Philippines, this perspective helps to clarify not only the mechanisms of American constitutional power, which provided both model and motivation for the colonial state, but also how the desires of the ilustrado class, which had animated the recent revolt against Spain and inspired a revolutionary archipelagic Filipino nationalism, could be co-opted when presented with real opportunities under the American civil regime.

While the US would offer possibilities for greater individual and class mobility than the Spanish, particularly in government and civil service, the filters of constituted power were nonetheless clearly reflected in the initial 1901 civil code enacted by the Philippine Commission for municipal and provincial elections. To vote, Filipinos would have to be male, aged over 23, and to have resided in a given municipality for at least six months. They were also required to belong to one of three additional categories: (1) individuals who could speak, read, and write Spanish or English; (2) individuals who owned real property worth a specified value; (3) individuals who held local government positions prior to 1899 (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Given the paucity of educational training offered by the Spanish, the first qualification was, initially, scarcely less restricted by class than the second, though this would change as the Americans expanded their own public education system. By this time, however, as Benedict Anderson (1998) observes, local Filipino political bosses, or caciques, had taken advantage of the proliferation of local and provincial elective offices, in the absence of autocratic territorial control or a geographically widespread colonial bureaucracy, to entrench themselves in power as a decentralized oligarchy that would persist into the Commonwealth and Post-Colonial periods. These political developments were abetted by American colonial land policies—including those organized around the breakup of the Spanish Friar estates—which resulted in the agglomeration of land under wealthy Filipinos.

Public education, as noted, was one area of stark difference between the American and Spanish colonial models in the presumed responsibilities of the state, and in the accretion of those duties in new institutions. For the Americans, it was a task that, like other object lessons of empire and democracy, was best initiated while the “peculiar” war, as Taft had described it, was ongoing. In August 1901, on the precipice of the most violent phase of the war, the first boatload of American teachers had arrived in Manila Bay to be dispersed into the pacified provinces, in some cases replacing soldiers who had constituted the first wave in the mass literacy campaigns that were considered critical to the creation of a democratic polity in the Philippines (see Figure 10.3). Filipinos, for their part,
embraced the opportunity; more than 200,000 students were enrolled in primary school by the end of 1902, with another 20,000 students enrolled in secondary school. Meanwhile, difficulties in recruiting American educators overseas opened opportunities for Filipino teachers, who by this time filled three-quarters of the 4,000 positions (Abinales and Amoroso 2005).

Additional opportunities for Filipino advancement were to be found in the civil service. For as Anderson (1998: 202) observes, “unlike all the other modern colonial regimes in twentieth century Southeast Asia, which operated through huge, autocratic, white-run bureaucracies, the American authorities in Manila, once assured of the mestizos’ self-interested loyalty to the motherland, created only a minimal civil service and quickly turned over most of its component positions to the natives.” Already in 1903 Filipinos occupied nearly half of 5,500 positions civil administration positions, later surpassing 90% after the Taft Regime network of senior American bureaucrats, for whom supposed Filipino incompetence (and racial inadequacy) remained a powerful colonial raison d’être, at last faded from power in the Philippines after the American Presidential election of 1912, which ushered in a new, reformist political regime. But it was during the Taft Regime

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12 “By the end of the ‘Filipinizing’ Governor-Generalship of Francis Harrison [1921],” Anderson (1998: 202) continues, “the proportion had risen to 90% (out of a mere
era that empire and democracy initially came to accommodate each other in the Philippines, as reflected in what Abinales (2003) has described as two parallel processes of institutional development.

The notion of dual state building processes need not imply, however, the existence of two separate American colonial states in the Philippines; rather, this duality can be grasped complexly, or dialectically, in terms of “oppositions grasped in their relations, but also each for itself” (Lefebvre 2004: 11). Thus, while the two regimes, civil and military, were born from the cheek-by-jowl processes of pacification, guerilla warfare, and democratization, their differing practices of governance in the Regular and Special Provinces were also carried out amidst geographically overlapping spheres of authority. The Bureaus of Health, Forestry, Lands, Weather, and Science (including a range of government laboratories as well as Divisions of Mines, Ethnology, Fisheries, etc.), for example, all resided institutionally within the Interior Department (under the direction of Philippine Commissioner Worcester), and yet many of these organizations, which operated across the archipelago, were particularly active in the Special Provinces, where their work with the “non-Christians,” and the less populated landscapes in which they dwelled, provided practical and ideological focal points for numerous government programs, and sites for progressive political experimentation (c.f. Worcester 1908; 1910; 1912; see Adas 1998; Resurrección 1999; Sullivan 1991).

In such institutions, Taft Regime colonials developed a progressive response to the American anti-imperialist critique in ways that simultaneously recovered and elided democratic impulses. Centrally organized projects such as road- and trail-building under the Bureau of Commerce—which conscripted the labor of “non-Christians” as payment for annual taxes—were similarly enabled in ways that would not have been possible under patronage driven local regimes elsewhere in the archipelago. Trail construction in particular was deemed to have a profound “civilizing influence” (Worcester, no date). As early as 1903, the insular (colonial) government itself, at great public expense and over withering public criticisms, resolved to head for Baguio—named the summer capital of the Philippines—in the highlands of the Cordillera (within the Special Provinces) for four months per year to legislate during its summer session, where the cooler climes provided particular relief to American colonials, away from the heat, humidity, and increasingly contentious oppositional politics of Manila. So, while the Regular and Special provinces were held to be institutionally distinct, in practice the spaces overlapped and blended into one another in many ways.

Throughout the archipelago, the achievements of the Army, along with the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary, came to be measured in the drawing down of the American troop presence. From a peak of 108,800 troops, the US reduced

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14,000 jobs) and by the mid-1930s, the Americans held only 1% of civilian bureaucratic posts, most of them in the educational field.”

13 This manuscript (~1910) was likely the basis of numerous lectures by Secretary Worcester in the Philippines and/or North America.
its forces to 72,000 soldiers by the middle of the decade, and to a mere 13,000 by 1910 (Abinales and Amoroso 2005). Even as Army, Constabulary, and Interior Department leaders remained staunch opponents of the political “encroachment” of lowland (Christian) Filipinos, and the trappings of democracy, into the Special Provinces, their successes in quashing and containing armed resistance, and in turning counter-insurgency efforts into a matters of more or less normal imperial “policing,” perhaps made the incorporation of the Special Provinces into the civil state authority inevitable. While Army governance in Mindanao and Sulu was built around collaboration with local Moro elites (though not without further bloodshed and controversy), the Constabulary was most successful in northern Luzon where it asserted itself as the key adjudicator of local conflicts and rivalries (Jenista 1987; Finin 2005). Such tactics did not solve once and for all the problem of popular insurgency for the state in the Philippines, particularly in rural areas, which would be produced and reproduced throughout the century by conditions of poverty and landlessness, but they did help to create an essentially stable political dynamic at regional as well as national scales as the dual state building processes were collapsed, in 1913, into a single process of state formation under the civil administration in Manila.

**Reflections on Colonial Warfare, US Imperialism and Democracy**

Responding vigorously to the rapid emergence of the US inter-oceanic empire, the fledgling American Anti-Imperialist League had argued, in a widely circulated 1899 platform statement, that “governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,” and thus, with reference to the Philippines, that “subjugation of any people is ‘criminal aggression’ and open disloyalty to the distinctive principles of our government.” Democracy and imperialism, the group argued, were fundamentally incompatible, whether inside or beyond national boundaries. “We protest against extension of American sovereignty by Spanish methods. … The United States have always protested against the doctrine of international law which permits the subjugation of the weak by the strong. A self-governing state cannot accept sovereignty over an unwilling people” (in Schurz 1899).

But were empire and democracy really so incompatible? The history—and geography—of the Philippine-American War, and of the simultaneous processes of war, pacification, and American colonial state formation in the Philippines, suggest otherwise. Understanding the intertwined expansion of American imperialism and democracy as, in crucial ways, a process of militarized power, offers a useful corrective to the well-intentioned exceptionalism of the anti-imperialists. In this vein, geographer Jean Gottmann’s classic (1971) distinction between *continental* and *colonial* warfare, though based on the historical geography of French military campaigns in North Africa, provides a helpful means of conceptualizing the military objectives and strategies of imperialist war (and counter-insurgency) across multiple contexts. For Gottmann, colonial warfare differed from *continental*
warfare in several fundamental ways. Most obviously, colonial wars were carried out in “remote countries” over large stretches of relatively unknown territory. They were characterized by enemy forces that were superior in quantity as well as in knowledge of the local geography, but inferior in their material organization and means of supply. “Different in means,” Gottmann (1971: 234–5) stressed, “colonial warfare is also different in goal,” for:

It aims not at the destruction of the enemy but at the organization of the conquered peoples and territory under a particular control. As far as possible it must avoid destruction during the campaign; first, in order to preserve the productive potential of the theater of operations and thus to economize the supplies coming from more distant initial bases; but more important, because the conquered territory is to be integrated immediately after conquest into the ‘imperial’ whole, politically as well as economically. … The problem is not so much ‘to defeat the enemy in the most decisive manner’ as to subordinate him at the lowest cost and in a way to guarantee permanent pacification.

Always already coupled with the problems of occupation and political organization, the imperatives of colonial warfare, Gottmann understood, were inseparable from the work of practical administration. For the French School of colonial warfare in North Africa, the interrelations among processes of war, pacification, and administration reflected and reproduced an imperial geography; they were part of the ensemble of means by which a conqueror built up an empire through absorption of conquered peoples and territories.14

Our understandings of wartime and “post-war” reconstruction efforts benefit from attention to Gottmann’s distinction, even if, in the US conquest of the Philippines, the application of the colonial problematic of avoiding destruction “as far as possible” can be called into question, at least when it came to minimizing the devastating human consequences of counter-insurgency practices. But what the young Gottmann does not seem to consider, does not anticipate as a paradigmatic imperial problem, is the extent to which these relations of colonial warfare and administration were bound up in the problem of transplanting democracy to conquered lands. As the American “democratic expansive tendency” in the Philippines suggests, models of democracy provided—and perhaps, continue to provide—a unique tool for modern empires, at once an alternative to war and a means of entrenching collaborative interests in distributions of power, and thus a means of displacing conflict from anti-colonial to more explicitly class-based and regional struggles.

On the 4th of July, 1902, as the American counter-insurgency, and expansion of civil government, continued to gain traction around the archipelago, and as

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14 Writing in 1943 from a slightly chauvinistic French perspective, Gottmann had not developed the internationalist voice that would characterize his later political geographical writing. See Muscará (2005).
effects of the cholera epidemic steeped Filipinos in untold misery, President Theodore Roosevelt (1902) saw fit to proclaim that the “ Philippine Insurrection” was over, and to declare a general amnesty and pardon for insurgents. It was, in hindsight, something of a “Mission Accomplished” moment, for the claim that “peace has been established in all parts of the archipelago except in the country inhabited by the Moro tribes,” turned out to be premature, even with the rather significant caveat. But while scattered, peasant-based guerilla resistance to US rule did not subside until after 1906, and even then continued to flare periodically, no longer, given the successes of American-officered Philippine troops as well as the diffusion of American-style democracy, did such forces place American colonial sovereignty seriously in question. Along with democracy, armed resistance had been normalized.

If the American colonial project in the Philippines offered (despite the presumed singularity of the formal colonial endeavor) a model of US imperial engagement with the world, and with the insular worlds of the tropics in particular, it was clearly not one that could be read in terms of discrete stages of conflict and reconstruction. It was, rather, a narrative of the simultaneity of counter-insurgency with processes of democracy-building and state formation, and the sense that the ongoing conditions of banal insurgency were to be tolerated as perhaps unavoidable occurrences of empire alongside—and framed in opposition to—the extension of democratic rights and individual liberties. And this narrative continues to frame American geopolitics today in settings such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The object lessons of democracy, as they were conceived in Washington and Manila, contributed in this sense to the justification of banal forms of imperial warfare, to the emergence of novel powers and counter-powers, and to the creation of new, mutually constitutive geographies of war and peace.

References


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Chapter 11
Mapping Intelligence: American Geographers and the Office of Strategic Services and GHQ/SCAP (Tokyo)

Trevor Barnes and Jeremy Crampton

Introduction

On July 13, 2010, a press release announced that the GIS company ESRI and the National Geospatial–Intelligence Agency (NGA) had signed a “strategic agreement.” ESRI would provide support for NGA’s goals of geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT.\(^1\) The release garnered little attention, which was hardly surprising. ESRI CEO Jack Dangermond noted in the release that his company had supported the NGA for over two decades. Furthermore, his company was just one of many. The connections between mapping (and now GIS and geospatial data) and the military are now longstanding, constituting an established component within the tight nexus that exists among geography, the state and the armed forces.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine one part of that nexus: the role of geographers and cartographers in shaping, producing and disseminating national intelligence. After all, much intelligence is implicitly geographical if not explicitly so. Inter alia intelligence takes the form of maps, reports of surface terrain, knowledge of transport infrastructure, and descriptions of regional complexes.

But while much intelligence involves geography, few geographers were systematically employed in that field until the twentieth century. At least in the United States, the first attempt to harness the skills of geographers in gathering and interpreting intelligence was the Inquiry, a study group established in September 1917 by President Woodrow Wilson to provide strategic information to government during World War One, and at the peace negotiations that followed. Employing at its peak 150 researchers across a range of disciplines, significantly it was based at the American Geographical Society in New York City. The geographer Isaiah Bowman was a key member, accompanying President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (Crampton 2006, Smith 2003).

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\(^1\) NGA defines GEOINT as “the intelligence derived from the exploration of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth.”
During the Second World War and its aftermath American geographers were even more important and numerous within military intelligence. We focus in this chapter on one arm of US intelligence during World War II in which geographers played a significant role: the office of the Coordinator of Intelligence (COI) that in 1942 was re-named the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The COI/OSS, as the precursor of the CIA, was the crucible in which modern American secret intelligence was born, producing significant geographical consequences. Moreover, once the COI/OSS was dissolved in 1945, geographers who were former members became involved in post-war reconstruction and development, a central theme of both this collection and this chapter. The larger point is that intelligence is important in making both war and peace, in destroying and renewing. While this may seem paradoxical, it is hardly surprising given that in both war-making and peace-making the military is central. Crucial to the operations of the military is always knowledge, that is, intelligence. An army marches on information as much as on its stomach.

One immediate question is the meaning of intelligence. For many it connotes covert operations and spying. But this is only a small, sensationalized part. We define intelligence as information explicitly collected and analyzed with a view to forming or guiding tactical and strategic political interests, doctrine or policy, especially those of government. In that task much useful information derives from open sources. It is the purpose to which the interpretation of that information is directed that is confidential not the information itself. An example discussed below is the regional reports produced at OSS for the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS). They were classified as CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET at the time, but they were based mostly on open source information, and read like any good regional monograph. Another example was “intelligence cartography,” or maps of strategic zones which “resulted in the development of a type of cartography hitherto essentially unknown in the government” (National Research Council 1946: 198). But even these maps rested upon information generally available. It was the way in which they were drawn, emphasizing a particular theme, which made them pieces of intelligence.

The consequence was that when COI/OSS was first established in July 1941, its first task was to gather publicly available sources of information on which intelligence interpretations could be based. In July 1942, for example, the geographer Kirk Stone was sent to riffle through the holdings of Pan Am Airways in San Francisco and Seattle, bringing back Pacific airline route manuals, 625 maps, pictures of ‘Pacific stations,’ and meteorological data.2

The purpose of our chapter is to examine the involvement of American geographers in the provision of US intelligence during and immediately following World War Two. It is concerned with documenting geographical practices of intelligence both in wartime and in the post-war reconstructions in Europe and

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2 Kirk H. Stone to William J. Donovan, July 1 1942, RG 226 Entry 1 Box 7, Folder 14, NARA.
the Far East that followed. We show how the wartime experience of the OSS shaped not only the personal biographies of the men involved, but also how it shifted geography onto a more scientific footing although sometimes at the cost of eradicating its political commitments.

We focus on a few individual American geographers involved in intelligence both during and after the War, drawing upon national and personal archives to reconstruct their activities. We begin with the formation of the COI/OSS, and the role within it of perhaps the most well-known American geographer at the time, Richard Hartshorne (1899–1992). He went to Washington DC as the founding Chief of COI’s Geographical Division in September 1941. Within a month he secured the services of Arthur Robinson, a graduate student in cartography at Ohio State University. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, COI expanded rapidly, with its Map Division employing more geographers than any other unit within the organization (more than 30). Arthur Robinson was its Chief. We discuss the contribution of the Map Division, and Robinson’s work in particular, to the generation of geographical intelligence both during the War, and in its closing stages in Europe when plans were drawn up for regional reconstruction. We focus on one of them, the Morgenthau Plan.

Robinson was the second person Hartshorne hired at COI. The first was Edward Ackerman, an instructor at Harvard, and specialist in environment and resources. The last section of the chapter is about Ackerman. At COI Ackerman first worked in the Geography Section, and after the organizational restructuring, the Europe-Africa Division. In 1943 he was recalled to Harvard as an Assistant Professor to teach military officers the regional geography of Japan in the School of Overseas Administration. With the American occupation of Japan from September 1945, he was then recruited by GHQ/SCAP (Tokyo). Headed by General MacArthur, GHQ/SCAP was at least for the first three years the government of Japan. Ackerman was charged with designing environmental and resource policies for the country in the post-war period. His geographical intelligence literally left its mark on Japan’s recovering landscape.

The Coordinator of Information/Office of Strategic Services (1941–45)

Never before and probably never since has such a unique group of scholars been assembled—historians, economists, political scientists, geographers, cartographers, and others, many of them leaders in their fields. (Wilson 1994: 72)

With its acronyms, codenames and spying activities—“the Farm,” Operation TORCH, Agent 109, suicide pills, the “Joan-Eleanor” device, black propaganda, psyops, overseas outposts in far-flung corners of the world, and special operations behind enemy lines—the enormous literature on COI/OSS belies the organization’s mere four-year period of official existence (1941–45).
COI/OSS began because of frustrations with interwar US intelligence. American intelligence operations during that period were scattered, with no clear chain of command, and subject often to vicious internecine struggles over jurisdiction. Robert Murphy, a senior US diplomat at the time, called US intelligence “primitive and inadequate. It was timid and parochial.” In response, and pushed by the rise of fascism and hostilities in Europe, and an expanding Japanese Empire in the Far East, in July 1941 President Roosevelt created a civilian agency attached to the White House, the Coordinator of Information (COI), directed to centralize intelligence. COI reported directly to the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with its founding charter “to collect and analyze all information and data which may bear upon national security” (quoted in Troy 1981: 423). Chief of COI was General William Donovan, a decorated World War I infantry battalion commander, and friend to both Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill (Ford 1970; Troy 1981). After Pearl Harbor, COI expanded dramatically, its staff growing from 2,000 in 1942 to over 9,000 in 1945. Even more importantly for our purposes, COI/OSS was the single most important wartime institution employing American geographers, at its height 129 of them (Harris 1997).

Donovan quickly established within COI/OSS, the Research and Analysis (R&A) Branch, becoming for some at least the organization’s “heart and soul” (Winks 1987: 114). Here the intellectual heavy lifting of intelligence was carried out, in which geographers were prominent. For Donovan the rationale for R&A was clear:

We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our government, documents and memoranda concerning the military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with knowledge both of the related languages and technique would yield valuable and often decisive results.

Chief of R&A was the Harvard Professor of European history, William L. Langer. Employing at its height more than 900 people, R&A was based in Washington DC. Additionally, there were “R&A outposts” dotted across the globe, and discussed in more detail below.

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4 The July 11 Executive Order that created COI, and the “Military Order of June 13, 1942” that transformed the COI into the OSS are reprinted as appendices in Troy (1981).
5 COI consisted of five separate branches, one of which was R&A. The other four were Secret Intelligence, Secret Operations, Morale Operations, and X2 (counter-intelligence).
6 R&A was established on July 31st 1941, and became operational on August 27. The Donovan quote is from Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art02.htm.
Perhaps the most striking feature of R&A was its extraordinarily talented staff, responsible for the collection and analysis of data and information in each of the wartime theatres of conflict. Initially, that staff came primarily from elite US East Coast universities, but as operations expanded, their origins were more diffuse, including by 1943 German émigré scholars.

All the social sciences were represented at R&A although economists, historians, and geographers were the most numerous. There were three main groups of academics. First, there were the established American professors like Langer, and Hartshorne. Hartshorne was called to Washington in early September 1941 to be Chief of the Geography Division. He was suggested by the geographer Preston James at a meeting in July 1941 convened by Donovan at Harvard to discuss R&A’s organization and personnel. James was there because of his commission in the Military Intelligence Reserve in 1923. James’s choice of Hartshorne was understandable. Hartshorne’s 1939 *The Nature of Geography* made him one of America’s most well-known geographers. He was also fluent in German, having spent two sabbaticals in German-speaking countries, most recently in Austria where he went to study border issues just after the 1938 Nazi Anschluss (Hartshorne 1979).

Second, there was a group of young faculty, or most often graduate students, who in the post-war period were to re-shape their respective disciplines. Included here were Arthur Schlesinger, Jnr., Walter Rostow, Paul Sweezy, Edward Shils, Sherman Kent, J. Barrington-Moore, Carl Schorske, Gregory Bateson, and Charles Kindelberger. There were two future Nobel-prize winners, seven future Presidents of the American Association of Historians, five future Presidents of the American Economic Association, and three future Presidents of the Association of American Geographers. Young prominent geographers within R&A included Edward Ullman, Kirk Stone, Joe Spencer, Chauncey Harris, and the two we will discuss in detail below, Arthur Robinson and Edward Ackerman.

The final group, and joining R&A only from mid-1943 because of security worries and the drawn-out process of vetting, was a group of European expatriate scholars, most often from Germany, and many from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Leftwing, brilliantly learned, frequently cantankerous, they included Harold Deutsch, Otto Kirchheimer, Herbert Marcuse, and someone we discuss in detail below Franz Neumann (Katz 1987).

Collectively this group through their talents fulfilled the mandate of the OSS, the collection and analysis of all information and data bearing upon national security. As Langer reflected at the end of the war, and pointing to what was to follow:

> Through the R&A Branch the specialized knowledge as well as the training in research of American universities was for the first time made the core of government service. There can be no doubt that we succeeded in pooling much of the best brain power and specialized knowledge of the country as far as the social sciences are concerned. The relationship of this type of government work
to the American universities should be maintained at all costs and the existing contracts should be preserved wherever possible.\(^7\)

By the war’s end, R&A had assembled an enormous amount of textual material—including aerial photographs, drawings, maps and diagrams. It possessed 300,000 captioned photos, 300,000 classified intelligence documents, over 2 million assorted types of maps, 350,000 foreign serial publications, 50,000 books, thousands of biographical files, and through the prodigious efforts of Wilmarth Lewis of the Central Information Divisions, 1 million 3x5 index cards organized by subject, cross-indexed, and containing pictorial material. Of course, this information was not static, but required continual revision.

That updating was essential in order to produce accurate intelligence material for the President and Joint Chiefs, as well as assorted enquiries from military personnel in the field. By the end of the war R&A produced a massive amount of written material and information. There were over 3,000 research studies, 700 reports, and over 8,000 original maps (Smith 1983: 371). More generally, knowledge had been fashioned and used to further American military and political interests. No nation had ever made such systematic use of the social sciences in the gathering and interpretation of military and strategic intelligence. National interests were pursued, as Donovan said, through “good old fashioned intellectual sweat” (quoted by Ford 1970: 148).

The production of these materials followed a rigid and rigorous process, very much adhering to the template of academic publication in scholarly journals. The gatekeeper at R&A was the Projects Committee,\(^8\) of which Hartshorne was Chair from late November, 1942. If R&A was at the heart of OSS, the Projects Committee was at the heart of R&A. It prioritized, set the standards for, and reviewed all individual intelligence reports written by R&A staff. As one of the many memos written by Hartshorne to set out the centrality and authority of the Projects Committee put it:

All requests for studies are referred to the [Projects] Committee and it considers all projects for studies instituted within the Branch. It assigns priorities and designates what division is to be responsible and what other units should cooperate or be consulted in the preparation of the work. Finally, it passes upon [sic] finished reports and controls their distribution.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) William L. Langer to William J. Donovan, Assets of the R&A Branch, 23 August 1945, page 1, RG 226, Box 9, Folder 3, NARA.

\(^8\) The Projects Committee was the executive arm of the Board of Analysts that served as an intermediary between Langer and R&A’s functional intelligence divisions. The Projects Committee was initiated in July 1942, but Hartshorne did not become Chair until November 17 of that year. Projects Committee Minutes of Meetings, 18 November 1942, RG 226, Entry 59, Box 1, NARA.

\(^9\) ‘Functions of Research & Analysis in Strategic Services’, no date, RG226, Box 9, Folder 3, NARA.
The Projects Committee not only controlled the topics that were written about, who wrote about them, and whether they saw the light of day once they were written, but also how they were written. COI/OSS was never to offer normative judgment. It was to stick strictly to the facts, to be scrupulously objective. As Chair of the Projects Committee, Hartshorne was the principal enforcer of objectivity, to safeguard scientific standards of language, truth and logic. In a Guide he laid out those standards:

It is of the utmost importance … [to] strive for the highest degree of objectivity. We should cultivate what might be called a clinical attitude … The most obvious and yet most common crime against objectivity is the use of hortatory and value words and phrases. Generally speaking, “should” and “ought”—not to mention “must” are taboo … Intelligence reports find their merit in terseness and clarity rather than expressive description … Proust, Joyce, or Gertrude Stein would all be equally out of place in R&A.10

Arthur Robinson, the Map Division and COI/OSS

Arthur Robinson (1915–2004) joined COI in October 1941 at 26 earning US$10 a day. By early summer 1942 he was Chief of the Cartography section, and by autumn, the Chief of OSS’s entire Map Division. As he told the story later, he had simply been in the right place at the right time. Only because Hartshorne by chance had stopped in Columbus, Ohio on his way to Washington to start at COI did he meet Robinson.

The Map Division comprised of four sub-sections: Cartography, Map Intelligence (MAPIS), Topographic Models, and Special Photography. It served primarily JANIS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Maps for ground forces were the responsibility of the Army Map Service, AMS, and the ultra-secret or “Bigot” class maps of the Normandy invasion were prepared by a map unit within the Geographical Section, General Staff (British War Office).

Unusually for the time, OSS’s Map Division produced many specialty or thematic maps, performing research as well as map production. For example, it was responsible for the maps used at the four Allied Conferences between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, as well as those for the Civil Affairs Staging Areas (i.e., D-Day invasion practice sites) in California and Shrivenham, UK. Or another example, maps were drawn of resource capabilities of the Axis powers. Robinson’s Division produced maps of German oil production capabilities, and bombing ranges from Dakar (then under control of the Vichy French). Robinson estimated that in total the Cartographic subdivision made 8,200 maps (about 100

10 “Draft of proposed guide to preparation of political reports,” n.d., RG 226, Entry 37, Box 5, Folder 3, pages 7–10, NARA.
a month), had a personnel of 153, and distributed about 5 million map sheets (copies) from a collection of over 1.7 million.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to regular activities the Division also carried out side-projects. These included making the gores (vertical map strips that comprise a globe) for the remarkable 50-inch “president’s globe,” worked on by both Map Intelligence and Cartography with data supplied by Preston E. James. One globe was given to President Roosevelt, and one to Prime Minister Winston Churchill (Robinson 1997).

One of Robinson’s most important cartographic innovations was designing a standardized base map that consolidated military operations across a large area, yet still provided details of smaller areas (Figure 11.1). Prefiguring the zoomable maps of Google Earth or GIS, Robinson (1979: 99) describes the procedure:

One of the larger projects was the compilation, construction, and printing of the OSS Theater Map, a “base map,” scale 1:1,500,000, in reasonable size sheets (approximating those of the International Map of the World) organized so that any number of sheets of any area would fit together when mounted. It was to be used as a wall map in situation rooms on which to post the daily military positions and other strategic data. (Robinson 1979: 99)

Then, as now, one of the main problems with large amounts of data is its integration or interoperability. This was not just important for US or UK datasets, but also for the international Peace Conference. Robinson urged that the Map Division be responsible for the international base maps, devising a system for assessing the reliability and quality of the data used on them. He enabled maps to be standardized into a scientific system capable of continually ingesting data. For example, the OSS undertook aerial photography of undermapped regions in Western and Central Europe in spring 1945 in an operation known as “Casey Jones” resulting in fresh coverage of as much as two million square miles (Cave Brown 1982: 640).

*The Map Division and R&A Outposts*

The Map Division not only operated in Washington DC, but maintained numerous overseas outposts that collected information (termed by participants, “the scramble for maps;” Wilson 1949: 298). Some outposts, such as the mission in Bern Switzerland overseen by Allen Dulles, were spy operations. And R&A Map Division personnel were sometimes assigned to these espionage activities, or were required to assess information gained from the Resistance or the Maquis.

Map Division outposts could also provide important strategic intelligence. For example, Richard Hartshorne wrote to Donovan arguing that the India-Burma

\textsuperscript{11} Memo, Arthur H. Robinson to William L. Langer, 28 September 1945. NARA, RG226, Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 8.
outpost ought to continue after the war to provide “long-run political and economic policy for the protection of the United States interests and security” (Cave Brown 1982: 646). But operations could be risky. In September 1945, J.R. Coolidge from the OSS and Map Division personnel were sent to Saigon to retrieve map intelligence left behind by the retreating Japanese. But while there Coolidge was shot and severely wounded in the neck by the Viet Minh (Vietnamese nationalists led by Ho Chi Minh), and given the distinction of being “the first American casualty in the Vietnam war” (Wilson 1949).13

12 “Proposal for Joint Departmental Production of Comprehensive Base Maps,” February 1944. This Report was submitted to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, by William Donovan, and was the outgrowth of consultation by the Map Division with the Library of Congress geographer Lawrence Martin. RG226, Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 9.

13 Coolidge survived, although he spent the next eight months in hospital on his return to the US. The first death occurred the next day when Peter Dewey, his OSS superior who had just visited Coolidge in hospital was ambushed by Viet Minh. In both cases there
Most outpost activity, however, was much more mundane and involved either collecting maps for Washington or building a local archive to assist field operations. Of the seven main Map Division outposts—London, Bern, Bari, Kandy (Sri Lanka), New Delhi, Kunming and Chung King (China)—London was by far the most important. Established on 1 February 1944, it was the largest (of some 60 staff, half were US personnel) and carried out both map intelligence and cartography. It was the London Map Division office that issued a secret report on its first two months of operations for Donovan. Leonard Wilson, its Chief, divided the Division into two: cartography (mapmaking), and “map information” that dealt with only published maps that were borrowed, copied and catalogued.

Incredible numbers of maps were processed from R&A Map Divisions worldwide and sent to Washington, some 200,000 a month. To do so, the OSS plundered many library collections. For example, the entire map research catalog of the AGS was microfilmed. But still it wasn’t enough. Donovan went on to the radio to make a nationwide appeal for receipt of yet more maps (Wilson 1949: 302). At one point the Map Intelligence Section (MAPIS) was so far behind in cataloguing that there were ¾ million maps waiting for processing. By war’s end the OSS claimed to have the largest map intelligence library in the world. One noteworthy acquisition made towards the end of the war was in Gotha, Germany. It was taken from the map publisher Justus-Perthes, and resulted in nine tons of material being sent to OSS-Washington. T-Force #17554, 4 April 1945 sent the urgent dispatch:

109 directs that contents of the firm Justus–Perthes (at Gotha, Germany), the largest map firm in the world, be obtained by OSS. All necessary steps should be taken to secure the building pending arrival of the map division personnel and guards should be placed over equipment. 109 authorizes Lloyd Black, Robt. Hall, and John Wells be ordered to Gotha immediately for this task. He further instructs that all authorization, transport and assistance be given this team. Materials to be forwarded to Washington without delay.”

is some evidence that the men spoke French to the Vietnamese and were mistaken for them. See the firsthand account by another Indochina OSS agent, Archimedes Patti, (1980).

14 R&A also maintained outposts in Algiers, Cairo, Caserta, Paris, Stockholm, Honolulu, Istanbul, Bucharest, Lisbon, and Athens. Map Division personnel were sometimes deployed there. Memo, Arthur H. Robinson to John R. Randall, 27 February 1945, NARA, RG226, Entry 146, Folder 1251.

15 Memo, Arthur H. Robinson to William L. Langer, 6 July 1945. NARA RG226, Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 8.

16 Memo, Arch Gerlach to Arthur H. Robinson, 7 June 1945. NARA RG 226, Entry 1, Box 6, Folder 8. The OSS library held some 1.3 million map sheets. Part of the citation for Robinson’s Legion of Merit award was the development of a cataloguing system that could adequately keep track of this collection.

17 NARA, RG226, Entry 99, Box 13, Folder 1.
“109” was the codename for the Director of the OSS, William Donovan. He keenly recognized the importance of maps for intelligence.

Reconstructing Germany and Japan

COI/OSS was concerned not only with providing intelligence for day-to-day, field operations but also thinking through larger geographical questions about the world once hostilities ceased. From 1943, it was clear that the Allies would win in both Europe and the Far East. But what to do with a defeated Germany and Japan? How were they to be reconstructed? The OSS directly dealt with these questions, and even after it was dissolved in September 1945, former OSS members, including geographers, continued to contribute.

1. Germany, the Morgenthau Plan, and the OSS

As we now know, post-war Germany was dealt with by dividing it into zones of occupation. Prefiguring the Cold War, the Soviets occupied eastern Germany, and the British, Americans and French occupied various western sectors. Although several official maps were produced, the most remarkable was one drafted by President Roosevelt over his lunchtime. As related by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau:

In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go. (United States Department of State 1972: 369–70)

Partition was only part of a larger, far more controversial plan for the future state of Germany known as the Morgenthau Plan. Developed during 1944 by Morgenthau it remains controversial even today. John Dietrich gives a stark assessment: “the plan was designed to completely destroy the German economy, enslave millions of her citizens, and exterminate as many as 20 million people” (Dietrich 2002: 3). This admittedly revisionist argument nevertheless points to the radical nature of this plan, a version of which was signed at the Quebec OCTAGON Conference by Roosevelt and Churchill in September 1944.

The Morgenthau Plan envisaged a partitioned Germany, de-Nazification, and, perhaps most controversially, stripping Germany of its industry and returning it to an agrarian economy, what the New York Times called a “nation of small farms” (Woolner 1998). Geographically Morgenthau proposed Germany ceding East
Prussia to Poland, and the Saar region to France, with the Ruhr industrial area becoming internationalized, belonging to no one (Figure 11.2)\(^\text{18}\).

**Figure 11.2   The Morgenthau Plan for partition of Germany, 1 September, 1944**

*Source:* (United States Department of State 1972).

Many at R&A were appalled. Within R&A, the analysis of Germany was given over to the Central Europe subdivision, and which was where many of the German émigré intellectuals worked (Katz 1989). They believed the Morgenthau plan would be disastrous. The Chief of the subdivision, Franz Neumann, wrote a paper providing a very different vision of a reconstructed Germany (discussed below).

Although the language of the Morgenthau Plan was watered down for OCTAGON where a reluctant Churchill signed on in return for an extension of the Lend-Lease program, its essential structure remained intact (United States Department of State 1972: 86 ff.). But it was during the OCTAGON summit that the OSS mounted its opposition. In the middle of the Quebec Conference, a lunch meeting was held between Shepard Morgan, scion of the banking family, Chief of the OSS London Division, and Donald McKay, a member of OSS’s influential Board of Analysts. Morgan was surprised to learn how much R&A had done on the disposition of Germany, and was shown a draft copy of Neumann’s paper,

\(^{18}\) The original Plan is on file in the Roosevelt Library, available at http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/t297a01.html.
“Constitutional Revival of Germany.” Morgan left, “anxious to show the paper to [War] Secretary Stimson as a counter blast to the Morgenthau paper.”

The contents of the Neumann draft can be compared with a paper he wrote shortly after the war (Neumann 1948). Neumann’s paper is a subtle geopolitical analysis of the conditions for post-war reconstruction in Germany, as well as a warning. Rather than the punitive measures of the Morgenthau Plan, or simply using a rebuilt Germany to block the threat of an emerging Communist Soviet Union, Neumann argued that only international cooperation and full democracy would prevent Germany becoming a mere territorial pawn in a peacetime tug-of-war between East and West. He argued that Germany was unlikely to become a democracy in the near future primarily due to it being under military government. Lacking self-government, any political bodies subsequently created would remain a “mere sham” (1948: 5).

In the face of bad publicity, the Morgenthau Plan was allowed to fade away. Although territorial partition clearly occurred, Morgenthau’s most controversial proposals were dropped. Local commanders of the Occupation Zones were handed decision-making authority. Nevertheless its effects were lasting, and may have retarded German economic recovery for as much as a decade.

2. Japan, Ackerman, COI/OSS and GHQ/SCAP (Tokyo)

With the combination of study in political and resources geography, [Ackerman] was drawn into the urgent efforts to improve the quality of war-time intelligence and post-war reconstruction. (White 1974: 299)

(i) The making of an intelligence officer  Our second case is the post-war reconstruction of Japan, and involving the very first geographer Hartshorne hired at COI, Edward Ackerman (1911–1973). Growing up an orphan in Idaho, Ackerman was a brilliant schoolboy. From Coeur D’Alene high school he won a scholarship to Harvard in 1930. He was spotted in his first-year by Harold Kemp, an Instructor in the Department of Geology and Geography, and partner of Derwent Whittlesey, professor in human geography in the same Department. Whittlesey became Ackerman’s teacher, mentor, and promoter, supervising Ackerman’s PhD thesis completed in 1939 on the New England fishing industry. It was Whittlesey who also secured for Ackerman an annual Instructor position at Harvard in 1940, and who recommended him to Hartshorne at COI. Hartshorne made him Chief

19 Memo, McKay to Langer, 16 Sept. 1944, NARA, RG226, Entry 1, Box 4 Folder 3 “Office of the Chief, R&A”.

20 Ackerman’s papers are at the American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie, and the basis for this section of the chapter.

21 Ackerman’s parents were first generation Swedish immigrants, but died within a year of each other when Ackerman was ten: the mother died of pneumonia caught from her son, the father from electrocution while working on the railroad.
of the Geographical Reports Section in the Geographical Division in September, 1941.

His responsibilities were “the planning and reviewing of studies made by an increasing [Geographical Division] staff.” Those studies provided intelligence about particular regions within the various theatres of war, ranging from assessments of beaches for possible troop landings to evaluating political and cultural sympathies of native residents. After COI’s 1942 internal restructuring that organized the analysis of intelligence geographically, and its renaming as the OSS, Ackerman was made Chief of the Topographical Intelligence subdivision of the Europe-Africa Division (the biggest and most important of the Divisions headed by Sherman Kent, “the father of intelligence,” and containing those sometimes-contrarian former Frankfurt school members including Neumann). Ackerman was a superb administrator, “reading at lighting pace, … never forgetting anything,” and with an uncanny “ability to secure the right men for his own section, and to maintain their morale at a high level under trying circumstances.” But he was also an outstanding scholar, concerned with re-conceiving the role of geography within the state-military nexus in which it and he were being put to use.

The initial Geographical Reports he supervised, and later those done under him at Topographical Intelligence, became the basis for the Joint Army Navy Intelligence Surveys (JANIS), and later still became the CIA World Factbook. The idea of JANIS was “to make available in one publication … all the necessary detailed information upon which may be based a war plan … in a given area.” As a publication it was first mooted in the summer 1942, and a template drawn up for the volumes. But following criticism that it was insufficiently sensitive to “actual

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23 The move involved tilting R&A away from disciplinary based research to regionally based research organized according to four geographical blocks: Europe-Africa, USSR, Latin America, and the Far East.


28 Memo: War and Navy Department and OSS, July 1 1943, RG 226, Entry 1, Box 1, Folder 2, NARA.
areal descriptions,” it was redrafted, and finally an acceptable “Outline Guide” was agreed in April 1943 (albeit modified further over time).29

The initial board overseeing JANIS, the Joint Intelligence Studies Publishing Board (JISPB), early on had its problems. The first OSS representative on the Board, the geographer Kirk Stone, complained to Hartshorne that “perhaps this Board should be dissolved … before … it unduly wastes money that could go to the production of bullets rather than second-rate intelligence.”30 But things improved once the dyspeptic Stone left, and Ackerman’s good OSS friend (and another geographer) Edward Ullman replaced him. Ullman subsequently brought in Ackerman (who by then had returned to Harvard—see below) as a consultant to revise significantly the JANIS regional geographical intelligence blue print. In June 1944 Ackerman provided a 19-page memo with detailed suggestions for change, and very much in-line with Ullman’s own sensibilities.31 The problem with JANIS reports were that they had become an “encyclopaedic regional anthology;” they needed to become more focussed, topical, systematic and specialized.32 As Ullman later wrote to Ackerman summarizing their discussions, if JANIS “tries to cover everything, it will produce … a mess. On the other hand, there are some adjustments that could be made towards producing as good geography of foreign areas as possible for use by the US government.”33 Those adjustments involved a more organized approach, or a functional approach as Ullman sometimes called it. Contributors needed to be specialists, and which “allowed workers trained in specific fields to concentrate on the field they knew …. The result is a better, more useful product than the previous Strategic Surveys and ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] Monographs.” Ackerman, along with Ullman, were in JANIS redefining the character of geographical intelligence, moving it from the butterfly collection of disconnected facts, to something more targeted and incisive, conceptually chiseled by a sharper, more directed thematic purpose. Sherman Kent was sometimes aghast at what geographers did in the name of intelligence.


30 Kirk Stone to Richard Hartshorne, 13 July 1943, RG 226, Box 1, Folder 20, NARA.


33 Edward L. Ullman to Edward Ackerman, 2 January, 1946, Ullman Papers, University of Washington, Seattle, Box 1, Folder 17.
calling them in his despondent moments “unemployable” (Ullman 1980: 219). But Ackerman and Ullman’s work on JANIS justified their payroll.34

(ii) How to be an occupier: The School of Overseas Administration

Geographical intelligence clearly counted. It counted also in another way when in early June 1943, Harvard’s Dean Paul Buck wrote to Langer at R&A requesting the return of Ackerman to the College. Buck realized that “the loss to you would be quite a blow,”35 but Ackerman had already stayed a year longer at COI/OSS than initially agreed. Moreover, as Buck continued,

> The University itself has war functions to perform and certain members of its staff are essential to discharging these functions. The War Department has now asked us to develop training programs for Civil Affairs Specialists and for the advance phase of Area and Languages. These programs are rated high in importance by the War Department. They require a great deal of geography of a high order … The return of Dr. Ackerman to us is essential …36

Indeed, he was. In 1943 the School of Overseas Administration was opened at Harvard charged with the task of “preparing officers for military government service in occupied territory” (Hyneman 1944: 342). The scheme began in spring, 1942, at the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. But “it soon became apparent that the demand for officers trained for civil affairs would run far beyond the [School’s] capacity” (Hyneman 1944: 342). Consequently, in 1943 the Civil Affairs Training Program (CATP) was launched, and offered at ten universities across the country, including Harvard, and which ran it from its new School of Overseas Administration. The program was geared toward providing everything anyone needed to know to practice military government in an occupied territory either in Europe or in the Far East. Instruction was offered in the techniques of state administration, language, and area studies (“useful knowledge and points of view about certain foreign people

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34 The Citation on the Certificate of Merit that Ackerman received for his OSS wartime contributions emphasized “the unique role [he played] in the program of outlines for the JANIS studies, which achieved such vital utilization in the strategic planning of military operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff … Partly as a result of his achievement JANIS became accepted as the standard topographical study of US Military Forces, and its use has been so widespread that the JANIS outline forms the basis for the new instructions to military and naval attaches for gathering topographical and related information in foreign areas ….” Quoted in a letter from D. Whittlesey to Dean P. Buck, March 7, 1947, Box 38, “1943–1947,” Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie.


and the characteristics of and conditions prevailing in certain foreign countries,” Hyneman 1944: 342–3).

Initially, the European and Far Eastern programs were the same length, 16 weeks. But later they diverged, with instructions for practicing military occupation in Europe shrinking to two months, but in the Far East expanding to beyond four months. In both programs, area studies were the “most important feature of instruction” (Hyneman 1944: 343). It was undertaking this “most important” task that Ackerman was recalled from OSS. Promoted from Instructor to Assistant Professor, he was to teach at the School of Overseas Administration the geography of Japan to large classes of officers, up to 400 at a time. He had no prior interest in Japan, though, and while he took lessons in Japanese he never listed it afterwards as one of his languages. The very day after Japan surrendered, he also wrote Charles Colby, Professor of Geography at Chicago, that “too much of my time has been devoted in the last two years to lecturing about things in which I am a mere beginner.” That did not stop him, though, from accepting an invitation from the War Department made in the spring of 1946 to go to Japan as an adviser to the Natural Resources Section within the US military government of occupation under General Douglas MacArthur.

(iii) The occupation and reconstruction of Japan The first time that the vast majority of Japanese ever heard Emperor Hirohito speak was when following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki he came on the wireless at 12 noon on August 15, 1945, to say that Japan was surrendering to the Allies. “The War had not necessarily developed in our favor,” and the Japanese people must now be

37 Ackerman’s 1956 “United Nations Personal History” lists five languages that he can at least read, but Japanese is not among them. “Edward A. Ackerman Bibliography,” Box 1, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie.

38 Japan surrendered to the US on August 15, but because of a difference in the time zones VJ Day was declared in the US on August 14. E.A. Ackerman to C.G. Colby, August 15, 1945, Box 38, “1943–1947,” Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie.

39 There is some evidence that Ackerman was overly modest in his self-assessment of his knowledge of Japan. The Associate Director of the School of Overseas Administration, Lauriston Ward, wrote a letter in support of Ackerman for his promotion to Associate Professor at Harvard extolling his expertise both in the class room and on panel discussions. On one occasion in a discussion about the sufficiency of Japan’s internal resources for economic growth, Ward remembered Ackerman arguing against his more mature and experienced panel members: “he stood up in his boots and so quietly and brilliantly supported his thesis that everyone present felt that he had made his case.” L. Ward to Dean P. Buck, June 14, 1947, Ackerman, Edward A. Papers 1930–1973, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming at Laramie.
prepared “to endure the unendurable, to bear the unbearable.”40 American troops had landed in Japan in early September, taking control of its government. The head of that new military administration, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), the American General Douglas MacArthur, ostensibly represented four nations (China, Russia, the US and the UK). But over the next nearly seven years of occupation (the Americans officially left Japan in April, 1952), he represented only one: the United States. Especially during the first two or three years of occupation, MacArthur exerted absolute control, becoming “a minor potentate in his Far Eastern domain” as John Dower (1999: 79) writes.

But MacArthur was a generally benign potentate, and, if not oxymoronic, a politically progressive one.41 The changes he enacted were enormous. Dower (2002: xx) says that under MacArthur Japan was “subject to one of the most audacious exercises in social engineering in history. Substantive reformist policies were introduced into virtually every level of society.” There was a massive land redistribution from a small class of feudal landowners to a very large class of peasant tenants, Japanese women were given the vote as well as a series of civil rights, trade unions were legalized, there was significant constitutional and educational reform, and at least initially the large conglomerate trading companies—the zaibatsu—that previously ruled the economy with an iron grip began to be broken up.

In addition, MacArthur and his more than 4,700 staff, many of the officers of whom were trained at the School of Military Occupation or one of its branch plant campuses, substantially directed the reconstruction of a decimated, war-blighted nation.42 And decimated it was: 2.7 million Japanese died during the War, four-fifths of Japan’s ships were sunk, one third of all of its industrial machines were destroyed, 65% of Tokyo’s buildings were razed, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were blown to oblivion, 30% of the population were homeless, and in the year following the end of the War living standards fell by 35% in cities, and 65% in the country (Dower 1999: 44–5). When he disembarked from the USS Missouri after officiating at the Japanese surrender, and saw the ruins of Tokyo for himself, MacArthur said Japan had become a “fourth-rate nation” (Dower 1999: 44).

40 The Emperor’s high-pitched, wispy voice in combination with his archaic, indirect prose meant that many of his listeners remained ignorant of Japan’s surrender even after the noontime announcement. The quotation from Hirohito’s speech is taken from Dower 1999: 36.

41 In his brilliant book about the American occupation of Japan, Embracing Defeat, John Dower (1999: 23) says MacArthur’s acts as Supreme Commander were “a remarkable display of arrogant idealism—both self-righteous and genuinely visionary.” Their progressive political character was achieved in spite of MacArthur’s barely muffled Christian missionary zeal, Orientalism, and a colonial jingoism that conceived the remaking of Japan as yet another of “the white man’s burdens.”

42 There was over 4,700 staff in 1948 (its maximum). They included 216 officers, 312 enlisted military personnel, 2,226 civilians (including Ackerman), and 1987 Japanese civilians who were secretaries, typists, translators, and research assistants (Takemae 2002: 141).
One of MacArthur’s advisors, General Charles Willoughby, (“my pet fascist,” MacArthur called him; Gordon 2009: 237) counseled minimal intervention. But MacArthur could not help himself. From 10:30 a.m. each morning (his “movements were as predictable as a metronome,” Dower 1999: 205) at General Head Quarters (GHQ) on the sixth floor of the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Building, Tokyo, MacArthur took to reconstructing Japan with “a messianic fervor” (Dower 1999: 23; Takemae 2002: 65). Given “an unusually free hand” by Washington (Dower 1999: 79), he and his staff at GHQ SCAP formed a shadow government. Decisions that they made about the constitution as well as the Constitution of the new Japan through the Central Liaison Office43 were handed on to Japanese bureaucrats and elected politicians for enactment and implementation (Schaller 1985: 28). GHQ SCAP was organized as a mirror copy of Japanese Government Ministries and bureaucratic departments, with 12 separate sections. It was an arrangement that allowed the most efficient conversion of decisions made by GHQ into Japanese government policy and legislation.

Of course, this procedure of government by fiat was fraught with problems, not least of which was that those serving in the US military government of occupation were sometimes quite ignorant about the country they were reconstructing. That might have included MacArthur who made only two trips outside of Tokyo during the entire time he was Supreme Commander. He seemed uninterested in knowing about the country he was changing. Such an attitude was also reflected in some of his senior staff. One colonel said, “If you know too much about Japan, you might be too prejudiced. We do not like old Japan hands” (quoted by Dower 1999: 224). That said, as Schaller (1985: 28) suggests, most of “the lower staff positions, where most real supervision took place, were filled by more qualified candidates.” This is also confirmed by Takemae’s (2002: xxvii; and also 146) meticulous study of Inside GHQ: “Many military officers [at GHQ] held advanced degrees and had received up to a year’s intensive training in civil administration and the Japanese language at leading American universities.” That’s what Harvard’s School of Overseas Administration was all about. Ackerman, of course, was one of those “more qualified candidates.” While his self-assessment of his knowledge of Japan might have been only that of a “mere beginner,” with his doctoral degree, prior experience at OSS, and teaching for two years at Harvard about the Far East, including in 1946 the publication of two substantial chapters about Japan (Ackerman 1946a and b), he was in comparison to many others a full blown expert, and eager to put into practice his geographical intelligence.

(iv) Ackerman in Japan Ackerman arrived in Japan in July 1946, returning to Harvard in February 1948, and followed by a second shorter stint from August 1948 to January 1949. He was based in the Natural Resources Section (NRS) at

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43 Takemae (2002: 113) describes the Central Liaison Office (CLO) as “a central clearing house and message center, the CLO transmitted SCAP policies into action and assuring that Occupation reforms proceeded smoothly.”
GHQ SCAP, and which had its parallel in the Japanese government (“The Natural Resources Committee” and which Ackerman helped to establish in 1947). NRS was inaugurated on October 2, 1945, charged with “advising SCAP on resource policy for agriculture, fisheries, forestry, mining and geology in Japan, Korea, and Japan’s former Pacific territories” (Takemae 2002: 188). It was headed by Lt. Colonel Hubert G. Schenck, a former geology professor at Stanford, who oversaw a staff of 265.

The NRS’s “day in the sun,” as Takemae (2002: 148) puts it, was its involvement in land redistribution. Japanese agriculture until the end of World War II was effectively a feudal system, one that “kept the producing tenant majority in a state of unrelieved misery” (Takemae 2002: 307). Half of the Japanese population worked on the land, and half of them were peasant farmers (Schaller 1985: 42–3). With the redistribution policy introduced by NRS, “over several years more than one third of land changed hands, which affected 30% of all Japanese” (Schaller 1985: 43).

While land redistribution was the big ticket item, NRS had other responsibilities including managing food and fuel emergencies, undertaking an inventory of Japan’s natural resources that involved hundred of NRS surveys, and Ackerman’s responsibility with a dozen staff members to assess Japan’s resource production potential in relation to its needs, and to devise policies to make the most efficient use of the limited resources it possessed.

The result was the publication on December 31, 1949, of his two-volume, 559 pages, *A Report on Japan’s Natural Resources*. It took close to three years to research and write, with contributions from 200 technical experts. But only 57 copies were made, and then given only to a limited number of readers (Ackerman 1953: ix). Three years later, however, the University of Chicago Press published an amended version, *Japan’s Natural Resources and their Relation to Japan’s Economic Future* (Ackerman 1953).

The *Report* is a sophisticated how-to manual for Japanese post-war reconstruction, for its *Economic Future*. Ackerman’s solution, and a theme taken up in his later general academic writings about geography from the late 1950s and early 1960s, is science and technology (Ackerman 1958, 1965). His answer for Japan is a version of the modernization thesis. Given the end of future growth and the limited means available to achieve it, success will come from rational intervention, from the application of science and technology.

The first part of the *Report* is a forensic accounting of Japan’s natural resources: food production including fisheries, energy, sources of fiber including forests, and mineral deposits. Again and again, though, Japan falls short: “If the production of present Japanese resources is considered in relation to requirements, one encounters a long list of deficiencies with only rare and minor exceptions of adequate production” (Ackerman 1953: 320). The problem is painfully clear: insufficient means given the ends. The answer: to be modernist, to be more efficient with those scarce means, and facilitated by science and technology. This technocratic approach meshed exactly with a larger national policy celebrating
science and technology. Vannevar Bush, one of the key US science managers in the post-war period, had published in 1945, *Science: The Endless Frontier*, and the President of Ackerman’s university, James Conant (1948: 77), said in 1947 there is “special sense in which science is called upon to help out with national problems.” It was no wonder then that Ackerman wrote in his report about Japan:

> The economic future of Japan in large measure rests with its research scientists, engineers, technologists and technicians. Without their contribution, increases in the production of food, fibers, minerals or other materials will be a empty hope, no matter how well intentioned and earnest the remainder of the people. Hope for more effective use of materials likewise rests with science and technology. (Ackerman 1953: 537)

This is Ackerman’s blueprint for a reconstructed Japan, for bringing it into the twentieth century. A failure to do so, as he pointedly argues at least in the 1953 version of the *Report*, potentially means a return to the old Japan, to the Imperial Japan. “One day the existence or absence of [modernist] projects may mean the difference between a democratic and autocratic Japan” (Ackerman 1953: 574). If ever there was a reason to reconstruct Japan this was it. When Lt. Colonel Schenk wrote to Ackerman at the end of his contract to thank him for his *Report’s* “remarkable contribution,” he said it “will aid not only those Americans responsible for writing the peace treaty, but also those Japanese charged with better management and use of Nippon’s meager resources.” Such are the consequences of a geographical intelligence.

**Conclusion**

Using intelligence for military strategic purposes goes back at least to the Punic Wars, 250 BCE, probably before then. And a central part of intelligence has always been geographical intelligence: knowing the topography of a battlefield, who is where, the natural resources available, the pattern of roads, paths and bridges, the dead-ends and impassable terrain, the location of population centers, and so much, much more. The map is one distinctive contribution of geographical intelligence, but so is the regional monograph, the locational analysis of industry, the political geography of borders, and the environmental resource assessment.

Geographers can be caught up within intelligence either directly, as described in this chapter, or indirectly when their work is taken up, and (unknowingly) used by those in the formal intelligence community. But in spite of this inevitability, geographical intelligence is rarely spoken about publicly in the discipline, instead

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consigned to an underworld existence, the place where secrets are buried. While we might have little choice about how our work is used as geographical intelligence, we do have some choice about whether we know about its use.

Recent works by Gregory (2004) on US military involvement in contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan, by Perkins and Dodge (2009) and Paglen (2009) on covert national spaces are starting to reveal some of the secrets of the underworld. Our chapter has focused on the origins and continued influence of the first centralized intelligence agency in the USA. This came surprisingly late, certainly well after those in countries such as the United Kingdom. But like the UK extensive intelligence network in support of the British Empire, the rise of the OSS coincides with the rise of the USA as a global geopolitical power. As with the Inquiry a quarter century earlier the COI/OSS relied heavily on academics, including cartographers and geographers. Geographers not only shaped the nature of the intelligence and how it affected and directed post-war reconstruction in Germany and Japan, but so too was the discipline affected. What is more, both intelligence and science were depoliticized in the process. Ironically, given that OSS was a government agency, its geographers emerged with the view that power and knowledge could be separated. As we pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, today the mangling of intelligence and disciplinary knowledges such as GIS continues unabated. Our chapter therefore is a contribution to a critical examination of geographical intelligences.

References


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Chapter 12
The US Militarization of a ‘Host’ Civilian Society: The Case of Postwar Okinawa, Japan
Takashi Yamazaki

Introduction

This chapter explores the main theme of this book: the practice of the social construction of post-conflict spaces that both reflect and help to reproduce hegemonic power relations. It does so by looking at actual processes of ‘militarization’ acting within a civilian society that is occupied by and forced to ‘host’ US military forces as a result of a war. For such a society, the end of the war may be the end of violent destruction by a hostile military power but is also the beginning of its total reconstruction by the same power. Thus war-time destruction is a prerequisite to postwar reconstruction, and the whole process of this transformation is driven by powerful military forces.

Although the term ‘militarization’ tends to cause confusion and dispute over its meaning (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009a), it is still useful to describe and conceptualize the transformation of a civilian society by military force. According to Enloe (2000), militarization is a mixture of material and non-material processes in which everyday life is transformed into a structure perpetuating militarism as an ideology and practice to sustain national security policies. The presence and representation of militarism in the form of military bases, personnel, memorials, movies, and commodities contribute to such a transformation. In this sense, militarization constitutes a set of institutions and processes that restrict and enable the actions of agents and reproduces militarism by the medium of such actions. In turn, this process creates and is dependent upon the social construction of militarized spaces and places (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009b, see also Giddens 1984, Agnew 1987).

Attention has been drawn, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to the many places in the world that have experienced and are experiencing various processes and degrees of militarization or securitization (Kuus 2009, Bernazzoli and Flint 2009a). Militarism is so pervasive and penetrating that it is sometimes difficult to be aware of its omnipresence. The militarization of everyday life, however, manifests itself and becomes irresistible in a particular time-space context. If we can identify such a manifestation and examine how it works in people’s daily lives in an empirical manner, we will be able to better and critically
understand why militarism has been so persistent and why militarization has been so transformative in our society. Militarization does not only affect women’s lives, as Enloe (2000) argues, but also transforms the landscape and social structures that surround them. Thus militarization is also a matter of geography.

Responding to a rapid growth in Anglophone geographic research on militarism and militarization, Woodward (2005) identifies three approaches in the sub-field: traditional military geography, political geography on armed conflict, and critical military geography. The third approach, which is the most instructive to this chapter, looks at the totality of military activities and militarism’s consequences and the way in which they are geographically constituted and expressed. Woodward (2005: 727) calls for geographical research “on the politics of military land use and the issues that flow from that, such as the political economies and social geographies of militarism and military activities, and the cultural geographies of military representation”. Bernazzoli and Flint (2009b), following the categorization of Woodward (2005), argue for a study of specific communities and the social construction of place-specific geographies of militarism. They propose a comparative analysis of militarization in order to understand how it unfolds differently in different localities due to the ways in which processes of militarization are mediated by unique local contexts.

Once a US base is located in a particular place, it will help constitute a particular local context in which a local civilian society develops in a certain way. The construction, maintenance, and management of a military base promotes close socio-economic interactions with the host society and transforms or militarizes the community. As mentioned above, Enloe (2000: 281) defines militarization as “the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria” (emphasis in original). Although she prioritizes the militarization of women’s lives among other aspects of militarization, this chapter extends her notion to cover various realms of the lives of local civilians so that we can better understand the local context in which US military presence is maintained as part of its militaristic national security policy.

Processes of postwar reconstruction or militarization are comprehensive, multifaceted, complex, and inseparable from each other. For pedagogic clarity, this chapter separates them into several conceptual subsets: physical, economic, social, and political processes. Physical processes of militarization include material reconstruction followed by destruction during a war, such as land confiscation, the construction of military bases, and the formation of military base towns nearby. Economic processes comprise the economic changes of a host society spurred by the presence of a military base. Examples include the development of commercial and service industries meeting the needs of military forces, the financial dependence of the community on the base for land rent income, base workers’ salaries, and subsidies provided by the base. Social processes are developed through human interactions between military personnel and local civilians, such as friendship, love affairs, marriage, cultural exchange, discrimination, and violent
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confrontations. Political processes of militarization relate to all of these processes and reflect uneven power relations between stationed troops and a host society, military personnel and civilians, and the dominating and the dominated, which may result in the distortion of local democracy and generate intra-local conflicts.

All of these processes are firmly embedded in and interwoven with the economic, social, and political lives of a host society so that militarization itself becomes seen as an essential element of the maintenance of the local society. By looking closely at the processes of militarization, we can understand not only the impacts of US military presence on local societies, but also how our seemingly ‘peaceful’ society is sustained by the existence of such militarized societies.

Drawing on the geographical approaches to militarism and militarization discussed above, this chapter attempts to situate processes of militarization in a specific time-space context, to illustrate multifaceted functions of militarization, and to show that processes of militarization contain contradictions and generate conflicts while perpetuating themselves. More specifically, it explores what kind of impact US overseas military forces can have on a host society and how they drastically reconstruct its socio-economic composition. The case study is of a civilian society on an island in Okinawa Prefecture (hereafter Okinawa), Japan that was militarized through the long-term stationing of US military forces after World War II. Discussion will focus on the spatio-temporal processes of militarizing the civilian society and the identification of physical, economic, social, and political interactions between local civilians and US military forces on the island, leading to a geo-historical illustration of the processes of militarization.

US Military Presence in Okinawa from a Multi-scalar Perspective

In order to understand how US military presence transforms a host civilian society it is important not to limit the scope of analysis to any single geographical scale such as global, national, or local. While the postwar “forward deployment” of US military forces is global in its nature, it necessarily manifests itself at the local scale. The US strategy of global deployment of military forces strongly conditions the location of its military presence. Thus any politics practiced with regards to a specific location needs to be seen from global and regional ( supra-national) perspectives. According to Kane (2006), since 1950 54 states have hosted at least 1,000 US troops, and foreign deployments have been concentrated in Europe and Asia (52% in Europe and 41% in Asia), reflecting the US containment policy during the Cold War. More than one-third of troop deployments until 2000 were to Germany, which hosted a cumulative total of more than 10,000,000 US military personnel between 1950 and 2000. With regard to Asia, Japan and South Korea have hosted cumulative totals of approximately 3,942,000 and 3,340,000 personnel respectively, comprising the second and third greatest concentrations in the world. Kane observes that for the most part, US troops were stationed abroad
as part of the Cold War system of deterrence through alliances with states such as Japan, South Korea, and NATO member states.

Kane’s dataset illustrates the spatio-temporal patterns of US military presence that reflect US foreign policy concerns over global military competition and related regional conflicts. The principal pattern of US military presence reflects Cold-War containment policy while the end of the Cold War led to the partial withdrawal of US troops from Germany. The Vietnam War, the first Gulf War, and the post-9/11 situation add significant regional variations to the maps. Kane (2004: 3) points out that the commitment of US troops has been consistent in Europe, varied in Asia, and relatively shallow in the other parts of the world. With regard to Asia, East Asia in particular, the US placed a large amount of troops in Japan and South Korea in the 1950s and Vietnam in the 1960s, and began to pull them out in the 1970s. However, their presence in Japan and South Korea has been quite consistent to the present day.

After World War II, Japan was completely disarmed and incorporated into the Western capitalist bloc through US occupation. The Japan-US security arrangements were formally established in 1951 when the Peace Treaty with Japan and the Japan-US Security Treaty were concluded. The current Japan-US Security Treaty, which was revised in 1960, determines two important obligations for both countries. Article 5 of the Treaty requires that the US defend Japan, which implies that an armed attack on Japan would result in a military confrontation with the US and, therefore, means that for Japan the Treaty possesses a deterrent effect. Article 6, conversely, requires Japan to provide the US with areas and facilities so that the US can station its military forces within Japan, particularly in Okinawa Prefecture. This ‘mutual’ relationship has sustained Japan’s constitutional pacifism and relatively non-aggressive Self Defense Forces (SDFs) on one hand, and US forward deployment in East Asia on the other.

The US military presence in Japan has had peculiar spatial aspects. After Japan was defeated in World War II, the US occupied Japan and took over its domestic military bases. As Japan restored its sovereignty in 1952 when the Peace Treaty with Japan was enforced, the US retreated from Japan proper but continued to hold the administrative rights over Okinawa, according to the Treaty, to maintain its military presence in the West Pacific. Even after the US gave the administrative rights over Okinawa back to Japan (i.e. Okinawa’s reversion to Japan) in 1972, US military bases remained intact according to the Japan-US agreement reached under the Cold War. As a result, currently approximately 75% (in area) of the US bases located in Japan are concentrated on Okinawa Island in Okinawa. Okinawa is a group of tiny islands in the southern fringe of Japanese territory (Figure 12.1). Okinawa Prefecture is located between Japan proper, Taiwan, China, North and South Koreas, and the Philippines. Due to such a location, the history of the islands has been partially defined by competition between regional powers such as China and Japan (later the US). Most importantly, Okinawa had been regarded in geopolitical terms as being on the Cold-War front facing military
threats from the Communist bloc. Conventional geopolitical discourses still argue that Okinawa maintains a geopolitical location “advantage” for the Japan-US security arrangements against China and North Korea as well as for US forward deployment toward the Middle East and Central Asia (see Kitazawa 2010).

Within Okinawa Island, there are more than 30 US military bases and installations amounting to 20% of the area of the Island. The figure has not been significantly changed since 1972. The “Central District” (Chubu-chiku) of the Island contains a number of US bases including two major air bases: the United States Air Force (USAF) Kadena Air Base (KAB) and the United States Marine
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Corps (USMC) Futenma Air Station. These and nearby bases were constructed in a region thoroughly destroyed during World War II and are part of the subsequent complete reconstruction of the local landscapes and societies adjacent to them.

The most useful way to understand the complex processes of militarization in postwar Okinawa is to look at the Central District, in particular the KAB and environs. The size and function of the KAB have been so substantial that it has had a tremendous transformative impact on neighboring areas. The KAB is one of the largest air force bases in the Far East with two 4 km-long runways and more than 14,000 US military personnel and 4,000 Japanese (Okinawan) employees. The KAB was constructed at the site of a Japanese military airport after the 1945 Battle of Okinawa. One of the outcomes from the construction of the KAB was the formation of Koza City.

Koza grew into a city in 1956 from a rural village called Goeku. US military forces constructed new military bases and military road networks connecting military bases around Goeku. The newly built bases provided job opportunities for Okinawans as workers and service providers, which brought about population concentration and drastic urban development in the formerly rural area. In addition, the name of Koza is said to come from Americans’ mis-description of the district name of Koja. All of these indicate that the origin of the city was closely connected to the presence of US military forces. As shown in Figure 12.1, Koza (currently Okinawa City) was surrounded by several military bases and installations so that Koza became a supply center for goods, services, and the labor force for the military and attracted military personnel even from other remote bases on the Island.

Processes of Militarization and the Construction of Koza

Physical, Economic, and Social Processes

Processes of militarization in Okinawa were actually begun prior to the Battle of Okinawa, or Operation Iceberg, in 1945 and the subsequent US occupation. Near the end of World War II, the war situation for Japan was deteriorating in the West Pacific. The Japanese Imperial Army had already militarized the Island by building military airports and stationing Japanese garrison troops so as to prevent the Allied Powers from approaching Japan proper. The Allied Powers, mainly US troops, aimed to seize Okinawa as a base for air campaigns over Japan proper. The consequence was the tragic ground Battle with more than 200,000 casualties, including civilians, and the physical devastation of the islands. The postwar reconstruction or militarization of Okinawa by US military forces was built on this devastation. Postwar processes of militarization, however, were much more comprehensive and of much greater magnitude. I conceptually categorize such postwar processes into four subsets: physical, economic, social, and political processes. In this section, the first three processes are examined to demonstrate
how these processes are integrated in the construction of militarized spaces, using the specific example of red-light districts.

With regard to physical militarization, as soon as the Battle of Okinawa ended in 1945 US military forces confiscated Japanese military bases and Okinawan private lands and built new military bases, including the KAB. The beginning of the Cold War in 1949 promoted this process, and Okinawa was physically transformed into a fortress with vast military bases and military road networks connecting them. Okinawans who had been incarcerated in concentration camps were released without access to their land. However, they were soon absorbed as workers and service providers into newly built military bases and the commercial and service industries serving the bases. As a result, they began to be settled and form sprawled residential and commercial districts adjacent to the bases.

Economic militarization followed such physical processes. The formation of Koza and other military base towns was a spatial manifestation of militarization. Roads leading to the gates of military bases began to be filled with small businesses catering to US military personnel, such as bars, restaurants, souvenir shops, hotels, and apartments. Hence, patron-client relationships between US personnel and Okinawans were established. The land rent paid by military bases also supported the lives of Okinawan landlords. Through such economic processes of militarization, the subsistence of Okinawan society became deeply dependent on the military. According to the statistics of the Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa-ken 2009), there were 87 military bases and installations (27,892.5 ha or 68,923.9 acres in area), 42,229 military personnel and their families, and 19,980 military base workers in Okinawa, 1972. The KAB and the adjacent USMC Camp Zukeran employed 2,742 and 3,237 workers respectively.

As shown in Table 12.1, the share of the military base economy accounted for 15.5% of the prefecture’s economy in 1972 when Okinawa reverted to Japan, approximately three times higher than today. The military base economy was not at all negligible compared to other industries based on local resources. Thus it is not difficult to imagine how much the economy of Koza was dependent on military bases. Since more than 60% of the city’s land was occupied by the KAB and other military bases, Koza received $601,197 from the rent of military land in 1965, which exceeded the year’s total city revenue of $552,677 (Ryukyu-seifu 1965). However, as Table 12.1 indicates, the largest component of the income from the US military bases was obtained by the provision of goods and services for the military. The pre-reversion economy of Koza was best characterized by the concentration of more than 200 bars, restaurants, and other shops for US military personnel (Koza-shi 1974, Yamazaki 2008a).
Table 12.1 Prefecture incomes related to US military bases, 1972 and 2006 (billion yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Prefecture Income (A)</th>
<th>Total (B)</th>
<th>Provision of goods and services (C)</th>
<th>Income from military base workers (D)</th>
<th>Paid rent of military land (E)</th>
<th>Others (F)</th>
<th>Income from tourism (C) (G)</th>
<th>Gross products of the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industry (D) (H)</th>
<th>B/A (%)</th>
<th>C/A (%)</th>
<th>D/A (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>501.3</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,959.2</td>
<td>215.5</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>409.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
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Social militarization refers to human interactions between military personnel and civilians. Given that US military forces were stationed in an occupied, non-American civilian society, processes of militarization manifested themselves in uneven and socially complex ways. In Okinawa the military base economy established through economic militarization promoted human interactions between civilians and US military personnel. Such interactions were highly unequal and gendered. The growth of Koza, for instance, was brought about by an increase in the male and female population. The latter was absorbed mainly into the eating, drinking, and entertainment businesses, including prostitution. Table 12.2 shows that the ratio of young females to the total population in the Central District of Okinawa Island was higher than that of Okinawa Prefecture, reflecting the concentration of young female population in the area where many military bases were located. The gender imbalance (i.e. high female ratio) of residents in their twenties was further striking in Koza. In other words, the formation of Koza was in part based on uneven and gendered power relations between the occupying male and the occupied female. Enloe (2000) pays particular attention to this aspect of militarization (i.e. the militarization of women’s lives). But economic and social militarization cannot be separated from each other and together contribute to the formation of particular landscapes, or the physical processes of militarization. For example, Center Street, one of the so-called “red-light districts” (tokuingai), became a local landscape feature. The existence of US military bases promoted the formation of red-light districts consisting of bars and restaurants and women working for US military personnel.
Table 12.2  Gender ratio in younger population at different scales, 1965 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All ages</th>
<th>15–19 years old</th>
<th>20–24 years old</th>
<th>25–29 years old</th>
<th>30–34 years old</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Okinawa Prefecture</td>
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<td>52.1</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>51.0</td>
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<td>45.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Red-light Districts as Integral Spaces of Militarization

As mentioned above, various processes of militarization were actually inseparable. Social processes of militarization were deeply connected with other processes. This section illustrates such inter-process connections by exploring the formation of red-light districts in Koza. After the KAB and military roads connecting to it were (re)constructed, several red-light districts were newly formed around the base and along the military roads in Koza (Figure 12.2). Most of the districts were patronized by male US military personnel. The formation of the red-light districts was not necessarily ‘natural’ but planned. After Okinawa was occupied by US military forces, sexual assaults against Okinawan women by US personnel became an urgent matter to deal with. In 1950 Goeku Village, a predecessor of Koza, built a red-light district at the fringe of the Village (the Yaeshima District or New Koza) in which prostitutes called “special ladies” (tokushu fujin) did their job so that other women might be protected from the assaults of US personnel (Miyagi 2000).

As the Village grew into one of the major cities in Okinawa, other red-light districts were formed one after another. Among these, Center Street, Gate Street, and Teruya (Old Koza) flourished in the middle of the City in the 1960s, in particular during the Vietnam War (1964–75). The formation of the red-light districts created peculiarly Americanized urban landscapes in Koza. Other red-light districts were not necessarily specialized in prostitution but were a complex of bars, restaurants, and other shops for US personnel. Figure 12.3 shows a street view of so-called “A-sign” establishments (bars and restaurants) on Gate Street in front of the KAB. The control of prostitution, including the impact of venereal disease and other hygiene conditions, in the districts soon became one of the major concerns for US military forces. In order to maintain the health and morale of their personnel, US military forces brought in the A-sign program in the 1950s through which Okinawan business owners were given permission to run their business for US military personnel. The contents and standards of the program changed over time until Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972. However, overall the
Reconstructing Conflict

Figure 12.2 The Kadena Air Base and red-light districts in Koza

Source: Google Earth

program functioned to regulate the location, construction, management, hygiene, and business ethics of establishments run by Okinawans. Figure 12.3 shows the early appearance of A-sign establishments and illustrates the kind of urban landscape that was emerging in this red-light district. Thus, physical, economic, and social processes of militarization were integrated into the working of the red-light districts. A close look at such spaces provides a lens to scrutinize how US hegemonic power operated on the island to perpetuate militarism.

The A-sign Program as Human Territoriality and Bio-politics

As social militarization led to an increase in human interactions between Okinawans and US personnel in the red-light districts, sanitary conditions of Okinawan establishments became a serious problem. In the context of the existing power relations, “problem” meant harm to the health of US personnel, not Okinawans. As I have shown elsewhere (Yamazaki 2008b), it became an urgent matter in the early 1960s for US forces to control the spread of venereal disease and to improve the hygiene conditions of local establishments outside military bases. In order to protect US personnel and their families from such problems, US military forces
established a licensing system to issue an A-sign to the local establishments that passed sanitary inspections. The “A” of an A-sign stands for “approved for US forces.” US personnel and their families were not allowed to use establishments without an A-sign.

The A-sign program was a means to not directly control prostitutes but the establishments that provided prostitution. However, not all the A-sign establishments provided prostitution. At the institutional level, US military forces prohibited selling prostitution to US personnel and carrying out sexual slavery, which made the nature of the program highly ambivalent about prostitution. In order to maintain their businesses, owners of the establishments required hostesses/prostitutes to have a regular health check (Onozawa 2006: 220–21). After 1962 when the A-sign program was resumed after several years’ suspension, prostitution within A-sign establishments was strictly prohibited. But it was still possible for US personnel to find prostitutes at A-sign establishments.

The stricter New Criteria was introduced into the A-sign program in 1962. It required of local business owners a significant sanitary improvement or ‘modernization as Americanization’ of their establishments such as installations of modern cooking equipments, toilets, furniture, floor layouts, and construction materials. Thus, to meet the Criteria the owners needed a large amount of investment money, which first contributed to a drastic decrease in the number

Figure 12.3 Bars and restaurants on Gate Street in the early 1950s. Source: Okinawa-shi (1997). Reprinted with permission of Okinawa City Government
of A-sign establishments. It soon turned out, however, that obtaining an A-sign meant increased profits and the ability to pay off the initial investment quickly. The program finally contributed to a significant alteration of local business customs and urban landscapes in the red-light districts.

Social processes of militarization, as seen in the implementation of the A-sign program, are not straightforward. The program attempted to control the behaviors of not only US personnel outside their bases but also Okinawans working in A-sign establishments. The A-sign program had two important dimensions as a spatial practice of disciplinary power: human territoriality and bio-politics. Sack (1986) theorizes human territoriality as a purposeful strategy using a territory. Human territoriality is defined as the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area (Sack 1986: 19). It has three essential tendencies: classification by area, communication by boundary, and enforcement or control. Its significances (e.g. norms, relationships to power, etc.) vary according to specific socio-historical contexts.

The concept of human territoriality illustrates how the A-sign program was also a spatial strategy to control behaviors of Okinawans as well as Americans. US military forces sometimes used the program as a sanction against non-cooperative establishments and areas. This sanction was called “off limits”. For sanitary and political reasons, US military forces suspended an A-sign for establishments and designated areas of establishments as off limits, and the sign of “off limits” was put up in front of such areas. US personnel were not allowed to enter off-limits establishments or areas. In the 1950s, the off-limits policy was not so firmly connected to the A-sign program and carried out rather arbitrarily for political purposes by the military. During the land struggle in 1956 the off-limits policy was applied to the municipalities which allowed anti-American rallies to be held in order to weaken Okinawan solidarity (Yamazaki 2003). In the 1960s, in particular after the New Criteria was introduced, the off-limits policy was more systematically adopted by a special board in US military forces. As my previous works (Yamazaki 2008a, 2008b) show, the most typical and frequent off-limits placement was on the establishments that could neither pass monthly inspections nor improve sanitary conditions, or those that had more than three cases of venereal disease infection of US personnel in a month and did not improve their management.

US military forces had realized that the off-limits policy was a powerful tool to sanction and control Okinawans because they feared losing their businesses dependent on the custom of US personnel. As a result, the repeated placement of “off limits” on red-light districts contributed to the creation of pro-American, as well as anti-American, segments among Okinawans. In other words, through the repeated hygiene inspections and off-limits sanctions many Okinawan business owners individually and collectively internalized the business values imposed on them by US military forces. To refuse to conform to the values meant to lose US customers and to look for Okinawan customers; as seen in Yoshiwara (a
The US Militarization of a ‘Host’ Civilian Society

red-light district which was placed almost permanently off limits). Therefore, the off-limits policy was a manifestation of human territoriality in which the behaviors of Americans and Okinawans were controlled in a certain way. This may be interpreted as a form of bio-politics (Foucault 1998). Although US military forces exercised authoritative power over Okinawan society, they did not directly transform Okinawan business practices as a whole. Rather, they acted as a disciplinary power that forced individual Okinawans to internalize American business values, which was one of the ways for Okinawans to survive adversities after the War. Thus, control by US military forces penetrated into individual Okinawans and their ways of life.

Spatial practices related to the program were also seen within buildings. The New Criteria consisted of strict construction and hygiene requirements including: location, construction (size and construction materials), interior surface finish, mechanical specifications for facilities, hygiene requirements (for employees and toilet facilities), storage, refrigeration, cooking utensils, dishes, and glasses, and other general requirements (USCAR undated).

With regards to location, the following conditions were required: “main street or main route of travel,” “well lighted,” “free of open drainage ditches,” “located in a business district,” “provides for pedestrian safety,” “no other drinking establishments in the same building,” and “location must present an overall sanitary and attractive appearance.” From these conditions, it can be inferred that US forces assumed that A-sign establishments should be built in urban areas where a public infrastructure had already been developed to some degree. Otherwise military base towns such as Koza would need to improve their public infrastructure so that A-sign establishments could be run in the towns. Thus, the A-sign program had a significant impact on the urban built environment.

At the same time, the A-sign program modernized or Americanized the Okinawan sense of hygiene and business morals. It seems that continuing to meet strict construction and hygiene requirements contributed to internalizing such ‘foreign’ values among Okinawan individuals. As a former A-sign restaurant owner on Center Street puts it:

A-sign inspectors used to enter establishments silent, inspect around the establishments, and check the nails of employees. If we received low scores in such an inspection, we would be placed off limits right away. Therefore, we had to make an all-out effort to maintain hygiene every day. In order to pass the inspection, we needed to cover a restroom with tiles and supply hand or paper towels in the restroom. The establishments whose owners’ fathers are still alive are very clean because the fathers ran them under the A-sign program. The floors of such establishments are so dried up that you can even sit on them. They are so clean and free of dirt. Therefore, in terms of hygiene, the A-sign program was good for us Okinawans. Although we were afraid of the inspection, there were many good things in it. (Ishihara Zeminaru 1994: 274)
In sum, the A-sign program was a kind of institutional node to connect various processes of militarization. Its primary purpose was to protect the health of US military personnel from venereal and other diseases outside their bases. The program as a socio-spatial practice of the disciplinary power of US military forces directed military personnel towards ‘safer’ establishments and areas while forcing Okinawan business owners and employees, including prostitutes, to internalize American hygiene standards and business values. Through the program, social, economic, and physical processes of militarization were promoted and integrated: human interactions between US personnel and Okinawans were controlled; Okinawan business owners improved their business environments to increase benefits; and the urban built environments of red-light districts were transformed. All of these were carried out on the island primarily to meet the requirements of US military forces. It can be said, therefore, that the A-sign program was an institutional device to militarize an occupied area (i.e. transform the area in its entirety so that instead it spontaneously served the demands of military forces) using a combination of human territoriality and bio-politics.

Although the A-sign program had a tremendous impact on the Okinawan sense of hygiene, business morals, and the urban built environment, it seems to have had little effect on US military personnel in terms of venereal-disease prevention. In the late 1960s, there were negative assessments of the effect of the program and even arguments for its abolishment among US military forces (Yamazaki 2008b). The major point of objections against the program was that the program did not bring about the desired behavioral changes of Okinawans and a sanitary and safe environment for US military personnel. Between 1968 and 1971, the venereal-disease infection rate of military personnel in Okinawa showed no recognizable and constant decrease. It was reported that the venereal-disease infection rate remained 150 to 200‰ per annum, suggesting that the program did not bring about any significant behavioral change of Americans (Yamazaki 2008a). Although the A-sign program was maintained until 1972, when Okinawa reverted to Japan, the effect of the program as a form of bio-politics by disciplinary power was limited in that it failed to decrease venereal-disease infection rates of military personnel and that it did not necessarily improve the hygiene conditions of A-sign establishments as desired. It was successful only in spatially excluding the act of prostitution within A-sign establishments (Yamazaki 2008a).

Political Processes

Before concluding this chapter, less material processes of militarization need to be mentioned. Political processes of militarization relate to the other processes mentioned above and reflect uneven power relations between stationed troops and a host society, which may result in the distortion of local democracy and the generation of intra-local conflicts regarding the military presence. Local politics of military base towns cannot be separated from their material foundations, such as the land and natural resources available for development, local industries, and
economic spill-over effects from military bases. This sub-section first illustrates
the relationship between politics and the material foundations of military base
towns. It then shows that political militarization is not necessarily a unilateral
process from the military to the civilian sphere. Rather, it is a dynamic interplay
between militarization and anti-militarization.

When the Battle of Okinawa ended with the surrender of the Japanese
Imperial Army, Okinawans generally accepted occupation by US military forces
as emancipation from Japan. This reflected how Okinawans had been colonized
and discriminated against by Japan proper. As mentioned above, the military
occupation and transformation (militarization) of Okinawa accompanied its
socio-economic rehabilitation by US military forces, though it was not a primary
objective of occupation. The US government and military forces invested a large
amount of grants and subsidies into Okinawa so that Okinawans could also sustain
the military bases by offering their lands, labor, and services to them. In return,
Okinawans earned rents, wages, and payments from the military. This was a
basic function of the military base economy and contributed to a creation of pro-
American segments among Okinawans; such as landlords who leased their lands
to, workers in the bases, and service providers who fulfilled the demands of military
bases. They tended to support the stationing of US military bases in Okinawa and
generally voted for conservative politicians in local elections (Yamazaki 2004).

However, soon after the War, Okinawans began to realize that US military
administration over Okinawa was oppressive to them. It threatened the lives
of Okinawans through violent crimes by military personnel, deadly accidents
caused by military exercises, and non-democratic foreign governance. Thus, the
above-mentioned processes of militarization did not proceed without persistent
resistance from Okinawans. The forcible seizure of Okinawan private land led
to the outbreak of island-wide anti-American protests in 1956 (Yamazaki 2003).
Unlawful conduct by US personnel, such as rapes and other violent crimes, often
offended Okinawans and triggered anti-American protests in Koza as well as
other places (Yamazaki 2004). The non-democratic foreign governance could not
prevent reversion movements (those in favor of Japanese rule) from rising in the
1960s.

Thus, US military bases were both beneficial and harmful to Okinawans. This
ambivalent nature of military bases was translated into local elections and politics.
The conservative (pro-American) segments in Koza usually supported conservative
politicians and their party. Through the 1960s, voters in Koza continued to elect
Choko Kuwae, a local political leader of a conservative party, as a representative to
the Government of Ryukyu Islands (GRI) Legislature. On the other hand, the same
voters continued to elect a leftist political leader Chojo Oyama as the city mayor.
Despite his anti-American ideology, Oyama tactically promoted the “friendship
programs” with the KAB in order to secure its financial endorsement. The US
governing body (US Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands or USCAR)
covertly supported conservative politicians to undermine Oyama’s credibility in
fear of the spread of communism (Yamazaki 2010). Regardless of such pressure,
voters preferred Oyama as the mayor due probably to the city’s economic growth caused by the Vietnam War and general public sentiments against foreign military rule. As seen in such complex political tensions, the stationing of US military forces created peculiar political conflicts, cleavages, and contradictions within Okinawan society.

Another political contradiction can be seen in the movements of military base workers. As mentioned above, the construction of US military bases in Okinawa provided Okinawans with job opportunities as military base workers. In the middle of the Vietnam War (1969), approximately 27,000 Okinawans were employed by US military forces (Uehara 1982: 462). As reversion approached, thousands of Okinawan workers began to be fired due to staged workforce reduction for military bases (Uehara 1982: 356–8). In combination with anti-military-base and peace movements initiated by Okinawan labor unions, the union of military base workers (Zengunro) was systematically opposed to such unilateral mass firing. Although military base workers deeply depended on military bases for their living, Zengunro was one of the most anti-American organizations in Okinawa and constituted a strong power base for leftist parties. From 1970–72 Zengunro organized a series of strikes, which not only caused serious conflicts with US military bases but also had a negative impact on the local economy dependent on the operation and consumption of the bases.

On the other hand, local business owners and employees dependent on US military bases constituted pro-American segments in the politics of Koza. Because strikes by Zengunro prevented US military personnel from consuming outside their bases, such strikes had an effect similar to the off-limits policy on local businesses. Thus they were furiously opposed to Zengunro strikes and even attempted to interrupt them, which sometimes led to violent skirmishes between these two groups. Such conflicts within Okinawan society had significant political implication because they deflected the target of Okinawan grievances from US military bases to their neighbors. People’s lives in the city were so deeply interwoven with the presence of US military forces that political processes of militarization promoted the development of cleavages and conflicts within the civilian society.

Although various protest movements against US military forces had been organized in Koza, the riot that took place at the early morning of December 20th, 1970 was the most striking. It was a spontaneously arising non-organized riot initiated when a car driven by a US serviceman hit a drunk Okinawan man on a street at the center of the city. Civilian and military police officers that came to the scene attempted to lead the serviceman away. Okinawans who began to gather at the scene tried to stop the officers, and the Okinawan crowd grew and turned into an angry mob. Subsequently the mob overturned, set alight, and otherwise demolished cars owned by US personnel.

According to USCAR documents (USCAR ca1971), when the riot broke out some Okinawans referred to an incident that had taken place in Itoman City (a city in the Southern District of Okinawa Island) a year earlier. In that incident a car driven by a heavily drunk US serviceman ran over and killed an Okinawan woman.
However, on December 7th 1970 the military court had found the servicemen not guilty due to a lack of evidence. This court decision greatly offended Okinawans. The fact that the Itoman incidence was a remote cause of the riot indicated that Okinawan collective grievances against US military forces had accumulated to the point of explosion. In other words, the riot marked an impasse of a hegemonic foreign military rule. Two years later, the administrative rights over Okinawa reverted to Japan and the contradictory processes of militarization by US military forces came to a formal end. Since the reversion, Okinawa’s economic dependence on the bases has significantly declined, although US military bases have been only incrementally reduced. Instead, Okinawa has become increasingly dependent on the subsidies provided by the Japanese government in exchange of hosting the bases for the Japan-US alliance.

Conclusion

The case study of Okinawa illustrates how the postwar stationing of US military forces in Koza reconstructed and militarized the landscapes, economy, society, and politics of the city so that it could serve the needs and values of US military forces. These processes of militarization physically transformed the former rural village and socio-economically reconstructed it as a military base town. As this chapter has shown, through processes of militarization, daily lives of civilians in the city were constructed and reproduced so that their lives were deeply interwoven with the operation of US military bases on the island. Militarism was the most dominant ideology inscribed in the city, and militarization was the most powerful mechanism that kept the city alive.

Above all, this chapter paid attention to red-light districts and the A-sign program as a set of socio-spatial nodes where different processes of militarization intersected and where the occupying and the occupied interacted. The program was not only an institutional device to improve hygiene conditions and prevent venereal disease in red-light districts, but also a means to control and discipline the civilian society using human territoriality and bio-politics. Such technologies of military governance operated successfully in creating pro-American segments of society and contributed to a perpetuation of the military presence. Militarization became a pervasive process in which everyday lives of people in Koza were constructed and reproduced.

However, militarization in Koza was not necessarily unilateral but aroused political opposition from people in Koza such as the election of the leftist mayor, Zengunro strikes, and the 1970 riot. It is important to know that militarization would face various resistances from the civilian society. In other words, militarization constructed a field of dynamic interactions between the military and its host civilian society, which constituted places, spaces, and landscapes around military bases as examined in this chapter. Therefore, careful reading of such (counter-) militarized components inscribed in a military base town helps us understand how
militarization can be naturalized in our daily lives and scrutinized with a critical eye.

This chapter has explored the practice of the social construction of post-conflict spaces that both reflect and help to reproduce hegemonic power relations. Through an empirical case study the connections between war-time destruction and postwar reconstruction were exposed. I believe that there are many similar cases in the world and that comparative studies would contribute to deepening our understanding of the historical and contemporary meanings of militarized places (Bernazzoli and Flint 2009b).

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Chapter 13
War as Emergency? Constructing and Deconstructing the California Agricultural Landscape
Don Mitchell

You asked to be reminded to look into the reason for importing 25,000 Mexican Nationals this year when our state is faced with a considerable amount of unemployment among our own people.

M.F. Small (Secretary to Governor) to Governor Earl Warren, March 25, 1946

Agribusiness in California has a dream, and it is dream no different from the dream of all other capitalists: to reduce labor to labor power, workers to a commodity, human beings to a “factor of production” that can be controlled with at least the same predictability as other factors of production like fertilizer, irrigation water, or seed stock. To a far greater degree than in other industries, however, agriculture is episodic: plants take time to grow during which little labor is needed; crops have to be harvested quickly at the optimal moment and rushed to market, cannery, or storage facility before they spoil. The fact that labor power is embodied in real people thus presents specific challenges to agribusiness. For short, intense periods a great deal of labor is needed; for much of the year the labor demand is far less. The single crop district form of agriculture that developed in California over the first half of the twentieth century—a form of agriculture that made anything like the family farm little more than a convenient idealization behind which self-styled “growers” could hide (Henderson 1999; Stoll 1998; Walker 2004)—intensified the periodicity of labor demand (Fisher 1953; Martin 2003, 20–22). This intensification of periodicity presented a problem to growers: how to assure enough labor of the right quality appeared at the right moment and at the right price and then disappeared when no longer needed. Perhaps even more than securing water or taming commodity markets in the east, the problem of labor power has always been the problem of California’s industrial form of agriculture, and the (always-to-be-struggled-for) answer has always been to find ways to increase labor’s mobility, to keep it moving, rather than allow it to settle down in anything like a community of workers (Galarza 1977: 7). By more thoroughly controlling their mobility, growers reasoned, workers could be more readily reduced to the

1 Earl Warren Papers, File 714, Farm Labor.
commodity labor power, stripped of will and agency, and made even more like other factors of production.

Before World War II, the preferred method of assuring the constant mobility of workers in California agriculture consisted of a dual strategy. The first strategy was to assiduously recruit workers from around the world to assure a labor oversupply and hence intense competition for available harvest jobs. This sped up the harvest, assured constant movement from one crop to another, and guaranteed the high degree of flexibility in the labor market that growers insisted was necessary given the vagaries of farming (Fisher 1953). The oversupply of labor not only increased the flexibility of labor, it also kept labor costs in check, which growers found to be vitally important given that California farming had long been capitalized on the assumption of “cheap labor” (Fuller 1939; Street 2004; Walker 2004). The second, related strategy was to violently resist any attempts by workers to organize and even partially determine the conditions under which they sold their labor power (Almaguer 1994; Daniel 1981; McWilliams 1939; Mitchell 1996; Street 2004).

But World War II presented an opportunity for a significant change—maybe even a rationalization—of the harvest labor market in California. With the war emergency, and with both the state and federal governments’ new found willingness to oversee the recruiting of hundreds of thousands of farmworkers in Mexico, essentially under conditions of indenture, growers saw an opportunity to bring the provision of labor power more fully under their control. The fledgling bracero program, launched in September 1942, offered a historic opportunity that growers were determined not to miss. They saw an opportunity to remake the landscape such that other laborers—domestic farmworkers and their families (white, ethnically Mexican, and others)—would find no room in the landscape: with new state intervention, if properly oriented, a new landscape could be constructed that would make access to this indentured form of labor necessary well after the war ended.

In the past, government intervention on any scale had brought with it attempts to “settle” the labor supply, to improve the conditions under which it worked and lived (thereby perhaps driving up costs), as well as efforts to bolster the rights of farmworkers as people, not merely as sellers of labor power. All such efforts—perhaps most famously encapsulated by the Farm Security Administration’s “government camps” made famous in Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath—were historical anathema to California growers (Daniel 1981; Mitchell 1996). The challenge for growers as the war began was to induce the federal and state government into developing a labor supply that growers could control and dominate with little interference.

By focusing on growers’ efforts to remove federal and state oversight of (but not investment in) the landscape of labor camps that governed labor mobility, I will show in this chapter how the vaunted labor peace—the grand compromise—that marked US postwar capital-labor relations in general did not merely elude California’s agricultural sector, but was actively designed out of it. Both during the war and after, wages for farmworkers stagnated and declined; after the war living
conditions for workers rapidly deteriorated. Indeed, the *bracero* program was a massive *destabilizing* force for agricultural labor, a force for inducing a “massive uprooting … by which entire towns and rural areas were gradually deserted, their residents denied the work that the braceros were contracted to do at a lower wage” (Galarza 1977: 8). In other words, growers were able to use the war emergency, and its aftereffects, to make the condition of workers, if anything, worse than they had been before the war. The war provided an opportunity to create a new “labor peace” in the fields of California that was quite at odds with the larger grand compromise that marked postwar industrial fordism. Curiously (and as we will see), the preservation of this peace required the *destruction*—at least to some large degree—of much of the landscape that the state (and growers) had so heavily invested in during the war years.

Almost everywhere else in California, the massive investments of the war years had transformative and lasting effects, effects still visible in the landscape even all these years later. Giant shipworks in Richmond, expanded ports around the San Francisco Bay and in Long Beach, vastly expanded industrial landscapes in the Southland and South Bay: these and other installations, made possible through an unprecedented state-organization of capital, provided the literal foundation for the rapidly expanding war economy that drew millions of new migrants into the state transforming it into an industrial powerhouse (Lotchin 1992; Starr 2002). Not only did direct state involvement make massive new production possible, it also laid the groundwork—again quite literally—for the postwar boom that was to make California the most economically dynamic state in the country. Even in the wake of the massive disinvestments and deep recessions of the post-oil embargo period, the wartime industrial investments continued to stand as proof of how crucial war was to California’s subsequent economic boom. California’s “public and private power blocs [had] wagered the state’s economic future on the bourgeoning military-industrial complex and became major players in the Pentagon-centered movement to maintain military preparedness in the postwar era” (Gilmore 2007: 36; Markusen et al. 1991), and in many respects it won the wager, as proven by the still-standing, sprawling industrial and residential landscapes it led to. Little is left, however, of the similarly large investment in the agricultural landscape, much of it made for similar reasons.

**Constructing the Wartime Landscape: Making Labor “Fluid”**

Soon after becoming Governor in 1943, Earl Warren called a special session of the California Legislature to pass the Food and Fiber Act of 1943. Written by California Farm Bureau Federation (CFBF) officials “and their sponsoring legislators,” as Warren put it, the Act created a wartime Farm Production Council (FPC), charged with supplementing the newly-initiated federal *bracero* and domestic emergency farm labor programs, by “recruit[ing] men, women and children for farm labor … transport[ing] them to their places of employment … provid[ing] for their
housing where none may now be in existence … feed[ing] them where facilities are not otherwise available,” as well as “rendering to farmers whatever assistance is necessary to the maximum production of food and fiber crops.” Signed into law on March 29, 1943, the FPC started work immediately. With a budget of $1.8 million, the FPC was charged with helping wartime growers achieve the “maximum production and availability of food and fiber possible from the farms of this State; to provide the most effective use of existing farm labor and facilities; and to augment such facilities” through the construction of new camps, processing plants, and so forth (FPC 1945: 3). Finding itself in frequent bureaucratic conflict with the state Extension Service and the War Food Administration (WFA), agencies that had been charged with many of the same functions (but especially with overseeing the importation of braceros), FPC focused particularly on supplying farmworker housing.

The FPC was entirely a growers’ organization, comprised of directors of commodity associations, “cooperatives” like Sunkist, chamber of commerce luminaries, executives of the notoriously antiunion Associated Farmers, and the like. By legislation, no representatives of labor could be part of the Council. To growers, the need for the FPC was pressing. Reports in the papers at the time the bill was being drafted claimed that California farmers had lost some $14.5 million of crops in 1942 due to a lack of labor. The governor’s personal emissary to Washington charged with lobbying for a permanent bracero program pegged the losses at $25 million. Interestingly, California growers also reported a “record harvest” that year. The primary job of the FPC, therefore, was to assure that those losses were eliminated, and those records exceeded. The war effort, farmers argued, depended on it.

To achieve its aims, the FPC set itself up as an “agency of the government operated as a business” that was “directed by farmers and guided by decisions of county committees of farmers,” in the words of its Chairman (Shay 1947: 5; Galarza 1964: 117). The FPC determined that the best way to assure increased wartime production was to rapidly remake the labor-landscape, making those transformations—the construction of new labor camps, the reconstruction of old ones, the provision of trucks and materiel, etc.—that would assure the proper supply of labor was on hand when and as needed. It sought, in other words, to significantly rationalize the system of labor procurement, as well as the ways it would be housed as a means of increasing control over and the predictability of, the farm labor supply.

The FPC’s immediate interventions were impressive. In its first year, the Council undertook nine major initiatives, ranging from converting county fairgrounds into bracero camps to purchasing and fixing dilapidated camps and selling them back to

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3 Press Release, 4/7/43, File 725, Teague to Warren 3/30/43, File 726, Warren Papers, FPC; Fresno Bee 12/12/42 and 1/2/43, Carton 6, File 55, Hollenberg Papers; FPC (1945), 3.
growers at costs, to securing rationed materials for growers constructing their own camps. In the following year it expanded its program, creating a series of mobile camps; depots for storing and renting tents and equipment to farmers, cleaning equipment and mattresses, receiving and redistributing surplus federal goods, and testing new construction techniques; developing camps for braceros in districts where growers had not yet organized into farmers’ associations legally entitled to receive them; and securing a fleet of trucks to move workers and produce to fields, camps, and canneries. In essence it provided a massive subsidy for California growers (FPC 1945: 5–12). As a result of its efforts, the FPC boasted that “cash farm income” for 1944 totaled $1.65 billion, a 10% increase over 1943, which itself had shown a large increase over the “record harvest” of 1942. The 1944 income was two-and-a-half times the 1936–1940 average, despite price ceilings on many commodities that “kept this figure substantially below what it otherwise would have been” (FPC 1945: 21). California now accounted for 13% of farm production in the US, and the demand for workers had grown concomitantly: by the first week of September, 1944, some 442,313 workers were “needed” in the state. The emergency provision of FPC housing had been vital to meeting this need and thus to setting those records.

This was an unprecedented intervention into the agricultural landscape in California. It was the most comprehensive and most rapid program of state-sponsored and -subsidized farmworker housing in the history of the state. Its transformative effect on the landscape, and the system of agricultural production, in the state was profound. By September 1, 1943 (that is within six months of beginning work) the FPC had established 67 “state-owned or controlled” labor camps in 26 counties. It housed another 4,000 workers in six camps the federal government had abandoned when it gave up its experiments in growing guayule for rubber. It provided buildings, equipment, or cash assistance to private operators housing another 10,000. This was not quite the 40,000 workers it promised to house in its first season, but it was still a massive and impressive undertaking. A year later, FPC controlled camps, or provided financial or material aid to farmers for private camps that housed almost 38,000 workers.

The FPC was sure of its work, and for its need: already presumed to be tight, the FPC declared that labor in 1945 promised to be even scarcer. It believed this even though it was well aware that growers routinely inflated their estimates of the number of workers needed and underestimated the number of workers available.

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4 Various Minutes, 1944–45, File 731, Warren Papers, FPC.
5 This number is well in excess of the “fulltime equivalent” required; many if not most workers worked part time (Governor’s Committee 1951, 174).
In 1945, for example, growers requested that 72,000 braceros be imported for the harvest when, the Extension Service told the FPC, no more than 54,000 were required to fill harvest needs. But, the FPC reasoned, the issue wasn’t so much the sheer number of workers as that too many of them were “‘frozen’ in the hands of their present employers for the season,” and thus what was needed were “efforts to keep some fluidity in the program.” The whole point of the bracero program, according to the FPC, was that braceros provided a “fluid supply of farm labor which was shifted to meet extreme shortages as they developed.” And the whole point of the FPC camp construction program was to “attain greater fluidity” in the distribution of braceros and other farmworkers by building the necessary infrastructure of that fluidity. Therefore, in winter, 1945, the FPC began to build camps on spec rather than in response to definite orders or established need, spending some $106,000 on construction and equipment in the first three months of the year alone, adding greatly to an already existing inventory of 518 camps and other boarding facilities in 26 agricultural counties.

The FPC’s concerted effort to supply growers with housing so as to assure a fluid labor supply had another purpose: to lessen or prevent fluidity of another kind. Throughout the harvest of 1944 and the winter of 1945, growers, the Extension Service, and the FPC complained of braceros going “AWOL”—jumping their contracts often to work for farmers paying higher rates. By August, 1945, there were some 7000 braceros “AWOL” in California. Equally a “problem with the operation of the program,” according to the directors of the FPC and WFA “has been [finding ways to encourage] the movement of workers from high paying crops such as peaches, prunes, grapes and tomatoes, to low average daily wage crops such as cotton,” as was continued “pirating” and “poaching” of workers by growers wanting to get their crops in as fast and as cheaply as possible. Growers were asked to refrain from hiring braceros who left their contracted jobs for higher wage crops. The penalty—for workers—was virtual enslavement: the Office of Labor of the WFA adopted a policy in 1945 of returning workers who skipped their contracts for higher paying work to their original employer under penalty of repatriation (the penalty to growers seemed to be non-existent). The effect of this policy was, of course, to hold down wages, whatever the labor market pressures. As one farmer candidly remarked: “if it hadn’t been for the Mexican Nationals” (braceros) who were prevented from seeking higher paying work “local Mexican pickers would be demanding and getting a dollar an hour for field work instead of 70 cents.”

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7 Minutes, 2/2/45, 3/1/45, 4/12/45, Supplement to Minutes, 3/1/45, Cocheron to Bruton, 3/1/45, “Pertinent Paragraphs” (Newsletter #5), File 732, Warren Papers, FPC.

Farm organizations, like CFBF, understood the importance of FPC’s labor camp construction program, as it worked in conjunction with WFA’s policy of trying to assure braceros remained with the growers or associations they were originally contracted to. It was “a very stabilizing factor on the whole farm labor program,” it declared in October 1945 as it prepared to lobby the legislature for a continuance of the FPC now that the war had ended. The CFBF appreciated the FPC largely because of its policy of building camps and housing for growers—housing in growers’ private camps, or camps controlled by and eventually sold cheaply to growers’ associations that pooled labor. This practice was in contrast to that of the Farm Security Administration (the original overseer of the bracero program), and even the WFA (which succeeded the FSA) which built camps for workers. About a fifth of the 63,242 braceros in the US on August 1, 1944, lived in WFA camps; an unknown number of domestic workers lived in such camps (Jones 1945: 15). From the first, federal camps had been perceived by growers as hotbeds of labor agitation, and misguided attempts by government “do-gooders” to control the conditions of labor in California (Daniel 1981, Mitchell 1996). At its 1945 Annual Meeting, therefore, the CFBF renewed its longstanding call that all federally-operated camps be handed over directly to growers’ associations and labor bureaus, not transferred to the state or another public agency (Jelinek 1976: 251). With the efforts of the FPC, by contrast, growers figured they could cement their control over labor while minimizing their direct cost for that labor’s reproduction.

But there is another reason growers favored the FPC. Wittingly or unwittingly, the FPC was engaged in remaking the landscape such that braceros (a controlled and “indentured” labor source: Calavita 1992; Fisher 1953) would henceforth be necessary and favored over domestic workers (who possessed a freedom of occupational mobility and could legally quit work in favor of higher paying labor elsewhere). Almost all the housing FPC built and deployed was designed for single men, almost none for families (domestic workers often worked and travelled as families). And its attempts at encouraging growers to provide housing for families were half-hearted at best, especially in comparison to the leading role it took in lobbying for programs to import single male workers from the Philippines, Central America, and Puerto Rico, for the expanded use of POW labor (even after the war ended), and other recruitment programs. Indeed, by the end of 1945, it had adopted a policy that “Housing in [FPC] camps shall be utilized for unattached men in

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9 Minutes 10/14/45, File 733, Warren Papers, FPC. It would be more accurate to say that active hostilities had ended; see below.

10 In the years 1943–1945, $2.5 million was expended on the construction and improvement of agricultural and railroad camps in California, an unknown portion of which was paid by FPC. By contrast, the federal government estimated that it had $15 million invested in the 27 camps it operated in the state, and that annual operations cost about $1 million. Division of Housing, Biennial Report, 1943–1944, File 2294, Warren Papers, DIR/DoH; Dean to Warren, 11/24/47, File 716, Warren Papers, Farm Labor.
agriculture not for families. This condition is imposed because of a need to make the fullest utilization of all facilities in view of the fact that total housing is short of total requirements, thus insuring proper housing for the maximum number or workers.” The very shape of FPC-built housing—mostly bunkhouses and multi-bunk tents—was seen to preclude their efficient use by families. Between 75% and 87% of the farm labor at this time was of what one official called “the normal type”—domestic workers of all races, single and in families—and only the remainder was braceros, prisoners, POWs, and “volunteers” (students, housewives, etc.). But it was this remainder, especially the braceros that constituted the “fluid” sector, and it was for them that the wartime landscape was constructed.11

Deconstructing the Wartime Landscape: Preserving Fluidity, Instilling Labor Peace

For a time it seemed as if the FPC’s exertions would be for naught. It was not clear that growers would continue to have access to their now-cherished braceros. In December 1944, the US Attorney General ruled that Mexican national workers could only remain in the country for 30 days after the cessation of hostilities. The war ended with Japan’s capitulation in August, 1945. But, saving the farmers their “emergency” labor supply, no official declaration of cessation was made.12 A friend of the farmers soon inserted a sentence in a 1946 appropriations bill to continue the program, now defining as the “emergency” that necessitated it not the war itself but an impending food shortage, the meeting of which, many in Congress averred, required the continued importation of Mexican workers (Rasmussen 1951, 50–52, 277; Kirstein 1977, 53). Though by as early as August 1945 the FPC was warning of deflation in farm commodity prices, projecting a decline in labor demand for 1946 to 80% of what it was in 1945, and consequently predicting a crisis of unemployment, its executive director, R.L. Adams, nonetheless complained that the 1946 appropriation—large enough to import 75,000 workers from Mexico—“isn’t enough,” especially since (in a wide departure from growers’ usual reason for preferring Mexicans: that others would not do unskilled stoop labor) “farming calls for experience—and strength and skill—and knowledge of what to do and how to do it.” This skill simply did not exist in workers recruited from “industrial plants nor on city streets.” While admitting that better housing on farms would do much to attract domestic workers, the fact, according to Adams, was that there simply was not enough, and not enough appropriate, housing available. The wartime landscape had not been built for domestic workers or for families. For the time being, then, according to Adams, bracero labor was a “necessity” not

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12 The President finally declared an end to hostilities on December 31, 1946.
only because of the pending food shortage, but because of a shortage of proper housing.13

But was governmental—and especially federal—intervention in and control over the labor landscape likewise a necessity? Growers did not think so. First in growers’ sights were the federal labor camps—the old FSA, now WFA, camps which had proved a thorn in their side since the mid-1930s, even as they had proved to be of such material benefit during the war. The campaign to take control of the federal camps—the last redoubt of family labor—was spearheaded by the California Chamber of Commerce’s Agricultural Labor Committee, chaired by noted citrus grower C.C. Teague, and comprised of some of the most prominent agriculturalists in the state. Teague, who as Governor Warren’s “personal emissary” in Washington, had been a central player in California growers’ successful effort to move the bracero program out of the hands of the FSA and into the farmer-friendly WFA (Mitchell 2010), created a subcommittee to travel to Washington and lobby for a bill creating a national farm labor program, a provision of which would bar the use of federal funds to fix or regulate the wages, housing standards, or hours of farmworkers. It would also bar government support of unionization and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.14

The final version of the house bill on farm labor was drafted almost in its entirety by a consortium of national farm organizations. H.R. 3367 incorporated all that California growers wanted in relation to barring the federal government from regulating farm labor, but added a proviso that the Secretary of Agriculture sell all federal camps, farm labor homes, and labor supply centers before December 31, 1948 to farmers or farmers’ associations. Were this version of the bill to be signed into law, it would assure that the federal camps would no longer be public; no longer would they necessarily be camps within which workers had a certain degree of autonomy; no longer, perhaps, would they continue to serve, as they had in the past, as a model, a point of pressure, for “obtaining better housing standards in rural areas in the past two or three years than was possible … in the past 30 years,” as one internal document put it in 1946. Now they would be just like all the other grower-controlled camps: little company towns or private fiefdoms.15

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13 Minutes, 8/9/45, File 733, Warren Papers, FPC; Adams, “1946 Farm Labor Prospects,” 1/14/46, File 714, Warren Papers, Farm Labor. At the very moment Adams was publicly announcing the need for more labor importation, the FPC privately informed the Governor that there was a labor surplus in the field and reports of the California Division of Housing detailed conditions in the camps as bad as they were at the nadir of the Depression. MacGregor to Warren 3/4/45; Division of Housing, Monthly Report to Director, 5/46 and 10/46, File 2296, Warren Papers, DIR/DoH.


15 H.R. 3367, 80th Congress, 1st Session, introduced May 7, 1947, Box 35, File 9b, Douglas Collection. “Subject Matter for Presentation to the Regular Staff Meeting to be Held on March 5, 1946,” Carton 40, File 33, Taylor Papers.
Concerted opposition to H.R. 3367 (and its Senate companion) quickly developed from unions, church groups, and sundry progressive organizations, especially since the bill seemed to fly in the face of a series of recommendations made by a recent Federal Interagency Committee on Migratory Labor. The bill did not pass; but neither did an alternative “progressive” bill introduced by California Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas (H.R. 3856), which was supported by unions and others concerned with the plight of farmworkers. A third bill (H.R. 4254/S.1555), much narrower in scope, did pass, however. This bill focused only on the question of labor camps and how they were to be disposed of by the federal government. Earlier, the Farmers’ Home Administration Act (passed in August 1946 with considerable support from growers), had not only abolished the FSA once and for all, it had also provided for all federal farm labor housing to be sold to the highest bidder. Growers soon realized that this provision might work against their interests, either putting the camps out of their reach or, worse, allowing labor organizations to purchase them. To rectify this, and not finding enough support for H.R. 3367, they pushed for a law to modify the camp liquidation program. H.R. 4254, widely known as the Bramblett Bill, did just that. It easily passed both chambers and was signed into law as Public Law 298 on July 31, 1947.

P.L. 298 provided that the camps should be sold to public or semi-public agencies, or to associations of farmers, but could not be sold to labor organizations or other community groups. The law further required that the federal government cease operation of the camps by January 30, 1948 (though it could contract out their operation if sales were not yet finalized). In fact Congress had only appropriated enough funds for their operation through September 30, 1947, and P.L. 298 did not appropriate any more. This represented a real victory for growers, as some federal camps (particularly in California) had begun to serve, in the immediate postwar years, as a stay against the hypermobility of agricultural workers that growers so desired. For some workers the camps were becoming something like permanent homes, especially since by the 1946 harvest season there was a severe rural housing shortage. Turnover of workers in the federal camps during the 1946 harvest “was relatively light … because housing was so scarce that folks were afraid to move unless they had definite assurance of shelter in a new location.” In the face of the housing crisis, the camps seemed to freeze up the liquidity of labor. For many growers the only solution was to get rid of the camps altogether—or barring that to take control of them to assure that residents were only resident

16 The Douglas bill was H.R. 3856, 80th Congress, 1st Session, introduced June 16, 1947, Box 98, File 9, Douglas Collection; a copy of H.R. 4254 is in File 716, Warren Papers, Farm Labor; S.1555 is in Box 35, File 9b, Douglas Collection. Extensive documentation of the opposition of the Chamber of Commerce-sponsored bill, and of provisions of the Bramblett Bill is available in File 716, Warren Papers, Farm Labor, and Carton 40 Files 22, 30, Taylor Papers. See also Rasmussen 1951, 55–6, 84).
when they were working on area farms, and that they could be forced out on the road when their labor was no longer desired.17

Even as the farm labor bills were working their way through Congress, the FPC liquidated itself on June 30, 1947, as per the terms of its enabling legislation, having already sold off its stock of camps, buildings, tent equipment, and so forth, almost entirely to farmers and at fire sale prices. No longer, therefore, would there be a state agency devoted explicitly to providing housing for farm labor. Faced with an evident rural housing shortage, growing unemployment, an influx of transient workers from the east, the imminent closing of the federal camps, and the elimination of the FPC, Governor Warren thus created an ad-hoc Committee on Migrant Farm Labor Camps to conduct a survey of farm housing conditions and to propose recommendations as to whether the state should take control of the federal camps. The Committee reported to the governor that the Attorney General had determined that current California law had no provision for state purchase and operation of the camps, and thus legislative action would be necessary. The legislature was not due to meet until the following year—and when it did, it voted not to take over the camps, but rather, at the behest of growers, to bar the state from operating them.18

It is hard to overestimate the shift in the geometry of power this liquidation of the federal camps (and the disinclination of California to take them over) represented. The camps had originally been constructed during the Depression not only as an emergency intervention into the appalling housing conditions that traditionally marked California fields; they had also been constructed as an intervention into the lopsided and frequently violent relations of labor that structured California agriculture. They were specifically understood as a means of curbing, at least a little, the overweening power of growers to control the lives of workers; to prevent housing from being used as a tool of strikebreaking and union-busting; and to create at least a limited island of worker independence and semi-autonomy in the


18 Minutes, 1/16/47, 3/6/47, 4/3/47, 6/5/47, Burke to Clayton 2/5/47, Burke to Warren, 6/30/47 File 735, Warren Papers, FPC; Warren to Brannan 9/12/47; Drobish to Warren 8/14/47, “Migratory Farm Labor Housing: Background and Factual Data, September 8, 1947,” File 716, Warren Papers, Farm Labor; “Labor Camp Bill Approved: Farmers Win in Senate Committee,” San Francisco News 3/19/48. Growers were divided on whether to abolish the FPC after the war; most organizations eventually supported abolition on the grounds of proving conservative values of limited government and private enterprise.
sea of grower hostility that defined farm work in California (Stein 1973: 150–59; Mitchell 1996, chapter 8).

Even so, as it turned out, growers proved reluctant to buy the federal camps, in large part because they were expensive to operate (officials estimated an annual operating deficit of $600,000, a figure expected to grow in coming years as necessary maintenance came due). Growers thus sought to bargain the USDA down, with the Chamber of Commerce asserting that “it is not the obligation of the farmers to buy the camps—it is the obligation of the Department of Agriculture to sell the camps” (original emphasis). They were partially successful. In the wake of a series of confusions and delays, and having trouble convincing states like California to take over the camps, the federal government leased the camps rent-free to growers’ associations: growers thus got the camps, but little of the expenses. Unsurprisingly, then, the government found few takers even when it offered to sell the camps to associations at 15% of their assessed value. Under the terms of their rent-free leases, growers liked to crow that they were adept at running good camps in which “the workers have been happy,” in large part, they claimed, because camps “were in better physical condition than … under government operation.” They claimed they were more efficient in running the camps than the federal government was.19

This was simply not true. Commenting on his experiences while interviewing a 10% sample of workers in eleven formerly-federal camps in California, an investigator for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) wrote that he “had been quite distressed at the changes I have seen in the camps.” He found only two camps “to be in as good condition was when the government operated them.” In these two camps, though, longtime residents were upset that they were barred from purchasing their own homes and apartments, assuming that growers wanted to retain the camps so they could “use housing as a control measure.” The investigator found that growers’ associations had cut maintenance in almost all the camps, even as rents were raised. In one camp, apartment rents began at $5 per month when the camp was first built, rising to $16 by the end of government operation. In the two months since the growers took it over, rents were raised to $36. The investigator quoted one resident’s calculation that the growers’ association was clearing about $11,000 a month after the salaries of its skeletal maintenance crew were deducted—a crew so thin on the ground that garbage cans were rarely emptied. The informant argued that “diarrhea is getting to be quite common due to the unsanitary conditions and we may have such an epidemic of it sometime that they will have to close the camp.” The investigator was at pains

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to point out that this camp was far from the worst he visited. Other investigators echoed the BAE findings. Under these conditions, growers associations saw little reason to purchase the camps. They now had control, and they were cash cows.\textsuperscript{20}

The federal government was in a quandary, however: the Bramblett Bill required it sell the camps, whether growers wanted to purchase them or not. The quandary was eventually solved through a provision in the landmark 1949 housing bill that allowed unsold labor supply camps to be transferred to local Public Housing Authorities (PHAs). Once again this represented something of a victory for growers as throughout rural California PHAs were largely controlled by growers, almost as a division of their associations. Thus while the camps remained (legally) public, they did not so much remain the small islands of freedom they were often imagined to be. Indeed, since many PHAs were unprepared to operate the camps, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) negotiated with growers’ associations to continue their operation. And since PHAs were under no obligation to receive the camps, the USDA sweetened the pot by transferring $2 million to the FHA for rehabbing camps prior to sale or transfer—between $20,000 and $50,000 per camp. This was a significant amount. At the best-run camps, investments in maintenance and improvement of the camps over the length of the growers’ association tenure (October 1947 to November 1950) tended to hover around $20,000 \textit{in toto}; and many camps it was far less.\textsuperscript{21}

These machinations concerning the federal labor camps need to be understood as a direct move by growers not only to take control of the conditions for living of many domestic farmworkers, but especially to show that, in the wake of the war, relying on domestic labor was foolhardy. It was clear that what they sought to do was not only control their domestic workers, but as much as possible to drive them out and replace them with much more easily manipulable \textit{braceros}. Yet, once again, the supply of \textit{braceros} seemed to be threatened. Congress had passed Public Law 40 in April 1947 that declared that the importation program would terminate at the end of that year. But one section of P.L. 40, together with a series of agreements between Mexico and the US, allowed for the “legalization” of undocumented workers in the border region. While most of these workers were regularized in Texas, growers in California’s Imperial Valley also greatly benefited (Calavita 1992: 24; Kirstein 1977: 55–6; Scruggs 1988: 97–8, 324–38). Even more, under the negotiated agreements, growers were now permitted to engage in the direct recruitment of Mexican workers—the holy grail of California farmers, and a practice they had been barred from since the inception of the program.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[20] Taylor, “Present Operation” and other reports in note 17.
\item[21] Governor’s Committee to Survey the Agricultural Resources of the San Joaquin Valley, \textit{Transcript of Public Hearing}, Fresno 6/20/50, p. 59. See the extensive correspondence in File 25, and Reporter’s Transcript of Meeting, Fresno 6/20/50, pp. 37–9, File 2, Governor’s Committee ALRSJV.
\item[22] De Guicio to McColly 4/4/47, File 715, Warren Papers, Farm Labor; Minutes 6/6/47, File 735, Warren Papers, FPC; various letters, USES to Hasiwar, Box 22, File 2,
\end{footnotes}
P.L. 40 expired in early 1948, and thus the source of regular and regularized braceros seemed threatened, and with it, in the growers view, whatever control and flexibility they had been able to create in the harvest labor market. Growers mobilized. While one group of growers was in Washington arguing for the extension of the bracero program, another delegation met with the Governor to enlist his aid in developing Filipino, Navajo, and Puerto Rican labor programs (though the growers made a show of being concerned about which Puerto Ricans since they “conceded that the negro people should not be brought into California”). Growers argued, in what was becoming a common refrain, that while it was true there were unemployed workers about, by and large they could not house them: the landscape had been remade for braceros. In the Salinas Valley, for example, vegetable growers boasted of having “one of the best housing projects in the State, but conceded that it was of the dormitory type” and not suitable for families. To house families of the 6,000 workers needed at peak season in Salinas “would require a small city,” growers averred, since in both vegetables and citrus “the labor is of such a character that women and children cannot perform it.” The importation of single men from Mexico, the Philippines of Puerto Rico was thus imperative. (The same argument was made by a representative of cotton growers, even though he admitted that there was no physical reason women and children could not be put to work in that crop.)

Though skeptical of some grower claims (and of their legal ability to keep “the negro people” out), the Governor expressed his support for the continued importation of labor, in part because the system of labor distribution in the state remained essentially irrational, no matter the interventions of the FPC during the war, as became clear that fall. The 1948 cotton harvest was the largest in history (acreage was more than 2.5 times the prewar average), and picking was paid at the “relatively high” rate of $3.00 per hundred pounds. As a result, workers abandoned “half-picked fields of tomatoes, prunes, and grapes to pick cotton” (USDA BAE 1950: 16). Overall during the year “there was more movement … than there had been for several years, and fewer days of work,” with workers frantically racing from crop to crop up and down the state (and into Oregon) in search of good wages. As a result, some districts faced labor shortages as their traditional local supply of workers was nowhere to be found (USDA BAE 1950: 17), seemingly to further cement the case for the need for an imported labor force whose “fluidity” was carefully controlled.

And the growers were to get their way. Even before California growers descended on Washington to lobby for an extension of the bracero program as P.L. 40 expired, key members of Congress, USDA, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) met to work out ways to continue labor importation.
regardless of the provisions of law (Calavita 1992, 25–6; President’s Commission 1951, 41). By February 21, 1948, a new agreement had been signed with Mexico. This agreement made growers directly responsible for contracting workers at recruitment centers in Mexico (heretofore the federal government had been the official employer; growers were subcontractors), and named the United States Employment Service (USES, heretofore only responsible for domestic labor recruitment) as the chief “operating agency” of the program. The USES role was solidified that July when Congress passed a law directing it, despite the formal cessation of the program under P.L. 40, nonetheless to recruit foreign workers, and workers in Puerto Rico, and to arrange for their transportation and deployment to farmers (Calavita 1992: 27; Kirstein 1977: 66; Scruggs 1988: 398–9).

With direct recruiting in Mexico now part of statutory law (if not completely in the terms they might prefer), growers were edging ever closer to turning the *bracero* program into what Carey McWilliams called their “dream of heaven” (quoted in Calavita 1992: 21) and creating what the Associated Farmers once called “a mobile task force of Mexican workers.” In other words: totally fluid labor power. For domestic workers (many of them Mexican American) matters were different. They found “fewer days of work” and a greater imperative to “rush away” (as one report rather euphemistically put it; USDA BAE 1950: 17) from one place to another in search of work, as *braceros* filled their old jobs. They petitioned the governor to halt further importations, and as growers upped their demand and asked for even more Mexican workers as the 1948 harvest neared its peak some domestic workers made it clear “they are ready to resist” further importation “by violence” if necessary.

For the first time since before the war, there was in fact a real possibility of resistance. Organized labor had largely abandoned farmworkers during the war, and the AFL in particular had a longstanding hostility towards organizing agricultural workers (Daniel 1981; Jamieson 1976; Majka and Majka 1982; Ruiz 1987; Weber 1994). With a change in leadership, the California Federation of Labor opened slightly toward the organizing of field workers, and even welcomed (if hesitantly) the AFL’s charting of the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU), an offshoot of the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, to organize California farm labor (Baldinger 1947; Galarza 1970, 1977; Grubbs 1975; London and Anderson 1970; Pitti 2001). In its earliest months, the NFLU concentrated its efforts among white, domestic farmworkers in Fresno, Kern, and Tulare Counties (indeed, its first organizer in California, Hank Hasiar, “knew no Spanish”). In particular, Hasiar focused on the “Okie” towns of Arvin (home of one of the FSA’s most successful camps, and the model for Steinbeck’s depictions), Lamont, and Weed

24 Galarza to Fishburn 10/20/48, Box 23, File 3, Galarza Papers.
Patch in the southern San Joaquin Valley, where many of the residents worked for the massive DiGiorgio Farms.26

When a thousand NFLU-organized workers struck DiGiorgio, the “mobile task force of Mexican workers” proved their worth.27 While the 130 braceros and 70 or so undocumented Mexican workers employed by the firm at first refused to cross the picket line, the Kern County sheriff, together with a representative of the USDA, encouraged them to return to work, probably under threat of deportation (Galarza 1964: 216; 1970: 23; 1977: 103–104; Street 2007). Over the next six weeks, the US Department of Labor dithered over whether a strike was really in effect. If it was, braceros would have to be withdrawn from the farm. By the time USDL had finally certified a strike, DiGiorgio had recruited a scab labor force. It is likely (though not certain) that had the braceros not been coaxed back to work on the first day, the strike (which was fairly disastrous for the fledgling union) would have taken a very different course. The flexibility—the fluidity—of bracero labor provided a crucial cushion.

That was true also in the next large strike action by the NFLU, in the northern San Joaquin Valley tomato harvest of 1950. When workers walked off their jobs demanding better pay and the end to a bonus system, braceros and undocumented workers were extensively (and illegally) recruited to replace them (Galarza 1977, 142). And despite a direct request from the Department of Labor, the INS refused to investigate the use of undocumented workers as strikebreakers. When striking workers were evicted wholesale from grower camps, the NFLU asked the state or federal government to make available to it a surplus camp, from either the supply of former federal camps, or ones left vacant when the California Water Project was completed. But its request was to no avail. The state averred that under the Bramblett Bill, it could not transfer camps to organized workers, only organized growers. Indeed, as the strike progressed, growers found it convenient to house some of the braceros and undocumented workers in one of the camps the union had earlier requested (Galarza 1977: 43).28

Despite these impediments, the Union was able to force wages upwards and see the end to the bonus system. But the gains did not last. In response to the strike, tomato growers redoubled their efforts to secure bracero labor the following year—once again housing many in precisely the camps the state refused to domestic workers—forcing many resident workers to “rush away” in search of work. Wages dropped—and continued to drop in real terms for the rest of the decade (Anderson 1964: 222)—and the bonus system returned. Growers increased both their control

26 Hasiwar, Confidential “Report on Farm Labor Organization in California, March 1947 to April 1949,” Box 9, File 8, Galarza Papers.
27 The analysis in this and the next two paragraphs draws on Mitchell (forthcoming).
28 See Galarza to Weber, no date, Galarza to Colina, no date, Galarza to Torreano, no date, Galarza to Mitchell, no date, Galarza to Boke, no date, Galarza to Warren 9/11/50, Galarza to Torreano 9/13/50, Mitchell to Galarza 9/18/50, Tobin to Mitchell 10/11/50, Box 46, File 8 Galarza Papers; Oakley to Small 9/13/50, File 2299, Warren Papers DIR/DoH.
over the labor market and flexibility in deploying workers. And they increased crop production by 15% between 1950 and 1958. By 1956, braceros made up half the peak labor force in the San Joaquin Valley and totally dominated the tomato harvest (Anderson 1964, Rooney 1961, Runsteen and Leveen 1981). And a year after the strike, declaring another war emergency (this time in Korea), and despite on-going concerns about roiling unemployment among domestic workers, Congress Passed P.L. 78, which returned the bracero program as a whole back to its statutory basis, and made the importation of indentured labor for all intents and purposes a permanent part of the mid-century landscape (Calavita 1992; Galarza 1964, Kirstein 1977; Scruggs 1988).  

In the wake of P.L. 78, the NFLU did not have a single significant labor or organizing victory in California. Whenever it came close, growers quickly deployed braceros, often kicking domestic workers out of camps to make room for them, and always claiming an “emergency” of one sort of another to justify their actions (Korea, impending bad weather, unstable markets in the east). The result was a massive and on-going displacement of domestic workers—what government officials in charge of the program called the “domination” of crops and districts by imported workers at the expense of local workers (State of California 1961, Anderson 1964, Galarza 1964, 1977). Throughout the 1950s, according to the highest ranking California official involved in the program, domination “grew like topsy.” Furthermore, camp conditions for all workers deteriorated over the course of the 1950s, especially in the former FSA camps, and in camps originally built and handed over to the growers by the FPC. In the latter case, federal officials found conditions at the end of the decade so appalling at two FPC-built camps that they removed a total of almost a thousand braceros at the height of the harvest, something they had rarely (if ever) done before. In all, 144 growers’ association camps were closed in California in 1959 (in 1958, only 129 camps were closed in the whole of the 10-state western region), and more than 1,000 (of 4,705) were threatened with closure if they were not drastically improved. But this was an aberration (induced in part by a new gubernatorial administration less beholden to rural interests than the one it replaced; Rarick 2005). More frequent was the state and federal governments’ uncanny ability to look the other way when, for example, braceros were “housed” in a “Big Corral” in Yuba City with no shelter, little shade, and no toilets before and after being distributed to individual farmers. 

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29 P.L. 78 required that braceros only be used in “essential” crops. A study by USDL, however, found that by 1959, “More than 60% of all Mexicans employed at peak [harvest] work in crops which are in surplus supply,” and that the Secretary of Agriculture had never determined a crop to be non-essential (State of California 1961, 306).

30 Transcript of Meeting, Between Edward Hayes ... and Representatives of the Community Serviced Organization, Oxnard, 1/15/59, Box 20, File 6; Hollingsworth to Galarza 8/23/57, Box 47, File 8; various notes on camp conditions, Box 47, File 1, Galarza Papers; Dellums and Bailey to Nixon 8/28/57, NAWU “Behind the Scenes in the Peach Bowl of America,” 10/16/57, Box 10, File 12, Knight Papers, Series 42; “US Shuts Down
Conclusion

The vaunted “labor peace,” the grand compromise, that marked postwar US labor relations did not just elude the California farm landscape, it was actively designed out of it. While the 1950s were in many ways a quiescent decade in the fields—the impressive, overt violence of the prewar years was not reprised—it was quiescent because, through the bracero program as well as their struggles for control of the camps, growers had quite thoroughly cemented their control over the conditions of labor. They had come much closer to fully reducing labor to labor power, people to factors of production. They had cemented conditions that increased mobility and contingency—flexibility and fluidity—while reducing its costs. They had succeeded in making what began as a supplementary labor force (and which at the end of the decade still only accounted for a little over a quarter of temporary and 10% of all farm labor in California) the essential labor force (State of California 1961, 84). It was essential now because it was totally “fluid” and nearly totally controllable. Indeed, by the middle of the decade growers had succeeded in winning rules that allowed for: the hiring of “specials” (long-term contracts for specially-designated, skilled, and reliable braceros that growers asserted were now vital to the whole growing process); instant telephone approval of recruitment requests (bypassing the normal paperwork and approval process); the ability to offer special four week contracts (the legal minimum was six weeks) when “emergencies such as unseasonably hot weather advances the maturity of a crop or causes overlapping seasons, or when domestic workers do not appear as expected;” a 15-day “grace period” after the expiration of a contract when braceros could be compelled to continue working; up to two 15-day “informal extensions” of contracts after the grace period; unlimited recontracting (despite provisions in P.L. 78 limiting this); unlimited “transfers” of braceros between growers (though worker consent was formally required); and provisions for unilaterally terminating bracero contracts (State of California 1961: 87–8).31

Growers had successfully mobilized during the war to establish an “agency of the government operated as a business,” the FPC, that was “directed by farmers and guided by decisions of county committees of farmers” and that was charged with constructing a landscape appropriate to the mass importation of single, male, workers from Mexico; and they had succeeded in the postwar period in deconstructing government control over that landscape (and much of the landscape itself), assuring that labor reproduction costs—and also wages—would decline as productivity and output increased. In so doing they undermined what little gains

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31 The unlimited recontracting was especially attractive; it meant growers could contract workers to the six-week minimum, and use the recontracting process both to weed out “jokers” and “agitators,” and to instill discipline in the others (Anderson 1964: 55).
domestic workers had made towards stabilization and a degree of rootedness in the prewar period. The labor peace in the postwar fields was achieved at the cost of deepening the immiseration of farmworkers, immiseration that would be little addressed until the resurgence of farm labor organizing by the United Farm Workers in the mid-1960s. That resurgence was itself predicted, as its primary architects like Cesar Chavez, Fred Ross, Delores Huerta, and Larry Itliong knew it had to be, on a concerted effort to wipe out, once and for all, the *bracero* program, a campaign that would take until the end of 1964 to reach fruition.

War provided an opening, an opportunity. Though there were any number of analyses at its outset showing that there was no serious labor shortage in the California fields (see Mitchell 2010), growers were able to successfully mobilize under the banner of the “emergency” of the war to achieve a spectacular reorientation of labor relations in the fields. As the war ended, growers found that the best way to secure their newly fluid labor supply was to perpetuate the pretext of an “emergency,” while reworking the material transformation of the landscape to make their new-found labor supply seemingly indispensable. Governor Earl Warren wondered, in 1946, why *braceros* were being imported into the state when unemployment was a growing crisis. The answer, developed in the midst of war, was simply because, convinced that they had to, growers found out they *could*.

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Chapter 14

The Hidden War: The “Risk” to Female Soldiers in the US Military

Lorraine Dowler

The Other Woman
Says it can’t be scary,
Because he only grabbed her,
Stalked her, didn’t rape her.
Didn’t do anything more.

Her friend says his grabs
were violent and painful
the way he followed her,
unseen, in the dark, came
from behind and did it again
and again. So now every night
is footsteps.

The military promoted him.
He was such an outgoing
sort—a family man, Christian and
a team player. They decided the
three female officers
who complained about him were
simply, like their friend, “a bad lot.”
like overripe tomatoes in the garden,
Who would bother with them?

One by one, her friend says, we
were denied promotion, split up
from the others by different shifts
and assignments. One sent to Alaska
and three left the military. A husband
wanted to kick his ass. Another said
he would kill him slowly.
The Other Woman says, 
Goddamn. That bothered 
you guys? That was nothing.

(McDonald 2008: 82–3)\(^1\)

**Introduction**

This chapter focuses on female soldier’s increased vulnerability in the United States Military from both state legislation that restricts women from combat units and violent attacks by their male cohort. This exposure is a direct result of their bodies being viewed as foreign within an institution that embodies masculinity and virility. The lack of understanding of women’s bodies in militarized environments is illustrative of what the popular media has coined “the private war” of female soldiers (Benedict 2009). The focus of this chapter might seem out-of-place in a volume that concentrates on the critical theme of post-war reconstruction. However, as Kirsch and Flint argue in the introduction to this book, the spaces of conflict and reconstruction are not only interconnected; the hegemonic power relations that are heightened during war are subsequently reproduced in spaces of post-war reconstruction. One particularly disturbing illustration of this concept is a 2004 study of veterans from the Vietnam War onwards, which detailed that 71% of the women veterans seeking help for post-traumatic stress disorder reported they were sexually assaulted or raped by a fellow solider (Murdach et al. 2004). To this end, trauma is a fluid process, which does not recognize the temporal boundaries of war and post war reconstruction.

The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First to point to the immediate issues of vulnerability for women in the United States Military and second to demonstrate how this particular case is part of a larger process of gender sovereignty. For this reason I argue there is an interdependent and gendered relationship with states considered sovereign in the global community and those states that have been classified as failed. As part of this analysis, I argue that gender is an important factor to portraying some sovereigns as liberal-minded and democratic, while others are viewed as totalitarian for their failure to protect women. Understanding the interdependency of sovereignty and state failure, within the framework of gender, is important to any discussions of post war reconstruction for the following reasons. First, if the events of some women in war are eclipsed in favor of projecting a national solidarity, then it would be difficult for all women to share equally in the post-war nation building process. Second, if state sovereignty or failure is defined by the visibility of women’s experiences, depending on their location in the world, then the power relations inherent to international relations will remain

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\(^1\) “Every Night is Footsteps” by Elizabeth Keough McDonald originally appeared in *Powder: Writing by Women in the Ranks, from Vietnam to Iraq* (Kore Press, 2008). Reprinted here with permission from the publisher.
unevenly skewed. Illustrative of this is Kelly Oliver’s argument that discussions of the liberation of women outside of the United States are used as a justification for war. She contends that the rhetoric of liberation “conceals women’s oppression here at home while at the same time reassuring us that we are liberated” (Oliver 2007: 47). Oliver specifically points to George W. Bush’s designation of Muslim women as “women of cover” needing to be saved from “backward traditions” as a way the United States “shores up images of freedom and privilege at home” (Oliver 2007: 47).

Consequently, we often think of wars as exceptional events that are waged in the desert, the jungle, city-streets, countrysides, beaches and even outer space. However, as the opening poem of this essay suggests war is not a spectacular public occurrence limited to battlefields, instead war can be viewed as a hegemonic progression, which continues to be battled, endured and survived in private spaces long after governments have declared the end of battle and the beginning of so-called peace.

Keeping this in mind, I argue that the temporal boundaries of warfare are far from precise and, rather than examining war as a dated “event,” feminist scholars view war as a practice which heightens and exploits gender identities. I am prompted by international relations scholar Laura Sjoberg who suggests that war is not simply an event but should be viewed as a process. Consequently, she challenges some of our temporal understandings of war in the following ways: “first wars start earlier and go on longer than traditional interpretations identify; second, wars reach deeper into societies than conventional reports would portray; finally, wars can be fought with a wider variety of means and by a wider variety of actors than previously imagined” (Sjoberg 2006: 53). Feminists are now examining war and militarization as linked systems that require a feminist analysis to uncover spaces of violence often overlooked by traditional academic approaches (Dowler forthcoming). Most importantly, a feminist analysis is one approach to understanding how the spaces of pre-war, and post-war reconstruction are linked in ways that reproduce the masculine hegemony of the state. This is of course not a new argument and many scholars have argued that the state has failed to protect certain groups of people, most specifically those who have historically been disenfranchised by the state due to race, gender, class and sexuality (Davis 2008, Riley 2008, Eisenstein 2007, Enloe 2007, Oliver 2007, Kinsella 2006, Cooke 2002). In this chapter I argue that the United States has attempted to reinforce its sovereignty by projecting an image of a liberal-minded yet chivalrous state, in terms of gender, while in reality is a “failed state” as a result of its failure to protect its own citizens, in this case, female soldiers in war.

This chapter addresses two paradoxes as they relate to the safety of female soldiers. First, in defining combat, it was determined that women were to be excluded from units that engage in direct combat on the ground. As a result, legislation was employed to protect women from enemy threats and not to place women in positions of bodily “risk”. This legislation is commonly addressed as the “risk rule” which will be explored later in this chapter. However, it is clear due
to the increasing number of women who are being killed, injured, and disfigured that women are most certainly being put in harms way (McSally 2007). This phenomenon will be examined later in this essay in the section titled: Protecting Women Soldiers from External Risk. The second contradiction addressed in this chapter explores the disparity between the patriarchal view of “risk” enshrined in military combat policies and the maintenance of threatening male practices when it comes to dealing with sexual harassment and assault of female soldiers by fellow soldiers. The violations of women’s bodies by fellow soldiers will be examined in the section of this chapter titled, Protecting Women Soldiers from Internal Risk. This chapter argues that the United States is a failed state because on one hand the state promotes notions of chivalry and protection for its female soldiers; while on the other hand, the state turns a blind-eye to both the external and internal threats women encounter everyday in the military. Most importantly, this essay argues that this false understanding of protection has implications for post-war reconstruction in that a closer reading of war exposes the connections between state power and acts of disciplining a society by way of invoking archaic gender norms into our everyday spaces. In other words, practices and beliefs pertaining to the combat zone, such as men as protectors of the nation, are used to maintain and intensify patriarchal relations in what are nominally defined as “normal” or “peaceful” moments in time.

Failed States

I argue that the United States is a “state that has failed” to protect certain citizens, women soldiers, who are operating on the multiple frontlines of the war. However this is a multiscalar argument that not only demonstrates how the state has failed female soldiers but has failed all citizens by adopting policies based on exclusion. For example, the unit cohesion policy allows for the recruitment of the underbelly of our society, such as convicted rapists, rather than gays and women (Frank 2009). Therefore one needs to question the general implications of labeling certain groups, such as women and gays, as inappropriate for full military service due to prejudicial policies; what does it mean in terms of the readiness of our military and for the state’s failure to protect its citizens at large? Most importantly, how does

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2 In his 2010 State of the Union Address President Obama asked Congress to repeal the law that established DADT. On May 27th 2010 the US House of Representatives approved the repeal, with a 234-194 vote, as did the Senate Arms Services Committee with a 16-12 vote. However the repeal does not go into affect until the DOD determines that unit cohesion, troop readiness and recruitment and retention of soldiers will remain unaffected by gay and lesbian soldiers being allowed to openly serve in the military. Under the repeal openly gay and lesbian soldiers cannot be removed from military service based on their sexual orientation, as in the case of women who are already legally allowed to serve in the military, the repeal of the DADT policy does nothing to ensure that gays will be fully
this failure spillover into “civil society” when women and gays are considered
disruptive to societal cohesion or deemed unable to act under fire? In other words,
does the disenfranchisement of certain groups within the military, in the name of
combat efficiency, lead to their further marginalization within general society, or
what are understood to be “peacetime” situations. Finally, how do notions of “state
chivalry” reinforce US sovereignty, while marking other states as failed?

This analysis destabilizes the already wobbly definitions of a “failed state”
which as Noam Chomsky points out is “frustratingly imprecise” (Chomsky 2006).
Chomsky argues that the concept of “the failed state” is a strategic weapon,
employed by the United States, to justify its military intervention in other nations.
Chomsky’s argument highlights some of the common characteristics between the
United States and failed states, in that failed states share an

inability or unwillingness to protect their citizens from violence and perhaps
even destruction. Another is their tendency to regard themselves as beyond the
reach of domestic or international law, and hence free to carry out aggression
and violence. And if they have democratic forms, they suffer from a serious
‘democratic deficit’ that deprives their formal democratic institutions of real
substance. … we should have little difficulty in finding the characteristics of
‘failed states’ right at home. (Chomsky 2006: 1–2)

I, like Chomsky, am interested in the ironies of “democratic deficits” when a
simple turning of the mirror uncovers similar failures on the part of the United
States. However, I argue that the bodies of the women highlighted in this chapter
share a commonality with failed states in that they help strengthen the perception
of United States as sovereign. Therefore, scale plays an important role in
determining both the sovereignty of the nation-state and the failure of the state over
the individual body. I submit there is a process of “gender sovereignty” at hand
whereby the bodies of women are utilized to both shore-up the sovereignty of one
nation-state while simultaneously eroding the sovereignty of others (Oliver 2007,
Sjoberg 2006, Tickner 2001). Historically, the strength of one’s military to protect
a territory and presumably all the citizens within that territory was considered a
hallmark of national sovereignty. Laura Sjoberg affirms the link between gender,
sovereignty and scale when she argues: “The sovereign state militarizes and
genders both personal lives and political relations” (Sjoberg 2006: 67).

I argue as a result of the process of gender sovereignty what appears to be
a progressive gender politics in terms of the actions of the state, in this case the
United States allowing the recruitment of women into their military ranks, is instead
the masking a type of territoriality that seeks to: 1) Discipline women within the
sovereignty to create a cohesive national image and 2) mobilize to establish a

accepted into the hyper-masculine ranks of the military. For example, the DOD study could
suggest that gay men be restricted from combat units as women are due to the argument of
unit cohesion.
superiority amongst sovereignties whereby, a nation appears broadminded when
gender is constructed in opposition to and juxtaposed against gender-roles in non-
Western states, rendering these states as powerless, tyrannical or failed.

Illustrative of this is Zillah Eisenstein’s argument that the presence of women
in the military may make the military appear more modern and egalitarian, as if
women have access to the same opportunities as men. However, she warns us
not to confuse a more modern military (the presence of women) with notions
democracy or women’s liberation. Instead Eisenstein contends that women’s
bodies are “sexual decoys” symbolic of the new military when in actuality they are
actors in the newest state of international relations (Eisenstein 2007).

Ultimately, sovereignty is strengthened when the state appears to be liberal-
minded vis-à-vis gender, especially when contrasted against other states that fail
to protect their citizens, especially women. For this reason, the concept of gender
sovereignty is non-linear and ‘jump scales,’ a term used by feminist geographers
to highlight global spatial fluidity (Herrod and Wright 2002). Therefore when
theorizing failed states or a state’s failure to protect all of its citizens; we must
theorize across scale, past the traditional boundaries of state sovereignty.

The concept of the failed state is only about 15 years old, and as previously
discussed is imprecise. In many ways we simply know the failed state when we
see it. For example, there was no question when we heard the testimonies of Tutsi
women detailing how they were gang raped by the Hutu militias, as they watched
their husbands being murdered, that the state had certainly failed its citizens.
When we saw the now infamous images of women in chador marched into a sports
stadium in Kabul and shot in the head by the Taliban, we would not question the
global community’s consensus that the Afghani state had failed. It is important to
state that it is not my intention to privilege the experiences of women in the United
States over women in other places in the world, rather my aim is to illustrate out
how the experiences of women in some locations are highlighted as a reason for
state failure, while in the other places, such as the United States, they are rendered
invisible to protect state sovereignty.

Having said that, Afghanistan, The Congo, Liberia, the former Yugoslavia,
have all been designated failed states or what Richard Falk calls the black holes of
caution us that failed states are far more numerous than we realize “but only few
ever will command our attention and become ‘seen on TV’, failed states”; such
as the mass murder in Rwanda, the famine in Somalia, and the Kurdish refugee
crisis after the Gulf War (Luke and Tuathail 1997: 711). My aim is to expand
on Luke and Tuathail’s discussion of failed states with the addition of feminist
understandings of scale and the body.

Illustrative of this would be how Captain Linda Bray captured the media’s
attention during “Operation Just Cause,” the 1989 action to capture Panamanian
President Manuel Noriega\(^3\). Bray, the commander of the 988 Military Police company in Panama, unexpectedly encountered enemy fire and found herself leading troops in combat when her unit was directed to seize a military dog kennel. She was later hailed as the first woman to lead troops in combat and thrust into the glare of the media attention. The initial blaze of media stories boasted of tales of her heroic actions, reporting that when her troops were pinned down by hostile fire, Bray led the charge by crashing through the kennel gates in a humvee (Copeland 1990, Ring 1990). Later these reports were deemed exaggerated (Broder 1990), and understated counter-narratives emerged claiming that Bray was not even present during the initial gunfire. Rather than questioning why military intelligence failed to spot that the dog kennel was in fact a heavily protected arms facility, the media attention triggered a fierce debate about whether she should have been there in the first place (Broder 1990).

Consequently, Bray found herself as the central figure in the question of the role of women in the US Military. Supporters of integrating women into combat groups, argued that Bray’s actions demonstrated that women are capable of full combat duty. US Representative Patricia Schroeder \(^4\) argued for rescinding the legislation that exempts women from combat, stating that the line between combat and non-combat is non-existent (Loy 2001). Opponents to the further integration of women in the military charged that the exaggerated accounts of Bray’s actions were part of a feminist assault to integrate women more fully into the military (Mitchell 1998). Phyllis Schlafly \(^5\), in an effort to limit the role of women in the military, seized the moment to argue the lesson to be learned from the use of women in the Panama invasion is that most of what we hear about the performance of women in the US Army is grossly exaggerated (Loy 2001).

The publicity given to Bray’s involvement in this firefight caused considerable resentment on the part of the fellow service members who did not feel that Bray’s simple carrying out of duty deserved to be singled out for special attention. The hostility directed toward her was so severe she finally resigned from the service (Francke 1997). Despite legislation, such as the “risk rule”, which bars women from combat, the military is often keen to publically acknowledge its liberal mindedness by showcasing the heroic feats of women in combat. However, despite

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\(^3\) Operation Just Cause was the codename for the 1989 invasion of Panama by the United States. The invasion was ordered by President George H.W. Bush in order to bring Panama’s President Manuel Noriega, a former key intelligence asset to the United States in the early 1960s, to trial in the United States for drug trafficking. Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990. He was taken to the US, tried, convicted and jailed on drug trafficking charges and is currently serving his 40-year sentence in Miami.

\(^4\) Schroeder was elected to Congress in 1972 representing Colorado. She became the first woman to serve on the House Armed Services Committee. She ran for President of the United States in 1988.

\(^5\) Schlafly is a lawyer and conservative political activists who over the years stood firmly against the feminist movement and the Equal Rights Amendment. Schlafly was an opponent of integration of women into the military, police forces and firefighting.
Reconstructing Conflict

the media’s attention, Bray had proven herself not only to be a fine soldier but a good commander, and yet she found herself in a paradoxical situation. If she had failed to capture the dog kennel then she would have become an iconic image on why women should not be allowed into the military. However violating the risk rule, and simply doing her job, she was ridiculed for the attention she received for “doing what the men do.” In fact, shortly after the battle she was reminded by commanding officers about her non-combat status as female soldier, inferring she had somehow acted inappropriately in terms of engaging in combat (Bray 2008). To this end she was chastised for her action, even though inaction would have resulted in the failure of her mission.

Operation Just Cause was controversial given the United States broke both international law and its own government policies by invading Panama. The original intent of this mission, to capture Manuel Noriega, was eclipsed by the public debates on the appropriate/ if any role, for women in the military. In doing the jobs they were trained for, Bray and the other women who were involved in the firefight became mythologized as a result of their gender. Feminist scholars have long questioned the reasons why gender roles become heightened during war? Rosemary Ridd (1987) investigated the relationship between the “power” of men and the “powerlessness” of women, and argued that such exaggerated representations become strategic weapons of war and suggests that national sovereignty is strengthened by demonstrations of solidarity especially when you have the presumably weaker members of your society fighting along side of you (Ridd 1987, Dowler 1998).

Although the state failed Bray in terms of the backlash that ensued for simply doing her job; the sovereignty of the nation-state remained secure because as long as the public was debating the role of women in the military they were not asking why Bray ended up securing an arsenal of weapons which included assault rifles, AK-47s, 9mm pistols, shot guns, grenades, and thousand of rounds of ammunition” in what was supposed to be a non-combat exercise (Miles 2008). Additionally having a woman at the helm of what was deemed a victorious mission reinforced the image of Panama as a failed state because even with so much firepower at their disposal, the Panamanian Forces were, nevertheless, defeated by a woman.

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6 The President did not consult with congressional leaders before his decision, although he did notify them shortly before the invasion. Congress had called for the President to intensify unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures and consult with other nations on ways to coordinate efforts to remove General Noriega from power. The Senate adopted an amendment supporting the President’s use of appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military options to restore a constitutional government to Panama however an amendment authorizing the President to use US military force to secure the removal of General Noriega had been defeated prior to the invasion (Grimmett 2004).
Unfortunately, almost 20 years later women’s bodies were still being debated in terms of their appropriateness for warfare. POW Jessica Lynch’s image was manipulated, in a similar way to Bray’s, to support state sovereignty, by mobilizing both soldiers and the American public to support an unpopular war. Illustrative of this was the intense media fervor around the experiences of Lynch in Iraq, who was first reported as a hero of war, standing against countless enemies holding them off with her M16. The Pentagon’s framing of Lynch detailed this small town blue-eyed, blond American gal, gallantly fighting as she defended her fellow soldiers. However, the question of why the Pentagon latched onto Jessica Lynch’s identity may run deeper than her middle-American appeal. Perhaps the Pentagon was concerned that the public would recognize that it was unfeasible for Lynch to have fired her weapon, as her M16 had jammed, as did many of the weapons assigned to her unit and in reality she had been knocked unconscious when her vehicle crashed. Upon her rescue she became the media’s damsel-in-distress who was rescued by her knights-in-shining-armor (Faludi 2007, Oliver 2007). Lynch found herself the object of Pentagon propaganda and reckless media reporting which was compounded by the public’s hunger to know if she was raped while she was a prisoner.

Lynch, who had been one of the first ordained heroes of this war, suddenly became a public enemy for wanting to set the record straight. When she testified before the United States House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (2007) she rebuked the Pentagon for erroneously manipulating her actions and portraying her as the “Rambo from West Virginia.” Jessica Lynch became a public relations nightmare for the Pentagon. Despite how much they tried to spin the story of her capture and rescue, she later testified to the lack of planning and training that led to her capture. After the above testimony she later explained (2003) to Diane Sawyer, “They were coming from everywhere…. we had vehicles getting stuck, vehicles running out of gas….our weapons were jamming.” When asked how they ended up separated from the rest of their unit, Lynch responded, “We weren’t thinking quickly. We were so tired, we were hungry… it was just a mistake.” Lynch also destabilized our notions of the enemy as cruel predators when she acknowledged, “No one beat me, no one slapped me, no one, nothing … I mean, I actually had one nurse, that she would sing to me” (Lynch 2003).

The framing of the Jessica Lynch story reveals interesting ways women’s bodies become weapons of war (Oliver 2007) or as Eisenstein (2007) would argue sexual decoys of war. As previously discussed, her capture coincided with the early days of an unpopular war, and surely would add to the escalating criticism of the invasion. The dual portrayal of Lynch as the warrior equipped for combat, as
well as the helpless victim needing rescue is illustrative of Robin Riley’s argument that depending on the needs of the state women’s bodies can be rendered, “visible, invisible or hyper-visible”. To this end Riley argues that the hyper-visual focus on women’s bodies allow the experiences of a some women to be “counted, battled over and controlled” while at the same time other views of women “recede such that constructions of femininity obscure the motivations of the militarized masculinity in providing ongoing means of justification, or in shaming the enemy most egregiously” (Riley 2008: 1193).

In a similar way to the hyper-visibility of Bray, the individuals who hailed Lynch as a hero while she was a POW quickly dismissed her as coward once the fable written by the Pentagon started to unfold. Although the Jessica Lynch story is an indictment of the United States government’s failure to supply adequate training and weapons to their soldiers, opponents of women in combat latched onto the story as yet another reason why women should not be put at risk. Like Bray, the hyper-visual image of Lynch aided in promoting a sense of patriotism in the United States. Her rescue demonstrated that the United States not only had military strength but was also a chivalrous nation who rescues their women from cruel predators like the Iraqi soldiers, who the media suggested beat and raped Lynch. To this end, the United States protected both Linda Bray and Jessica Lynch in that they were both assigned to non-combat roles. However what both of these cases affirm is that there is no “rear” where women can safely operate out of while male soldiers face battle in the front lines. As Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder argued in the case of Operation Just Cause, “Once you no longer have a definable front, it’s impossible to separate combat from noncombat. The women carried M-16s, not dog biscuits” (Time, 1990). In the next two sections of this chapter I will outline how women are indeed operating on the frontlines of war and are vulnerable to risk. However this risk is due to 1. a state failure to recognize women’s combat roles and 2. to acknowledge that women are far more vulnerable to attack from their fellow US soldiers than from enemy fire.

**Protecting Women Soldiers from External Risk?**

The DoD established the “Risk Rule” (1988) to allow the majority of women to volunteer for military service without being forced to serve in units operating in or near the frontlines. The Risk Rule states:

… risks of direct combat, exposure to hostile fire, or capture are proper criteria for closing non-combat positions or units to women, when the type, degree, and duration of such risk are equal to greater than the combat units with which they are normally associated within a given theater of operations. (CMR report 2003)

The risk rule allows the state to appear both liberal-minded in terms of allowing women to pursue military careers, while at the same time reinforcing patriarchal
views about the protection of women. The ruling supports stereotypical notions of women as “helpmates” to male warriors. In this way, both the bodies of women and men are constructed by the needs of the state to uphold a sense of national sovereignty (Yuval-Davis 1997, Nagel 1998, Young 2003). Most importantly, the risk rule not only presumes to limit the chance of women being injured or killed in combat it also limits the chances of women having to kill. For example, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Merrill A. McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, indicated that despite his belief that women are capable of flying combat aircraft, he would nonetheless choose a male pilot over a more qualified woman. Even though “logic tells us otherwise”, he explained, “I have a very traditional attitude about wives and mothers and daughters being ordered to kill people” (Abcarian 1992).

The current US Department of Defense (DOD) policy for assigning military women to non-combat roles was issued in 1994 after a hearing before the Military Forces and Personnel Subcommittee of Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives. At the time opponents to women in combat used three arguments: physical strength, unit cohesion, and societal norms. At the foundation of their argument were the following assumptions: that women are physically weaker than men and therefore standards would have to be lowered and unit effectiveness jeopardized; the presence of women in units leads to fraternization, sexual harassment, and sexual assault; women lose a disproportionate share of time due to pregnancy, which would undermine unit readiness; combat takes women away from their children thereby destabilizing family structures; the presence of women in combat units would adversely affect unit cohesion and undermine the moral of men who do not want to work with women (McSally 2007). What is striking about this framing is how these standards are based on the experiences of men’s bodies and it is assumed that women’s bodies will simply not measure up.

Martha McSally (2007), a Colonel, in the United States Air Force, acknowledges as a general norm men may be stronger than women. However, when examining physical strength in the military she asserts that many women have the strength for ground combat while many men in the military do not. It is critical that the very criteria that is utilized to restrict women from combat is not employed to determine if male recruits have the necessary physical strength before assigning them to ground combat positions. She argues “The double standard here is glaring: Male recruits are not disqualified from entering combat career fields for lack of physical strength, but all female recruits are peremptorily disqualified from such fields regardless of their physical strength” (McSally 2007: 1011).

In tandem with the Risk Rule one of the most effective and long-lived arguments for restricting women out of combat, as well as keeping gays out of the military has been unit cohesion, which promotes the dynamic of men in groups. This argument is based on the affective bonds that underlie military culture and promotes a primary group amongst members of the military. For a good length of time, unit cohesion or the strong emotional bonds between soldiers was argued to be a critical factor in combat motivation (McSally 2007). Recent comprehensive
reviews of the cohesion literature argue that it is important to distinguish between social cohesion and task cohesion (McSally 2007). Social cohesion refers to whether or not members of a unit like and more importantly trust each other while task cohesion refers to whether members share the same goals. Recent studies detail that the relationship between cohesion and performance was due primarily to commitment to task rather than interpersonal attraction or group pride. In other words, to the extent that there is a relationship between cohesion and performance, it is task cohesion—not social cohesion—that correlates with performance (McSally 2007).

This view of unit cohesion as an emotional bond has long saturated Hollywood depictions of war. We have all seen the now clichéd scene, whereby the hero, usually white and male, provoked by his rage when his friend steps on a landmine, runs through that very same landmine field while rushing the enemy and in the end wins the battle in memory of his fallen comrade. This of course is a ridiculous depiction of warfare that only serves to promote the image of the single predatory male warrior. Let me detail a different scenario of heroism in a field of landmines:

No one prepares women for where she is going to pee when she is on a convoy? I mean most of us girls just went right underneath our trailers and peed and told the guys to look the other way. I was convoy commander, I’d stopped the convoy cause we had a vehicle break down and we also had to pee. So we got out to pee, and this girl starts walking off my convoy, and I started yelling at her, what are you doing and you need to get your ass back here. What a scene she is yelling, “I need to pee.” I’m yelling I don’t care. You need to be right here. I will watch you, I will do whatever it takes. She yells back, “But I have my period.” And I’m still yelling, I don’t care. You are not walking out there. Do you realize there are landmines over there? What are you doing? She was new, so, you know, this was shocking to her. I’m yelling you could die because you need to go pee over there instead of peeing right here by my truck. I know she got miffed at me, but she could have died. Because women aren’t supposed to be in these dangerous situations, you know, no one talks about it. No one in basic training is going to say to her, you’re going to need to pee right by your truck. Nobody talks about it and it’s like, oh my God, where do you pee, where do you poop, where do you change your pad? Believe it or not this is a discussion that could save your life! (personal interview)

At first glance, two women talking about where to urinate while on convoy seems banal, however, even the everyday act of urination can put a woman’s life at risk. I doubt a narrative such as this would end up scripted for a Hollywood movie. However, this soldier’s account details how the state has failed to protect women soldiers as a result of viewing their bodies as out-of-place in the battlefield. To this
end, women are not trained in the simplest tasks, such as urinating in a safe place. More to the point, if the military recognizes that bodily functions such as urination could place women in harms way then the military would have to admit that they had failed to abide by its own legislation of not placing women at risk.

Furthermore, in 2006, Janis Karpinski, the former commander of Abu Ghraib prison, testified before *The International Commission of Inquiry for Crimes Against Humanity*, investigating the Bush administration. Karpinski stated the true cause of death for some female soldiers who served in Iraq had been covered up. She testified that the women had indeed died of dehydration, as the military had reported. However she charged that the military failed to disclose that women were dying of dehydration because they would not drink liquids late in the day. They avoided liquids due to their fear of being assaulted by male soldiers when they used outdoor bathrooms in the middle of the night (Leibovich 2006). It seems evident that a state has failed to protect its citizens when simple acts, such as urination during convoy or going to the latrine, become a marker for bravery.

Inherent within the group cohesion argument is the understanding that women are a distraction to men, not only sexually but as the assumed weak-link of their cohort who will be in need of protection. I argue that women are indeed a distraction to men in their units but not because they need to protect women from “the enemy” but from other men in their units. A now retired army colonel explained it in this way:

> When I was in training my drill instructor didn’t want me there. He told me that I was part of some feminist mission to destroy the army and he was determined for me to wash out. If we had to do 50 push-ups he would put his foot on my back and as I was coming up he would push down with all his weight. He would keep me there all day, I was probably doing hundreds of push-ups but none of them counted because I would collapse under the weight of his boot. When we would head back to the barracks a couple of the guys would come in and help me. I literally couldn’t lift my arms so I couldn’t get out of my clothes. They would help me out of my clothes; I would keep my T shirt and underpants on because I was very shy back then. They would help me in the shower, even shampoo my hair and put me to bed. In the morning they would come in and get me dressed. (personal interview)

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8 In the textbook *Military Preventive Medicine: Mobilization and Deployment, Volume 1*, a chapter titled “Health Care for Women in Mobilization and Deployment” made note of the increase in urinary tract infections, amongst deployed female soldiers from maintaining a full bladder in order to avoid urination. The study also observed an increase in dehydration amongst deployed women who drink less liquid to also avoid having to urinate. The study recommended that women deployed in combat areas employ such methods as using a urinary diversion device; wear a poncho when squatting outdoors to act as a privacy screen (Keep 2003).
For women soldiers the threats from within the ranks are often more destabilizing than any fear of the frontline.

The plight of women was highlighted as one of several reasons to go to war in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as was defense of the sovereign. In the early days that followed these operations, the media focused on the roles of women in the new military, illustrated by the 2003 cover story of *Time Magazine* with the caption “When Mom Goes to War” (*Time* 2003). Discussions tended to focus on disruption of the homefront as unprecedented numbers of women were deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently gender helped reinforce the sovereignty of the United States as the world theater witnessed the juxtaposition of the images of women in Afghanistan and Iraq under totalitarian regimes with those of the United States forces, including “moms”, fighting in solidarity against these oppressive regimes. However, the unit cohesion and risk ruling, marked the bodies of these very same women soldiers as out-of-place in the military.

In the next section of this chapter I argue that the United States, through the support of a hostile working environment for female soldiers, has created a situation whereby women are more vulnerable to internal threats than those of enemy fire. Ironically, legislations such as the risk rule and arguments of unit cohesion seem incongruous with the everyday lives of both male and female soldiers in combat areas. For example many male soldiers have to look out for the females in their units not to protect them for the enemy but to protect them from their fellow soldiers. From a strategic standpoint, the hostility expressed towards female soldiers is weakening the focus and cohesion of the military.

**Protecting Women Soldiers from Internal Risk?**

On Oct 6th, 1994 at the Congressional Hearing on the possibility of opening up ground combat positions to women, congressman Stephen Buyer asked if the American public is prepared “to see one of its daughters [as a female soldier] half naked dragged by a rope through the streets of a foreign capital, [sic.] after she is shot down delivering combat troops to a fire fight” (Buyer 1994: 4). Representative Buyer was referring to the highly publicized and gruesome photographs of two US soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu one year earlier. Although the images of the two US soldiers were tragic and one can only imagine their families’ grief when these images were made public, Rep. Buyer suggests that as a society we are capable of grappling with public images of brutal violence against men but not of women.

However, imagine the journey of the parents of Private LaVena Johnson, when after two and half years of a struggling with the US Army, by way of the freedom of public information act, were able to obtain copies of the army’s official documents regarding the death of their daughter. The US Army determined Johnson’s death, as a suicide from a self-inflicted M-16 shot after she was found dead on the military base in Balad, Iraq, in July 2005. The Johnsons found it hard
to believe that their daughter, who seemed happy and energetic about her military career, would take her own life. However Johnson’s father, a service veteran himself, became suspicious upon seeing the damage to his daughter’s body. When Private LaVena’s father viewed the crime scene photographs, he inspected images of his daughter who was small, about 5’ tall and 100 pounds. Some sort of blunt instrument, given she had a discernable broken nose and loose teeth, had clearly struck her face. The photographs of her naked body exposed bruises, scratch marks and teeth marks on the upper part of her body. The right side of her back and right hand had been burned from some sort of accelerant that had been poured on her body and then ignited. The photographs of their daughter’s genital area revealed substantial bruising, cuts and damage resulting from some sort of corrosive liquid being poured into her genital area (Zucchino 2009).

Perhaps Rep. Buyer is correct in thinking that the United States is not prepared to view images of this nature, which is most likely why shortly into the investigation, a decision was made by higher officials to close the homicide and to classify Johnson’s death a suicide. As a result, no further investigation took place into a possible homicide and Private Johnson’s death officially remains a suicide. Christopher Grey, a spokesman for the Army Criminal Investigation Command, called its investigation of the Johnson case complete. He commented the command is prepared to reopen any case in which new, credible information warranting further investigation is brought to their attention. The Johnson’s have speculated that the government has covered up the murder of their daughter because they fear it will hinder recruitment of women into the military (Zucchino 2009).

Shortly after LaVena’s death, in October 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) implemented the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR). The purpose of the program is to eliminate sexual assault within the Department of Defense. In 2008 SAPR released a report detailing sexual assault in the military that stated that in the year 2007 there were 2,688 reports of sexual assault involving Military Service members9. Rep. Jane Harman, D-California, stated, “We have an epidemic here, women serving in the US military today are more likely to be raped by a fellow solider than killed by enemy fire in Iraq” (Harman 2008). Rep. Harman, points to the ironic position of the US government which on one hand promotes combat exclusion rules as a presumed way of protecting their servicewomen from the frontlines of battle, while simultaneously ignoring the jeopardy these very same women are in from the male soldiers.

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9 This highly publicized report was based on unrestricted reporting, which limits a woman to reporting her rape through the chain of command which puts a woman in further jeopardy given the prevalence of “command rape” in the military and limits confidentially. The DOD has recommended the implementation of “restricted reporting” which is a confidential report that allows the victim to by-pass the chain of command and receive medical care, advocacy and counseling service without an investigation being initiated. It has been estimated up to this point in time that military may be under-reporting by half the number of rapes because of the nature of the reporting system.
However, as the DoD’s report suggests, our female soldiers are certainly at risk. In this way we frame the protection of our female soldiers though policies such as “the risk rule” but are not prepared to witness the private war of women soldiers (Benedict 2009). Benedict elaborates:

In the army, nearly 90% of rape victims are junior ranking women, average age 21, while most of the assailants are noncommissioned officers or junior men, average age 28. Women soldiers have been punched, knocked unconscious, slashed with knives and threatened with guns by solider rapists. (Bendict 2009: 6)

As one National Guard officer who was stationed in Iraq elaborates on the constant sexual harassment:

Most of the military sexual trauma happens with your own peers. The rapes were happening all the time. I mean when you look at sexuality in itself, um, nothing is sacred in I got propositioned every single day. And it wasn’t, “Hey, baby, how you doing”, it was “do you want to fuck” and this would come from men who reported to me. My councilor would ask me “Well, why didn’t you nail them?” Okay, if I go to the Commander and I tell him, I’m getting sexually harassed from this guy, whom are they going to move, him or me? More than likely it’s going to be me that gets moved, because I’m the one who has the problem with it and couldn’t keep him under control. You know, I had one of the guys say, “Why didn’t you discipline him?” How am I going to explain when somebody asks, “why does he have extra duty and why is he doing this?” Because he sexually harassed me! That ain’t gonna help me. I looked at him and said, not in your lifetime. My rank is worth much more to me than his and I would be the one to lose the rank. He ain’t worth it to me. (personal interview)

Surveys of female veterans serving up to the time of Gulf War stated that 90% had been sexually harassed (Benedict 2009: 7). Despite the increase in the number of women in the military it is still an isolating experience. In Iraq, women still only make up one in ten troops, and often serve in platoons with few other women or none at all. Benedict argues that this isolation, along with the military’s traditional and deep-seated hostility toward women, can cause problems that many female soldiers find as hard to cope with as war itself; degradation and sexual persecution by their comrades, and loneliness instead of the camaraderie that every soldier depends on for comfort and survival (Benedict 2009).

Conclusion

I opened this chapter by arguing a feminist analysis is a necessary approach to understanding how the spaces of pre-war, and post-war reconstructions are linked
in ways that reproduce the masculine hegemony of the state. My incorporation of the concept of the failed state was not to critique the theory for its lack of understanding of more diverse forms of social-organizations. There a several scholars who skillfully dispute this designation and argue in favor of an international legal order that values numerous and different forms of social organizations (Luke and O’Tuathail 1997, Erenreich Brooks 2005). Instead, I argue that the plight of women in the armed services demonstrates that the United States has failed to recognize other forms of social order within it’s own state structures. In other words the United States is in a “state of failure” regarding the role of women in the United States Military (Erenreich Brooks 2005: 1159).

Although, an understanding of the US failure to protect female soldiers is of critical importance in its own right; I argue that this particular case is part of a larger process of gender sovereignty. This is important to post-war reconstruction because war has always been gendered and this has resulted in the development of a strategy of war whereby, the selection of men as potential combatants and women for feminized war support roles has helped shape the war system. In turn Goldstein argues (2001) the pervasiveness of war in history has influenced gender profoundly in general society.

More broadly, the bodies of women soldiers are being utilized as weapons of war, however, this war is not on a battlefield, it is between those who advocate that women should be fully integrated into the armed services and those who want to see women restricted from combat or vacate the military entirely. However, what is clear is that the government’s no risk rules places women in harms way. Women are finding themselves in combat situations and they are not receiving adequate training because technically they are non-combatants. Additionally, women soldiers are under the constant pressure of sexual harassment and one can only surmise that the statistics pointing to noteworthy levels of this crime against female soldiers are minimal given the difficulties of reporting rape in the military (Benedict 2009).

As discussed, feminists have long argued that one of the by-products of militarization is the establishment of gender norms not only in militarized spaces, such as the battlefield, but in the quotidian spaces of our communities. This type of disciplining of gender roles also functions across scale and if the sovereignty or failures of states are in part defined by the visibility of some women experiences over others, than any future understanding of a democratic form of international relations would surely be out-of-reach.

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The central themes of this book have been the identification of the false dichotomy of war and peace, the social construction of “post-conflict” spaces as embodiments of power relations, and the ways in which these spaces both reflect and reproduce hegemonic power relations. Furthermore, the chapters have highlighted the ways in which everyday practices of power and violence in what are deemed spaces of peace, reconstruction, and “post-conflict” are very much related to practices of war. Each of the chapters has made a particular contribution to illuminating these themes, developing our understanding of them, and offering ideas for further research. In this brief conclusion, we do not re-hash these themes, as they were presented in the introduction. Instead, some of the insights generated by the chapters are identified and briefly discussed before, in an inference designed to provoke further avenues of research, the moral and political imperatives of the “re” in post-war reconstruction are briefly explored.

Consistent Themes in the Geographic Investigation of Post-war Reconstruction

As a collection the chapters illustrate a number of ways in which geographic and critical geopolitical approaches can inform our understanding of post-war reconstruction. Some of these contributions rest on the traditional strengths of geography, while others resonate with broader critical themes that can be found across the social sciences and humanities. The purpose of identifying these themes is to illustrate a sense of a common approach that offers coherence to geographers’ work on the topic of post-war reconstruction while also suggesting a loose framework for continued research.

The Production of Place

The social construction of place has, in different theoretical manifestations, been at the heart of the discipline of human geography. By focusing upon post-war reconstruction as a contested process that is grounded in particular geographic settings geographers are able to bring a place-specific focus to the understanding of post-war reconstruction as well as to add the particular politics of war-peace transitions and legacies to our knowledge of how places are made and re-made.
The concentration upon the intersection of war and peace poses a troubling, but perhaps intellectually fertile, fusion of the idea of place annihilation (Hewitt 1983; Graham 2004) and a progressive sense of place (Massey 1993). The dynamism, porosity, and inter-connectedness of places that Massey advertised as a pathway towards peace also make places portals for the diffusion of processes of violence and destruction. By breaking down the false dichotomy of war and peace, the ways that progressive places may become arenas of violence can become an important focus for research, with consideration to be given to the role of inter-connectivity, agency, and scale in facilitating these dynamics.

The Politics of Scale

A focus on inter-connectivity of places is related to the need to examine the politics of post-war reconstruction in a manner which integrates geographic scale with horizontal connections (Leitner et al. 2008; Marston et al. 2005). The result, illustrated within this volume, is a geography of war and post-war reconstruction that considers the multiple spatialities of the actors and contexts driving and being created by the political geographic processes at work. For example, the global reach of the US military or the rhetoric and practice of neo-liberalism are inseparable from the decisions made by actors within particular settings regarding the form of institutions to be built and the nature of political participation. The political construction of places, in a post-war context, necessarily requires the construction of political linkages that span beyond the place. The diffusion of basing rights in the wake of warfare in places such as Okinawa reveal with complexity the differential impacts of militarism as they are experienced locally as part of a regional and global geopolitical strategy. A scalar sensibility, that sees the fusion of the local to global (Swyngedouw 1997) and the role of the political construction of scale (Cox 1997) helps in making sense of the ways that ostensibly distinct zones of war and peace may be interconnected through political, economic, and social processes occurring over larger spatial scales, including, of course, that of the planet.

Geopolitical Rhetoric and Practice

The contribution of critical geopolitics in focusing upon the rhetorical construction of geopolitical imaginations should also be connected to the way in which rhetoric is one tool in the social construction of places and in the shaping of spatial relationships. The prosecution of warfare and post-war reconstruction are social practices that are legitimated, and contested, through the construction of Gramscian common-sense understandings of what is necessary, proper, and just. In turn, the political nature of post-war reconstruction leads to the identification of the way counter-hegemonic narratives facilitate practices that challenge the establishment of new power relations. The ways that war and peace are configured in biographical narratives, framed as objects of intervention (or not) by international NGOs, or represented by state actors, shape the geographical conditions under
which war is waged, whether as “wars of reconstruction” or “war by other means.” Such Gramscian logics also extend beyond the conventional spaces of war and military power—and beyond conventional spheres of geopolitics—to places, such as California’s agricultural landscape, wherein war can be used to mobilize the conditions of “emergency” that enable new waves of capital accumulation.

The Role of Knowledge Production

The integral role of geopolitical rhetoric in the politics of post-war reconstruction leads to an identification of the way in which knowledge is produced and reproduced. Knowledge is produced formally, such as the discipline of geography’s formal involvement in intelligence collection or, rather differently, in Pol Pot’s second grade political geography textbook. Other actors include the media, for example in highlighting the post-tsunami context as a crisis while largely ignoring a related war. Also, everyday practices of social domination and marginalization, such as patriarchy and racism, which underlie practices of warfare and, in most cases, post-war reconstruction are maintained by taken for granted labeling and attitudes. This book too is an exercise in knowledge production, but it is intended, instead, to challenge such common sense labels, attitudes, and “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977; Mitchell 2000). How such critical knowledge of the twin processes of war and peace, and of the complex geographies of reconstruction, can have any real effect is a question that may, at present, have few clear answers, but it is one that nonetheless we cannot shrink from asking.

Imperialism

The contemporary attention to transnationalism in the social sciences requires consideration of the persistence of empire or imperialism in world politics, and the role of post-war reconstruction in imperial projects. The historic cases discussed in this volume, especially the Philippines and Japan, mesh with discussions of contemporary events in Iraq to show a continual attempt to project militarized power into political spaces that are ostensibly foreign and sovereign. Post-war reconstruction has been a powerful means to facilitate such imperialist or transnational reach, but so has the diffusion of democracy, the seeming antithesis of empire, in the aftermath of imperial warfare. New models of breaking and remaking the state—democracy as imperial gift—in some ways reflect this continuity while also reproducing an imperial geopolitics of occupation that remain largely unwinnable by military means. These processes are particularly well-informed by a geographic approach that connects place-specific practices to broader processes and agendas.

This framework, while by no means comprehensive, has been effective throughout the book, in combinations of its elements, in exposing the false dichotomy of war and peace. Now, as a final thought, future research can be provoked, perhaps, through problematizing another aspect of post-war
reconstruction; the tension between restoration and inception of new place-specific politics at a moment of transition from war to peace.

Do we Really Mean “Re” in Post-war Reconstruction?

The false dichotomy of war and post-war reconstruction has exposed the fusion of different forms of violence in the constant process of making, destroying, and re-making places. The role of annihilation of an enemy’s forces has been a long-standing axiom of what has become known as the Clausewitzian Western way of war. Though the coherence and continued meaning of a Western way of warfare is now being challenged (Black 2010), with the identification of war as a new and complex measure of state and non-state, and criminal and political activities (Kaldor 1999), the practice of destruction and total annihilation in warfare remains. Hewitt (1983) made a significant contribution to our understanding of the geography of war by highlighting the role of place annihilation in warfare. Rather than identifying purely military targets in areas apparently distanced from civilians, as a romantic view of the Clausewitz’s strategy may imply, warfare has, since World War I, increasingly become about the destruction of places of habitation and the people within them. Hewitt’s article on the bombing of German and Japanese cities in World War II identified the destruction of human habitat that was the focus of strategic bombing strategies and seeded the development of nuclear weapons strategies. Hewitt’s work anticipated other studies of urbanism and bombing, including Stephen Graham’s (2004) focus on the urban geography of war. Graham’s (2004: 25) use of the term urbicide—“the deliberate denial, or killing, of the city”—illustrates the ongoing focus of conflict in urban settings and the role of warfare in destroying not just landscapes and lives, but also the cultural constructs that are given physical presence in places.

Hewitt was very much interested in the destruction of place-specific culture in his analysis of war, but he also concluded by discussing the resiliency of human beings and their ability to rebuild places that had been physically annihilated by war. On the one hand is a technocratic functional approach that sees reconstruction as an opportunity to rebuild in a more modern and rational fashion (Hewitt 1983: 277). On the other hand, Hewitt concludes his essay by emphasizing the geographic tradition of studying human communities, of where and how people live; pointing to the need for place-based research on the actual lived experience of people during and after conflict. The notion of reconstruction is tackled head-on by Hewitt (1983: 278):

the tenacious if pathetic resumption of life amid the rubble and “killing ground” of their cities by bombed-out survivors seems more fully to measure our topic and its tragedy than all the statistics of what was lost or the prodigious reconstructions of the “new” Germany or Japan. And what better description of their activities than as “place-making”?
Conclusion

The intriguing point is that the term used is place-making rather than reconstruction. The former does not imply any sense of finding or restoring past political and social relations, while the latter does.

The politics of reconstruction has been addressed in other literatures. For example, ecologists have pondered the appropriateness of the rhetoric and practice of “restoration.” The debates are illuminating for our own consideration of post-war reconstruction in a number of ways. First, the debate over preservation versus restoration has, at its heart, a question of human agency (Baldwin et al. 1994). Preservationists tend to see a more pristine view of nature in which humans are viewed as an invasive species, while restorationists see nature as an evolutionary process in which humans, as an evolving species, are directly implicated. The lesson to take from this point is that “places” of war and post-war are dynamic socially constructed entities, and part of that construction is the way they are framed and analyzed by academics. Secondly, another key question is whether nature is something that can be preserved or returned to an apparent pristine condition or whether the goal is to accommodate sustainable change (Baldwin et al. 1994). In relation to post-war reconstruction, the challenge is to recognize that a sustainable peace requires a new set of place-specific social relations, but with the legacy of recent armed conflict. The implication is that ecological restoration is a political process that is constrained by overarching contexts of social rules and norms (Light and Higgs 1996). Meshing these ideas with our concerns, the politics of post-war reconstruction is then a matter of a nested politics of change within places that are partially framed by, or resistant to, dominant political agendas. As discussed in the introduction, a global neo-liberal agenda has permeated ideas and rules of “best practice” in post-war reconstruction in diverse places (Robinson 2003).

These debates dovetail with discussion of place within geography. Most notably is Massey’s (1993) call for a progressive sense of place, rather than reactionary views of place as repositories of idealized social relations. However, the twin concerns of “place-making,” to recall Hewitt (1983), after a period of war, and the recognition that social relations and the places that frame them are dynamic are brought into focus when it is realized that these very same social relations are likely part of the wars’ causes. To re-build is, then, an invitation to restore social injustices and conflicts that are likely to provoke another bout of war. However, “place-making” is unlikely to be a utopian project given that the war produced political winners and losers. Instead, the choice to make a place rather than reconstruct is fraught with power relations regarding what is built, how, and for whom. For critical geographers with an agenda of seeking a just and peaceful society, the politics of reconstruction or a new round of “place-making” require an intervention into place-based politics that must be aware of the rights of losers and winners, whatever their past, and of the inherent dangers of reconstruction. Hence, a critical geography of post-war reconstruction is a complex moral intervention.
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